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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to investigate the main weaknesses of the banking sector in 
Montenegro and, more generally, in Central and Eastern Europe. By contributing to the 
understanding of banking sector fragility, we seek to help regulatory authorities craft more 
effective regulations and policy interventions in order to minimize the costs that could arise 
from banking instability. The review of previous research suggests that an increase in the 
incidence of non-performing loans indicates increasing fragility of the banking sector and/or 
the lack of efficient banking supervision. Thus, the ratio of non-performing loans is taken as 
the key indicator of banking vulnerability. To examine the determinants of non-performing 
loans we use data at the individual bank level. We investigate whether in these countries the 
ratio of non-performing loans is driven predominantly by macroeconomic developments (i.e. 
similar factors to those recognized in the theory of financial crises) or by transition-specific 
factors, such as inadequate risk-assessments, the high risk appetite of banks’ management and 
the high concentration in the banking sector. This empirical analysis initially focuses on the 
sensitivity of the ratio of non-performing loans to macroeconomic and bank-specific factors in 
Montenegro. Subsequently, the analysis is extended to Central and East European countries. 
Bearing in mind the large presence of foreign banks in these countries, a particular feature of 
this analysis is that non-performing loans are modelled to capture differences between banks 
based on ownership structure. In order to account for time persistence in the structure of non-
performing loans, a dynamic panel approach is used. However, in the Montenegrin model, 
given that the lack of cross sectional units precludes GMM Estimators, we investigate the use 
of FE estimation adjusted to take account of dynamic misspecification. The empirical findings 
suggest that strong performance in the real economy results in a lower ratio of non-
performing loans but there is also a significant positive effect of past rapid loans growth in the 
second year after the end of the credit boom. The latter finding suggests that aggressive 
lending coincides with more reckless risk taking. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests 
that some bank-specific features, which reflect banks’ management policies, affect the 
evolution of non-performing loans. The multi-national study suggests that foreign banks are 
likely to have lower ratios of non-performing loans. Based on our findings, regulatory 
authorities should expand their monitoring framework to include both macroeconomic and 
bank-specific indicators when assessing the stability of the banking system. In addition, 
regulators should be more concerned about any loosening of bank lending criteria in an 
upturn, since our results suggest a delayed effect of loans growth on the incidence of non-
performing loans. 
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CHAPTER 1: Recent Economic Development in Montenegro 
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1.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 32 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This Chapter provides an assessment of the main characteristics and developments of the 
Montenegrin banking sector, which are important for the analysis of the stability of the 
banking sector in Montenegro. The stock and money markets are still in their infancy, thus 
the banking sector has a dominant role in the financial system in Montenegro. Banks are the 
primary source of funding for all sectors of the economy. The banking sector is mostly 
foreign owned. It is frequently argued that a stable and efficient banking sector helps to 
accelerate economic growth. Banking stability in Montenegro is necessary not only to 
promote internal stability but also to attract the inflow of the foreign direct investment and 
the development of small and medium enterprises necessary for the convergence to the EU’s 
level of per capita GDP. Given the nature of the empirical analysis undertaken in the research 
programme reported in this thesis, the emphasis in this Chapter is on developments from 
2004 to 2010, though more recent data is utilised when available. 
The Chapter starts with a review of macroeconomic indicators of the Montenegrin economy 
(Section 1.2) followed by an analysis of the conditions in the money market (Section 1.3). 
Section 1.4 focuses on the banking sector, examining the degree of concentration and 
competition, the structure of banks’ assets and liabilities, and their exposures to credit, 
liquidity and market risk. Section 1.5 analyses the role of the Montenegrin Central Bank and 
its influence on the Montenegrin economy. Section 1.6 examines the need for a stable 
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banking system in Montenegro, while in Section 1.7 an initial comparison is made with 
banking sector developments elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the Chapter 
concludes with section 1.8, which explains the main objectives of this research programme.  
1.2 The Montenegrin Macroeconomic Environment1 
Montenegro is a small and open economy. After a relatively low GDP growth rate in the first 
years of this millennium, during the three-year pre-crisis period Montenegro saw a 
remarkably accelerated economic growth with the average rate amounting to 8.7 per cent.  
The main factors that contributed to this rapid economic growth were: the introduction of the 
euro as official currency, privatization, trade liberalization and tax reform, the large inflows 
of foreign direct investment and the stable management of public finance. For example, in  
2007 real GDP growth reached 10.7 per cent, the unemployment rate dropped to about 11 per 
cent, while average earnings increased by 30 per cent. In the same year, public spending 
accounted for 47 per cent of GDP, though the budget had a surplus of 6 per cent of GDP. In 
the same year, public debt was only about 27 per cent of GDP while the internal debt was 
about 14 per cent of GDP. 
Table 1.1 Main macroeconomic indicators for Montenegro from 2004 to 2012 
Source: Monstat database and Central Bank of Montenegro 
However, the crisis induced a decline in economic activity and the deterioration of almost 
every macroeconomic indicator. Industry is one of the branches which was most severely hit 
                                                          
1 All data are provided by Statistical Office of Montenegro - MONSTAT and the Central Bank of Montenegro 
(CBM). 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Growth rate 
(%) 
4.4 4.2 8.6 10.7 7.5 -5.7 2.5 3.2 -2.5 
Inflation rate 
(%) 
2.2 2.4 2.8 7.7 6.9 1.5 0.7 2.8 5.1 
FDI Inflows 
(in thousand of 
Euro) 
54,741 383,000 644,000 1,057,229 847,316 1,224,000 652,836 494,741 633,694 
FDI Outflows 
(in thousand   
of Euro) 
2,931 8,300 178,000 489,447 265,363 157,503 100,728 105,636 172,104 
Net FDIs (in 
thousand of 
Euro) 
51,810 374,700 466,000 567,782 581,952 1,066,497 552,107 389,104 461,590 
Current 
account 
deficit (% of 
GDP) 
-9.7 -9.1 31.1 -37.9 -47.7 -25.4 -20.0 -18.7 -14.7 
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by the crisis. The crisis strongly hit the Montenegrin metal industry as well as the related 
mining industry. In addition to the inherited problems, these branches have faced increasing 
problems in placing their products in international markets. 
The crisis adjustment became apparent in the behaviour of inflation which reached its record 
low 0.7 per cent in 2010. Namely, over the three-year pre-crisis period the inflation rate 
averaged almost 6 per cent, in part reflecting the high rates of economic growth. The global 
financial crisis induced a decrease in aggregate demand, both national and international, 
resulting in low rates of inflation worldwide. Substantial monetary and fiscal stimuli used 
globally to combat recession inevitably have affected Montenegro, so in the post-crisis period 
inflation in Montenegro was a result of price rises in energy and food products which 
Montenegro mainly imported. The inflation rate in 2006 amounted to less than 3 per cent, 
though in 2007 it increased to 7.7 per cent (see Table 1.1). 
In 2007, Montenegro had a very high balance of payments deficit (44 per cent of GDP), 
which was a consequence of the faster growth in expenditure on imports compared to income 
from exports in the trade balance. The main causes of that large deficit in the trade balance 
were: accelerated economic growth and increased foreign direct investment; and, in import-
dependent activities, increased openness together with weak competitive ability of the 
domestic economy (CBM, 2008). Namely, the accelerated economic growth meant higher 
FDIs, and higher FDIs stimulated a higher import of goods. The latter is explained by the fact 
that the most FDIs have been in tourism and real estate (construction), and those sectors 
required large imports of goods for their further development. 
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Source: CBM database  
Figure 1.1 Capital and financial account in Montenegro from 2007 to 2012 
 
Furthermore, as shown in the Figure 1.1  in the 2007-2012 period the capital and financial 
account recorded net inflows as a result of net inflows of foreign direct investment sub-
accounts. The portfolio sub-account recorded net outflows in all years except in 2010 and 
2011, while the other investment sub-account recorded net outflows from 2009. Owing to 
euroization, the high level of external debt and large debt service requirements Montenegro is 
vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and this requires the CBM to pursue a more 
prudent policy. Furthermore, given that Montenegro is a small country, even a relatively 
small shock may have a large impact on the economy. Thus, the CBM should enforce 
prudential norms, requiring sound capital buffers and take appropriate supervisory measures 
with problem banks. Bearing in mind the decline in the capital inflows and a large fall in 
external and domestic demand, significant external adjustment took place. Namely, the 
current account deficit was reduced by half between 2008 and 2010, even though imports 
contracted. However, in 2010 the capital account deficit was high at about 26 percent of 
GDP, as exports and tourism hardly recovered.  
During 2006–2010, net FDI financed on average 70 per cent of the current account deficit, 
excluding the one-off inflows from the recapitalization and partial privatization of 
Montenegro’s power utility in 2009. Access to capital was retained through foreign banks’ 
increased financial support to their Montenegrin subsidiaries, which contributed to a rise in 
external debt. In terms of the share of FDIs in gross domestic product, which reached almost 
25 per cent, Montenegro had the highest FDIs inflows in the region in 2007. Those FDIs have 
been concentrated in the growth-enhancing sectors of the economy. Factors which might 
have contributed to that high foreign direct investment inflows included privatization, the 
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introduction of VAT at rates from 17 per cent (that was lower than in other countries of the 
region), low taxes on profits at only 9 per cent and reductions in other barriers to business. 
Those were all factors that made FDIs in Montenegro more attractive.  
In 2008 the net inflow of foreign direct investment (inflow minus outflow) increased by about 
8 per cent compared to the previous year, while the total FDI inflows in 2008 decreased by 
about 20 per cent compared to 2007, of which 99 per cent related to non-residents investing 
in Montenegro and 1 per cent concerned the withdrawal of assets invested abroad. Outflow of 
the foreign direct investment in 2008 was also reduced by 45 per cent compared to the 
previous year. Looking at the structure of the outflow, 63 per cent were related to real estate 
while the withdrawal of foreign equity shares in domestic banks and companies amounted for 
10 per cent. In that period, investments of residents of Montenegro in the banks and 
companies were reduced and they participated in total outflow of FDI with 19 per cent. The 
remaining 8 per cent of total outflow of FDI was dedicated to the reduction in inter-company 
debt and the withdrawal of share capital invested in another domestic company. Net FDIs 
were increasing until 2010, when they fell by 48 per cent (see Table 1.1). Even though net 
FDIs had a drastic fall, there had been still a significant FDIs inflow considering that there 
were no major privatisations in 2010.  
Analysing the structure of inflows by country of origin in 2008, inflows from the EU 
countries was 53.8 per cent of the total (the largest shares being from Cyprus
2
 about 15.5 per 
cent and the UK about 8.3 per cent), while the largest investments from other countries come 
from the Russian Federation (15.1 per cent), Switzerland (7.9 per cent) and Serbia (5.2 per 
cent).  
                                                          
2 Much of these inflows were suspected of being of Russian origin. 
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.2 Structure of FDI inflows into Montenegro from 2008 to 2012 
 
The structure of FDIs has improved a little from 2008. While investment in real estate has 
declined from 49%  to 36% of total FDI,  investment in companies and banks is more or less 
stabile (36% in 2007 and 34% in 2012). The decline of real estate in 2008 and 2009, was 
partly due to the smaller number of buyers from abroad, reduced supply of credit funds as a 
result of the crisis, and partly about the difficulties of registering land that emerged at the 
beginning of 2008. In addition, in 2008 foreign investments in local companies and banks 
amounted to 31 per cent less than the previous year. More diversified FDI has been noticed in 
2010 and in later years. According to the CBM (2010) although Montenegro has not used all 
its potential to attract FDI, a new model of growth is required. The future development 
should be based on performance and competitiveness growth, international presence, and the 
further development of creativity and entrepreneurship.  
The specificities of Montenegro, as small and open economy, indicate a large and volatile 
current account. For example, if any big project requires import of goods not locally 
produced, that may be quickly reflected in a build-up of current account deficits. The current 
account in the post-crisis period is lower than in the period before the crisis (see Table 1.1). 
However, this improvement in the balance of payments is not primarily the result of better 
competitiveness of the Montenegrin economy, but is rather due to global crisis and reduced 
domestic demand. According to the CBM (2010), the issue of competitiveness of the 
Montenegrin products in international market, both regarding their price and quality, remains 
a key problem that the economy will have to face in the future and require additional efforts 
to reduce the current account deficit.    
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Given that from 2008 the fiscal deficit increased, a fiscal adjustment has been necessary, in 
order to ensure macroeconomic stability. With the decrease of GDP of about five per cent in 
2009, the fiscal deficit increased rapidly. In addition, fiscal revenues declined, mainly 
because of non-payment of taxes and the liquidity problems of mainly state owned 
companies. The end of the expansion phase turned budget surpluses into significant deficits, 
resulting in a rise in public debt, with the Government issuing Eurobonds to finance their 
needs. Altogether, reflecting also the Government's support for the restructuring of large 
enterprises in the real sector, public debt increased to 51 per cent of GDP by the end of 2012. 
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.3 Public debts as a percentage of real GDP in Montenegro from 2006 to 2012 
 
Delayed and slowly progressing structural reforms in the public sector, which started before 
the global financial crisis and have not yet been completed, have contributed to the rising 
share of public spending in GDP. This may be justified in the short term, because the supply 
side is not yet generating the growth and corresponding tax revenue to cover government 
spending. Conversely, high government spending is being used to offset the still lacklustre 
performance of the private sector. If the public sector debt is to be sustainable, then in the 
long run it may be necessary to stimulate the competitiveness of the economy by 
strengthening the supply side, in particular export capabilities. 
Overall, the macroeconomic indicators show that Montenegro in the pre-crisis years achieved 
macroeconomic stability and rapid economic growth. That was particularly important given 
the recent political turbulence in the region (the war in former Yugoslavia, hyperinflation and 
economic sanctions). Comprehensive reforms and macroeconomic stability enabled the 
signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU and the application for EU 
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membership. With the highest per capita FDI in Europe and the diversified origin of that FDI, 
Montenegro has relied and will continue to rely on FDI as a major source of growth. 
Specifically, foreign investors have been interested in the implementation of capital projects 
in infrastructure (highway) and energy (only 18 per cent of hydropower potential has been 
utilized) and major tourist projects on the Adriatic coast. However, as stated by Montenegrin 
Foreign Investors Council (MFIC) (2013), Montenegro should continue to reduce barriers to 
business, particularly in terms of faster decision-making at the state and local levels, which 
are necessary for the implementation of development projects. At the same time, it is 
necessary to encourage the diversification of the economic structure through an increase in 
small and medium enterprises and to continue strengthening their competitive abilities 
(Ivanovic et al., 2010). 
1.3 The Montenegrin Money Market  
The money market in Montenegro is in the early stages of development. The Montenegrin 
money market is characterized by a limited, or more precisely a scarce, choice of instruments 
and a relatively modest circle of market participants. There are several reasons for the slow 
development of this market.  Until recently there was no adequate regulation of this market. 
In addition full euroization meant that the central bank has no transmission function. 
Additional reasons for the slow development of money markets were initially a very low and 
later high liquidity of banks, as well as the overall low level of liquidity in the Montenegrin 
economy. In a period of growth in banks' liquidity, the need for the issuance of their 
securities did not exist. However, in that period, the banks began to appear as the most 
important customers of short-term bills issued by Ministry of Finance to cover budget 
illiquidity.   
In Montenegro the most widespread instruments in the money market are short-term treasury 
bills, which do not have a secondary market, bank guarantees and bilateral bank loans. The 
Central Bank of Montenegro, as the fiscal agent of the Ministry of Finance, organizes 
auctions of treasury bills with maturity 28, 56, 91 and 182 days. The Central Bank of 
Montenegro in this process has just a technical role, and receives funding for these 
operations. It publishes information on the amount of sales and the achieved average 
weighted interest rate. All finance raised from these auctions goes to the Ministry of Finance 
and the independence of the Central Bank is not jeopardised by this role. The participants in 
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the primary market of treasury short-term bills in Montenegro are: the Government (as the 
issuer), the Central Bank (as the fiscal agent) and, as the purchasers,  banks, institutional 
investors (mostly insurance companies, stock exchanges, brokers and dealers), entities 
outside of the financial sector, as well as individuals.  
Although there are inter-bank loans, they are made without an organized market, i.e. by 
agreement between the interested banks. Tradable deposit certificates and repurchase 
agreements as money market instruments did not exist until 2008, because of the high 
liquidity of banks. The Bank`s Law (2008) allowed banks to use these instruments based on 
the collateral of treasury bills with the Central Bank (repo transactions). Bank guarantees, 
although they exist in the form of guaranteeing the payment obligations of debtor, are not the 
subject of trading, and their possessor in case of an increased need for cash cannot sell them 
in a secondary market. 
1.4 The Banking System 
1.4.1 Number of Banks, Competition and Concentration of Banks 
The Montenegrin banking sector is dominated by foreign banks. Namely, of the eleven banks 
which operate in Montenegro, nine of them are mainly foreign owned. Foreign-owned banks 
have around 90 per cent of total banking sector assets. Montenegrin banks have focused on 
the domestic market having little or no direct exposure to foreign markets. The degree of 
concentration in the Montenegrin banking system is very high (Table 1.2). At the end of 
2010, one bank had a leading position with regard to all parameters, while the three largest 
banks accounted for 57 per cent of total assets and 56 per cent of deposits.  
Table 1.2 Concentration ratio of the banking sector in Montenegro, end 2010 
 Assets Loans Deposits Capital 
1 bank 24.39 22.09 31.66 15.48 
3 banks 57.39 58.26 56.18 41.90 
5 banks 76.87 78.33 77.13 58.45 
7 banks 91.21 97.98 91.82 75.66 
Source: CBM database 
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From 2004 to 2007, the Montenegrin banking sector expanded rapidly. The rapid growth was 
driven by the entry of foreign banks, along with increased domestic demand, particularly in 
the real estate sector (CBM, 2011). As outlined by Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), the 
presence of foreign banks may be beneficial for consumers by offering superior products and 
services, for the financial industry by increasing the quality of services and finally, for the 
economy by increasing efficiency. However, there may be some costs associated with the 
entry of foreign banks. Hellmann et al. (2000) reveal that in order to maintain or increase 
their market share foreign banks are inclined towards higher risk activities. These issues will 
be analysed further in Chapter 6. However, due to the overheated domestic demand and the 
impact of the global financial crisis the expansion of the banking sector halted in late 2008.   
1.4.2 Structure of Assets and Liabilities 
The impressive growth in the Montenegrin banking sector in the pre-crisis period, resulted in 
an increasing share of total banking sector assets in gross domestic product (GDP) from 26.6 
per cent in 2004 to 111 per cent  in 2007. Due to the influence of global financial crisis and 
restrictions on the credit activities of the banking sector, asset growth slowed down in 2008, 
increasing by 11 per cent. The asset growth stopped in 2009, declining by 8 per cent and 
further by 3 per cent in 2010. This decline continued until 2012.  
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.4 a) Total banking sector assets/ GDP (%) b) Annual growth of assets (%) in the 
period 2004-2012 
 
In the structure of total banking sector assets cash and cash equivalents (which include banks 
deposits at CBM and at other institutions abroad) and total outstanding loans are the most 
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important elements. From 2004 to 2008, their share in total assets constantly increased.  
However, the fall in the share of cash and cash equivalents in total banking sector assets 
became particularly worrying in 2008, pointing to the problems in the reduction of total 
deposits and difficulties related to the non-payment of outstanding credit claims. 
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.5 Structure of total assets in the period 2004-2012 
 
The expansion of the banking assets was based on the extremely high rate of credit growth, 
which was one of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe. Namely, in 2006 and 2007 
extremely high rates of credit growth (125 per cent and 165 per cent, respectively) were a 
significant factor assisting the development of the real sector. However, such high growth 
rates in loans were not accompanied by adequate growth rates in provisions and capital, so 
that the Central Bank of Montenegro, in the fourth quarter of 2007 issued a set of restrictive 
measures, which limited credit growth in 2008. The biggest limitations were imposed on the 
biggest banks since the negative consequences of excessive credit expansion of those banks 
would have had the greatest impact on the overall stability of the banking sector. In addition 
to credit growth limitations, a requirement to maintain the solvency coefficient at a minimum 
10 per cent in 2008 (legal minimum amounted to 8 per cent) was prescribed. Namely, 
increasing the amount of banks’ capital was expected to ensure adequate protection of banks’ 
clients’ interests.  
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.6 Annual growth of total outstanding loans in Montenegro, from 2004 to 2012 
 
Lending activity began to decline in the last quarter of 2008 due to the impact of the global 
financial crisis, with total loans outstanding falling by about two per cent in the last quarter of 
2008, as banks became concerned about their worsening liquidity situation and the ability of 
their parent banks to provide additional financing. That decline continued in 2009, when total 
outstanding loans fell by 14 per cent, mainly due to banks’ deterioration of asset quality and a 
decline in demand for loans from the corporate sector, which was affected by the weakening 
situation in the real economy sector. In 2010, total outstanding loans declined by a further 
eight per cent. This decline continued until 2012. 
According to the Central Bank’s classification of assets, loans are categorized as short term 
loans – approved for a period of one year and long term loans – loans approved for a period 
over one year. A tendency has been the growth of long-term loans in the reporting period, 
mainly because in the household loans there was a growth in mortgage loans, whilst loans to 
the private sector were mostly dedicated to the construction of tourist facilities, roads, etc.  
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.7 Term structure of loans in Montenegrin banking sector from 2004 to 2012 
 
According to the banks reports to CBM, the quality of assets deteriorated from 2008. As can 
be seen in Figure 1.8, there has been a dramatic increase in the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total gross bank loans (NPLs). According to the CBM Quarterly Report (2009, December), 
asset deterioration was a consequence of the excessive credit growth in previous two years, 
which was stimulated by banks’ management motivated by quick profits, neglecting adequate 
and objective assessments of the financial ability of borrowers to repay loans. Thus, 
underestimation of assumed risks led to a deterioration in all parameters of the quality assets 
in the system. The high growth rates of economy motivated firms to undertake investment, 
leading to increased debt obligations for the business sector. Hence, the weakened economy, 
particularly the poor performance of the construction sector and the real estate market, 
contributed to a rapid increase in NPLs. This rapid increase of NPLs combined with 
increasing banking regulation, more stringent supervision, and the impact of those assets on 
banks’ risk-weighted assets (RWAs) encouraged Montenegrin banks to reconsider their long-
term strategies concerning their assets. Namely, banks stopped approving new loans. Thus, an 
increase in non-performing loan ratios might be also due to the contraction in total 
outstanding loans as banks ceased lending, thus as a proportion of total loans NPLs increased.  
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.8 Share of non-performing loans in total loans in Montenegro, 2004 to 2012 
 
In 2012, the reduction in lending by banks and the high burden of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in banks' balance sheets, remained a challenge which could hamper economic 
growth. 
For the purpose of adequate credit risk management, banks in Montenegro are obliged, 
pursuant to the Decision on Minimum Standards for Credit Risk Management in Banks 
(OGM, 87/09), inter alia, to classify risk asset and off-balance items in five categories (A, B, 
C, D, and E) and to allocate appropriate loan loss provisions. 
Table 1.3 The quality of banking sector’s assets 
Good Assets A Classify elements of assets that are estimated to be fully charged  in  
accordance with the agreement   
Special Assets B Classify elements  of assets for which there is a low likelihood of 
achieving a loss, and these elements  of  assets require special attention of 
bank because  a potential risk, if would not be adequately followed, could 
lead to weaker prospects in charged  
Substandard Assets C Classify  elements  of assets for which there is a high likelihood of 
achieving a loss, because clearly identified weaknesses 
Doubtful Assets D Classify elements where, bearing in mind the ability of the debtor's credit, 
the value and possibility of realization collateral, payments are unlikely to 
happened; 
Loss E Classify elements  of assets that will be completely irrecoverable 
Source:  The Decision on Minimum Standards for Credit Risk Management and Operations with Persons 
Related with the Bank 
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In order to have a clearer picture of the participation of non-performing assets to total assets, 
the following Figure 1.9 a) presents assets by categories, while the Figure 1.9 b) presents the 
evolution on non-performing assets by categories of substandard, doubtful assets and losses.  
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.9 a) Banking sector`s asset by categories (good-A, special-B, substandard-C, 
doubtful assets-D and losses-E), in millions of euro 
 
 
Source: CBM database 
b) Non-performing assets by categories (substandard-C, doubtful assets-D and losses-E), 
extracted from 1.9 a), in millions of euro  
 
In the structure of liabilities, the largest share belongs to deposits and obligations under 
borrowing. However, their share in total liabilities significantly changed from 2004 to 2010. 
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The positive trend in the share of total deposits stopped in 2007. Since that period, total 
deposits declined by almost 20 percentage points. The global financial crisis and loss of 
confidence in the banking sector caused a massive withdrawal of deposits. In addition, 
according to the CBM Supervision Report (March 2009) a further reason for the large 
reduction in total deposits, has been the case of non-payment of loans where the banks were 
using deposits as cash collateral. That meant that the deposits had not been withdrawn from 
the banks, but had been used for the payment of liabilities to banks. A massive withdrawals 
of deposits has been has been compensated with an increase in borrowings and credits. 
Looking at the Figure below, there has been a significant drop in the share of capital in total 
assets.  
  
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.10 Structure of total liabilities in the period 2004-2012 
 
The most significant share of total borrowings was borrowings from abroad. According to the 
banks reports to CBM, the rapid growth of loans was mainly based on borrowings from 
abroad. Most of the borrowings from abroad refer to the borrowing from foreign parent 
banks, whose subsidiaries dominate the Montenegrin banking sector (see Figure 1.11).  
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.11 Banks’ borrowing from abroad, in millions of euro 
 
Funding from parent banks (borrowings from parent banks as a share of total liabilities) 
increased from 2005, reaching the peak in 2008. Financing from parent banks constituted 76 
per cent of total borrowings at end-2008, exposing the banking sector to liquidity shocks in 
the case where parent banks were unable to sustain financing to their subsidiaries. However, 
this share decreased by 20 per cent in 2009, by 5 per cent in 2010 and a further 23 per cent in 
2011.  
1.4.3 Liquidity  
The negative effects of the global financial crisis were reflected in Montenegrin banks' 
liquidity. In the last quarter of 2008, there was a significant reduction in total banks` deposits. 
In particular, large withdrawals happened due to the panic instigated by the media and 
negative experiences from failed foreign currency savings from the early `90s. As noticed in 
the previous subsection 1.4.1, high rates of credit growth were mainly financed by foreign 
parent banks’ lending to their Montenegrin subsidiaries, resulting in high loan-to-deposit 
ratios. The high loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD) exposed the banking sector to substantial 
liquidity shocks. 
Table 1.4 Loan to deposit ratio in Montenegro from 2004-2010 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Loan to deposit 
ratio 
103 77 87 121 169 154 140 
Source: CBM database 
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The LTD ratio that was increasing steeply until 2008, in 2009 it declined to 154 per cent, and 
then fell further to 140 per cent in 2010. However, those LTD ratios were extremely high. As 
illustrated in Figure 1.12, at the end of 2010 the LTD ratios in Montenegro were higher than 
in many Central and East European countries.  
 
Source: IFS database 
Figure 1.12 Loan to deposit ratio in CEE at the end of 2010 
 
A large withdrawal of deposits severely subverted the liquidity of the banking sector in late 
2008, although the situation has since improved. The system’s liquid assets to short term 
liabilities ratio declined in 2007 and 2008 (see Figure 1.13).  It is most likely that banks with 
extreme credit growth rates were focused on future revenues. As explained in the previous 
section, the increase in the proportion of loans in banks’ total assets was, above all, the result 
of the declining share of cash, which therefore worsened the banks’ liquidity position. The 
liquidity ratio of liquid assets to short term liabilities declined from 32 per cent at the end of 
2007 to 21 per cent at the end of 2008 (see Figure 1.13). Since then, liquidity at the aggregate 
level improved with a liquidity ratio of 26 per cent at the end of 2009, particularly because of 
CBM measures to improve liquidity in the system by lowering the reserve requirement rate, 
as well as due to large inflows as a result of privatization of one large state company.  In 
2010, the liquidity ratio improved further to about 33 per cent by year end. 
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Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.13 Movements in the ratio of liquid assets to short-term and long-term liabilities 
 
A further cause of the improvement in banking sector liquidity from 2009 was significant 
capital injections from the foreign parents’ banks that had signed an agreement called the 
Vienna Initiative. The goal of that agreement was to maintain the exposure of foreign parent 
banks in emerging Europe and to support their subsidiaries by capital injections, bank-
specific guarantees etc. The Vienna Initiative will be analysed in more details in Chapter 3. 
The foreign parent banks gave strong support to their subsidiary entities in Montenegro and 
provided them with a sufficient amount of liquid assets for the regular servicing of 
obligations to clients, thereby preventing capital erosion. Five banks have received 
subordinated debts in 2008 to 2010, while, in 2009 a few banks have been recapitalized. As a 
result, the capital adequacy ratio (CAP) of the system stood at 15.4 per cent at end of 2010, 
well above the prudential minimum requirement of 10 per cent. Subsidiaries of foreign banks 
also had an opportunity to manage their NPLs through transferring them to the Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs) of their parent banks.
3
Two Montenegrin banks have 
chosen to permanently remove non-performing assets from their balance sheets by 
transferring them to factoring companies owned by their parent bank. Those factoring 
entities, therefore, were not subject to consolidation at the bank level. However, domestic 
banks have had to maintain their NPLs on their balance sheets. Moreover, increased 
                                                          
3 However, the transfer of NPLs into the Asset Management Companies (AMCs) of their parent banks does not 
affect our empirical analysis of NPLs presented in Chapter 5. Namely, those transfers had happened in 2011, 
while our empirical analysis includes developments from 2004 to 2010.  
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provisions for non-performing loans adversely affected the profitability of the bank, which 
will be discussed in the following sub-section. 
1.4.4 Profitability 
Profitability of the banking sector, after an upward trend from 2005 to 2007, was rapidly and 
drastically impaired in 2008. Analysing the profitability of the banking sector, we distinguish 
subjective and objective factors which had influence on the banks` profitability. Subjective 
weaknesses in some banks may refer at first to bad credit risk management which resulted in 
high levels of additional provisions being required (in accordance with the regulatory 
framework), high overhead costs, etc. Objective factors may be related to the prudential 
limits imposed on credit growth in 2008, withdrawal of deposit potential of the fourth quarter 
and almost complete suspension of the credit activity of banks that led to questions 
concerning   the ability of some banks to service regularly their obligations to customers, 
more difficult access to external sources of funding, etc.  
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.14 Movements of ROA and ROE at the aggregate level in the period from 2004 to 
2011 
 
These negative financial results consequently led to negative indicators of return on average 
assets (ROA) and return on average equity (ROE) at the aggregate level. As can be seen in 
Figure 1.14, the ROA decreased from -0.6 per cent in 2008 to -0.7 per cent at end-2009, to -
2.8 per cent at end-2010, and improved slightly to -0.1 per cent at end 2011. The ROE 
declined from -6.9 per cent in 2008 to –7.8 per cent at end 2009, and declined dramatically in 
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2010 reaching -27 per cent at end of 2010, whilst significantly improving to -1.1 per cent at 
the end of 2011.   
1.4.5 Market Risk 
The degree of exposure of banks to market risk primarily depends on the dominant activity of 
the bank. That has been an important component of risk for investment banks or in banks 
where a large part of the activities related to the trading book. The main drivers of market risk 
usually are the interest rates, exchange rates, stock indexes, etc. In modern developed 
financial systems it is assumed that the market quickly responds to various signals through 
variations in the prices of securities and thereby affects the value of the portfolio of banks 
(Furlong and Williams, 2006). However, in the Montenegrin banking system the overall level 
of market risk has been low. Trading securities, derivative financial assets and securities held 
to maturity have a negligible share of total banks assets (about 3 per cent in 2010). These 
have been new instruments for Montenegrin banks starting in 2009. After the introduction of 
the Euro as the official currency in Montenegro, the exposure to market risk in Montenegrin 
banks has been very limited, according to the CBM Financial Stability Report (2011b). In 
addition, the level of foreign exchange risk is low. The most common alternative currency 
either for loans and deposits throughout the period 2004-2012 was the USD; however from 
2008 the banking sector had more liabilities than assets in the US currency (Figure 1.15). 
 
Source: CBM database 
Figure 1.15 Aggregate exposure of foreign currency risk in Montenegro, in millions 
 
-12000000
-10000000
-8000000
-6000000
-4000000
-2000000
0
2000000
4000000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Dinar USD GBP CHF other
22 
 
At the end of 2008 the currency structure of loans was:  5.8 per cent were related to loans in 
foreign currency. Deposits in foreign currency consisted 2.6 per cent of total deposits and 
banks borrowings in foreign currency accounted for 12.2 per cent of total borrowings. 
Summing up the findings of this section, it has been found that the rapid expansion of the 
banking sector in Montenegro stopped in late 2008, largely due to the impact of the global 
financial crisis on the overheated domestic economy. This growth of banking sector assets in 
Montenegro was led by foreign banks. Foreign banks financed excessive credit growth that 
affected banks` liquidity position resulting in high loan to deposit ratios. Importantly, 
excessive credit growth posed a threat to the Montenegrin banking sector’s stability, bearing 
in mind that all sectors of the Montenegrin economy had a high level of debt. The weakened 
economy contributed to a rapid increase in non-performing loans. Finally, the crisis had a 
dramatic impact on banking sector profitability. The measures which the Central Bank of 
Montenegro introduced in order to protect the banking sector during the global financial 
crisis will be analysed in the following section.  
1.5 The Role of the Central Bank of Montenegro 
The Central Bank of Montenegro (CBM) was founded in 2001, based on the Law of the 
Central Bank of Montenegro which was adopted in 2000.  Previously, it was a branch of the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia. Given the political circumstances and abuses of monetary 
policy in Yugoslavia, the Government of Montenegro in 1999 decided to replace the dinar 
(official currency of Yugoslavia) and to take over all powers in the field of monetary policy. 
Initially the Deutsche Mark was introduced as the official currency and later, in 2002, it was 
replaced by Euro. The Central Bank of Montenegro was founded as an independent 
institution responsible for monetary policy, establishing and maintaining a sound banking 
system and efficient payment system in Montenegro. Given that the monetary system of 
Montenegro has been based on the euro, as the official currency, and Montenegro's economy 
is fully euroised, the Central Bank Montenegro has no direct responsibility for issuing 
currency or price stability, which are the responsibilities of the ECB.  
According to the Law on Central Bank, a primary objective of CBM is maintaining financial 
stability. The Central Bank of Montenegro is currently the only central bank that has 
identified financial stability as its primary objective. Other central banks have defined 
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financial stability as an objective, but only as a secondary one. However, it should be 
mentioned that CBM is only in charge of the banking sector and micro-financial institutions 
and it does not have a responsibility for other participants in the financial system, such as 
insurance companies, financial leasing companies, voluntary pension fund management 
companies etc. This issue has been partially overcome by the Financial Stability Council 
being chaired by the CBM Governor. The Financial Stability Council includes members of 
the Ministry of Finance, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Insurance Supervision 
Agency and the Central Bank. 
Although the Central Bank does not have the function of issuing currency, it has some 
instruments of monetary policy. The most important instrument is control of banks` reserve 
requirements. The reserve requirements for banks have an indirect impact on money supply 
(monetary policy). Given the lack of public confidence in the Montenegrin banking system at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the CBM initially conducted very restrictive 
obligatory reserve policies. However, as the situation in the banking system improved, this 
instrument was partly relaxed. According to the CBM (2012), this restrictive reserves policy 
preserved the banking sector in the crisis period. For example, only one bank had problems 
and that bank in 2008 requested financial assistance from the state, that loan was repaid in 
2009, but underlying asset quality problems remained. The CBM has two further instruments 
affecting money supply. One instrument is loans to banks and the other open market 
operations - buying and selling of securities. For the purpose of meeting the liquidity 
requirements, the Central Bank can approve certain banks to use up to 50% of their reserve 
requirement deposits to maintain their required daily liquidity (Decision on Detailed 
Conditions for Granting Liquidity Loans to Banks; OGM, 15/11). Also the Central Bank 
could approve intra-day credit to meet liquidity requirements; under specified terms that 
whole amount of credit can be collateralized by securities issued by the State of Montenegro, 
EU Members States and international financial institutions or other securities deemed 
acceptable by the Central Bank (Decision on Bank Reserve Requirement to be Held With the 
Central Bank of Montenegro; OGM, 35/11). The other instrument is open market operations, 
which the CBM uses to purchase and sell securities in order to regulate the banking sector’s 
liquidity. Open market operations affect the interest rates, banks’ lending potential and 
activity, and consequently the economic activity in Montenegro. When buying securities the 
central bank creates a currency outflow and thus decreases the interest rate. The reverse 
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situation applies when selling securities. However, the CBM is not an issuing monetary 
authority and does not use open market operations to conduct traditional monetary policy.  
By open market operations CBM purchases and sells securities issued by Montenegro, EU 
Member States and international financial institutions, or other securities which are 
acceptable for this purpose. These operations may be performed through spot trading 
contracts or through direct trade with an individual bank using forward contracts (Decision 
on Open Market Operations, OGM 15/11). 
The second objective of the CBM is to establish and maintain a sound banking system. As 
previously stated, the CBM is in charge of the supervision of all banks and micro financing 
institutions (currently 11 banks and 5 micro-financing institutions). Until 2008, the process of 
supervision was based on Basel I, since then there have been efforts to implement Basel II. 
The Basel II framework, which Kraft (2003) argued was a good example of the sustainable 
development of prudential ratios to meet constantly changing complex challenges, will be 
discussed in Chapter 4. Since 2008, with a view to maintaining banking sector stability and in 
order to meet Basel II requirements, the CBM has improved the regulatory framework. The 
CBM has adopted a new law on banks, with pertinent sub-legal legislation that has provided 
the legal framework for a gradual transition to Basel II, i.e. the Capital Requirement Directive 
(CRD). The adoption of the Law on Banks in 2008 and a set of by-laws in 2008 were largely 
compliant with EU directives and international standards. The CBM has implemented a 
prudent bank licensing policy and issuance of permissions and/or approvals to provide for the 
strengthening of corporate culture, competition and protection of depositors. In addition, the 
CBM has developed risk-based supervision with a portfolio management approach to 
banking supervision, with a particular emphasis on credit risk supervision. Finally, the CBM 
established cooperation and exchange of data with other regulatory bodies in the country with 
a view to strengthening consolidated supervision. Some requirements were even more 
stringent than the Basel II requirements. Namely, the minimum required solvency coefficient 
was set at 10 per cent, while according to the Basel II the minimum required amount should 
be 8 per cent. 
To restore consumer confidence in the banking sector, the CBM adopted an emergency anti-
crisis law in October 2008: the Law on Measures for Protection of the Banking System 
(MPBS). The provisions of this law were generally consistent with crisis responses seen in 
other countries, giving the government the authority to: (i) fully guarantee the deposits of all 
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individuals and legal persons; (ii) facilitate credit guarantees for interbank loans; (iii) provide 
liquidity support to a bank in need of additional funds for a period of up to one year; (iv) 
upon a bank’s request, make a prepayment of state borrowings from that bank (including 
loans carrying a government guarantee); and (v) provide funds for the increase of a bank’s 
capital, with a view to protecting and ensuring the stability of the banking system. The law 
also provided for the CBM to: (i) approve the use of funds of the reserve requirements; and 
(ii) use up to 50 per cent of its capital for granting short-term loans to banks. The MPBS 
broadly served its intended purpose and expired at the end of 2009. 
Although progress has been made in the regulations, some Basel II requirements were not 
followed. Namely, the main disadvantage of CBM supervision was poor knowledge of 
modern techniques such as early warning systems and stress testing, which should have been 
adopted in order to help ensure the stability of the banking sector.  
The Montenegrin Central Bank is the accounting agent which processes interbank payments. 
The Central Bank administers the non-cash system of payments for its clients, banks and state 
organizations. It is responsible for establishing and maintaining an efficient system of 
payments: performing, regulating and controlling that system of payments. Finally, the CBM 
has the role of the government’s fiscal agent and in managing the foreign reserves of 
Montenegro.  
According to Vlahovic and Cerovic (2005), the CBM has a very high level of independence 
based on Petursson’s (2000) and Cukierman’s (2002) criteria. According to Petursson’s 
(2000) criteria, the legal independence of central banks is assessed on a scale from 0.7 to 65, 
and the independence of the CBM is assessed at 53.55, which is relatively high, though lower 
than the 63.55 score for Croatia. According to these criteria the CBM cannot be awarded 
maximum points, given the first and last question. Specifically, the Law on the CBM does not 
explicitly state that the stability of prices is a goal of CBM, which is understandable given the 
full euroisation of the Montenegrin economy and the specific role of its central bank. Further, 
although the Law determined that the mandate of the Governor, five years,  is longer than the 
electoral cycle (4 years) in this criterion CBM does not receive the highest grade (which is 
awarded in the event that the mandate of the governor is for 8 years or longer). 
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Table 1.5 The degree of independence of the CBM 
Criteria Weight  Points Total 
The charter of the central bank is clearly defined goals, expressed  
with a price stability goal 
1 0 0 
The extent to which the central bank sets policy objectives 1 10 10 
The extent to which the central bank conducts compliance with 
monetary policy instruments 
2 10 20 
The extent to which government funding is allowed by the central bank 2 10 20 
Length of the mandate of the Governor 0.5 7.1 3.55 
Total   53.55 
Source: Vlahovic and Cerovic (2005) 
Measured by Cukierman’s (2002) criteria, the independence of CBM is high and amounts 
0.935 (on a scale from 0 to 1). Cukierman’s (2002) questionnaire is used as a measure of 
central bank legal independence, covering information on the chief executive officer, policy 
formation, objectives and limitations on lending to the government. Similar to the Petursson’s 
approach, CBM cannot be awarded maximum points on Cukierman’s criteria and cannot be 
rated as a completely independent central bank. Namely, the CBM main limitation is its very 
limited capacity to conduct independent monetary policy and consequently, its inability to 
affect the inflation rate in Montenegro. Thus, its primary objective cannot be price stability. 
In addition the length of tenure of the Governor is just five years, which does not attract the 
highest score. In addition, the Governor is appointed by Parliament, based on the 
recommendation of the President of the country, which again does not attract the highest 
degree of independence score. However, the CBM formulates the policies and that has the 
highest independence score. Regarding lending to the government, according to the Law on 
Central Bank: “The Central Bank may not, either directly or indirectly, grant any loans to the 
Government, other government bodies and organisations, local self-government units or any 
other persons owned by or in the majority ownership of the state or local self-government 
units (Article 7 and 8)”, which attracts the highest score by Cukierman’s criteria. However, 
one limitation of such indices is that they measure the degree of ‘de jure’ independence not 
the ‘de facto’ degree. Actual independence can only be accurately measured by actions, not 
by legislation. 
27 
 
The macroeconomic policy tools available to guide the Montenegrin economy on a path of 
sustained convergence are, deliberately, severely constrained by unilateral euroisation. At the 
current juncture, the absence of a policy interest rate and the significant limitations to its 
lender of last resort function reduce the central bank's ability to influence bank lending and 
thereby to support economic growth. 
1.6 The Stability of the Banking Sector in Montenegro 
As stated in the previous section, maintaining financial stability has been the CBM’s primary 
goal. The stability of the financial system is an important component of macroeconomic 
stability and hence potentially contributes to economic growth, employment growth and 
poverty reduction. In a stable financial system, aggregate demand does not significantly 
deviate from the production possibilities of the real sector; the functioning of financial 
markets and lending are not distorted by barriers, while the value of important securities do 
not differ significantly from what would be their ‘fair’ prices. A stable financial system 
allows the efficient allocation of resources and management of financial risks and promotes 
price stability (Fabris, 2006). As noted above, a key driving force of economic development 
in Montenegro is FDI inflows, and it has been argued that the stability of the financial system 
is a prerequisite for attracting that key driving force (CBM, 2007).
4
 The attraction of a 
substantial net inflow of foreign direct investment, and the resulting diversification of 
economic structure and strengthening of its competitive ability, requires a stable financial 
system (Ivanovic et al., 2010). 
In line with the EU enlargement process the integration of the Montenegrin financial system 
in the EU has become a priority. This integration with EU certainly entails changes in the 
regulatory and supervisory environment. In particular, integrated markets need a unified 
regulatory framework. The integration and flexibility of financial systems play an essential 
role in promoting full convergence and supporting economic stability within the monetary 
policy framework of the EU (Kraft, 2003). 
In Montenegro the financial system is “bankcentric”. As evidenced above in section 1.2, the 
banking system is the key component of the financial system, as other financial institutions 
                                                          
4
 This is the mainstream view. Alternative perspectives are included in the discussion in Chapter 2, such as 
Minsky ̓s theory of endogenous financial stability. 
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are still underdeveloped. Banks are the most important participants in the transfer of funds 
from domestic and foreign surplus sectors to deficient sectors. In such conditions, the 
stability of the banking system is a fundamental determinant of the stability of the entire 
financial system, and thus the achievement of macroeconomic stability and economic 
development. Bearing in mind the structure of the financial system in Montenegro, it is less 
likely that a full blown financial crisis could emerge in a segment of the system other than the 
banking sector (Žugić and Fabris, 2014). That was best illustrated by the Montenegrin stock 
exchange crunch in spring 2007, which had almost no consequences for the rest of the 
financial system or the real economy. 
Continued stability is essential for the further development of the banking sector in 
Montenegro, given the experience of the last decade of the twentieth century, when there was 
a complete devastation of the banking system and loss of confidence in banks.
5
 Banking 
relies on confidence, because the banks deposit function cannot be totally insured. Without 
the stability of the banking system there is no trust in banks, and thus no effective banking 
system (Fabris, 2006). Stability of the banking system can be assisted through the 
diversification of banking services (payment, currency conversion, some forms of insurance, 
custody jobs, etc...). However, the diversification of banking services can create its own risks 
for banks in Montenegro, especially if those banking services are out-sourced to businesses 
with an insufficient level of know-how.  
The recent increase in foreign ownership within the banking systems of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including Western Balkans, significantly increased financial connections within 
Europe. Foreign ownership has brought great benefit to the local countries, such as an easier 
and faster restructuring of the banking system, improved risk-management techniques, 
greater access to foreign capital, and greater financial deepening (Cardenas et al., 2003). On 
the other hand the benefits are great also for the parent banks in relation to the generation of 
profits. At the same time, these growing financial connections increased susceptibility to 
                                                          
5
 In the early 1990s the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia, sanctions, hyperinflation, wars in the region and 
the deterioration of the economy completely destroyed the previous financial system. People were unable to 
withdraw savings (mainly in foreign-currency) which they had deposited in Yugoslav banks. As a result of the 
loss of confidence in the banking system in that period the general public was often keeping their savings ‘under 
the mattress’. 
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negative spill overs, both in the domestic and host countries. Hence, domestic banks are 
exposed to the strong impact of external risks, especially now with the present trend of 
increasing interdependence of banks at the international level.  
The key threat to financial stability in Montenegro is the relatively high level of non-
performing loans (Sirtaine and Rosenberg, 2012; Žugić and Fabris, 2014). According to 
Žugić and Fabris (2014), referring to eventual factors that may lead to aggravating financial 
stability, these should primarily be sought in the banking sector as a relatively high share of 
non-performing loans. As mentioned in section 1.4, since the beginning of the global 
financial crisis, the deterioration of loans’ quality has become significant. In 2010 non-
performing loans in Montenegro had a leading position in the region and excessive credit risk 
has been identified as of importance in the Montenegrin banking sector (Dakić, 2014). In 
order to mitigate that problem, there has been cooperation between the World Bank, the 
Ministry of Finance and the CBM, in order to develop a model of voluntary financial 
restructuring of non-performing loans known as the “Podgorica Approach”. However, that 
will be explained and assessed in the concluding Chapter.  
The increase in non-performing loans seems to have had, as yet, no great impact such as a 
bank run in the Montenegrin banking sector. However, it may imply a high level of fragility 
of the banking sector and a lack of the efficient banking supervision. Consequently it is 
important to analyse the determinants of the level and behaviour of non-performing loans 
since they are often considered as an indicator of financial vulnerability and of future 
turbulence in banking sector. Thus, non-performing loans will be considered as a main 
indicator of banking distress in Montenegro, and great attention in this thesis will be paid to 
the examination of the determinants of loans` quality in order to preserve banking sector 
stability. Regarding Montenegro, our objective is to investigate the macroeconomic and 
bank-specific determinants of non-performing loans.  However, since non-performing loans 
are a point of concern in Central and East European countries as well, we will extend our 
research for those countries. 
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1.7 Comparative Developments in the Banking Sectors of Central 
and East European Economies  
As in Montenegro, credit risk currently represents the main threat for financial stability 
elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (Barisitz, 2011; Jakubik and Reininger, 2013).  This 
section will briefly examine the main recent developments in banking sectors in CEE 
countries; while a more detailed analysis of CEE banking sectors, in the period before and 
after the global financial crisis, will be presented in Chapter 3.  
Although the banking sectors of CEE are based on the traditional model, approving loans and 
collecting deposits, they are by far the most important channels for domestic financing. In 
most CEE countries, banking sectors are mainly foreign owned (this will be discussed in 
section 3.4.1). High foreign ownership has been largely a legacy of economic transition, 
when banks were privatized to strategic foreign investors to quickly introduce modern 
banking practices and secure financial stability (IMF, 2013a). Increasing and high reliance on 
foreign funding emerged during the CEE region’s credit boom in the mid-2000s. 
The catching-up process with West European processes and practices was initially supported 
by increased macroeconomic stability; however, most CEE countries had become 
increasingly vulnerable in the wake of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Namely, during 2002-
2008, most CEE countries experienced huge credit, housing and consumption booms, and 
associated high current-account deficits and external-debt levels. In September 2008, 
previous inflows of bank funding reversed and the overheated CEE economies experienced 
deep recessions.  
Moreover, average bank asset quality in CEE deteriorated sharply when the financial crisis 
hit these economies. As a result of deteriorating profitability caused by the challenging 
macroeconomic conditions and a decrease in aggregate demand, loans gradually, increasingly 
turned to non-performing. In addition, the weak macroeconomic environment put pressure on 
the financial position of performing enterprises.  
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Source: World Developed Indicators database 
Figure 1.16 Non-performing loans in Central and Eastern Europe, average as a % of total 
loans, 2004 to 2011 
 
Many of the rapidly approved loans of the boom years have turned problematic, pushing the 
average NPL ratios in the CEE region from a pre-crisis low level to worryingly high level in 
2011 (see Figure 1.16). In particular, some CEE countries had ratios of over 20 per cent (see 
Section 3.5).  Those high NPLs were likely to affect credit supply going forward (Sirtaine 
and Rosenberg, 2012; Klein, 2013; and IMF, 2013a). Furthermore, the associated 
provisioning adversely affected profits, and according to IMF (2013a) dented the long-term 
profitability of western banks’ engagement in CEE making them more cautious to deploy 
capital in that region.  
Strong growth in the ratio of non-performing loans was a sign of their fragile banking 
conditions that were exposed by the financial crisis. Namely, the rapid growth in NPLs forced 
most of the CEE countries to ask for financial help from the IMF, European Union and the 
European Central Bank since. That will be examined in section 3.5.1. 
The CEE region’s recent experience suggests that the banking sectors in CEE need to 
carefully assess recent developments in their NPLs, while anticipating adverse future 
movements in their NPL ratios. In order to anticipate these future movements this research 
programme develops, in Chapter 6, an appropriate model to estimate all determinants that 
have a significant influence on the incidence of NPLs in CEE countries.  
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1.8 Conclusion and the structure of the thesis 
The recent rapid growth of banking assets in Montenegro was driven by the entry of foreign 
banks, which now have a dominant role in the Montenegrin banking sector. It is argued that, 
in 2008, ‘excessive’ credit growth, primarily financed by high external borrowing, posed a 
threat to banking sector stability, given that all sectors of the Montenegrin economy had a 
high level of debt. The strong credit growth from 2003 to 2008 led to an unsustainable boom 
that suddenly ended with the occurrence of the global financial crisis. Subsequently, the deep 
recession pointed to a number of accumulated problems, including the poor quality of many 
of the loans in banks` books. The boom and bust cycle in Montenegro left behind a large 
number of non-performing loans, which present the main current threat to banking stability. 
This situation has been very similar to that found elsewhere in the Central Eastern and 
Europe region. 
Given that non-performing loans are a good indicator of banking vulnerability, the 
investigation of the determinants of non-performing loans is important in order to assess the 
prospects for future banking stability. Thus, the research in this thesis will refine the concept 
of banking stability with special reference to factors contributing to the incidence of non-
performing loans; investigate which requirements for banking stability were disrupted in the 
last global financial crisis; and examine the effect of global financial crisis on Central and 
East European banking systems. In addition it will examine banking stability from the 
institutional, or more precisely, the regulator’s perspective, highlighting the weaknesses of 
supervisory authorities in global financial crisis. Finally, this research programme will 
empirically investigate the determinants of non-performing loans in Montenegro, and then in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and derive policy proposals to promote banking stability in these 
countries. 
In particular, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework for this research programme. 
Throughout this Chapter we will critically review the literature on banking crises, given that 
banking sector fragility refers to the latent possibility of a crisis. Furthermore, Chapter 2 will 
explain why non-performing loans are usually considered to be a good predictor of banking 
sector fragility. Chapter 3 examines the nature and causes of the last global financial crisis 
and identifies which preconditions for a stable banking sector were disturbed. This Chapter 
will explain the consequences of global financial crisis, focusing on Central and East 
33 
 
European countries. Furthermore, the analysis investigates the contagion effects of global 
financial crisis, calling into question how foreign banks treated their subsidiaries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of banking stability from the regulator’s perspective, in 
particular demonstrating the weaknesses of supervisory authorities in the pre-global financial 
crisis period. This Chapter highlights the need for appropriate stress testing techniques, which 
should be based on both macro and microprudential perspectives. Credit risk assessment, in 
particular, modelling of non-performing loans, presents an important part of stress testing. 
Thus, in Chapters 5 and 6 we empirically investigate the determinants of non-performing 
loans. Chapter 5 is focused on a bank-level study of Montenegro, while Chapter 6 is focused 
on the banking sectors of Central and Eastern Europe. In Chapter 7, based upon the findings 
of the previous analyses we will suggest forward-looking central bank policies that should be 
adopted in order to safeguard banking sector stability. 
In summary, this thesis will introduce, apply and wherever possible quantitatively assess the 
factors contributing to the incidence of non-performing loans and vulnerability in the banking 
sector of Montenegro and Central and Eastern Europe and, based on those findings, develop 
policy proposal for these countries.  
  
34 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: Banking Sector Instability: Characteristics, 
Mechanisms and Consequences 
Contents: 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 34 
2.2 Financial and Banking Stability ................................................................................................... 35 
2.2.1 Liquidity........................................................................................................................................................................ 39 
2.2.2 Solvency ........................................................................................................................................................................ 42 
2.2.3 Profitability ................................................................................................................................................................. 43 
2.3 Banking Crises .................................................................................................................................... 46 
2.4 Links between Banking Sector Stability and Economic Activity ...................................... 50 
2.5 Non-Performing Loans .................................................................................................................... 53 
2.6 Contagion ............................................................................................................................................. 60 
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 63 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the conclusions of the previous Chapter highlights the need for banking sector 
stability in a small country such as Montenegro.  Analysing the main characteristics and 
developments of the Montenegrin banking sector, we identified that the main threat to 
banking sector stability appeared to be a high incidence of non-performing loans. Thus, in 
this Chapter we re-examine the concept of banking sector stability with special reference to 
developments contributing to a rising incidence of non-performing loans.  Therefore, Chapter 
2 develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of banking sector stability.  The banking 
sector serves as a major channel through which instability may be transmitted to other sectors 
in the economy. Thus, it is necessary to have a stable banking sector which supports the 
efficient allocation of resources and distribution of risks across the economy. The assessment 
of the stability of the banking sectors is of particular importance for regulators, depositors, 
investors and the general public. The importance of knowing the main factors disturbing the 
stability of the banking sector is discussed throughout this Chapter.  In addition, in this 
Chapter we examine the channels transmitting financial turmoil from a crisis-country to other 
countries, identifying what makes a country particularly vulnerable.  Therefore, this part of 
the Chapter will provide an introduction to the analysis presented in the following Chapter 
where we investigate how the recent global financial crisis was transmitted to the CEE 
region.  
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Section 2.2 starts with a discussion of the meaning of financial stability, highlighting that in 
most economies financial stability largely depends on the stability of the banking sector. 
Moreover, for an understanding of banking fragility in this section we identify the main 
characteristics of a stable banking system in order to understand the possible sources of 
instability and the mechanisms behind the occurrence of banking crises. Furthermore, given 
that the banking sector fragility usually refers to the possibility of a crisis, in Section 2.3, we 
provide a review of the literature on banking crises. The next Section 2.4 explains why 
macroeconomic and financial risks are likely to be closely interrelated, highlighting that 
macroeconomic instability may contribute to banking sector instability. The findings from the 
literature review in the previous two sections, suggest that the incidence of non-performing 
loans could be a good indicator of the degree of distress in the banking sector, thus the 
Section 2.5 is dedicated to examining the appropriate definition of non-performing loans and 
reviewing theory on the determinants of their incidences. In the next Section (2.6) we 
examine the nature of a financial contagion and the mechanisms by which a crisis could be 
spread from one country to another. The conclusions of this Chapter are presented in Section 
2.7.  
2.2 Financial and Banking Stability 
The role of financial and banking development in the promotion of economic growth has 
been investigated by many researchers. Much of the initial theoretical and empirical literature 
suggested that a strong banking sector is important for economic growth. Schumpeter (1934) 
stressed the role of the banking sector as the main financier of productive investments and 
thus as an accelerator of economic growth.  Furthermore, King and Levine (1993) found that 
financial services stimulate economic growth by increasing the rate of capital accumulation 
and by improving the efficiency with which economies use that capital. The study by Levine 
et al. (2000) analysing 74 countries from 1960 to 1995, reveals that the development of 
financial intermediaries exerts a statistically significant and economically large impact on 
growth even after controlling for simultaneity bias or country-specific effects. Furthermore, 
Mavrotas and Son (2004) find that the magnitude of the positive influence of financial sector 
on economic growth varies depending on the level of development. The estimation results 
suggest that the effect of financial sector development in developing countries is more 
persistent and larger than in developed countries. Hasan et al. (2009) suggest using both 
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qualitative and quantitative measures when assessing the dependence of financial sector 
development on economic growth. They derive qualitative measures for the development of 
the banking sector, by calculating cost- and profit- efficiency and quantitative measures by 
credit volumes for each individual bank in 11 European countries for the period 1996-2004. 
Their findings suggest that an improvement in bank efficiency spurs five times more growth 
than does an identical increase in credit. The quality effect is stronger in developed 
economies, while a quantity increase is also beneficial in developing economies. Arcand et al. 
(2012) study whether there is a threshold above which financial development stops 
contributing to growth. Their results suggest that in countries with a very large financial 
sector the relationship between financial depth and economic growth disappears. Indeed, a 
ratio of total credit to the private sector above 80-100% of GDP appears to have a negative 
impact on economic growth.  According to Arcand et al. (2012), there are two possible 
reasons for this negative impact: excessive credit growth could lead to high economic 
volatility and a rising probability of a financial crisis, and high credit volume is generally 
related to potential resource misallocation. Investigating particular measures of development 
in the financial sector, Ayadi et al. (2013) analyse the relationship between the financial 
sector and economic growth in the southern Mediterranean region over the 1984-2010 period. 
Their results indicate that credit to private sector and bank deposits are in many specifications 
negatively associated with growth, suggesting that there are problems in the allocation of 
credit and weak financial regulation and supervision in the region. Studying the real effects of 
financial sector growth, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2013) also find evidence that higher 
growth in the financial sector reduces real growth. They argue that financial booms are not, in 
general, growth enhancing, probably because the financial sector competes with the rest of 
the economy for resources.  In addition, using data by sectors, they investigate the 
distributional nature of this effect and find that credit booms harm what are normally thought 
of as a key engine of growth:  the more R&D-intensive sector. They conclude that there is a 
pressing need to reassess the relationship between finance and real growth in modern 
economic systems. 
In most modern economies financial stability largely depends on the stability of the banking 
sector. The failure of banks may cause financial vulnerability, which consequently may lead 
to deterioration in the economic environment. The development of financial systems may 
have reduced risks in markets, but the fundamental characteristics of financial intermediaries 
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may make economies more vulnerable to financial sector turmoil than in the past (Rajan, 
2005). How vulnerable that sector might be, we will investigate in the following Chapter in 
the context of the recent global financial crisis, which resulted in a failure of financial 
institutions and financial markets, and further to output declines. Furthermore, this 
deterioration in the economy led to a further rise in distresses in the banking sectors. Levine 
(2004) summarising the literature on bank-based and market-based financial systems
6
, argues 
that a bank-based financial system can improve the (i) acquisition of information on firms, 
(ii) intensity with which creditors exert corporate control, (iii) provision of risk-reducing 
arrangements, (iv) pooling of capital, and (v) ease of making transactions. Furthermore, he 
notes that supporters of bank-based systems argue that there are fundamental reasons for 
believing that market-based systems will not do as good a job of acquiring information about 
firms and overseeing managers. Consequently, these limitations may hurt resource allocation 
and economic performance. Furthermore, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) argued that the 
importance of banks is more pronounced in developing countries because financial markets 
are usually underdeveloped and banks are typically the only major source of finance for the 
majority of firms and are usually the main depository of economic savings. The analysis 
presented in the previous Chapter indicated that these characteristics were present in the case 
of Montenegro and most of the Central and East European countries.  
Financial stability, which includes the stability of the banking sector, plays an important role 
in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argued that "the 
fundamental role played by the financial sector is to facilitate the reallocation of funds from 
individuals with excess capital given their investment opportunities towards firms with a 
shortage of funds vis a vis their investment opportunities." (p. 559).  A stable financial 
system means that the main system components, which include financial institutions, markets 
and infrastructure, are capable together of absorbing foreseeable adverse disturbances. 
However, there is still no universally recognised definition of financial stability. Maybe the 
most comprehensive definition is given by ECB (2007, pp.7): “financial stability  can be 
defined as a condition in which the financial system – comprising financial  intermediaries, 
                                                          
6 Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) explain the difference between bank and market-based financial systems 
using a conglomerate index of financial structure they constructed. They compare the ratio of banking sector 
development relative to stock market development (both measured in terms of size, activity and efficiency). 
Countries with larger ratios are classified as bank-based and those where the conglomerate ratio of banking 
sector development to stock market development is below the mean are classified as market-based. 
 
38 
 
markets and market infrastructure – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of 
financial imbalances, thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial 
intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation  of 
savings to profitable investment opportunities”. 
Reviewing the literature on financial stability, two frameworks can be identified. First, where 
financial fragility is identified with a financial crisis and the other which makes a clear 
difference between financial fragility and financial instability. Minsky (1992) was the first to 
distinguish between the terms financial fragility and financial instability. Tymoigne (2010), 
following Minsky’s framework, defines financial fragility as the dependence of financial 
positions (balance sheets, income account, cash-flow accounts) on refinancing and 
liquidation, while, financial instability refers to the propensity of financial fragility to affect 
the economic process; it ultimately materializes itself by a debt-deflation process. Namely, 
Minsky notes that financial fragility generates financial instability on the up and on the down 
side. The up side is identified with bubbles, while the down side is identified with financial 
crisis and debt deflation. Following this, the goal is to prevent financial instability by limiting 
the growth of financial fragility. Tymoigne (2010) distinguishes between two approaches to 
financial instability and financial fragility. First, the static approach which conceptualizes 
financial instability as an unfortunate by product of capitalism that results from unpredictable 
random forces that no one can do anything about except prepare for through adequate loss 
reserves, and capital and liquidation buffers. Second, the evolutionary approach 
conceptualizes financial instability as something that the current economic system invariably 
brings upon itself through internal market and nonmarket forces and that require change in 
financial practices rather than merely good buffers. Furthermore, he compares the two 
approaches in order to lay the foundation for an empirical analysis developed within the 
evolutionary approach. His findings suggest that with macroeconomic data, it is possible to 
detect financial fragility, especially Ponzi finance.
7
  In particular, his methodology was 
applied to the residential housing sector in the U.S. and was able to capture some of the 
trends that are known to be sources of wider economic difficulties. The most recent period 
                                                          
7 Minsky (1992) in “Financial Instability Hypothesis”, described three phases of debt financing, with Ponzi 
finance being one of these. In particular, Ponzi finance refers to a situation where the lender expects that neither 
the principal nor interest will be returned.  
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recorded the use of Ponzi finance in housing from the second quarter of 2004 to the first 
quarter of 2007, after which the moving average of home prices started to decline. 
The effects of banking instability on the economy can be very costly. Namely, as described 
by Berger et al. (2008), the banking sector serves as a major channel through which 
instability may be transmitted to other sectors in the economy by disrupting the interbank 
lending market and payments mechanism, by reducing credit availability, and by freezing 
deposits. Bearing in mind that banks have a central role as financial intermediates a crisis will 
have adverse effects on the efficient operation of the market economy. Such adverse 
developments, as explained by Ioannidis et al. (2009), are likely to be reflected in a reduction 
in investment and consumption, increases in unemployment, and disturbances to the flow of 
credit to individuals and firms causing an overall economic slowdown. Hence, it is important 
to have a sound, stable and healthy financial system to support the efficient allocation of 
resources and distribution of risks across the economy. Thus, assessment of the stability of 
the banking sectors is of importance for regulators, depositors, investors and the general 
public. For an understanding of banking fragility we need to identify the main characteristics 
of a stable banking system and to understand the possible sources of instability and the 
mechanisms behind the occurrence of banking crises. Thus, in the following subsections we 
will analyse the main components of a stable banking sector: liquidity, solvency and 
profitability. In order to have a stable system, banks will need to balance these three 
elements.  
2.2.1 Liquidity 
Maintaining appropriate liquidity is considered a basic prerequisite for the sustainability of a 
bank in financial markets. Effective liquidity risk management helps in providing a bank with 
the ability to cover its cash obligations, which are uncertain because they are influenced by 
external events and the behaviour of other participants in the economy (BCBS, 2008). 
Liquidity management is of, great importance, because the inadequate liquidity of a single 
financial institution may have an impact on the entire financial system.  
Banks are characterized by balance sheets where their liabilities (deposits) are generally 
short-term, while many of their assets are long-term and illiquid. The fundamental role of 
banks, in the maturity transformation of short-term deposits to long-term loans, makes banks 
vulnerable to the risk of insufficient liquidity, either individually or for the banking system as 
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a whole. Practically any financial transaction or commitment has an impact on the liquidity of 
the bank. The bank is obliged to pay back demand deposits at any time depositors request 
them. This is explained in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model. Instability may arise in a 
situation when a depositor in a particular bank withdraws his deposits, believing that other 
depositors are likely to withdraw their funds as well. In this situation the bank will have to 
call in its loans and suffer the associated losses. Unanticipated withdrawals can push a bank 
to liquidate some of its assets at a loss and, in the extreme case, to fail. In this case, all 
rational depositors will seek to withdraw their funds as quickly as possible, producing a “run” 
on the bank (Hendricks et al., 2006). Moreover, in this model, bank runs can be contagious. 
Although this Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model is simplified, it nevertheless captures the 
essence of past bank runs. Bank runs are a common feature of extreme crises, which will be 
analysed in the next section.  
Croccket (2008) notes that liquidity as a concept should be considered in the light of the 
“procyclicality” of the ﬁnancial system. He explains that as the expansionary phase of an 
economic cycle proceeds, asset values increase, causing collateral values to rise, and inducing 
additional lending by ﬁnancial institutions. Those that have ﬁnanced positions through 
leverage proﬁt most during this positive phase. Croccket (2008) argues that these gains 
provide borrowers with the incentive and the means to borrow more, and provide lenders 
with the reassurance that their risks are acceptable. He reports that during this positive phase 
of the cycle, leverage tends to increase, and lending institutions take on what, with the beneﬁt 
of hindsight, can be seen as more risky exposures. To sum, in this phase credit costs seem to 
be low, liquidity is cheap and easily available, volatility is moderate, and competitor 
institutions are likely to be aggressively pursuing market opportunities. However, the system 
is vulnerable to a sudden change in the cycle. That change, can be caused by some external 
shock (e.g. by sudden increase in commodity prices, unanticipated rise in interest rates, etc.) 
or can be endogenous, such as overlending to a particular sector, e.g. housing. Croccket 
(2008) concludes that when market players see declines in asset prices, they see their capital 
cushions shrink and seek to protect their liquidity by reducing exposures. Thus, declining 
prices have the further effect of raising perceived vulnerability.  
Liquidity shock mechanisms can operate through the balance sheets and through asset prices 
when market price declines. This has been confirmed by Cifuentes et al. (2005), Adrian and 
Shin (2008a), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008).  Frank et al. (2008) summarised the 
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mechanisms through which liquidity shocks influence various markets during the normal 
times and in the period of financial distress. According to their research, these mechanisms 
are quite different. Namely, they explained that during normal times, market illiquidity 
shocks are typically short-lived, as they create opportunities for traders to profit and, in doing 
so, provide liquidity and contribute to the price-discovery process. However, during periods 
of crisis, several mechanisms may amplify and propagate liquidity shocks across financial 
markets, creating systemic risks.  
Vento and Ganga (2009) stress that liquidity risk is not an “isolated” risk like credit risk, it is 
rather a “consequential” risk, that can be triggered or exacerbated by other financial and 
operating risks within the banking business: for example, where exposure to credit risk is in 
terms of high concentrations of risky assets in the bank`s portfolio, a high amount of delayed 
bank`s receivables, or market risk exposures when the securities become illiquid due to the 
adverse events in the market. Here, the relationships with other risks tend to create 
uncertainty with regard to liquidity risk measurement and to the management of a bank’s 
liquidity gap profile (the difference between the bank`s assets and liabilities in a certain 
period). 
An important issue regarding banks’ liquidity is how multinational banks manage liquidity 
across their whole banking organization. Funds circulate between parent banks and their 
affiliates in diverse foreign markets. However, in the wake of a funding shock parent banks 
may start to withdraw and redirect liquidity within their banking organizations (Düwel, 
2013). In some emerging markets the large presence of foreign banks may contribute to the 
transmission of a crisis. Particularly, this may affect those CEE countries where foreign 
subsidiaries often rely on interbank and wholesale markets rather than on retail deposits for 
funding (see Aydin, 2008). Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) document that U.S. global banks 
activated their internal capital market in order to reallocate liquidity within their banking 
organizations. Furthermore, they found that the funding of foreign affiliates by parent banks 
is mainly determined by the location of the affiliate bank as a source of funding or destination 
for foreign investment, and its distance from the headquarters of the parent bank. According 
to the authors those could be more important determinants of funding than the attractiveness 
of the local economic environment.  
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Global liquidity, which reflects the availability of low-cost funding in global financial 
markets (Domanski et al., 2011), is typically created by the cross-border operations of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. Therefore, cross-border flows should be of 
particular interest for policymakers to monitor. Bruno and Shin (2014) examine global 
liquidity in terms of the aggregate cross-border lending through the banking sector. They find 
evidence for a bank leverage cycle as a determinant of the transmission of financial 
conditions across borders through banking sector capital flows. A distinctive prediction of 
their model is that local currency appreciation is associated with higher leverage of the 
banking sector, thus providing a conceptual bridge between exchange rate movements and 
financial stability. 
Events at the global level in the last few years indicate an increased complexity of liquidity 
risk and the need for its effective management and supervision (BCBS, 2008). Before the 
global financial crisis, financial markets were fairly active and resources could be provided at 
relatively low costs. The sudden disappearance of favourable market conditions shows how 
liquidity can quickly deteriorate, and that illiquidity can last for quite a long time. This 
process will be analysed in more detail in the next Chapter.  
One reason for financial fragility is the pressure to hold inefficient liquidity. If the demand 
for liquidity rises above the usual level, there will be a sharp fall in the price of assets. This 
drop in asset prices may force other banks into insolvency and exacerbate the crisis. Namely, 
as explained by Allen and Gale (2003), the pecuniary externalities from one set of agents 
forces another much larger set into bankruptcy, or in simplified way, a small shock (to 
liquidity demand) can have a large effect. The central bank can mitigate this situation by an 
appropriate injection of liquidity. However, tight regulations, such as capital controls, are 
another instrument that can potentially be used to intervene. These instruments will be 
addressed in the Chapter 4. 
2.2.2 Solvency 
Solvency implies that the real value of a bank’s assets is at least equal to the value of its 
liabilities. When the value of a bank’s assets falls short of the value of its liabilities, the bank 
is insolvent. The value of a bank’s assets may drop because borrowers become unable or 
unwilling to service their debt (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a). More precisely, a 
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bank is insolvent if loan losses exceed a bank’s compulsory and voluntary reserves together 
with its equity cushion.   
The level at which a bank’s assets exceed liabilities, is the level of bank’s capitalization, 
which is an important indicator of the banking sector stability. The amount of capital that a 
bank should hold, primarily, depends on the risk level of its assets (Hardy, 1998). A higher 
level of capitalization is required in risky credit activities, greater market fluctuations, more 
variable inflation etc. The likelihood that a bank remains solvent depends on it being 
profitable, well managed, and sufficiently well capitalized to withstand foreseeable adverse 
events (Lindgren et al., 1998, p. 9). According to Hardy (1998), changes in banks’ 
capitalization or a rapid erosion of banks' capital as they absorb mounting losses, are a signal, 
and a component, of the banking sector’s weaknesses.  Thana (2008) notes that insolvency, 
initiated by a high level of non-performing loans in banks, is another characterization of a 
banking crisis. In addition, referring to the recent subprime banking crisis, Thana (2008) 
argues that a solvency crisis can also be generated by losses in off-balance sheet positions 
arising from movements in stock market prices.  
A drop in asset prices may move other banks into insolvency and exacerbate the crisis as 
evidenced by Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Allen and 
Gale (1998, 2003), Diamond and Rajan (2009). Frank et al. (2008) argue that increasing 
financial integration and innovation can make market and funding liquidity pressures readily 
turn into issues of insolvency. Furthermore, they find that the interaction between market and 
funding illiquidity increased sharply during the global financial crisis and bank solvency 
became an important consideration. They explain that the subsequent write-downs and losses 
emanating from structured financial products required that banks raise significant amounts of 
new capital from other investors, such as sovereign wealth funds. Many banks following the 
GFC have had to strengthen their balance sheet positions through capital injections from 
other investors.  
2.2.3 Profitability 
Empirical findings suggest that bank profitability is an important predictor of financial crises 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999). The literature on the bank-lending channel (Van 
den Heuvel, 2003) has long shown that economic activity is hampered if the commercial 
banks, the most prominent agents in the credit markets, cannot execute their lending function 
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properly. Therefore, because a profitable banking sector is better able to perform its lending 
function, a profitable banking sector is likely to contribute significantly to the stability of the 
financial system (Dietricha and Wanzenriedb, 2010). However, alternatively high 
profitability may be itself be a cause of instability. Namely, after the global financial crisis it 
was noticed that excessive risks were attached to the generation of those previously high 
profits.  
In orthodox theory profitability is usually considered to be a function of internal and external 
determinants. Dietrich and Wanzenriedb (2010) explained that bank profitability is usually 
measured by the return on average assets and is expressed as a function of internal and 
external determinants. The internal determinants include bank-specific variables that 
originate from balance sheets and/or profit and loss accounts (Themba and Tobias, 2011). In 
particular variables such as bank size, risk, and overhead costs are typically used as internal 
determinants of banking profitability. The external variables reflect environmental variables 
(such as GDP growth rate, inflation, etc.) that are expected to affect the profitability of 
financial institutions. 
Summarising the internal determinants of profitability, Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) find a 
positive and significant relationship between the size and the profitability of a bank. On the 
other hand, Micco et al. (2007) find no correlation between the relative bank size and the 
return on assets, i.e., the coefficient is always positive but never statistically significant. 
Many empirical studies found that asset quality has a direct impact on the profitability of 
banks. Yuki (2006) finds that poor asset quality is the major cause of a bank’s poor 
profitability. That might reflect the fact that banks that are exposed to high-risk loans also 
have a higher accumulation of unpaid loans. These loan losses lower the returns of the 
affected banks (Dietrich and Wanzenriedb, 2010). Berger (1995) found that banks with a high 
capital ratio tend to earn more profit through translating the safety advantage into profit. 
Empirical evidence by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Abreu and Mendes (2002), and 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) indicate that the best performing banks, in terms of 
profitability, are those who maintain a high level of equity relative to their assets.  Albertazzi 
and Gambacorta (2006) explain that after a drop in bank profitability, if equity is sufficiently 
low and it is too costly to issue new shares, then a bank will usually reduce lending, 
otherwise they fail to meet regulatory capital requirements and that may produce 
contractionary real effects on consumption and investment. Another important determinant of 
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profitability is overhead costs. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) finds that the higher the overhead 
costs in relation to the assets, the lower the profitability of a bank. 
In order to evaluate the stability and soundness of the financial and banking sector many 
studies link business cycle fluctuations and banking sector profitability. A positive phase of 
economic activity seems to improve the profitability of the banking sector, primarily since 
there is a relatively high demand for loans in that phase of the business cycle, given that 
clients are more profitable than in the recession phase. Conversely, a recession in the 
economy reflects negatively on the efficiency of operations and the profitability of banks. 
Namely, bad economic conditions can worsen the quality of the loan portfolio, generating 
credit losses, which eventually reduce banks’ profits. In particular, Apergis (2009) finds that 
there exists a procyclical relationship between bank profitability and economic conditions, 
with the boom phase exerting a stronger impact on bank profitability vis-à-vis the effect 
emanating from contractionary phases. Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2006) also find that bank 
profits are pro-cyclical: GDP influences both net interest income (via lending activity) and 
loan loss provisions (via credit portfolio quality). Controlling for macroeconomic and 
structural factors, in their model, banks in the United Kingdom and United States were found 
to make higher profits than their counterparts in the euro area. They report that this result 
seems at least partly related to their more flexible cost structure, which allows intermediaries 
belonging to these banking systems to react more quickly to exogenous shocks.  
Major transformations in the economic environment can have a significant impact on banks’ 
performance. Determinants such as the central bank’s interest rate, inflation, GDP 
development, taxation and variables representing market characteristics (e.g. market 
concentration) are related to a bank’s profitability. Most studies have shown a positive 
relationship between inflation, central bank interest rates, GDP growth, and bank profitability 
(e.g., Bourke, 1989; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the legal and institutional characteristics of a 
country matter. According to the results of Bourke (1989) a bank’s concentration ratio shows 
a positive and statistically significant relationship with its profitability. On the other hand, the 
results of Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Staikouras and Wood (2004) indicate a 
negative but statistically insignificant relationship between bank concentration and profits. 
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Summing up, we can conclude that liquidity and solvency often overlap and interact with 
each other. Banks can fail either if they face liquidity shortages or if they are insolvent. Also, 
an aggregate shortage of liquidity can lead to banks becoming insolvent. Thus, it is difficult 
to determine the root cause of a banking crisis. Another predictor of a crisis may be, as noted 
above, both excessively high and low profitability, which depends on bank-specific and 
external (macroeconomic) determinants. In the next section we will review the literature on 
past banking crises in order to assess which of these requirements were disturbed in these 
crises.  
2.3 Banking Crises 
Since banking system fragility refers to the latent possibility of a banking crisis in the 
financial system, in this section we will provide an analysis of banking crises. In particular, in 
this section we will focus on banking crises before 2007, while a separate and more detailed 
analysis of the recent global financial crisis will be provided in the following Chapter. 
Banking crises have been present in the world for centuries. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) 
report that, over the past two centuries, the 66 countries they study had experienced 286 
banking crisis, 105 of which have come since 1945. There are many definitions of a banking 
crisis. Bearing in mind Tchana’s (2008) classification, a banking crisis can be identified by 
the lack of liquidity, a sharp reduction in the value of banks` assets, a credit crunch and 
insolvency. Namely, given Schwartz (1985), Miron (1986) and Wolfson (1986) research, a 
banking crisis refers to a lack of liquidity in the banking system, where the demand for 
liquidity is higher than its supply. Furthermore, for Guttentag and Herring (1984) and 
Manikow (1986) a banking crisis is characterized by a credit crunch. Fisher (1933), Flood 
and Garber (1981), and Minsky (1982) described banking crisis as a forced sale of assets 
because the structure of capital is not in line with market-determined asset values, causing a 
further decline in asset values. Therefore, according to these authors, a banking crisis begins 
with liquidity problems which lead to solvency problems. Monnin and Jakupii (2010) define 
banking instability as the probability of the banking sector becoming insolvent within the 
next quarter. Hence, a lower probability corresponds to greater stability and vice versa. These 
economists consider a banking sector to be insolvent if, at the end of the quarter, the market 
value of the assets owned by all the banks of a country is not sufficient to repay its total debt. 
This description is similar to that used by Bordo et al. (2001), who define a banking crisis as 
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a period of “financial stress resulting in the erosion of most or all of aggregate banking 
system capital”. A combination of above mentioned definitions of a banking crisis is offered 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (1985). They characterized a banking crisis as 
a sharp reduction in the value of banks` assets as well as banks` deposits, resulting either 
from an apparent or real insolvency of many banks or from an apparent or real liquidity 
problem in many banks and accompanied by some bank collapses and, possibly a credit 
crunch. 
According to Allen et al. (2009) banking crises can be explained by two theories. According 
to the first, banking crises are identified with financial panics, while according to the second 
theory crises are fundamentals-based. Both theoretical approaches have a long history. Allen 
et al. (2009) argue that according to the first theory, banking crises typically occur as the 
consequence of a financial panic, caused by random withdrawals of deposit regardless to 
changes in the real economy (Kindleberg, 1978). In the research conducted by Bryant (1980) 
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies. These analyses are 
based on multiple equilibria. Allen et al. (2009) explain that in these models, agents have 
uncertain needs for consumption in an environment in which long-term investments are 
costly to liquidate. If depositors believe that other depositors will withdraw then all agents 
redeem their claims and a panic occurs. Furthermore, Allen et al. (2009) note that equilibrium 
exists where everybody believes no panic will occur and agents withdraw their funds 
according to their consumption needs. However, they find that the theory is silent on which 
of the two equilibria will prevail and in at least one equilibrium there is a panic. They explain 
that the depositors’ beliefs are self-fulfilling and are coordinated by “sunspots”; but 
“sunspots” do not have much predictive power. Thus, they conclude that since there is no real 
account of what triggers a crisis, it is difficult to use the theory for any policy analysis. 
Finally, according to this approach banking crises can be eliminated by the adoption of a 
deposit insurance scheme. 
According to the second view, the degree of fragility of the banking sector depends solely on 
the phase of the real economy. Calomiris and Mason (2003) while studying four crises using 
a broad range of data, conclude that the first three crises were fundamental-based while the 
fourth was panic-based. However, this fundamental-based approach to a crisis will be 
discussed in the following section 2.4. A more recent, and maybe the most comprehensive 
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definition, is provided by Laeven and Valencia (2008, p. 5), who characterise a systemic 
banking crisis as an event in which: 
“… a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and 
financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a 
result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking 
system capital is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices … 
sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some 
cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general 
realization that systematically important financial institutions are in distress.” 
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, p. 56), crisis is defined by “two types of events: (i) 
bank runs that lead to closure, merger or takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions; and (ii) if there are no runs, the closure, merger, takeover or large scale 
government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that 
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions”.  
There are several theories of crises. One part of the theory of the causes of banking crises 
emphasizes asymmetric information in credit contracts or in bank-depositor relations as 
fundamental determinants behind financial crises. Namely, asymmetric information can be 
defined as a situation where different parties in a financial contract do not have the same 
information. According to orthodox neo-classical economic theory this leads to potential 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems and other informational problems that may have 
an important impact on the financial system. One possible result is financial instability and 
banking crisis (Minsky, 1992). For example, as noted by Mishkin (1997) borrowers who take 
out loans usually have much better information about potential returns and risk associated 
with the investment projects they plan to undertake than lenders do. Moreover as explained 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), borrowers with the riskiest investment projects will now be the 
ones most likely to take out the loans at high interest rates, since they will draw benefits and 
leave the losses for lenders. The result of this adverse selection is that banks ration credit, 
they stop lending, rather than raise interest rates further, causing the overall supply of loans to 
decrease (the ‘credit crunch’). From the perspective of the depositor, the bank management 
generally has much better information about the quality of the bank's assets than the depositor 
has. This approach gives an explanation of bank runs and a banking panic based on the idea 
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that depositors cannot costlessly value individual bank assets (Bordo and Wheelock, 1998). 
Hence, they have difficulty in monitoring the performance of banks. 
It is difficult to identify and predict the exact timing of bank runs. As a result, in the literature 
there is still no single criterion for detecting a banking crisis. While studying the indicators of 
the banking crises in different countries, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) proposed simple 
criteria for identifying a crisis which combines qualitative data on the state of the banking 
sector’s assets and quantitative indicators of non-performing loans and bank solvency. Once 
the criteria have been established, financial experts in specific countries could make a 
professional assessment of whether a crisis exists or not. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiach 
(1998b, 2005) suggest the following indicators for identifying a crisis in the banking sector: 
when the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceed 10 per 
cent and the cost of the rescue operation is at least 2 per cent of GDP. Disruptions in the 
banking sector may result in a state takeover of banks; an onslaught of depositors
8
 and a 
deposit freeze in banks. Given that indicators of asset quality, in particular the incidence of 
non-performing loans, often are identified with disturbances in the banking sector, section 2.5 
will be dedicated to  defining non-performing loans, analysing their costs and assessing how 
the problems associated with a rising incidence may be addressed.  
As stated in the previous section, banking crises can be very costly. According to Honohan 
and Klingebiel (2000), banking sector distress can frequently be attributed to crisis 
management measures of a particular kind adopted by the government during the early years 
of the crisis. They reveal that the fiscal costs are linked to a set of crisis management 
strategies. In particular, their results suggest that unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended 
liquidity support, repeated recapitalizations, debtor bail-outs and regulatory forbearance add 
significantly and sizably to those costs. According to Cecchetti et al. (2009) not all of these 
crises have had visible real costs, but most have. In their restricted sample of 40 financial 
crises fully one fourth resulted in cumulative output losses of more than 25 per cent of pre-
crisis GDP. And one third of the crisis-related contractions lasted for three years or more. 
Most, but not all, systemic banking crises in their sample coincide with a sharp contraction in 
output from which it takes several years to recover.  
                                                          
8 A situation when a large number of customers withdraw their deposits from a bank at the same time.  
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2.4 Links between Banking Sector Stability and Economic Activity 
The link between banking stability and economic activity has been of particular interest to 
policy makers in order to help them to inform their monetary policy decisions. A stable 
macroeconomic setting is typically viewed as one of the preconditions for financial, and 
hence, banking stability. Examining the relation between a stable macro economy and 
banking sector stability is the role of this section. 
In examining the relations between banking sector stability and the real economy, the  
literature is mainly focused on two issues: first, on macroeconomic influence to banking 
sector stability; and; second, on quantifying the costs of banking sector crises in terms of real 
output losses. As mentioned in section 2.2, there are studies that consider that the 
development of the financial and banking sector acts as an important contributor to economic 
growth (King and Levine, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998a; Levine, et al., 
2000; Mavrotas and Son, 2006; etc.). However, in this thesis we are interested in examining 
and assessing banking sector stability, thus we will focus on the first strand of the above 
mention literature. Moreover, Monnin and Jokipii (2010) summarising previous research on 
banking sector stability, and relying on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998a) findings, note that it is difficult to separate cause and effect in the 
financial sector to real economy, thus it is less clear whether or not the banking sector is the 
main trigger of an economic slowdown. 
In order to determine the banking crisis, many studies focus on the role of the 
macroeconomic variables and its impact on banking system. As mentioned in section 2.3. 
according to one strand of theory, the fundamental based approach (Gorton, 1988; and Allen 
and Gale, 1998, 2007), leading economic indicators could predict the onset of banking crises. 
Moreover, according to these authors the banking sector stability depends solely on the phase 
of the real economy. Basically, according to these authors, when the economy goes into 
recession or depression the returns on bank assets will be low. Given their fixed liabilities in 
the form of deposits or bonds they may unable to remain solvent. This may precipitate a run 
on banks. This view is consistent with the research conducted by Gorton (1988) where in the 
U.S. in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a leading economic indicator, the 
liabilities of failed businesses, could predict the occurrence of banking crises. Furthermore, 
Allen and Gale (1998) develop a model that is in line with the business cycle view of the 
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origins of banking crises. They assume that depositors can observe a leading economic 
indicator that provides public information about future bank asset returns. If high returns are 
anticipated then depositors are quite willing to keep their funds in the bank. Allen and Gale 
(2007) explained that with real shocks, optimal risk sharing requires contingencies and, given 
the debt-like properties of demand deposits, crises are the only way to achieve these 
contingencies. In this case banking crises can be eliminated by a central bank acting as a 
lender of last resort.  
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiatche (1998a) the emergence of systemic banking 
crises in developed and developing countries suggests that crises tend to erupt when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak, particularly when growth is low and inflation is high. 
Also, high real interest rates are clearly associated with systemic banking sector problems. 
However, they state that a weak macroeconomic environment is not the sole factor behind 
systemic banking sector problems. Structural characteristics of the banking sector and of the 
economic environment in general also play a role. Furthermore, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) stressed that a banking crisis may be preceded immediately by a marked slowdown in 
GDP growth. Hogart et al. (2001)  analysing a sample of 43 banking crises find that crises 
have often come after a boom in developed countries but frequently occur at the peak of one 
in emerging market economies. In particular their findings suggest that average GDP growth 
in the three years before crises was above its 10-year trend in two-thirds of the emerging 
market countries and three-quarters of the developed countries.  
Herring and Wachter (2003) found that many financial crises were the corollary of bubbles in 
real estate markets. That finding has been confirmed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b, 
2009), who found that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by credit booms and 
asset price bubbles. Knutsen (2012) considers that the growth in bank lending during the 
upswing of the business cycle and the corresponding accumulation of debt in the non-
financial sector increases the banks’ credit risk, and consequently financial fragility in the 
financial sector. This amplifies the danger of an outburst of financial crisis, and increases 
systemic risk. Thus, the foundation for a financial crisis is laid down during a credit fuelled 
boom. Examining the events which preceded the last global financial crisis, Adrian and Shin 
(2008b), Brunnermeier (2008), Greenlaw et al. (2008), and Taylor (2008b) considered that 
one cause can be found in the policies of low interest rate adopted by the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks after the collapse of the technology stock bubble. Those factors, as 
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reported by Allen et al. (2009), helped fuel a dramatic increase in house prices in the U.S. and 
several other countries such as the U.K., Ireland and Spain. In 2006 this bubble reached its 
peak in the U.S. and house prices there and elsewhere started to fall. This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3.  
Previous research suggests that a good macroeconomic environment positively affects the 
quality of banks` assets. However, research suggests that banks do not make enough 
provisions in these positive conditions, and when the conditions reverse, bad loans and loan 
losses emerge. Quagliarello (2007) explains that the beginning of an expansionary phase in 
the economy firms’ profits tend to increase, asset prices rise and customers’ expectations are 
optimistic. Expansion of aggregate demand leads to a rapid, often more than proportional, 
growth in bank lending and in the economy’s indebtedness. During the boom banks may 
underestimate their risk exposures, relaxing credit standards and reducing provisions for 
future losses. After the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, 
borrowers’ creditworthiness deteriorates and non-performing assets are revealed, thus causing 
losses in banks’ balance sheets (cyclicality). Quagliarello (2007) finds that the business cycle 
affects non-performing loans for a large panel of Italian banks over the period 1985–2002. 
This discussion will be continued in the Chapter 5, where we will investigate which 
macroeconomic variables influence the incidence of non-performing loans.  
Even though many banking crisis were preceded by macroeconomic vulnerabilities it would 
not be appropriate to link banking instability entirely to macroeconomic instability. Theory 
suggests that macroeconomic instability is a sufficient condition for banking crises to emerge. 
Moreover, systemic crises are also closely linked with institutional and structural factors. 
Regulatory changes, weaknesses in the legal framework, inadequate official supervision are 
frequently important elements. Importantly, banking crises often reveal existing weaknesses 
within the banking system. Namely, Llewellyn (1999) notes that usually the case that the 
seeds of the problem (e.g. over-lending; weak risk analysis and control) were sown in the 
earlier upswing of the cycle. Even earlier, González-Hermosillo, et al. (1996) explains that 
bank fragility is essentially, a function of liquidity risk, market risk and credit risk. In turn, 
those risks are conditioned by macroeconomic conditions and can be influenced by the 
overall fragility of the banking system. They suggest that bank-specific indicators explain the 
likelihood of a bank’s failure, while macroeconomic variables largely determine the timing of 
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failures. This analysis will be continued in Chapter 5 where we will investigate both 
macroeconomic and bank-specific indicators of banking sector distress. 
2.5 Non-Performing Loans 
Over the last two decade the literature that examines non-performing loans has expanded in 
line with the greater attention paid to understanding the factors responsible for financial 
vulnerability. This situation may be attributed to the fact that non-performing loans have an 
important role in assessing financial vulnerability as evidenced by the strong association 
between non-performing loans and banking and financial crises, as mentioned in the previous 
section. According to some researchers, the incidence of non-performing loans is a significant 
predictor of insolvency (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Barr and Siems, 1994; Berger and De 
Young, 1997). Hou (2007) concludes that failing banking institutions always had a high level 
of non-performing loans prior to their failure. Greenidge and Grosvenor (2010) suggest that 
the incidence of non-performing loans is a key element in the initiation and progression of 
financial and banking crises. Louzis et al. (2010), citing Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), also 
indicate that rising non-performing loans can be used to mark the onset of a banking crisis. 
However, even if non-performing loans exceed the previous highest recorded level that does 
not necessarily lead to bank failure. Furthermore, Guy (2011) argues that non-performing 
loans have been widely used as a measure of banks’ asset quality, and a high incidence is 
often associated with banking crises in both the developed and developing world. 
Historically, there is abundant evidence that a rise in non-performing loans precede banking 
and financial crises in Argentina, East Asia and Sub-Saharan African Countries during the 
1990s. Namely, the 1997 East Asian financial crisis left Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea 
and Malaysia severely affected by high non-performing loans. Namely, as documented by the 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), non- performing loans of the banking system reached 19 per 
cent of aggregate loans in Indonesia, 17 per cent in Thailand, and 16 per cent in Malaysia by 
the end of 1997. However, according to Ahmad (2002) analysing the Malaysian financial 
system, credit risk had already started to build-up before the onset of the 1997 Asian 
Financial crisis, but became more serious as NPLs increased. Similarly, Fofack (2005) found 
this relationship to be significant; highlighting those high costs of non-performing loans 
exacerbated the banking crisis. The global financial crisis was also attributed to the rapid 
default of sub-prime loans/mortgages.  There is evidence that the level of NPLs in the US 
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started to increase substantially in early 2006 in all sectors (Greenidge and Grosvenor, 2010). 
Bearing in mind this previous experience it is understandable why so much emphasis is 
currently given to studying the determinants of non-performing loans when assessing banking 
stability.  
The terms bad loans or problematic loans are often used as synonyms for non-performing 
loans (Berger and De Young, 1997; Fofack, 2005; Bexley and Nenninger, 2012). Fofack 
(2005) alternately uses impaired loans for non- performing loans. According to Berger and 
De Young (1997), a high level of non-performing loans indicates poor management in 
banking institutions.
9
 Generally non-performing loans are defined as loans which do not 
generate income for a relatively long period of time. According to Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1999), IMF Guide (2004a) and Guy (2011) that is the principal and/or interest on these loans 
has been left unpaid for at least 90 days.  
According to the Institute for International Finance (IIF) and Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) non-performing loans are categorized as: 
- Substandard: Payment in doubt (Overdue by more than 3 months up to 6 months). 
Banks make 10% provision for the unsecured portion of loans. 
- Doubtful: Payment improbable (Overdue by more than 6 month to 1 year). Banks 
make 50% provision for doubtful loans. 
- Loss: Virtually uncollectable (Overdue by more than 1 year). Banks make 100% 
provision for loss loans. 
As summarised by Barisitz (2011), national non-performing loans definitions commonly refer 
to three elements. The first element refers to “principal or interest 90 days or more overdue”, 
which is in line with the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide (2004). 
Second, the presence of underlying “well-defined weaknesses” in either the loan or the 
borrower. This part refers to the bank’s assessment of to what extent the borrower’s 
economic or financial standing has deteriorated (the debtor’s insolvency and/or bankruptcy) 
which could happen before the period of 90 days overdue. And the last one refers to the 
frequently applied credit quality categories, where the weakest categories are “substandard”, 
“doubtful” and “loss or write off`”, proposed by IIF and BIS.  
                                                          
9
 This will be discussed in detail in section 5.3. 
55 
 
This classification is based on the IIF and BIS documents but, different countries have 
different approaches to classify their non-performing loans. Some countries, such as Russia
10
, 
shorten the period for unpaid loans when they become past due. The intention in this case is 
to put such loans on lenders’ watch lists sooner and require them to address these loans 
before losses start to escalate (Ernst and Young, 2004). A fuller discussion of the 
comparability of definitions of non-performing loans will be presented in the section 6.3. 
Bearing in mind the findings of the literature on how non-performing loans may be harmful 
for banks, the regulatory institutions need to prescribe minimum standards for credit risk 
management. Dedu and Nechif (2010) argue that the basis of sound credit risk management is 
to identify existing and potential risks inherent in banks’ lending activities. Furthermore, they 
proposed that measures to counter such risks should include: policies controlling the large 
exposures, adequate diversification, and improved monitoring of risk exposures. These 
policies were in line with those advocated by deServigny and Renault (2004). Further 
proposed measures were the appropriate classification of assets, which involves the 
assessment of the repayment capacity of the loan portfolio and other credit instruments, 
including interest incurred and not received that expose the bank to credit risk; and loss 
provisioning policies or establishment of an adequate provisions to absorb the expected losses 
in the loan portfolio and the level of assets that generates losses (Greuning and Brajovic, 
2003). 
In 1996 it was agreed to establish a universal international standard among banking 
regulators. The aim of that standard was to have a measure for how much capital a bank 
needed to hold in order to guard against credit, market and operational risk. That is how the 
first Basel Accord was created. Basel I was focused on the Cooke ratio, a ratio defined as the 
amount of capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Risk-weighted assets are simply the 
classified assets in four categories, multiplied by the risk weight, as presented in the 
following table. 
 
 
                                                          
10
 In Russia, non-performing loans for legal persons are as loans in arrears for more than 30 days, while non-
performing loans for actual persons are loans in arrears for more than 60 days. 
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Table 2.1 Risk weights of on-balance-sheet assets 
Risk weights (%) Asset category 
0% Cash, claims on central governments and central banks denominated in national 
currency and funded in that currency, other claims on OECD central governments 
and central banks, claims collateralised by cash of OECD central-government 
securities or guaranteed by OECD central governments. 
20% Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guaranteed by, or 
collateralised by securities issued by such banks; claims on banks incorporated in 
the OECD and claims guaranteed by OECD incorporated banks; claims on 
securities firms incorporated in the OECD subject to comparable supervisory and 
regulatory arrangements, including in particular risk-based capital requirements, 
and claims guaranteed by these securities firms; claims on banks incorporated in 
countries outside the OECD with a residual maturity of up to one year and claims 
with a residual maturity of up to one year guaranteed by banks incorporated in 
countries outside the OECD; claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector 
entities, excluding central government, and claims guaranteed by or collateralised 
by securities issued by such entities; cash items in process of collection.   
50% Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied 
by the borrower or that is rented.  
100% Claims on the private sector; claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD 
with a residual maturity of over one year; claims on central governments outside 
the OECD; Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector; 
premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets; real estate and other 
investments; capital instruments issued by other banks; all other assets.  
Source: BCBS (1988), Annex 2. 
 
The aggregate amount of each asset category is then multiplied by the risk weight assigned to 
that category. The resulting weighted values from each of the risk categories are then added 
together. The sum is the bank’s total risk-weighted assets, which forms the denominator of 
the Cooke Ratio.  
However, from 2004 a new more risk sensitive capital adequacy framework was adopted. 
Namely, according to BCBS (2004) Basel II establishes more rigorous assessment of risk and 
capital management requirements designed to ensure that a bank maintains capital reserves 
appropriate to the risk the bank exposes itself through its investment and lending practices. 
However, the Basel II framework allows a more flexible approach for estimating the 
minimum supervisory capital, emphasising the use of a standardized and internal rating-based 
(IRB) approach. In the standardised approach, the risk weights are based on a rating that is 
provided by external credit assessment institutions or other institutions accepted by national 
supervisors such as export credit agencies, while in the IRB approach, the rating is produced 
internally by a bank’s risk-management system.  The banks are allowed to use the ratings of 
more than one external credit assessment institutions but some precise rules are designed to 
prevent any opportunistic (‘cherry-picking’) behaviour (Ayadi, 2005). Therefore, banks will 
not be allowed to choose, for each customer, the rating source assigning the most favourable 
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judgement (thereby reducing the total amount of regulatory capital).  As argued by Ayadi 
(2005), it was hoped that better ratings would bring about lower weights in the computation 
of risk-weighted assets; moreover, as in Basel I, different categories of counterparties (from 
individuals to sovereign governments) will receive different sets of coefficients. In the Basel 
II standardised approach a bank allocates a risk weight to each of its assets and off-balance 
sheet positions. It then calculates a sum of risk-weighted asset values. A risk weight of 100% 
indicates that an exposure is included in calculation of risk weighted assets value which 
translates into a capital charge equal to 8% of that value, as the minimum prescribed capital 
ratio is 8% according to Basel II.  
In addition, in order to ensure comparability across banks, the Basel II established minimum 
qualifying criteria for the use of internal rating-based approaches that cover the 
comprehensiveness and integrity of banks’ internal credit risk assessment capabilities 
(Fofack, 2005). According to the IRB approach, credit exposure will be a function of five 
basic risk parameters which are presented in Table 2.2 below.  
Table 2.2 Risk parameters by the IRB approach 
Type of parameter Definition of the risk parameter 
Probability of default 
(PD) 
The default probability for a borrower over a one-year period.  A starting point 
of the measurement of PD is the definition of default. In general, the default 
event arises from the non-payment of principal or interest. It is commonly 
accepted that default occurs if payment is past due 90 days. These types of loans 
are characterised as ‘non-performing’.  
Loss given default 
(LGD) 
The expected amount of loss on a facility provided to the borrower when s/he 
defaults. To determine LGD, a bank must be able to identify the borrowers who 
defaulted, the exposures outstanding at the time of default and the amount and 
timing of repayments ultimately received. In addition, private information on the 
borrower and the availability of collateral could serve to develop the LGD 
estimates. 
Exposure at default 
(EAD) 
The amount the borrower owes at the time of default. The EAD is the sum of the 
current utilisation expressed as a percentage of the total commitment and the 
loan equivalent, which is the additional utilisation as a percentage of the unused 
commitment. 
Maturity estimate of 
the exposure (m) 
This parameter raises the possibility that the original probability of default needs 
to be revised and possibly increased.  
Diversification 
coefficient (rho) 
The degree of diversification and correlation of the credit portfolio to which the 
exposure belongs.  
Source: Ayadi (2005) 
 
According to BCBS (2005), bank calculates the expected loss through a simple multiplication 
of (PD*LGD*EAD). In conjunction with the maturity estimate of the exposure (m) and the 
diversification coefficient (rho), these risk parameters are translated into estimates of 
potential future loss, thus defining the basis of minimum capital requirements (Ayadi, 2005). 
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The IRB approach enables estimates to be made of capital requirements for various specific 
exposures, such as to the corporate, sovereign or retail sectors. 
Regulations and risk measurement have to be strengthened in order to prevent an 
accumulation of non-performing loans and avoid a possible banking crisis. However, to what 
extent Basel II provided such protection will be investigated in Chapter 4. Namely, in 
Chapter 4 we examine whether the regulations before the global financial crisis were 
adequate.   
A high incidence of non-performing loans tends to generate economic, financial and fiscal 
costs to financial institutions. Firstly, non-performing loans deteriorate the banks’ financial 
statements. Furthermore, provisions for non-performing loans and write offs which are made 
in banks` balance sheets in order to cover potential losses, affect banks profitability.  Non – 
performing loans may reduce banks liquidity, credit expansion, and consequently slow down 
the growth of the real sector (Somoye, 2010). According to Fofack (2005), high levels of 
non-performing loans can produce significant economic and financial cost. He explained that  
these loans may negatively affect the level of private investment, increase deposit liabilities 
and constrain the scope of bank credit to private sector through a reduction in banks ‘capital, 
falling saving rates as a result of runs on banks, accumulation of losses and related increased 
provisions to compensate for these losses. Thus, according to Fofack (2005), non-performing 
loans potentially reduce private consumption and in the absence of credible deposit guarantee 
mechanisms to protect small depositors, can be a source of economic contraction, especially 
when coupled with declining gross capital formation in the context of a credit crunch caused 
by erosion of banks’ equity and assets.  Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Laeven and 
Valencia (2008) summarising the evidence from systemic banking crises conclude that a high 
level of non-performing loans may cause significant financial costs. For example, in 
Macedonia in 1993-1994 70 per cent of total banking system loans were non-performing and 
the costs of banking system rehabilitation, obligations from assumption of external debt, 
liabilities regarding frozen foreign exchange, and contingent liabilities in banks were together 
estimated at 32% of GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 2008). Also, 
in 1998, non-performing loans in Romania were estimated to amount to 25-30 per cent of the 
total loans in six major state-owned banks. The Central Bank injected 210 million dollars in 
the largest state bank, which was about 0.6 per cent of GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999; 
Laeven and Valencia, 2008).  
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Given the implications of the high level of non-performing loans for investment, economic 
growth and the future banking and financial stability, these loans cannot be left unresolved. 
Non-performing loans resolution usually refers to loan restructuring and collection, in order 
to ‘clean’ balance sheets. However, in more acute situations, outright sale or securitization of 
problematic assets may be needed. Historically, the resolution of non-performing loans 
referred to the transfer of these loans from fragile financial institution by asset management 
companies and/or deposit insurance schemes. Dado and Klingebiel (2002) while concluding 
that the proper management and disposition of impaired assets are one of the most important 
tasks of successful and speedy financial restructuring,  distinguish, citing Sheng (1996), two 
alternatives for asset management strategies which include setting up a government agency 
with the full responsibility for acquiring, restructuring and selling  of the assets (the 
centralized approach) or letting banks and other creditors manage their  own non-performing 
assets (the decentralized approach). Furthermore, Dado and Klingebiel (2002) analyse seven 
banking crises in which governments mainly relied on banks to resolve non-performing 
assets. Their analysis underscores that as in the case of a centralized strategy the prerequisites 
for a successful decentralized restructuring strategy are manifold. The successful countries 
were those who significantly improved the banking system’s capital position enabling banks 
to write down loan losses; banks as well as corporations were given adequate incentives to 
engage in corporate restructuring; and ownership links between banks and corporations were 
limited or severed during crises. 
According to Sirtaine and Rosenberg (2012) research in Europe and Central Asia, efforts by 
banks to resolve NPLs have been proceeding slowly because of a collective action problem
11  
and of various obstacles in the business environment
12 
which make NPL resolution difficult. 
Namely, they explain that individual banks have too little incentives to resolve NPL solely, 
thus the government or central bank may have to initiate and/or coordinate action. In addition 
they suggest that the collective action problem could also be overcome by direct government 
intervention, but this has the downside of potentially large fiscal costs or the retroactive 
                                                          
11
 Collective action program includes both individual banks and public sector interventions, because individual 
banks cannot usually resolve the problem of high non-performing loans by themselves. 
12
 These obstacles mainly refer to laws and regulations that need to be amended to remove obstacles to NPL 
resolution. According to Papa (2012), the main barriers to fast non-performing loans resolution are 
shortcomings in the regulatory and accounting frameworks, the absence of well-developed corporate and 
insolvency framework, adverse tax incentives as well as simply overloaded court systems and too lengthy 
proceedings.  
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change of private contracts by government fiat. This, the World Bank argues, should 
therefore be confined to truly exceptional circumstances. With non-performing loans being 
unresolved in an appropriate timeframe, economies might be hampered by resources being 
tied to unprofitable sectors. Whilst a speedy resolution of non-performing loans is necessary, 
this should be conducted in a manner that contributes to overall banking stability. For 
example, in the case of Hungarian, Latvian and Romanian banks in 2012, a sudden write-
down of loans may cause large capital shortages, with solvency ratios falling below the 
required minimum (UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis, 2012). 
2.6 Contagion  
As explained in section 2.2, in Diamond and Dybvig`s (1983) classical model of a bank run it 
is rational for individual depositors to either hold funds in the bank or withdraw  funds, 
depending on the actions of all other depositors. Thus, in a currency crisis, the process is 
analogous to a bank run in that there is a sudden withdrawal of funds from a country sparked 
by investors` fear that unless they act quickly they will be too late to claim the limited pool of 
foreign exchange reserves (Dornbusch et al., 2000).  
When explaining contagion in financial markets, Sell (2001) differentiates between a 
fundamental contagion, which is caused by direct links between the country originating the 
crisis and the countries affected by its consequences, and a non-fundamental contagion, 
which could be due to a general shift in the risk perception of international investors. Kaluza 
(2010) referencing the World Bank provides a comprehensive definition of contagion. 
Namely, he provides three distinct definitions of contagion: a broad one, a restrictive one as 
well as a very restrictive definition. The broad definition of the contagion describes the 
“cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-country spillover effects” (p.3). 
This broad view of contagion views contagion as any transmission of shocks across countries. 
This view considers that contagion can take place both during “good” times and “bad” times, 
it does not need to be related to crisis, even though, contagion has been emphasized during 
crisis times. The restrictive definition provided by the World Bank describes contagion as the 
“transmission of shocks to other countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any 
fundamental link among the countries and beyond common shocks” (p.4). Therefore, a crisis 
could spread from one country to other countries not only via fundamental channels, but also 
by herding behaviour of international investors. The very restrictive definition by the World 
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Bank describes contagion as “when cross-country correlations increase during crisis times 
relative to correlations during tranquil times” (p.4). Therefore, the impact of certain shocks 
across countries would systematically increase during crisis times. 
In general, contagion includes shocks which are transmitted through trade links, competitive 
devaluations and financial links (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Sell, 2001).  Dungey et al. (2003) 
consider these will produce an anticipated spillovers, and they include linkages that capture 
changes in market fundamentals and economic relationships between countries. However, 
according to Dungey et al. (2003), who are citing Masson (1999), Favero and Giazvazzi 
(2000) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), there are also unanticipated spillovers. Namely, these 
shocks are transmitted between countries by linkages that are not transparent, and are typical 
in equity, currency and fixed interest markets. Dungey et al. (2003) provide an empirical 
analysis of the transmission of contagion in equity markets during the Russian bond default 
and LTCM crises in 1998. Contagion was identified as the effects of unanticipated shocks 
from either Russia or the United States on other global markets. Contagion from Russian 
bond default in 1998 was found to be important, but quantitatively smaller than contagion 
from LTCM crisis, and mostly affected industrial countries. There were two main channels of 
transmission; one was through direct exposure of U.S. banks and hedge funds and European 
banks to Russia. The second was an indirect channel arising from interconnections between 
German and European financial markets, as well as that of the United States.   
Eichengreen and Rose (1999) distinguish two channels for the international transmission of 
speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets. The first channel is trade links, where 
they consider that attacks spill-over contagiously to other countries with which the subject 
country trades. The second channel is macroeconomic similarities, where they consider that 
attacks spread to other countries where economic policies and conditions are broadly similar. 
Their large, quarterly panel of twenty industrial country data from 1959-1993, suggests that 
both the “macroeconomic” and “trade” channels of transmission are empirically relevant, 
however, the trade effects dominated. 
Eichengreen and Rose (1999), Glick and Rose (1999), and Forbes (2001) stress trade 
linkages. In addition, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) (2009) notes that the role 
of trade channels of transmission has increasingly become important for emerging market 
economies during the last two decades. Namely with a speeding up of the process of global 
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integration, trade openness rose rapidly. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003); 
Caramazza, et al. (2000); Fratzscher (2002); and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
emphasize financial channels, whilst Forbes and Chinn (2004) attribute the main role in the 
transmission of financial shocks to trade, with bank lending being of increasing importance 
over time. 
Enders and Peter (2012) investigate the transmission of the global financial crisis, of 2007-
2009 via trade and financial channels. Calibrated to German data, their model predicts 95% 
of the observed decline in real output at the beginning of 2009. The trade channel turns out to 
be responsible for 70% of this movement, while the financial channel explains the remaining 
30%. However, transmission via the financial channel is found to trigger a longer-lasting 
recession relative to the trade channel, thereby prolonging the crisis abroad. Balakrishnan et 
al. (2009) find evidence that financial stress, which has appeared to be a key conduit of 
transmission, tends to spread rapidly to emerging economies and with a high pass-through. 
They concluded that the unprecedented spike in financial stress in advanced economies in the 
third quarter of 2008 had a major effect on emerging economies and raised the financial 
stress index above levels seen during the Asian crisis. The origins and nature of the global 
financial crisis will be analysed in more detail in the following Chapter.  
Finally, the transmission of a shock through these channels may affect multiple countries at 
the same time (a common shock) or a specific country (a country specific shock). As 
explained by Balakrishnan et al. (2009) the role of common factors is likely related to the 
increasing financial integration of the majority of emerging economies in the past decades or 
in other words, financial globalization. One example is common-lender effects via the blanket 
withdrawal of funds by highly exposed multinational financial institutions, which will be 
explained in the next Chapter. Beside these channels of transmission, country-specific 
indicators of vulnerability can make certain countries more prone to the propagation of 
external shocks. As suggested by the empirical literature these indicators, include current 
account and budget deficits, composition of capital inflows, domestic banking sector 
indicators, and other structural characteristics.  
According to the IMF’s WEO (2009), emerging economies obtain some protection against 
financial stress from their typically lower current account and fiscal deficits and higher 
foreign reserves during positive phases of the advanced economies’ cycle. However, during a 
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downswing in advanced economies, they cannot prevent its transmission, although they may 
limit the implications of financial stress for the real economy by utilising foreign reserves to 
buffer the effects of a drop in capital inflows.  
The transmission of potential shocks is becoming stronger over time given that the emerging 
economies have increasing financial links to advanced economies. In the recent period, in 
European transition economies bank lending has been considered as the major channel of 
transmission. Namely, Aydin (2008) demonstrates that interbank market conditions in 
Western Europe have had an increasing impact on bank lending in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, this topic will be addressed in Chapter 3.   
2.7 Conclusion 
In this Chapter the importance of banking stability has been explained and the main 
preconditions for a stable banking sector, liquidity, solvency and profitability, identified. The 
literature review suggests that the violation of these preconditions may lead to a banking 
crisis, which can be costly for the entire economy. In general, a banking crisis can be 
identified by the lack of liquidity, a sharp reduction in the value of banks` assets, a credit 
crunch and growing insolvency.  
Many banking crisis were preceded by macroeconomic vulnerabilities. A stable 
macroeconomic environment is one of the preconditions for financial, and hence, banking 
stability. However, it would not be appropriate to link banking instability entirely to previous 
macroeconomic instability. There are other factors contributing to the banking distress, which 
will be addressed later in the thesis. 
Banking crises are difficult to identify and predict; however, according to previous empirical 
studies, an increasing incidence of non-performing loans usually precedes banking and 
financial crises. In general, non-performing loans are loans which do not generate income for 
a relatively long period of time. It has been argued that the incidence of non-performing loans 
is affected by the macroeconomic environment and bank-specific indicators. A fuller analysis 
of these determinants will be provided in Chapter 5.  
In this Chapter we have explained that contagion results from shocks which are transmitted 
through trade and financial links. Moreover, a shock transmitted through these channels may 
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affect multiple countries at the same time. The common lender effect is an example how 
shocks can be transmitted to other countries, due to increased financial integration and 
globalization. In addition, country-specific indicators of vulnerability, such current account 
and budget deficits, composition of capital inflows, domestic banking sector indicators, 
indicate how certain countries are more prone to the external shocks.  
The following Chapter will assess which of the preconditions for banking stability were 
disturbed in the recent global financial crisis. Furthermore, Chapter 3 will analyse how the 
global financial crisis spread to the CEE region, leaving a high proportion of non-performing 
loans in most CEE banking sectors.   
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3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter evaluates the fundamental causes and consequences of the global financial 
crisis, concentrating upon the role of financial linkages. The Chapter will serve as a special 
case of the previous Chapter, in the sense of explaining the mechanisms behind the 
occurrence and severity of this particular crisis. As explained in Chapter 2, macroeconomic 
and financial risks are closely interrelated. Macroeconomic instability (inflation, 
unemployment, external imbalances, asset price bubbles and excessive credit growth) may 
contribute to financial instability, particularly when banks and their borrowers are exposed to 
significant interest rate and exchange rate risks.  
By analysing the causes of the global financial crisis, we seek to identify the main 
macroeconomic influences at work. In addition, we consider the consequences of global 
financial crises in order to understand the contribution of the finance and banking sector to 
the contagion process, whereby the effects of the global financial crisis are transmitted from 
the countries where it originated to the countries of CEE and SEE. There are several linkages 
that are potentially able to transmit external shocks across borders. However, here, the focus 
is on financial linkages and on potentially moderating influences of different financial 
structures. This Chapter provides illustrative statistics for the pre-crisis period indicating 
potential macro and financial imbalances in the CEE region. The crisis was followed by 
rapidly multiplying credit quality problems, accompanied by a credit crunch and a high level 
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of non-performing loans. The global crisis has called into question how parent banks treated 
their subsidiaries in CEE region, given the dominant ownership of foreign banking groups in 
region. 
One of the aims of this Chapter is to demonstrate how macro structural developments 
contributed to the global financial crisis. This part will contribute to the analysis in Chapter 6, 
where we will investigate, among the others, the effect of the macro determinants on the 
incidence of non-performing loans which have remained high in the post-crisis period. The 
second objective of this Chapter is to explain the influence of financial and banking systems 
structures and their implications for economic performance in CEE economies in the 
aftermath of the GFC. In particular, we consider the implications of a high degree of foreign 
ownership for the contagion process.  
This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an analysis of the global financial 
crisis, explaining its causes and consequences. Section 3.3 evaluates the macro vulnerabilities 
in Central and Eastern Europe in the pre-crisis period, with Subsection 3.3.1 examining the 
phenomenon of excessive credit growth in the CEE region during this period. In the next 
Section, 3.4, the analysis assesses the main financial linkages in CEE. The discussion in 
Subsection 3.4.1 provides an overview of the pattern of bank ownership in the CEE region, 
while in Subsection 3.4.2 the analysis focuses on the common lender and cross border 
lending in the region. Section 3.5 discusses the impact of the GFC on the CEE region and 
subsequently analyses the actions of western parent banks in CEE during this period. The 
conclusions of this Chapter are presented in Section 3.6. 
3.2 The Global Financial Crisis 
For the first time since the 1930s, the world economy experienced a major global financial 
crisis in 2008. The crisis started as a “subprime” crisis in the United States in the summer of 
2007, and later spread to a number of other countries through a combination of direct 
exposures to subprime assets, the gradual loss of confidence in a number of asset classes and 
the drying-up of wholesale financial markets (Merrouche and Nier, 2010). As noted by 
Merrouche and Nier (2010), the major Western economies faced financial imbalances, 
characterized by an overreliance on wholesale funding sources by their banking systems and 
asset bubbles in residential property markets. The GFC was accompanied by dramatic events 
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such as the failure of major financial institutions and significant government interventions in 
their financial systems around the world. First, the causes of GFC will be discussed.  
3.2.1 Causes of the Global Financial Crisis 
This section investigates the drivers of the global financial crisis. There is, as yet, no 
complete agreement on the causes of global financial imbalances. According to Taylor (2007) 
and White (2009), accommodative monetary policy in the US from 2001 fuelled an increase 
in financial imbalances. Accommodative monetary policy is usually used to stimulate 
consumers spending by making borrowing cheaper by lowering the interest rate. According 
to Adrian and Shin (2008b) low short-term rates may have reduced the cost of wholesale 
funding for financial institutions, leading them to increase the leverage. In addition, low 
interest rates provided investors with incentives to hold riskier assets, including structured 
products that promised higher returns (Gerlach and Moretti, 2011). Moreover, Taylor (2007) 
argues that low interest rates in financial markets as a whole increased the supply of and 
demand for mortgages, causing a surge in housing price inflation. Against this, Merrouche 
and Nier (2010), citing Jiménez et al. (2007) and Gambacorta (2009), reveal that lower policy 
rates are associated with lower risk-taking, since low short term rates increase intermediation 
margins and profits, which in turn can reduce the incentive for financial institutions to take 
risks. 
According to Portes (2009), Bernanke (2009), Eichengreen (2009), Krugman (2009) and 
King (2010) widening global trading imbalances and associated capital flows were the key 
factors contributing to the global financial crisis. Borio and Disyatat (2011) explain that an 
excess of saving over investment in emerging market countries, as reflected in corresponding 
current account surpluses, eased financial conditions in major developed deficit countries and 
exerted significant downward pressure on world interest rates. Furthermore, they note that 
low interest rates fuelled a credit boom and risk-taking in major advanced economies. This is 
in line with King (2010) who argues that the large flows of capital into western financial 
markets decreased interest rates and encouraged excessive risk-taking. As summarized by 
Merrouche and Nier (2010),  citing Bernanke (2005), high capital inflows may reduce long–
term interest rates (and thus compress spreads), causing financial institutions to lever up and 
investors to “search for yield”.  In addition, Ostry et al. (2010) note that large capital inflows 
may provide lower-cost financing for local banks, and they also may reduce long term 
interest rates. While Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) explain that, due to the large capital 
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inflows, the total credit supply to the domestic economy may increase, causing a rise of local 
assets (house) prices. 
There is general agreement that the supervision standards and instruments to maintain the 
banking stability prior to GFC were weak (this will be discussed in chapter 4), leading many 
to argue that it was a combination of accommodative monetary policy, growing global 
imbalances and weak supervision standards that caused the build-up. Maddaloni and Peydró 
(2010), based on Acharya and Richardson (2009), Allen et al. (2009), Rajan (2010) and 
Taylor (2008a), conclude that the key contributing factors were an excessive softening of 
lending standards due to too low levels of short-term (monetary policy) and long-term 
(government bond) interest rates, a concurrent widespread use of financial innovation 
resulting in high securitization activity, and weak supervision standards, especially for bank’s 
capital. Acharya and Richardson (2009) explain that banks had placed problematic assets, 
such as securitized mortgages, in off-balance-sheet entities, so that they did not have to hold 
significant capital buffers against them. Maddaloni and Peydró (2010) analysing bank lending 
standards in Euro area and the U.S., find that low short-term interest rates softened lending 
standards, both for firms and households. Furthermore, they report that softening of lending 
standards, especially for mortgages, was amplified by high securitization activity, weak 
supervision of banks’ capital, and too low (and for too long) monetary policy rates. In 
addition, they also demonstrate the costs of the softening of lending standards; namely 
countries with softer lending standards, related to negative Taylor-rule residuals (low 
monetary policy rates), and prior to the financial crisis had a worse economic performance 
afterwards, as measured by real, fiscal and banking variables. 
The period prior to GFC was characterised by excessive borrowing, excessive lending and 
excessive investment, which had been fuelled by significant economic and regulatory factors. 
Excessive borrowing and lending were related, particularly, to the subprime mortgage market 
in the United States, especially during 2005 and 2006. While the excessive investment mainly 
resulted from the period of low interest rates globally in the wake of the onset of banking 
crisis in Japan at the beginning of 1990, following the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2001 
in the Unites States; and finally, from the imbalances in savings and investment between the 
Anglo-American economies and the rest of the world. As reported by Arner (2008), excessive 
borrowing and lending involving commercial real estate, corporate lending (especially for 
mergers and acquisitions and private equity transactions), commodities and international 
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equities, impacted not just on the U.S. market, but also other markets. This broad-based 
excessive borrowing and lending were fuelled by excessive investment by investors around 
the world in financial institutions in the U.S. (Arner, 2008).  
Excessive borrowing, lending and investment were encouraged by, as previously mentioned, 
the different forms of securitization. Securitization, as defined by Ashcraft and Schuermann 
(2008), is a process through which loans are removed from the balance sheet of lenders and 
transformed into debt securities purchased by investors. Securitization allows lenders (banks) 
of assets (such as residential mortgages) to transform a future stream of revenue (loan 
repayments) into a present value pool of capital, which can then be used to support further 
lending.  Maddaloni and Peydro (2010), note that the securitization of loans initially can 
result in assets yielding attractive returns for investors and also enhances banks’ lending 
capacity, especially when the capacity constraint is binding (in times of high credit growth, 
partially stemming from low monetary policy rates). As part of the securitization process, and 
in order to relocate certain assets and liabilities from the banks` balance sheet, special legal 
entities such as special purpose vehicle (SPV) were created. Namely, as explained by 
Schwarcz (1998), the bank transfers rights in current or future receivables or other financial 
assets to a SPV, which in turn issues securities to capital market investors and uses the 
proceeds from the issue to pay for the financial assets (see Figure 3.1). This was the most 
common structure used in the United States and in other countries.  
 
Source: BCBS (2006) 
Figure 3.1 The securitization process 
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Other securitization products included structured investment entities (SIV) which were used 
to issue commercial paper, and operate in a similar way to a SPV. Investors bought 
commercial paper issued by the SIV mainly because of their attractive returns. SIV exercised 
profits based on the difference in interest rates earned on long-term loans and paid interest 
rates on short-term debt. Theoretically, as summarized by Arner (2008), securitization allows 
the distribution of banks` credit risk to a wider range of investors, thereby reducing the cost 
of borrowing for ultimate borrowers and reducing the risk to lenders of defaults on 
underlying loans. However, the securitization products provided significant incentives to 
abuse, and that lay at the heart of the credit crisis. Particularly, as Arner (2008) reports, in the 
United States and other developed countries loans came to be made not by banks, but instead 
by specialists, mortgage brokers for real estate or investment banks that intended on profiting 
from charging to arrange loans and with little or no attention paid to the ability of the 
borrower to repay in the future. 
Comparing the GFC with previous crises, there are some similarities. Namely, as identified in 
section 2.3, asset price booms are common in crises. As reported by Claessens et al. (2010) 
house prices increased dramatically before the crisis, in particular in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and most of the other markets that subsequently ran 
into problems. These booms were generally fuelled by fast rising credit, resulting in sharply 
increased household leverage. As seen in previous crises, the combination of rapid house 
prices increases and increased leverage turned out to be the most dangerous elements. The 
dynamics of this housing boom were similar to developments in previous banking crises. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) compared developments in house prices in the United States 
before 2007 with those in the previous “Big Five” crises (Finland, 1991; Japan, 1992; 
Norway, 1987; Sweden, 1991; and Spain 1977). They found an excess of 30 per cent 
increases in housing prices prior to financial crises and marked declines in the year of crisis 
and in subsequent years. They noted that the rise in U.S. house prices, prior to the 2007 crisis 
exceeded those prior to the “Big Five” crises. 
As in earlier crises, the rapid expansion of credit played a large role in the period before the 
GFC. Rapid credit expansion has been noticed in the United Kingdom, Spain, Iceland, 
Ireland, and several Eastern European countries, often fuelling real estate booms. Credit 
booms generally coincide with large macroeconomic fluctuation (IMF WEO, 2004b), with 
real output, consumption, and investment rising above trend during the build-up phase of 
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credit booms and falling below trend in the subsequent phase (Claessens et al. 2010). In 
addition, Claessens et al. (2013) noted that while aggregate credit growth was less 
pronounced, reflecting slower corporate credit expansion, household indebtedness in the 
United States rose rapidly after 2000, driven largely by increased mortgage financing, with 
historically low interest rates and financial innovation contributing. In spite of low interest 
rates, debt service relative to disposable income reached historical highs. 
In many countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, large portions of loans were 
denominated in foreign currency prior to the GFC. Those exposures had been common 
before, for example in the Asian financial sector before their crisis of the late 1990s. 
Historically, as explained by Szpunar and Głogowski (2012), one common driver of high 
foreign currency lending was a significant interest rate differential in favour of foreign 
currency loans for the clients. Namely, lower interest rates on foreign currency loans than on 
local currency loans often caused a strong demand for foreign currency loans, once their 
supply appeared. However, although the interest rates on foreign currency loans were lower 
the borrower's ability to service these debts depended on exchange rate stability. This implied 
a high default risk correlations across loans and systemic exposure to external shocks 
(Claessens et al., 2010). 
To some extent, the GFC has many of the same characteristics as other recent banking crisis. 
However, the GFC had its own unique feature: excessive subprime lending which in the 
longer term acquired a high-risk profile and significantly increased leverage. Claessens et al. 
(2013) discussed that even though the subprime model seemed good for risk allocation, it 
turned out to undermine incentives to properly assess risks and led to a build-up of tail 
risks.
13
 Furthermore they explained that the lack of understanding of the true value of assets 
in that model quickly turned a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis. Lastly, they suggested 
that in countries where non-banks (including money market funds, investment banks, and 
special-purpose vehicles) played important roles, the risk of runs became more likely, as 
these institutions usually did not fall under the formal financial safety net. In addition, the 
regulation and supervision of new structured credit instruments and techniques was also 
ineffective. Increased international financial integration contributed to the GFC. Financial 
integration increased dramatically in the years before the crisis, involving many markets and 
                                                          
13 Risk tails refers to the end portions of risk distribution curves, the bell shaped diagrams that show statistical 
probabilities for a variety of outcomes.   
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different countries. Increased financial integration enabled the US securitisation boom, which 
has been considered as the proximate trigger for the crisis, to expand to other countries. Lane 
(2012) considers that it is difficult to imagine that the growth in these credit markets would 
have been of a similar magnitude without the participation of foreign investors (especially 
foreign banks), which fuelled the accelerated growth of the asset-backed securities markets in 
the United States. As presented by Acharya and Schnabl (2010) and Bernanke et al. (2011), 
European banks were major purchasers of the asset-backed securities. In addition, these 
banks also obtained dollar funding in the US money markets (Shin, 2011). Therefore, the risk 
exposure of European parent banks grew in line with these US activities. On the other hand, 
financial globalisation permitted rapid growth in the balance sheets of many banks. Namely, 
globally-active banks grew rapidly, making it difficult for national supervisors to adequately 
monitor and assess their risk profiles. In addition, local banks expanded their lending by 
tapping international wholesale markets, which fuelled credit growth in a number of countries 
(Lane, 2012). Finally, financial globalisation had an important role in emerging markets, 
where an increased demand for low-risk debt assets from emerging-market official sources 
and the increased supply of equity opportunities in these countries may have added fuel to the 
securitisation boom (Bernanke et al. 2011). 
In summary, a confluence of factors is currently thought to have produced the GFC: 
excessive borrowing and lending, securitizations, mispricing risk, inaccurate credit ratings, 
lax monetary policies and insufficient regulation. Given these factors the GFC became an 
unavoidable consequence. 
3.2.2 Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis 
The GFC produced a huge downshift in the path of economic output, consumption and 
financial wealth (Luttrell, et al., 2013). As Claessens et al. (2010) show, this might not have 
been a surprising outcome since recessions associated with financial crises tend to be 
unusually severe, resulting in much larger declines in real economic activity, and their 
recoveries tend to be slow. Similarly, globally synchronized recessions are often long and 
deep, and recoveries from these recessions are generally weak. 
Loosening lending standards during the boom had significant consequences in most 
countries, but particularly so in the United States where mortgages were more likely to be 
packaged into securities. The trading books of investment banks and other financial 
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institution were especially affected, since if the market price of securities fall, accounting 
conventions often requires that the loss is recognised immediately, which is not the case for a 
traditional loan portfolio. Namely, the banks’ losses were concentrated in securities rather 
than in loans in the traditional balance sheet. In this environment, as explained by Ellis 
(2009), banks’ perceptions of risk increased, and they started to tighten lending standards. 
Namely, banks became more careful, as were their borrowers experienced difficulties 
refinancing their loans. Projects that seemed attractive and profitable in the good times 
suddenly become risky.  
SPVs began having difficulties issuing CDOs, as the demand for structured products dried 
up. In many cases, backup lines of credit for the SPVs were cancelled, creating severe 
liquidity problems for the SPVs. In order to protect their reputations, many banks took back 
assets that they had transferred to SPVs. Liquidity pressures and credit quality impairment 
increased, and banks started reporting major losses. In addition, banks become unwilling to 
lend to each other. Namely, the TED-Spread, which is a difference between interbank rates 
(originally 3-month LIBOR) and Treasury-EuroDollar rate, rose dramatically in summer 
2007.  
When banks started to face bankruptcies (see the following text box), it triggered a further 
increase in risk aversion. When risk aversion rises like this, the macroeconomic consequences 
can be severe (Ellis, 2009). The United States, most of the euro area countries and Japan were 
experiencing economic contractions by the first half of 2008. Ellis (2009) notes that bank 
regulation and behaviour might explain how a US mortgage crisis propagated into essentially 
a North Atlantic banking crisis, but trade and confidence effects explain why that North 
Atlantic banking crisis escalated into a global problem. 
Text box 3.1 Bankruptcies, Acquisitions and Bank Runs 
 
 
 September 17, 2008. Britain`s biggest mortgage lender HBOS is taken over by Lloyds 
TSB in a 12bn deal. 
 September 25, 2008. In the largest bank failure in the United States, Washington Mutual, 
and the giant mortgage lender which had assets valued at 307bn is closed down by 
regulators and sold to its JP Morgan Chase.  
 September 29, 2008. Wachovia, the fourth largest US bank, is bought by its Citigroup in 
a rescue deal backed by US authorities.  
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Source: Brunner (2011) 
 
The intensification of the crisis, see Text Box 3.1, led to the deterioration of most 
macroeconomic indicators. According to United Nations World Economic Situation and 
Prospects Report (2012), there was a sudden contraction in the volume of world trade and 
industrial production. This fall in world trade volumes in 2009 was exceptional with exports 
from developed economies falling by 12% and, notably, a collapse in transition economies’ 
demand for imports of 26% (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 World trade: changes in volume of exports and imports, by major country 
groups, 2003-2012 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
World 5.10 10.60 7.80 9.40 7.00 2.70 -9.20 12.30 6.40 4.50
Developed economies 1.90 8.20 5.80 8.50 6.10 1.90 -12.20 11.00 6.10 3.30
Economies in transition 11.40 12.90 4.00 7.00 7.40 2.00 -6.90 4.20 5.20 1.90
Developing economies 11.00 15.00 12.00 11.20 8.40 4.20 -4.40 15.30 7.00 6.40
World 5.80 11.20 8.30 9.50 7.50 2.70 -10.70 13.40 6.70 4.30
Developed economies 3.80 8.80 6.40 8.10 5.00 0.30 -13.00 10.40 5.30 2.60
Economies in transition 12.50 18.20 10.50 15.70 21.80 1.50 -26.10 11.00 6.40 7.00
Developing economies 10.50 16.80 12.50 12.20 11.70 6.60 -4.50 18.70 9.00 6.80
Volume of exports (annual % change)
Volume of imports (annual % change)
 
Source: United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects Report (2012) 
 
Bank Runs 
 Northern Rock: September 14, 2007 
Depositors withdrew £1bn from Northern Rock in what is the biggest run on a British 
bank for more than a century. They continue to take out their money until the 
government steps in to guarantee their savings. 
 Bear Stearns (investment bank): March11, 2008 
Goldman Sachs refuses to honour ``netting`` arrangements that would expose them 
directly to Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns`s hedge fund clients flee and they are unable to 
secure funding on repo market. 
 
 April 2007. New Century Financial (specializes in sub-prime mortgages) files for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
 March 17, 2008. Bear Stearns acquired by larger rival JP Morgan Chase for $240m in a 
deal backed by $30bn of central bank loans. 
 July 13, 2008. US mortgage lender IndyMac collapses – the second-biggest bank in US 
history to fail 
 September 15, 2008. Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 
Merrill Lynch taken over by Bank of America for $50bn. 
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The decline in global aggregate demand was accompanied by new strains in global financial 
markets, in particular, increased borrowing costs and a shortage of trade credits. In response 
to falling domestic and external demand, industrial production also came under pressure. By 
early 2009, world industrial production was falling at a 27 percent annualized pace. In the 
second half of 2009, production began recovering, initially led by accelerating growth in 
China (World Bank, 2010). The financial crisis also caused a collapse in commodity prices 
(UN, 2010).  For example, by early 2009, oil prices decreased by almost 70 per cent from 
their peak levels of mid-2008. During the same period, prices of metals and prices of 
agricultural products also declined significantly.  
Since the beginning, of the GFC, the number of unemployed has risen in most economies. 
Namely, by 2012 the number of unemployed in the United States of America had more than 
doubled since the beginning of the crisis. The unemployment rates in the euro zone and Japan 
have also increased significantly. Unemployment rates in transition economies and 
developing countries also moved higher, in particular in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and Central and South-Eastern Europe (UN, 2010).   
Macroeconomic shocks can feed into banks’ balance sheets through the credit-risk 
transmission channel (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). Namely, a large body of research finds 
that a weak global macroeconomic outlook implies that borrowers have become riskier. The 
borrowers are likely to face greater difficulty servicing their debts. As highlighted by 
Claessens et al. (2013) debt servicing and repayment are likely to be vulnerable to the 
economic downturns and changes in monetary conditions. Furthermore, they argue that this 
maximized defaults correlations across loans, generating portfolios highly exposed to 
declines in house prices, confirmed later through the large number of non-performing loans. 
In general, non-performing loans rise relative to total lending when economies turn down 
(Keeton and Morris, 1987; Pesola, 2005; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Nkusu, 2011) and the 
GFC has been no exception to this pattern. In that environment, banking sectors were 
weakened in all the major economies. For the CEE region, the global financial crisis was 
experienced as a huge external shock. Since the CEE banking systems were not directly 
exposed to “toxic assets”, the crisis was transmitted to the region through several indirect 
channels (Petreski and Lazarov, 2013), which will be discussed further in the Chapter 
(Section 3.5). However, primarily we will analyse the macroeconomic environment in CEE 
countries in the period before the GFC.  
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3.3 Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the Pre-Crisis Period  
The CEE countries have followed a particular model of development that was based on 
political integration, institutional development, trade integration, financial integration and 
labour mobility (Becker et al., 2010). The key features of this model, until the emergence of 
the global financial crisis, were solid economic growth (see Figure 3.2), that brought incomes 
closer to the level of developed countries and increased financial integration; remarkable net 
capital inflows corresponding to current-account deficits; the presence of the large western 
European banking groups; credit expansion; significant real exchange-rate appreciation; and 
lower real interest rates in most of the CEE countries. Although the catching-up process was 
initially supported by increased macroeconomic stability, most of these countries had become 
increasingly vulnerable before the crisis. In particular, they experienced huge credit, housing 
and consumption booms, and associated high current-account deficits and external-debt 
levels.  
 
Source: World Bank database, World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.2 Annual GDP 
a
 growth
 
in Central and East European countries (%) 
a) Unweighted average of GDP growth rate is used 
 
Before the global financial crisis, economic growth in CEE economies was largely based on 
external financing. As explained by Jude (2014), foreign investors were of major interest for 
policy makers, in order to maximize domestic investment.  Analysing FDI in CEE countries, 
Mileva (2008) suggests that it stimulates domestic investment, particularly in countries with 
weak institutional development and underdeveloped financial markets. This is in line with 
Gray and Jarosz’s (1993) argument that in CEE the need for foreign capital and know-how to 
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repair their economies and stimulate growth was immense. Kose et al. (2006) suggest that 
domestic investment can also be stimulated by the “collateral benefits” associated with FDIs. 
Namely, they argue that in order to attract foreign investors, governments in developing 
countries’ are forced to set in place good macroeconomic policies and improve political and 
economic governance. 
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Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.3 a) Gross domestic investment (% of GDP) Figure 3.3b) Gross domestic savings 
(% of GDP) in CEE countries  
Note:  Based on unweighted average 
 
Low saving rates were present in most of the CEE countries (Figure 3.3 b). Looking at 
Figures  3.3 a) and 3.3 b), it is noticeable that in  the years 2004-08 gross domestic savings  
were only around 50% of gross domestic investment in the CEE countries. Bearing in mind 
that FDI accounts for only around a half of domestic investment, the figures suggest that at 
least half of all investment could not be covered by domestic savings.  That, in turn, indicates 
the importance of inward FDI to the economic development of the CEEs. That importance of 
FDI is even greater if we consider the quality of investment (e.g. the extent to which 
investment embodies technical progress), corresponding transfers of know-how and other 
positive externalities.  In other words, in the boom years around half of all investment was 
FDI and almost certainly a much larger proportion of the high-quality investment.  
Total net private financial inflows to CEE were particularly high before the recent global 
financial crisis (Figure 3.4). These inflows took various forms, including foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio investment and other investment flows. Looking at the 
composition of net capital inflows illustrated in Figure 3.4, there was a gradual and 
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substantial increase in net FDI inflows. FDI inflows were crucial for the CEE countries 
during the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s, in order to accelerate the restructuring of 
their economic systems.  FDI flows have been argued to exert a significant impact on the 
catch-up rates of this region (Tondl and Vuksic, 2003). Other investment flows (mostly 
consists of cross-border loans) were more volatile than FDI, though interestingly, in the peak 
years before the crisis their magnitude even exceeded FDI inflows. 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010. 
Figure 3.4 Net private financial flows in Central and Eastern Europe (% GDP), 1999-2009 
Note: Other investment mainly consists of international banking flows and parent companies lending to their 
subsidiaries. 
 
FDI Inflows of capital to CEE countries exceeded corresponding inflows to any other 
emerging or developing region in the years before 2009. Figure 3.5 shows that net FDI 
inflows reached about 13 per cent of the GDP of the whole CEE region by 2007. FDI flows 
to CEE declined after the region was adversely affected by the propagation of financial 
turmoil during the 2008. Regarding net FDI inflows, the situation within the CEE region was 
quite diverse. For example, Hungary`s net FDI inflows reached about 52 per cent of the GDP, 
whereas net FDI inflows in Slovenia were just 4 per cent of GDP (Figure 3.6). One crucial 
explanation for these differences in inward FDI to CEE was the diversity of the respective 
national economy (Filippov and Kalotay, 2009).  
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010. 
Figure 3.5 Net capital flows to emerging regions in the pre-crisis period (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.6 Net capital flows to countries in CEE (% of GDP) from 2004-2007 
 
An important task when analysing a country’s vulnerability to the external shocks in regard to 
capital inflows is the extent to which FDI, which developed differently to portfolio flows 
during the contagion of the current crisis, is able to cover current account deficits (CAD). In 
general, FDI is considered to be more stable than other financial flows since investments in 
fixed assets may be more difficult to liquidate (compared with portfolio investments) and 
because direct investors tend to make long-term commitments (McGettigan, 2000). However, 
an important caveat is that some of the recent FDI into emerging Europe was due to 
privatization and, therefore this inflow of FDI may not be sustainable (Vamvakidis, 2008). 
Furthermore, Vamvakidis (2008) explains that foreign bank borrowing from parent banks has 
been financing an increasing share of the current account deficits in most countries, primarily 
in the Baltics and in South Eastern Europe. There were significant differences in the region in 
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the extent to which inward FDI covered the CAD. Figure 3.7 shows the respective values 
varying from 135% (Czech Republic) to 36% (Lithuania) in 2007. The data implies that in 
the year before the crisis, the countries most vulnerable to immediate liquidity constraints in 
financing the CAD were Latvia and Lithuania, while Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia were even able to over compensate for their current account deficit by attracting 
large FDI. 
 
Source: UNCTAD database 
Figure 3.7 Inward FDI / CAD Ratio in CEE (2006-2007) 
 
Large current account deficits are of concern, as they pose financing risks if the capital 
inflows stop. According to Vamvakidis (2008), the deterioration in the current account 
balances in emerging Europe was driven by an increase in investment, as high investment 
was expected to improve these countries’ growth prospects and, then eventually, help reduce 
their current account deficits. By the end of 2007, these vulnerabilities were recognized. 
Namely, the IMF (2008, p. 15) warned that “…the heavy dependence on foreign capital 
leaves the region exposed to an abrupt retrenchment of capital inflows” and “economies with 
large current account deficits or high external debt ratios would be especially vulnerable if 
foreign financing dried up.” 
The existing monetary frameworks and open capital accounts may also have contributed to 
the build-up of vulnerabilities in CEE. The choice of exchange-rate regime played an 
important role in the catching-up process of CEE (Becker et al., 2010). Prior to the crisis, 
most CEE countries (except Albania, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and 
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Slovenia) maintained fixed rates. According to Mishkin (1996), fixed exchange rates have 
been one of the causes of instability in many emerging market financial crises. A fixed 
exchange-rate regime fuels inflation in an economy that is catching-up (Becker et al., 2010). 
Namely, when a country is converging in term of GDP per capita, then price level 
convergence translates into higher domestic inflation. Darvas and Szapáry (2008) explain, the 
main risk for countries with fixed exchange rate systems is that with no room to let their 
nominal exchange rate appreciate to accommodate the price level convergence and with little 
or without risk premia, their real interest rates become excessively low due to higher inflation 
if the nominal rate rise less. Low interest rates may have encouraged domestic demand and 
led to excessive credit growth and booms in several CEE countries. Namely, Sorsa et al. 
(2007) note that the currency board in Bulgaria and the heavily managed float in Croatia 
largely subject these economies to euro interest rates that have been too low for their cyclical 
conditions. That situation have exacerbated credit growth. Furthermore, Sorsa et al. (2007) 
argue that the fixed currency regimes have desensitized economic agents and authorities to 
exchange rate risk, as indicated by their currency mismatches, the largest in the region, and 
led to the under-pricing of currency risk. Therefore, countries with fixed exchange rate 
systems amplified their imbalances in the boom and contributed to severe declines in the bust 
period.  
In those countries with a floating exchange rate, the structural price-level convergence can 
also be accommodated by nominal exchange-rate appreciation. Becker et al. (2010) 
recognised that on one side, the difficulties of managing the catching-up process under 
inflation targeting with floating exchange rates cannot be underestimated; and on the other 
hand, countries with floating exchange rate regimes succeeded better than countries with 
fixed exchange rate regimes in maintaining macroeconomic stability. Countries with floating 
exchange rates had an easier time dealing with large capital inflows than countries with fixed 
exchange rates (Bakker and Gulde, 2010). According to IMF (2013a) countries with fixed 
exchange rates cannot let the nominal exchange rate appreciate in the face of capital inflows, 
and are therefore less able to “insulate” domestic liquidity from capital inflows. Furthermore, 
IMF (2013a) report that in countries with floating exchange rates tightened monetary 
conditions, by letting the nominal exchange rate appreciate, contributed to the less 
pronounced credit boom, lower inflation, and lower current account deficits. 
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In this section, we discussed the macro economic imbalances in CEE before GFC. The 
analysis will be continued in the following section, where another source of vulnerability, 
credit growth, will be discussed.  
3.3.1 Credit Growth: A Key Source of Vulnerability 
Credit expansion was an important driver of economic growth in CEE countries (Becker et 
al., 2010), but it is also often considered to be a key factor in their vulnerability. Namely, 
along with the growth of foreign investment in the financial sector and inflows of other 
capital, the credit to GDP ratio increased rapidly before the crisis in the CEE region (Figure 
3.8), though with substantial differences across countries. The level of credit as a percentage 
of GDP remained below the EU15 average in the pre-crisis period (Figure 3.8) and several 
empirical studies (Kiss et al., 2006, Égert and Mihaljek, 2007; and World Bank, 2007) 
suggested that the level of credit was below equilibrium. However, Becker et al. (2010) argue 
that the speed at which the equilibrium level of credit is reached matters for macroeconomic 
stability. They explain that from the perspective of inflationary pressure, it is not the level but 
the rate of growth of credit that is important. The evolution of the credit-to-GDP ratio was 
markedly steeper in the Baltic and SEE countries. Becker et al. (2010) explain that given the 
extent of foreign investment in real estate and financial services which contributed to the 
huge pre-crisis housing booms and excessive credit booms, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that the resulting structural imbalance was a cause of these countries ̓ increasing vulnerability.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.8 Credit to the private sector (% GDP, 2004-2011) 
 
The CEE countries with low levels of financial intermediation at the beginning of the new 
millennium generally experienced faster credit growth compared to those CEE countries with 
higher credit–to–GDP ratios (Figure 3.9). According Hilbers et al. (2006), on the demand 
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side, the credit expansion was supported by higher income expectations, often related to these 
countries’ (prospect of) accession to the European Union. On the supply side, as explained by 
Hilbers et al. (2006), the credit surge was facilitated by foreign financial institutions entering 
these markets with the objective of rapidly increasing their market share.  
 
Source: Hilbers et al. (2006) 
Figure 3.9 The CEE Region: Catching Up from Low Levels of Intermediation 
 
Most CEE countries experienced potentially unsustainable growth rates in private credit 
markets in the years before the crisis. Namely, credit growth significantly exceeded deposit 
growth in most CEE countries. The Loan to Deposit ratio has been relatively high and rising 
in all these countries, suggesting that deposits have not been able to meet loan requests in 
recent years. This has led to an increasing dependency on foreign funding, which has mainly 
been channelled through the banking sector. UniCredit CEE Banking Study (2011) reports 
that with leveraging on abundant international liquidity and the low cost of country risk, local 
banks were able to support credit growth by financing domestic lending via international 
capital inflows, given the context of low domestic saving rates. As can be seen in Figure 3.10, 
with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia, the changes in bank 
credit to GDP ratios significantly exceeded those in the ratio of bank deposits to GDP. In 
particular, the LTDs were rising rapidly in the Baltic countries.   
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Source: Arvai et al. (2009) 
Figure 3.10 Change in deposit and credit to GDP (2003-2007), in percentage points 
 
As Égert and Mihaljek (2007) explain, rapid credit growth can fuel consumption, lead to 
sharp rises in house prices and feed inflation and wage growth. This process can erode 
competitiveness and contribute to current-account deficits and the build-up of external debt. 
The data presented in Figure 3.11 indicates a close relationship between pre-crisis credit 
growth and the current-account balance. As reported by ECB (2009), strong growth in 
housing loans and rising house prices contributed to the output boom in the construction 
sector, stimulating demand for particular imported goods such as white goods etc. In addition, 
they reported that the housing loans have raised the overall ability of households to ﬁnance 
consumption; thus, these loans may also have contributed to rising inﬂationary pressures 
and/or current account deficits. The two countries with the highest rise in private sector loans 
as a percentage of GDP are those with the largest current account imbalances in the region.  
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Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.11 The relationship between pre-crisis credit growth and current account 
balances 
 
There have been growing concerns about the implications for macroeconomic and banking 
stability where rapid credit growth has coincided with vulnerabilities in the domestic 
financial systems. What was the “normal” or “satisfactory” level of credit? Was the fast 
credit growth just a result of the structural changes associated with mid-transition or of a 
catching-up process? The large increase in credit growth rates was mainly driven by the 
aggressive business strategies of foreign banking groups that dominate in CEE countries 
(which will be examined in following section). As explained by Hilberts et al. (2006), fast 
credit growth contributed to a rise in imports and current account deficits in most CEE 
countries. The low savings rates in most of the CEE countries (Figure 3.3 b) suggest they 
were highly dependent on foreign investors to fund these deficits.  
In addition, optimism about future earnings led to a boost in asset valuations and a surge in 
capital inflows in almost all CEE countries that allowed firms and households to borrow and 
spend more (Hilberts et al., 2006). On the financial side, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (section 
1.7), prudential indicators such as non-performing loans, capital adequacy ratios, and loan to 
deposit ratios worsened, suggesting that the banking system had significant vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, Hilberts et al. (2006) argue that banks may be highly exposed to indirect foreign 
exchange risks, since foreign currency–denominated loans represent a substantial proportion 
of total loans. They also note that a sharper decline in interest margins, resulting from 
stronger competition, would decrease profitability and thereby increase the vulnerability of 
Albania 
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Montenegro 
Serbia 
 
Slovenia 
Bulgaria  
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Estonia 
 
Latvia 
Lithvania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Romania 
-25
-24
-23
-22
-21
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
A
ve
ra
ge
 C
A
/G
D
P
 f
ro
m
 2
0
0
4
-0
7
 
 
Average private sector credit/GDP from 2004-07 
86 
 
the banking system. These vulnerabilities in the financial sector will be explored further in 
Chapter 6.  
3.4 Financial Linkages in Central and Eastern Europe  
Developing countries can receive growth and investment benefits from growing trade and 
financial linkages with the rest of the world, but the latter also increase their exposure to 
costly spillovers from abroad (Moghadam et al., 2011). The aim of this section is to identify 
and examine those channels of transmission that played a crucial role during the recent 
financial crisis in CEE. As mentioned in section 2.6, the recent literature investigates the 
transmission of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 via trade and financial channels. Part 
of the literature suggests that countries which are more integrated are more prone to be 
affected by external shocks. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2009) stressed that greater 
synchronisation of shocks is present when there are stronger trade ties. However, as stated by 
Enders and Peter (2014) transmission via the trade channel leads to a relatively short 
recession, while the financial channel, in contrast, has longer-lasting effects. Given the focus 
of this thesis, we will focus on explaining the relevance of the financial linkages. 
Furthermore, Backé et al. (2013) note that the financial channel has traditionally dominated 
the trade channel in South Eastern Europe, whereas the trade channel has traditionally played 
a stronger role for the CIS region. In particular, we will examine the role of cross-border bank 
lending and the common lender channel that is likely to be one of the major channels of 
transmission. This appears very important bearing in mind the close banking relationships 
between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the years preceding the global 
financial crisis. A key indicator of the massive growth in financial linkages between Eastern 
and Western Europe is the number and systemic importance of foreign-owned banks 
operating in Central and Eastern Europe. In the following sub-section we will analyse the 
banking sectors in CEE economies, with special emphasis on their ownership structures.  
3.4.1 Banking in Central and Eastern Europe — an Overview of Bank Ownership 
After the fall of communism and arrival of capitalism in CEE, the need to restructure the 
banking system became apparent. It brought about large-scale restructuring and the 
introduction of many institutions that did not formerly exist. In order to stimulate 
competition, most CEE countries initially adopted very lax licensing and regulatory regimes, 
leading to a large increase in the number of banks (Barisitz, 2005). One of the main issues in 
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many CEE countries in the early 1990s was the low quality of banking regulation and 
supervision, resulting from a complete neglect of this function during communist rule 
(Altman, 2006). Throughout the 1990s most of these countries experienced major banking 
crises and painful structural transformation (Altmann, 2006). However, at the turn of the 
millennium the environment stabilized, most CEE countries began membership talks with the 
EU and banking activities entered a path of sustained expansion, boosted by robust economic 
growth (Barisitz, 2005). The legal environment a in the financial sector, also improved with 
respect to laws on banks, bankruptcy laws, collateral laws, and confidence in the application 
of the law. In order to benefit from the region’s transition process, several EU 15 banks partly 
shifted their business focus to Eastern European countries by entering their banking sectors 
(Čihák and Fonteyne, 2009). The main mode of entrance was their acquisition of newly 
privatized banks in CEE. As explained by Kalusa (2010) this situation heightened the 
contagion risk in the case of adverse developments in the host country for the domestic 
country’s financial system. In addition, difficulties primarily occurring in the domestic 
banking system might easily spread to CEE and could even trigger contagion throughout the 
region (Arvai et al., 2009).  
Although banks in European transition countries have made considerable progress in 
improving their performance and services since the early 1990s, as explained above, the 
banking sectors in these economies still do not possess the financial depth of their Western 
Europe counterparts nor are banking services as well developed in these countries (Bonin et 
al., 2008). Nonetheless, state banking structures have been replaced by privately-owned, 
market-oriented, generally well-capitalized banking institutions that are independent from the 
government and state-owned clients. 
Foreign-owned banks dominate the financial systems of the CEE countries, these are mainly 
European banking groups attracted by these countries' growth prospects or their shorter-term 
investment profitability (Raiffaisen Research, 2011). In the ten years to 2008, large banks 
from Western Europe took strong positions in CEE countries.  As summarized by Deuber and 
Shpilevoy (2013), from 2000 until 2008/2009 western banks increased their CEE loan books 
and asset base by 10 to 30 per cent per year in Euro terms. The total CEE assets of the top 
seven Western European banks increased from EUR 215bn in 2005 to EUR 490bn in 2011 
(Deuber and Shpilevoy, 2013). Their presence improved efficiency, skills and technologies 
and brought fresh capital in the region. These Western European banks improved access to 
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credit, introducing very important banking products that were largely absent during 1990s in 
these economies, like mortgages (Kolev and Zwart, 2013). Figure 3.12 illustrates the 
overwhelming presence of foreign banks in CEE countries.   
 
Source: EBRD Survey of Central Banks (2012), IMF (2012) 
Figure 3.12 Market Shares of Assets of Foreign-Owned Banks in the CEE Countries in 
2011 
 
Foreign-owned banks control the majority of assets in the CEE banking sector and have 
acquired dominating competitive positions, on the basis of a 70% or more share of total 
assets, in all analysed countries except Slovenia, Latvia, Poland and Bulgaria. In some 
countries, like Slovakia, Estonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, foreign-owned 
banks positions are completely dominant; and overall in SEE foreign-owned banks’ share of 
total assets is particularly high. This appears to be a phenomenon specific to CEE countries 
when looked at from the perspective of countries in Western Europe, where foreign 
ownership is typically within a range of 5-15% of total assets (Raiffeisen Bank Research, 
2012). However, the high share of foreign ownership in banking sectors in CEE countries 
should be seen in a broader emerging markets context. Raiffeisen Bank Research (2012) 
reports that emerging markets’ superior economic and banking-sector growth outlook, 
compared to most advanced economies, provided the incentives for international banks to 
penetrate CEE fast-growing markets, leading foreign-ownership ratios there to rise over the 
past decade. Moreover, as presented in Raiffeisen Bank Research (2012), large foreign banks 
seek to smooth earnings profiles by diversifying away from their home market as a singular 
high concentration risk. Opportunities for large international banks to move into emerging 
markets arise in aftermath of a crisis. Namely, Cardenas et al. (2003) argues that: “foreign 
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bank entry in emerging market economies has been the result of dealing with financial crises, 
while in mature economies foreign entry comes from competitive pressures” (p. 3). As 
outlined above, this is true to a large extent in CEE as well. As can be seen in Figure 3.12, the 
market share of foreign banks is well above the average for Western Europe in all analysed 
markets. In the Czech Republic, where foreign banks account for 83.1% of banks’ capital and 
96.1% of assets, the foreign strategic investors were credited with contributing “to 
overcoming the lingering financial crisis that had plagued the country since the mid-1990s” 
(Barisitz, 2005, p. 62). 
As can be seen in Figure 3.13, these foreign banking groups are predominantly from Western 
Europe. The strongest foreign presences, in terms of assets, are Austrian, Italian, Belgian, 
German and French banks. However, in the case of Bulgaria, and to a smaller degree Serbia 
and Romania, the contagion risk is increased by the large presence of banks from Greece. 
 
Source: Raiffaisen Research (2011) and own calculations 
Figure 3.13 Market shares of foreign banks in CE and SEE countries by country of origin 
(in % total assets) in 2011 
CE: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia 
SEE: Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In general, the presence of non- European banks in CEE is limited, the two main exceptions 
being Citibank and GE Capital. There exist very few large, domestically-owned banks in 
CEE, and the OTP of Hungary and the NLB from Slovenia have been able to become 
regional players. OTP, which is mainly owned by a number of domestic investors and funds, 
has become a strategic foreign investor in the banking markets of Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and Montenegro. The Austrian banking sector is the largest investor in all 
countries discussed with the exception of Poland, Slovenia, and the Baltic States. In the 
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Baltic States, Swedish banks have taken a very dominant position, with Swedfund and SEB 
controlling over 60% of the total Baltic market (Bank-Austria Creditanstalt Report, 2004, p. 
14). 
 
Source: Raiffeisen Research (2011) 
Figure 3.14 Share of assets of CEE subsidiaries as % of group assets 
 
Concerning the exposure of international banking groups to the CEE market, OTP and NLB 
are clearly in the first position with 100% of assets in the region (see Figure 3.14). These 
Hungarian and Slovenian banks are followed by three Austrian banks, namely the Raiffeisen 
Group (58% of assets in CEE), Erste Bank (40%) and Hypo Alpe Adria (38.2%). With 
business models directed to the traditional lending and a strategy based on the assumption of 
a structural and productivity catch-up in the labour-intensive loan business, Deuber and 
Shpilevoy (2013) reported that the number of branches operated by leading western banks in 
CEE and CIS soared from 9,000 to 15,000 between 2004 and 2009. 
3.4.2 “Common Lender” and Cross-Border Linkages  
As explained in Chapter 2, the “common lender”, as an important source of funding for a 
number of countries, can be considered as a channel through which financial shocks could be 
transmitted. Arvai et al. (2009) explain the common lender channel in the following example. 
When the private sectors of two countries in the region, A and B,  borrow mainly from the 
banking system of a third country, C (the common lender);  a shock affecting A may result in 
liquidity or solvency pressures in the banks of C, provided that the parent bank is highly 
exposed to A. The problems in A could then spillover to B, even though B’s economy is not 
directly linked to A’s, because of the third country, C, which is present in both A’s and B’s 
banking sector. Therefore, Arvai et al. (2009) conclude that the parent bank’s presence in the 
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region could transfer a shock from one country to other countries in the region in which the 
parent bank has significant operations. Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) argue that in a situation 
where the common lender is highly exposed to a crisis country, adjustments to restore capital 
adequacy or reduce risk exposure can lead to sudden cuts of credit lines in other economies. 
They explain that when a common lender has a rise in non-performing loans in one country; 
it is likely to reduce its credit risk exposure, either by choice or for regulatory reasons, in all 
the countries in which it operates. Furthermore, Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) noted that when 
the same institution is the main source of funding for several countries, the increase in non-
performing loans following a financial crisis in one of the borrowing economies may induce 
the common lender to require early repayment of its outstanding loans elsewhere. 
Unlike in Western European countries, a large share of cross-border banking in the CEE 
countries was in the form of local subsidiary lending rather than direct cross-border lending. 
Namely, in recent years the expansion of cross-border banks, particularly from Western 
Europe, in the CEE region accelerated to such an extent that most parts of the local banking 
sector are now owned by foreign affiliates, as revealed in section 3.4.1. Given the strong 
cross-border, inter-linkages between Western and CEE banking sectors problems in a parent 
bank can affect its subsidiaries in the CEE region. Namely, liquidity or solvency problems 
experienced by a parent bank could directly spread to its subsidiaries. In particular, as argued 
by Arvai et al. (2009), banks that are heavily dependent on parent bank funding to support 
credit growth could face a sudden shortfall of, or costly access to, credit, if the parent bank 
either withdraws its deposits or lending to the subsidiary or increases  the interest rate on its 
funding. 
Figure 3.15 shows the distribution of cross-border exposures between CEE and Western 
European banking systems.  
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Source: IMF: WEO April (2008) 
Figure 3.15 Exposure of CEE countries to Western European countries in 2007 
Note: Emerging Europe exposure to western European banks is defined as the share of the reporting banks 
in each western European country in the total outstanding claims on a given emerging European country 
(both bank and nonbank sectors). 
 
This exposure of CEE countries could contribute to their potential vulnerabilities if they are 
heavily concentrated in one country. Austria, Germany, Italy and Sweden have concentrated 
their funding activities in Central and East European countries. Looking at South Eastern 
Europe, their banking systems rely mainly on parent banks in Austria, Italy, Germany and 
France, while in the Baltic countries foreign funding mainly originates from Swedish banks. 
Some countries, like Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary rely on more diversified foreign 
sources than the other countries in the sample. Figure 3.15 implies that adverse developments 
in the Swedish bank will be felt most severely in the Baltic States, while liquidity problems in 
Austrian banks are likely to exert significant difficulties in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, etc.  
Arvai et al. (2009) provide indices of exposure to regional contagion in CESE which reveal 
that the larger the dependence of a country on funds from foreign country banks (directly or 
indirectly through the banking systems), and the larger the exposure of these home country 
banks to the trigger country, the higher the values of the contagion indices. They also find 
that the contagion indices are highest when the common lender has activities that are 
substantially concentrated in CESE region, whereas the indices are smaller when the common 
lender has large presence in, but smaller exposure to, CESE in terms of its economic size. 
Namely, the exposures to any country in the region are economically too small to affect the 
funds available to others when problems emerge in a trigger country. Their results reveal that 
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Austria, as the dominant “common lender”, would have the largest effect in propagating 
shocks across a wide range of CESE countries. 
One way to check to what extent the CEE economies are vulnerable to contagion effects, is to 
check how those countries experienced the GFC. This is the task of the following sections.  
3.5 Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Central and Eastern 
Europe 
The global financial crisis hit the CEE region in the fourth quarter of 2008, after the turmoil 
that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The global financial crisis triggered concerns 
with respect to CEE countries because of their high economic and financial integration with 
the Western countries. As explained above, those concerns related to high domestic credit 
risk, unhedged borrowing in foreign currencies and strains related to the euro-area debt crisis. 
Transmission to these countries was through several channels. As previously mentioned, the 
two channels of transmission, that are thought to have played a crucial role were: (i) trade and 
foreign direct investment; (ii) financial linkages through which banks in CEE were exposed 
to western banks, or what ECB (2012) call “deleveraging” e.g. via a decline of external 
funding to local subsidiaries of western parent banks (previously termed the common lender 
channel). The ECB (2012) notes that transmission escalated in late 2011 when funding 
pressures on European banks reached a peak. Since then, the ECB’s provision of long-term 
funding with a maturity of three years via two special longer-term refinancing operations 
(LTROs) in December 2011 and February 2012 significantly mitigated pressures on 
European banks (ECB, 2012). Although bank deleveraging, presumably associated with a 
reduced reliance on external funding and a decrease in lending activity to the real economy, 
materialised at the beginning of global financial crisis in many countries, ECB (2012) 
reported that there was no evidence of a retrenchment of parent bank lending to subsidiaries 
by the end of 2011.  
The impact of the financial crisis varied across CEE countries. In some countries the liquidity 
shortages and the solvency problems emerged, particularly in countries where the external 
imbalances had grown rapidly before the crisis. As reported by Berglöf et al. (2009) emerging 
market risk premiums increased while the FDI flows and bank lending flows and export 
volumes decreased. Many countries experienced large declines in their economic activity (see 
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Figure 3.16) together with a credit crunch. Even though the financial crisis was severe, the 
worst consequences of past crises, such as a bank runs and the collapse of the systemic banks, 
were avoided. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.16 GDP growth rate in CEE after 2007, on average (left) and by countries (right)  
 
The CEE region experienced in 2008-09 a much larger fall in capital inflows than Latin 
America or developing Asia (Figure 3.17), with a 10 percentage of GDP decrease between 
2007 and 2010. Countries in the CEE region were hit hard, especially since many of these 
countries are small, open, and highly sensitive to external shocks. According to (Becker et al., 
2010) large reliance of CEE countries on net external funding created a systemic risk in these 
countries because of potentially devastating chains of corporate defaults and the related 
currency risk for the economy as a whole. These are likely to lead to a further increase in loan 
delinquencies and a further deterioration of bank loan portfolios. However, the retrenchment 
of parent bank lending was avoided since multilateral action was undertaken. That will be 
discussed in the following subsection 3.5.1. 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010. 
Figure 3.17 Net capital flows to emerging regions in the post-crisis period (% of GDP) 
 
Figure 3.18 shows the large slowdown in net capital inflows in 2008 and 2009 in most of 
CEE countries. However, in some countries, Albania, Montenegro, Estonia and Poland, the 
impact was delayed. In 2010, the sharpest decrease of capital inflow happened in 
Montenegro, while a net capital outflow happened in Hungary.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators database 
Figure 3.18 Net capital flows to countries in CEE (% of GDP) from 2007-2011 
 
In CEE the GFC was also transmitted through trade. For the open highly internationally 
integrated CEE countries the reduction of exports had strong negative effects on domestic 
production and employment. As reported by Sprenger and Vincentz (2010), when the crisis 
appeared there was no way to compensate for the declining foreign demand of one country by 
exporting more to other countries. The strong dependence on exports did not only lead to 
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production losses but also contributed to a loss in foreign currency earnings which in turn 
affected the exchange rate (Sprenger and Vincentz, 2010). The reduction of exports increased 
the current account deficit, which was already high before the crisis. The more export-
oriented CEE countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (Raiffeisen 
Research Report, 2014) were the most highly exposed to reduced foreign demand.  
By the beginning of 2009 the crisis was felt in almost all sectors. Namely, even though the 
output declines had slowed and the confidence indicators stabilized, the ripple effect of the 
crisis began to be felt in the corporate, households and banking sectors (Berglof, 2009). There 
was a rise in corporate insolvencies and unemployment (see Figure 3.19), though labour 
market rigidities may also have played a role in the latter’s rise (IMF, 2013c). Namely, in 
cutting wage costs, as explained by IMF (2013c), there is a trade-off between a reduction in 
wages and employment, thus the more wages adjust the less employment has to. Moreover, 
they argue that it is likely that the poorly functioning labour markets caused large adjustments 
in employment rather than wages. In addition, Bakker and Zeng (2013) found that the large 
differences among EU countries in post-crisis employment performance were to a large 
extent driven by the need to adjust corporate balance sheets, which had greatly deteriorated in 
the years of rapid growth in some countries. 
 
Source: IMF WEO database 
Figure 3.19 Unemployment rate (%) in CEE economies in the post-crisis period 
 
Important post-crisis issues include credit contraction, rising non-performing loans, and a 
strengthening of weak bank balance sheets in many countries of CEE. The crisis recovery has 
been credit-less, in the most problematic of the CEE and SEE countries (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Hungary, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, see Figure 3.16). As 
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reported by Mucci et al. (2013), who analysed the banking sector trends in CEE, the weak 
demand was present at the forefront of the weak credit growth in a number of countries, with 
banks generally being characterized by an excess of liquidity Furthermore, they reported that 
the retail lending proved to be more stable during the crisis, showing growth even in 2009.  
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Source: Central Bank websites and financial stability reports 
Figure 3.20 Growth of total loans (in % y-o-y change in Euros) in Central and East 
European countries 
 
During 2010, lending activity continued to expand, most strongly for those countries in South 
Eastern Europe, particularly in those countries with a previously strong credit growth (Serbia 
and FYR Macedonia). While at the end of 2009 and during 2010 credit growth in Central 
Eastern Europe started gradually to dissipate on the back of continuing turmoil in the global 
financial markets (Figure 3.21). According to Mucci et al. (2013) growth was stimulated by 
the corporate segment which profited from the cyclical recovery in the economies in 2010 
and the beginning of 2011, while retail lending turned more subdued, even though there have 
been some improvement in household financial conditions and stronger consumer 
confidence.  
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Source: Raiffeisen Research (2011) 
Figure 3.21 Average growth of total loans (in % y-o-y change in Euros) in Central, East 
and South East European countries 
 
According to the ECB (2009), rising unemployment, lower incomes and corporate defaults 
most likely lead to a further increase in loan delinquencies and a further deterioration of bank 
loan portfolios. In addition, as reported by EBRD (2011) the vulnerabilities arising from 
foreign exchange denominated borrowing by unhedged entities, the underdevelopment of 
local capital markets and adjustments to the new post-crisis, strengthened regulations also 
fuelled the rise in non-performing loans in CEE.  Three years after the onset of the crisis, in 
2011, the share of non-performing loans in total loans in the banking sector, in CEE 
countries, remained very high and worrying. However, analysing Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) findings, the highest ratios of non-performing loans in CEE countries are still lower 
than non-performing loans ratios in some Asian countries in late 1990 that reached 30-40 
percentage.  In 2011, a growth in the share of non-performing loans occurred in nine CEE 
countries, in particular in Albania, Serbia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovenia. However, in 
some countries the share decreased, thus relieving bank balance sheet pressures, though in 
countries like Lithuania, Montenegro and Latvia the share remains at high levels (see Figure 
3.22).  
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Source: World Development Indicators 
Figure 3.22 Share of non-performing loans in total loans (%) in CEE 
 
Addressing the high level of non-performing loans presents a major challenge for the CEE 
region. Namely, it poses the question of whether their banking sectors are able to withstand 
that stress without causing a failure in confidence, which could lead to the collapse of their 
banking sectors (see Section 2.3). 
3.5.1 Actions of Parent Banks in CEE in the Period of Crisis  
Given the importance of foreign-owned banks in CEE banking systems established earlier in 
this Chapter, we pay particular attention to the behaviour of the parent banks. As the GFC hit 
Western Europe it was questionable whether the parent banks would manage to support their 
subsidiaries and branches in CEE countries. Another disadvantage of non-euro area CEE 
countries was their restricted access to euro liquidity and the ECB’s collateral policy. 
Namely, the near-paralysis of the euro-area interbank money market after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers meant that commercial banks in Central and Eastern Europe were largely 
cut off from euro liquidity (Darvas, 2009). Finally, the possibility of contagion, i.e. intra-
regional spill-overs, was also among the major fears for CEE countries. These concerns will 
be analysed in this sections.  
As shown by Berglöf et al. (2009), Mihaljek (2009) and Takáts (2010), in the first year of 
global financial crisis, outflows of foreign bank loans in Central and Eastern Europe were 
quite resilient. In that respect, the presence of mainly foreign-owned banks, especially in 
smaller economies in CEE (BIS, 2009), appear to have been, less affected by the decline in 
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cross-border loans. Indeed, Berglöf et al. (2009) find that the output drop during the crisis 
was smaller in countries with a higher share of foreign banks, suggesting that the impact of 
the crisis would have been even larger without their presence in the region. This finding is 
also in line with the research of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2008). They find that 
“subsidiaries of multinational banks, in sharp contrast to domestic banks, do not tend to 
reduce their credit supply when the host country is hit by a banking crisis” (p. 27). In 
contrast, the larger economies of CEE where foreign bank ownership has not been dominant, 
e.g. Poland, have been confronted with relatively higher contractions in cross-border bank 
loans (BIS, 2009). Kalusa (2010) explains that the relative large withdrawal of cross-border 
bank loans from the Czech Republic and Poland, in late 2008, may also have been because of 
the relatively high level of soundness and liquidity of these countries’ banking systems. 
However, later studies such as De Haas and Van Horen (2011) find that during the crisis 
banks foreign bank subsidiaries reduced their lending earlier and faster than domestic banks, 
whereas domestic banks were a relatively stable credit source. Also, Allen et al. (2011) note 
that many foreign banks were “locked in” because their local subsidiaries had given long-
term loans in the host countries, which could not be recalled. In addition, Popov and Udell 
(2010) provide evidence that less capitalised Western European banks reduced the credit 
supply of their Eastern European subsidiaries during the early stages of the global financial 
crisis.  
Comparing CEE to other global emerging regions it becomes evident that in Central and East 
European countries the post-Lehman decline in cross-border bank lending was relatively 
mild. In particular, the Western European banks, withdrew less liquidity from the CEE 
countries than from other regions of the emerging world (Figure 3.23). 
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Source: Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010), Table 1a, 1b. 
Figure 3.23 Cross-border flows, % change by source in the global emerging regions in the 
period before and after the GFC 
Notes: This graph indicated the growth of foreign claims (cross-border and foreign exchange claims by local 
subsidiaries) over the periods 2006, 3rd quarter to 2007, 2nd quarter, and 2008, 3rd quarter to 2009, 2
nd
 
quarter, from three advanced to three emerging regions, plus growth in loans by domestic banks in the 
respective emerging region 
 
McCauley et al. (2010) find that local lending by subsidiaries of large international banks was 
more stable than cross-border lending. This may be due to the European banks’ commitment 
to the region and the Vienna Initiative. Also, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) reveal that 
countries covered by the Vienna Initiative appear to be associated with mitigated local 
lending declines. In addition, De Haas et al. (2014) show that foreign banks that participated 
in the Vienna Initiative were relatively stable lenders than those banks that did not 
participate. The Vienna Initiative, launched in January 2009, was a coordination effort that 
brought together international financial institutions, European institutions, regulatory and 
fiscal authorities and the largest banking groups operating in emerging Europe. Its main goal 
was to prevent a large scale withdrawal of cross-border banking groups from the region.  
Bearing in mind the new circumstances and potentially new risks the Vienna Initiative has 
changed three times since it was launched.  The Figure below presents the three phases of 
Vienna Initiative.  
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Figure 3.24 Vienna Initiative improvements 
 
The key objective of Vienna Initiative 1.0 was to preserve financial sector stability in East 
European markets by maintaining adequate solvency and liquidity in the subsidiaries of 
western banks. Developed within the context of the “Vienna Initiative” and supported by 
EBRD, EIB and World Bank, the new Joint International Financial Institution (IFI) provided 
assistance that enabled banks to maintain their exposure to the region, meet their capital 
requirements and direct their lending activity to the real sector. For two years, under IFI 
assistance, the EBRD and World Bank committed to the provision of up to 24.5 billion of 
financing to financial institutions operating in the CEE and the CIS region, and made 
available more than €33 billion in crisis-related support for financial sectors in the region 
(EBRD, EIB, and WB Report, 2011). In Table 3.2 we present for each of the 16 countries of 
the CEE region the funding commitment, up to a total of €12, 5 billion (column "total 
signed") and the funding made available, in total more than €17, 5 billion (column "total 
approved"). 
 
 
 
 
Vienna Initiative 
Vienna Initiative 
1.0 (from January 
2009 – early 2010) 
Vienna Initiative 
plus (from March 
2010 – end-2011) 
Vienna Initiative 
2.0(from January 
2012onwards) 
Focus on response 
to GFC that spilled 
over to countries of 
the region 
Focus on financial 
crisis prevention 
Focus on mitigating 
systemic risk 
resulting from the 
recent EU debt 
crisis 
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Table 3.2 Delivery on EBRD’s, EIB`s and World Bank`s Commitments under the Joint IFI 
Action Plan, up to end 2010 (in millions of Euros) 
Source: Joint IFI Action Plan (2011) 
 
The various participants in the Vienna Initiative 1.0 made different commitments. For 
instance, the host country authorities were responsible for appropriate macroeconomic 
policies, liquidity support in the local currency irrespective of bank ownership and supporting 
their deposit insurance schemes (De Hass et al., 2012). Parent bank groups and the home 
country authorities behind them were responsible for providing funding in foreign exchange 
and recapitalising subsidiaries where needed (EBRD, 2012). The Vienna Initiative 1.0 
successfully achieved its objectives. Banking groups maintained their exposures in the 
region, continued lending to the production sector, and contributed to the economic recovery 
in 2010 and 2011. 
An interim phase was the Vienna Initiative Plus. In this phase, the Initiative created a 
platform for public-private cooperation in order to analyse and advice on longer-term issues 
for future crisis prevention, such as the widespread lending in foreign currencies prevalent in 
the region. This phase involved group meetings of parent banks, regulators, central banks, 
 EBRD   EIB   World 
Bank 
  
 Total 
approve
d 
Total 
signed 
Total 
disbursed 
Total 
approve
d 
Total 
signed 
Total 
disbursed 
Total 
approve
d 
Total 
signed 
Total 
disburse
d 
Bulgaria 449 299 181 444 424 224       
Hungary 483 467 87 1,596 1,306 851 1043 1 1 
Latvia 151 104 127 518 332 147 309     
Lithuania 30 30 35 268 213 170 480 10   
Poland  585 545 407 2,494 1,918 1,392 218 14 8 
Romania 799 431 282 795 700 437   168 90 
Slovakia 70 55 35 564 544 363       
Slovenia 50   956 791 559       
Albania 50 29 25 35 10 0   2 2 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
156 154 70 459 334 82 
52 
12 4 
Croatia 159 159 146 913 733 305 141     
FYR 
Macedonia 
64 57 10 120 110 75 
26 
26 24 
Montenegro 60 38 6 130 109 56 79     
Serbia 447 301 213 664 604 335 139 139 47 
Czech 
Republic 
      1,349 1,269 995   44   
Estonia    155 50 50       
 
Total 
 
 
3,553 
 
 
2,669 
 
1,624 
 
11,460 
 
9,447 
 
6,041 
 
2,457 
 
416 
 
176 
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ministries of finance and international institutions in which on-going issues were discussed, 
such as, NPLs, local currency and capital market development, Basel III etc.  
As a response to new dangers to the CEE region, such as Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, in 
January 2012, the Vienna Initiative moved to a second phase. This time, the crisis affected 
not only banks but public finances of home countries as well. Vienna 2.0 has a different aim. 
Namely, instead of external assistance programs, such as Joint IFIs` assistance, the aim is to 
create sustainable bank business models, involving (i) the deleveraging process of banking 
groups through cooperation of home and host country supervisors, and (ii) greater reliance on 
local sources of funding (EBRD, 2012).  
The CEE region has also been protected by an additional characteristic that is unique to 
emerging Europe. Namely, some of the observed countries are members of European Union, 
while some of them are candidates to European Union. Thus, these countries have developed 
political ties that produced financial support through European institutions.  For example, 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania received loan packages financed by the EU and IMF. Overall, 
the strong international crisis response, such as the Joint IFI Action Plan of the EBRD, the 
EIB Group, and the World Bank Group, played an important role in the restoration of 
confidence in the European region (EBRD, EIB, and WB Report, 2011). 
3.6 Conclusion 
By considering both direct macroeconomic influences on financial instability/crisis and the 
influence of financial/banking structures on the subsequent contagion effects of the global 
financial crisis, this Chapter will inform the analysis in Chapter 6. Namely, this Chapter 
provides illustrative statistics and initial analysis of most of the variables that will be used in 
the CEE model of non-performing loans. 
Overall the experience of the global financial crisis suggests that the macroeconomic 
developments, in particular growth rates, interest rates, exchange rates and excessive credit 
growth, are important in understanding the impact of the global financial crisis on countries 
and, correspondingly, in understanding the associated incidence of non-performing loans. 
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Although the GFC resulted in large declines in economic activity, a large slowdown of net 
capital inflows, higher unemployment and insolvencies, a credit crunch followed by credit 
quality problems and high ratios of non-performing loans, and bank recapitalizations, full-
blown financial crisis was avoided. As noted in section 2.3, the crisis in emerging economies 
involved currency crises, with large overshooting of exchange rates, runs on banks, and the 
collapse of systemic banks. However the worst of these outcomes were avoided in the CEE 
region. While there was a modest credit crunch and high non-performing loans ratios in CEE 
countries after the GFC, these were of moderate size compared to those in other emerging 
markets. Namely, the data shows that CEE countries suffered less outflows of bank lending, 
as a share of existing bank assets, than other emerging regions, and had a share of non-
performing loans well below the level seen in several recent crises.  
Finally, currently the empirical literature suggests that international bank lending through 
local branches and subsidiaries is more stable than direct cross-border lending, and indicates 
that foreign bank subsidiaries reduce their lending during a financial crisis less than 
domestic-owned banks.  That suggests that the impact of the GFC crisis would have been 
even larger without foreign bank presence in the region and that the same foreign banks that 
helped create the macroeconomic imbalances and over-indebtedness also helped reduce the 
impact of the resulting fragility. Those circumstances have indicated why bank lending 
outflows from emerging Europe were generally more moderate than from other regions 
(Berglöf et al., 2010). The last section also shows the benefit of private-public co-operation 
and the role of international financial institutions as coordination mechanisms (Vienna 
Initiative). This finding suggests that the structure of banking sectors in CEE countries, 
particularly regarding ownership, had a moderating effect on the transmission of the global 
financial crisis to these countries. The influence of foreign banks on the quality of loans in 
these economies will be investigated in Chapter 6.  
Amongst researchers there is also a general agreement that the supervision standards and 
instruments to maintain the banking stability prior to GFC were weak,   this argument will be 
critically assessed in the following Chapter. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the causes and effects of the global financial crisis presented in the previous 
Chapter indicated that economic, structural and institutional weaknesses lay at the core of that 
crisis. As we noted, these weaknesses in the period before the global financial crisis created a 
lethal combination of accommodative monetary policy, growing global imbalances and weak 
supervision standards. In this Chapter we are interested in investigating the conditions for 
banking stability from the institutional, or central bank’s perspective. In particular, we 
analyse how appropriate banking regulations and prudential techniques can enhance stability 
of the banking sector. 
This Chapter will provide a critical assessment of the design of a regulatory and supervisory 
framework for maintaining banking stability (Section 4.2). A subsection, section 4.2.1, is 
dedicated to examining the regulatory challenges in financial systems dominated by foreign 
banks, including a discussion of capital flow management. The Basel arrangements and their 
contribution to banking stability will be assessed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents an 
evaluation of the current switch from micro to macro prudential regulation and supervision. 
As noted by the IMF (2011), macroprudential policy requires a capacity to identify systemic 
risks early enough so that appropriate action can be taken to support financial stability.  
Therefore, in the Subsection 4.4.1 we will investigate the techniques used to anticipate future 
adverse events, in particular we will analyse early warning systems and stress tests. Lastly, 
the Section 4.5 contains concluding remarks.  
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4.2 Regulation, Supervision and Banking Stability 
Bearing in mind the key role of the banking sector in an economy, banking has been one of 
the most regulated and monitored industries in the world (Tchana, 2008). According to the 
International Competition Network Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Working 
Group (2005), banking regulation originates from microeconomic concerns over the ability of 
bank creditors (depositors) to monitor the risks originating on the lending side and from 
micro and macroeconomic concerns over the stability of the banking system in the case of a 
bank crisis. Regulation means defining the legal and organizational status of banks, defining 
the banking business and specifying the required proportions between the different positions 
in the banks' balance sheets. Barth et al. (2004) describe regulation as a set of laws and rules 
which are applicable to banking, while they define supervision as the monitoring process by 
the authorities of banks’ activities and the enforcement of banking regulations. According to 
the World Bank Global Financial Development Report (GFDR) (2013) the key challenge of 
regulation is to provide a better alignment of private incentives with the public interest, 
without taxing or subsidizing private risk-taking, while supervision should ensure the 
implementation of rules and regulations.  
The objectives of banking regulations have changed over time. During the 1980s, as 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, there were new developments and processes such as 
deregulation, securitization, internationalisation and growing competition between banking 
institutions. The new approach to banking regulation and supervision emphasised the benefits 
of increasing competition between the banks and between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions. According to Allen and Herring (2001), there are broadly four goals of banking 
regulations, namely: preventing systemic risk, providing protection for investors, enhancing 
efficiency, and improving social welfare. Summarising the literature on recent banking 
regulations the most common cited objective of banking regulations refers to ensuring the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector, by lowering the level of risk to which banks 
lenders and creditors are exposed by reducing systemic risk. According to Čihák and Tieman 
(2008), regulation should aim at supporting the efficient allocation of resources across the 
economy in normal times. Furthermore, they argue that the final test of a well-functioning 
regulatory framework is whether it contributes to the financial system’s intermediation 
capacity, while decreasing the likelihood and costs of systemic financial crises.  
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In most countries, central banks organize the regulation of banking sector given their role of 
the lender of last resort.  As seen in the Table below, this is a case in the majority of most of 
Central and Eastern European countries.  
Table 4.1 The body/agency which regulates and supervises commercial banks 
Country Body / Agency 
Albania Central Bank  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 
Two bank supervisory agencies for two entities (Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) 
Bulgaria Central Bank  
Croatia Central Bank  
Czech Republic Central Bank  
Estonia  A single bank supervisory agency 
Hungary  A single bank supervisory agency 
Latvia  A single bank supervisory agency 
Lithuania Central Bank  
Macedonia, FYR Central Bank  
Montenegro Central Bank  
Poland  A single bank supervisory agency 
Romania Central Bank  
Serbia Central Bank  
Slovakia Central Bank  
Slovenia Central Bank  
Source: World Bank GFDR (2013) 
 
However, that was not always the case through the history (e.g. Allen and Herring, 2001). In 
fact, central banks were typically founded for very different purposes. Through history 
central banks have been focused primarily on maintaining price stability and subsequently 
financial stability. However, since the 1990s, the objective of financial stability began to gain 
greater prominence among central banks. Allen and Herring (2001) summarized that 
historically systemic risk was manifested by crises, thus avoiding systemic risk is the prime 
objective of banking regulation. Typically a central banks` surveillance is broad, starting with 
the financial sector, payments system, real economy, monetary and fiscal policies, as well as 
developments in the international economy. The ultimate products of that surveillance are 
recommendations for the relevant authorities to respond to unfavourable development and 
prevent a crisis. Since, central banks have a wide range of policies (e.g. interest rates) and 
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instruments for safeguarding financial stability (e.g. monitoring  macroeconomic variables 
etc.) they have vital roles in fostering the soundness of financial institutions, particularly 
banks, as they have the powers of supervision and regulation. However, recently some 
countries (such as Estonia and Hungary) have taken responsibility for bank regulation and 
supervision away from the central bank and placed it in a separate regulatory authority, in 
some cases one which encompasses securities firms or insurance companies as well as banks 
(Barth et al., 2004). This had happened partly because financial conglomerates have become 
more common and they frequently offer a variety of financial products and services that cut 
across different institutional regulatory lines. 
There have been many attempts to classify banking sector regulations. For example, Mishkin 
(2000) distinguishes between:  restrictions on asset holdings and activities; separation of the 
banking and other financial service industries; restrictions on competition; capital 
requirements; risk-based deposit insurance premia; disclosure requirements; bank chartering; 
bank examination;  supervisory versus regulatory approach.  More specifically, restrictions 
on asset holdings and activities are targeted at preventing banks from excessive risk-taking by 
limiting the type of assets they may hold and by restricting them from engaging in non-core 
business activities, which might subject the bank to too much risk. The separation of the 
banking and other financial service industries is designed to prevent the government's safety 
net being extended to other activities. Restrictions on competition are designed to combat 
moral hazard incentives for banks to take on more risk. In addition those restrictions include 
the previously mentioned separation of industries, restrictions on entry of foreign banks, 
restrictions on branching
14
, and ceilings on rates charged on loans or on deposits. Capital 
requirements specify the amount of capital which banks should hold, in order to discourage 
excessive risk-taking. Given that deposit insurance can increase moral hazard incentives, by 
appropriately pricing the premia banks pay to reflect the risks undertaken, the moral hazard 
problem may be reduced. To ensure that depositors and the marketplace have better 
information on banks activities, regulators can require that banks adhere to certain  standard 
accounting principles and disclosure of specific information. Bank chartering concerns the 
control of banks’ entry. A typical chartering process, as Mishkin (2000) explains, requires 
that the people planning to run a bank need to submit an application that shows how they plan 
to operate the bank. Then, the chartering authority examines whether that bank is likely to be 
                                                          
14
 Branching restrictions refer to the geographic limitations on the ability of individual banks to open more than 
one office or branch. 
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sound, by analysing the amount of initial capital, the quality of banks intended management, 
etc. Bank examination means that banks must be examined in order to check the compliance 
of banks with existing regulations and enforcement actions must be taken in the case of non-
compliance. Finally, Mishkin (2000) differentiates between the “regulatory approach” and 
“supervisory approach”.  In particular, he argues that the “regulatory approach” simply 
presents a set of regulatory rules, while the “supervisory approach” represents a shift of the 
regulators' action towards the monitoring of the soundness of bank managements' practices 
with regard to controlling risk.  
A more extensive classification of existing regulation and supervision is provided by Barth et 
al. (2001).  According to their classification, there are 12 basic types of banking regulation 
covering: entry into banking, ownership, capital, activities, external auditing requirements, 
internal managements/organizational requirements, liquidity and diversification requirements, 
the deposit requirements, the accounting/information disclosure requirements, the 
discipline/problem institutions/exit, and supervision. Most of these categories overlap with 
Mishkin’s (2000) classification, except that Barth et al. (2001) have included external 
auditing and liquidity and diversification requirements. Namely, banks should be required to 
obtain certified audits and/or ratings from internationally renowned rating agencies. In 
addition, regulations may require that banks should report their liquidity provisions and 
diversification positions.
15
 
Tchana (2008) based on the previous classifications grouped existing banking regulations 
into three broad categories: regulatory measures affecting the bank’s balance sheet (capital 
adequacy requirements, reserve requirements, and asset holding restrictions), regulatory 
measures affecting the structure of the banking system (separation of the banking and other 
financial industries like securities, insurance, or real estate, restrictions on competition), and 
regulatory measures for banks’ owners and managers’ behaviour (risk-based deposit 
insurance premiums, disclosure requirements, bank chartering, and bank examination). 
Bearing in mind that in the next Chapter, we will investigate the determinants of the quality 
of loans, we will pay the special attention to the three measures are aimed at affecting the 
bank’s balance sheet: restrictions on asset holdings, capital adequacy requirements, and 
reserve and/or liquidity requirements. Namely, according to Giordano (2009) restrictions on 
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 For example, whether banks satisfy the minimum liquidity requirement; or whether they satisfy guidelines 
regarding asset diversification; are banks prohibited from making loans abroad etc. 
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asset holding and activities discourage banks from undertaking excessive risk taking by 
limiting the type of assets the banks can hold and by restraining banks from engaging in risky 
non-core activities. Moreover, regular bank examinations and restrictions on asset holdings 
indirectly help to reduce the adverse selection problem (which was discussed in section 2.3) 
because given fewer opportunities to take on risk, risk-prone entrepreneurs will be 
discouraged from entering the banking industry. Capital requirement refers to the amount of 
capital a bank has to hold as required by regulatory authorities and/or supervisory agencies in 
order to prevent the bank for future unexpected losses. According to Mishkin (2000) there are 
three types of bank capital requirements:  the first type is based on the so-called leverage 
ratio, which is the amount of capital divided by the bank’s total assets. The second is the 
Basel I Accord type where assets and off-balance sheet activities are allocated into four 
categories, each with a different weight to reflect the degree of credit risk, then the capital 
requirements are calculated as a percentage of a bank's capital to its risk-weighted assets. The 
third type is where capital requirement are based on the level of market risk taken by banks. 
Bearing in mind the importance of capital adequacy requirement in a regulatory and 
supervisory framework we will assess more recent Basel accords in the following subsections 
4.3 and 4.3.1. Reserve and/or liquidity requirements cover the amount of funds that banks are 
required to keep on deposit in accounts designated for such purpose by the central bank. As 
explained by Thana (2008), reserve requirements are probably one of the most ancient types 
of banking regulation; they have been viewed as a form of taxation on banks by governments, 
since generally these required reserves do not bear interest.  
So far, the empirical literature does not provide uniform evidence that the many types of 
regulation assist banking stability. There are no robust results indicating that regulations such 
as entry restriction, capital requirement etc. have a significant and persistent positive effect 
on banking sector stability. Namely, Barth et al. (2006) assessed the importance of each type 
of regulatory policy on the stabilization of the banking system. They found that the 
relationship between capital adequacy requirement and banking stability is not robust. 
Moreover, they find that the standard features of banking supervision and regulation do not 
reduce and may even increase the chance that countries experience banking crises. Also, they 
suggest that regulations lead to more developed banking sectors or more efficient banks. 
They argued that their findings do not mean that regulations which have not been proven 
effective have no role in strengthening the banking sector. Rather, their interpretation is that it 
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suggested a supporting role for regulation, one in which the regulators` job is to verify that 
the information being disclosed by banks is accurate, and to penalize banks that disclose 
false, misleading or inadequate information. In a later study, Barth et al. (2008) outline the 
findings of a survey of bank regulations in 142 countries, which again suggest that meeting 
the required capital requirements does not necessarily enhance banking sector stability or 
efficiency. Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2010) using data for more than 
3000 banks in 86 countries find that compliance with the Basel core principles does not affect 
bank risk measured by Z-scores.
16
 Finally, Barth et al (2012) in their fourth survey of banking 
regulations make comparisons with earlier surveys since 1999 and assess the relationship 
between changes in bank regulations and banking system performance. Their data indicates 
that many countries made capital regulations more stringent and granted greater discretionary 
power to official supervisory agencies over the past 12 years, but most countries have not 
enhanced the ability and incentives of private investors to monitor banks rigorously and 
several have even weakened such private monitoring incentives. In addition their analysis 
suggests that many countries are making counterproductive changes to their bank regulations 
by not enhancing the ability of and incentives for private investors to monitor banks. 
In contrast, De Nicolò et al. (2012) analysing the impact of capital regulation, liquidity 
requirements and taxation find that mild capital requirements
17
 increase bank lending, bank 
efficiency and social welfare relative to an unregulated banking system. In addition, their 
findings indicate that liquidity requirements reduce bank lending, efficiency and social 
welfare significantly. However, Dobravolskas and Seiranov (2011) while investigating the 
causes of the last financial crisis, find that the deterioration of financial stability was a result 
of deregulation processes in major financial markets since 1980s and the inadequacy of 
national micro-prudential
18 
regulators. Namely, in the period before the global financial 
crisis, in many countries, a progressive deregulation of various aspects of the functioning of 
financial institutions was present. As noted by Sinha (2012), the process of deregulation had 
included removal of overall policy constraints on banks’ ability to perform their core 
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  They define the Z-score as (average return on assets +equity/assets)/(standard deviation of the  return on 
assets) over [t, t-4].  They interpret the Z-score as the number of standard deviations by which returns would 
have to fall from the mean to wipe out all equity in the bank (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). 
17 De Nicolò et al. (2012) put a benchmark of core capital ratio at 4%. According them, when the capital ratio 
equals 4% a bank is operating under "mild" capital requirements. In their analysis the capital ratio can increase 
up to 12%.   
18 Microprudential regulations aim to prevent the failure of particular individual financial institutions. A 
discussion of the microprudential approach will be provided in Section 4.4. 
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functions; encouraging universal banking; permitting non-bank financial institutions to 
undertake financial intermediation; placing greater emphasis on financial markets to allocate 
resources and increased integration of financial markets. In addition, as we argued in Chapter 
3, new financial products, financial derivatives, were loosely regulated and this weakening of 
regulation was a contributory cause of the global financial crisis. 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the banks in CEE countries are increasingly merging and 
creating strong cross-border banking groups. Consequently, the banking sectors in these 
countries are now dominated by foreign banks. At the same time, banking regulation, in 
terms of supervision, and responsibility for financial stability, remains predominantly 
national. This imposes additional challenges for financial regulators. Namely, as Čihák and 
Tieman (2008) noted, financial globalization has made individual country financial systems 
much more linked, and substantial differences in regulatory and supervisory quality can 
become exposed in a cross-border crisis. In their investigation of countries around the world, 
they find that: (i) on average, countries’ regulatory frameworks score one notch below full 
compliance with the internationally accepted standards
19 
(on a 4-notch scale); (ii) per capita 
income is significantly linked to cross-country differences in regulatory quality; (iii) higher 
regulatory quality in banking is correlated with better banking sector performance over the 
2002-2006 period; and (iv) there are substantial differences in regulatory quality across 
regions, some but not all of which can be explained by differences in the level of economic 
development. Their findings suggest that high-income countries are characterized by better 
supervisory structures, given that these countries have more developed financial systems. 
However, the last global financial crisis has shown that the quality of supervisory systems in 
high-income countries was insufficient given the complexity of their financial systems. 
As Caprio (1996) noted, the success of financial reform and the stability of financial systems 
depend particularly on developing an effective regulatory framework that rewards prudent 
risk-taking and is attuned to both financial institutions and the structure of the economy. Such 
a framework should be developed whilst participants the financial system are adjusting to 
changes in incentives. Namely, Caprio (1996) highlights the importance of reshaping the 
regulatory environment promptly, at the same time as permitting non-bank financial 
institutions to participate in financial intermediation and as new financial products, financial 
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 These standards included the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; the Insurance Core 
Principles, issued by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors; and the International Organization 
of Securities Commission’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. 
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derivatives are introduced. Ingves (2006) stresses that efficient banking regulation is needed 
both to reduce the risk that banks run into problems and to minimize the externalities that 
arise if banks actually fail. As explained by Tymoigne (2009), traditionally the regulatory 
financial framework has been organized in order to detect frauds and “imprudent” risk 
management, and to make sure that economic incentives are set “properly” to promote 
smooth economic growth. However, the recent global financial crisis has shown that the 
previous framework was not appropriate; but this will be later discussed. Caruana (2010) 
explains that the currently emerging framework for financial stability favours a 
macroprudential
20 
orientation of regulation and supervision to address systemic risk. 
Furthermore, he highlights that the institutional framework needs to be adjusted at national 
level to pay more attention to the monitoring and control of systemic risks and internationally 
to ensure cooperation and consistency across borders. 
It is now widely accepted that banking sector regulations that prevailed in the period before 
the crisis must undergo significant changes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2010; Sinha, 2012; De 
Nicolò et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Caprio, 2013). The recent global financial crisis further 
highlighted weaknesses in the financial regulations and supervisions. One of them was the 
lack of system wide, now popularly called macro-prudential regulations and supervision 
which led to the failure of some financial institutions. This will be analysed in Section 4.4, 
but initially we will discuss Basel regulations (Section 4.3). Namely, the Basel capital 
regulations represent an important driving force behind the regulatory and supervisory 
improvements which should be implemented. After the period of financial liberalization in 
the 1980s, the most important type of regulations that had emerged was the Basel Accord 
with its capital requirement and its supervision practices. This new regulatory framework has 
contributed to an international convergence of banks’ risk management standards, whilst 
improving these standards in many countries. 
However, given the ownership structure of banking sectors in CEE there is a need to examine 
the specific regulatory challenges facing these banking sectors, particularly as these are the 
dominant intermediators for the large capitals flows in the CEE region.  
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 Macroprudential regulation aims to maintain stability of the overall financial system. The macroprudential 
approach will be assessed in section 4.4. 
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4.2.1 Regulatory Challenges in Financial Systems Dominated by Foreign 
Banks 
In this section we will discuss the regulatory challenges in financial systems dominated by 
foreign banks, with a specific mention of the special case of unilaterally euroised or 
dollarized countries. More broadly we will tackle the challenges of liquidity management 
faced by central banks in these countries, including a consideration of capital flow 
management from a macroprudential perspective.  
The presence of foreign-owned banks poses potential risks for Central and East European 
countries. Many foreign-owned banks in CEE relied heavily on external funding from their 
parent banks to support rapid credit growth.  The financial soundness of the foreign bank can 
influence the volume of lending by these banks through its subsidiaries as well as through 
cross-border transactions. As mentioned earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, liquidity or solvency 
problems of foreign banks may be transmitted through both their internal capital markets and 
their cross-border lending to domestically owned banks. However, these banks also played a 
critical role in post-GFC stabilization, through specific commitments on debt rollovers and 
recapitalization (under the European Bank Coordination—“Vienna”—Initiative). Though the 
Financial Stability Board (2011) reported that during the last financial crisis, there had been 
worries amongst national authorities in CEE that the problems experienced outside the region 
could affect the availability of credit and even the viability of the operations of foreign banks 
throughout the region. Furthermore, they noted that the cross-border supervision did not 
provide sufficient powers and rights to information to the host country in some cases, which 
complicated management of the risks associated with foreign financial institutions. Prasad 
(2010) suggests of three types of regulatory responses in regions where foreign financial 
institutions increase their presence and where the institutions from within the region increase 
the scale of their foreign operations: greater oversight by national regulators of the 
international operations of their domestic financial institutions, better coordination with 
regulators from outside the region, and greater coordination among regulators in the region.  
Regarding the predominant foreign ownership of banks in CEE, the GFC highlighted the 
importance of developing mechanisms to curb the effects of large and volatile capital inflows 
in these countries. Namely, capital flows between countries are of huge interest  for 
determining financial conditions especially those capital flows which are intermediated by 
the banking sector (Allen et al., 2011; Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Obstfeld, 2012a, b; 
116 
 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld; 2012; Lane and Pels, 2012). Bruno and Shin (2012) noted that 
banking sector capital flows were associated with a leverage cycle in the banking sector, 
mainly through the supply and demand of wholesale bank funding.  As explained by Allen et 
al. (2011) and Lane and Pels (2012), credit expansions were mainly financed by capital flows 
through the banking sector. Thus, the procyclicality of banking sector capital flows poses 
challenges in setting policy and regulatory responses. The cross-border spillovers associated 
with banking sector flows have also highlighted the importance of international coordination 
in banking regulation and in monetary policy. However, such coordination is not easy to 
implement, even when the interests of the relevant countries coincide. Moreover, even when 
coordination is globally beneficial, it might still generate tensions with national governance. 
Large capital inflows may present a difficult task for economic policymakers. Lipsky (2010) 
notes that in the absence of an adequate policy and institutional framework capital inflows 
can complicate macroeconomic management, reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, 
and create systemic stress. In order to prevent large capital flows one of policy responses is to 
tighten monetary policy in order to reduce incentives for capital inflows. In addition, fiscal 
policy should also be tight, as it reduces currency appreciation pressures (Cardarelli, et al., 
2007). Cardarelli, et al. (2007) identify that during periods of large capital inflows fiscal 
restraint can help limit real currency appreciation and foster better growth outcomes in the 
aftermath of such episodes.  When large capital flows fuel credit booms and where 
ineffective microprudential regulation is present, Ostry et al. (2010) reveal two policy 
choices:  monetary easing or direct interventions in currency markets. Von Hagen and 
Siedschlag (2008) explained that with a fixed exchange rate, capital inflows then lead to a 
rapid increase in international reserves. The central bank may try to sterilize their impact on 
the money supply, but as Von Hagen and Siedschlag (2008) noted in practice this may be 
costly and bring only limited success. Inflationary pressures then result in a real appreciation, 
a loss in international competitiveness, and a widening current account deficit. On the other 
hand, they explained that under a flexible exchange rate, the central bank may be more 
successful in keeping inflation low, but at the cost of a nominal appreciation of the currency, 
with the same effect on competitiveness and the current account. However, when such 
economic policies are not sufficient then capital controls, recently propagated by IMF, may 
be useful as an additional policy tool.  
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The intensity of capital controls is measured in the literature in many different ways 
(Habermeier et al., 2011). Some studies use a binary variable indicating the existence of a 
specific measure, and some use combination of a few binary variables (Clements and Kamil, 
2009; Coelho and Gallagher, 2010). There are studies on capital controls which count the 
number of regulation changes (Cardoso and Goldfajn, 1998), while others calculate tax 
equivalent intensity (De Gregorio et al., 2000). Some empirical studies find no effect of 
controls on the overall volume of inflows (De Gregorio et al., 2000; Binici et al., 2009), while 
others do (Campion and Neumann, 2004; Coelho and Gallagher, 2010). Gabor (2011) argues 
that IMF’s proposal for capital controls offers a formulaic solution which neglects the 
institutional make-up of money and currency markets. She argues that it is asymmetric in its 
emphasis on the upturn of the liquidity cycle and sanctions capital-controls only as a last-
resort solution. She stresses that the IMF approach can have perverse impacts, increasing 
vulnerability where banks play an important role in the intermediation of capital inflows. 
However, the introduction of capital controls may be beneficiary for euroised/dollarized 
economies, such as Montenegro. Namely, as we presented in Chapter 1, the significant 
foreign investment in Montenegrin real estate might have been a way to move funds offshore 
and avoid capital controls, since in Montenegro there are no capital controls. Furthermore, the 
country’s euroization, high level of external debt and large debt service requirements render 
the Montenegrin financial sector vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and call for 
more prudent fiscal policy, as domestic monetary policy is limited. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the soundness of the banking system is necessary to bolster the resilience of the 
economy and promote private sector-led growth. Thus, reinforcement of the legal and 
prudential frameworks and stronger supervisory practices are essential. Given that full 
euroization limits the ability of the central bank to provide liquidity support to banks, 
conservative capital and liquidity requirements for banks may be required. In particular, the 
CBM should assess whether banks have enough capital to cover potential losses and NPLs, in 
order to escape the build-up of huge NPLs, which would subsequently be sold to factoring 
companies. Factoring contracts may be a good way to save the capital of banks that have 
problems with debt collection. However, factoring contracts like other financing agreements 
should be regulated. A lack of regulation and monitoring of these contracts in practice carries 
the risk of abuse, which creates legal uncertainty and limits the development of the factoring 
industry. It is important that all parties are aware of their rights and obligations under the 
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contract of factoring, thus it may be necessary to regulate this industry and make these 
contracts more transparent. These factoring companies are regulated by national lows in some 
CEE countries (Serbia, Latvia, and Croatia), but in Montenegro they are not yet regulated and 
leave a room for abuses. 
To sum up, implementation of an appropriate approach to manage capital flows is likely to 
require a holistic approach. Some countries, like Montenegro where economic growth is 
mainly led by investment still needs large capital flows. Thus, that holistic approach in 
managing capital flows should consider the economic priorities of the country and the need 
for responsible monetary and fiscal policies, as well as the institutional characteristics of the 
country.   
4.3 Review of the Basel Arrangements  
In Section 2.5 we argued that improvements in the international regulatory framework for 
banking were necessary to ensure that risk management policies prevented excessive risk 
accumulations. In that context we started assessing the Basel Arrangements, focusing on 
minimum capital requirements according to the Basel I and later adapted in Basel II. In this 
Section we will expand our analysis of the Basel II arrangements bearing in mind their 
importance and significance to the banking industry and the overall macroeconomic needs of 
countries.  The IMF (2005) argued that the effective risk-based banking supervision provided 
by the Basel arrangements was necessary for a strong financial infrastructure, financial 
stability and economic development.  This section will provide a discussion of the critical 
issues concerning the development and implementation of the Basel Accords among 
developed and developing countries, in particular focusing on CEE countries.  The Basel II 
Accord on capital standards was implemented in 2007 in a large number of countries, but 
excluding some transitional countries of CEE.  The delay in the implementation of the Basel 
arrangements in some CEE countries, mainly Western Balkan countries (such as Albania, 
Bosnia and Hezegovina, etc.; see Table 4.2) was partly due to these countries’ historical 
legacy and circumstances related to their transition process.   
These countries had to make major changes to processes and practice in their financial sectors 
in order to meet Basel requirements, starting from their legal framework. In particular, they 
had to adopt and implement new laws on banking, with pertinent sub-legal legislation in 
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accordance to EU Directives
21
 in order to provide the legal framework for a gradual transition 
to Basel II. 
Table 4.2 The regulatory capital adequacy regimes the countries used as of end of 2010 
 
Source: GFDR (2011) 
 
The implementation of Basel II requires the adoption of an extremely sophisticated and 
expensive process, which took several years of implementation in some countries of CEE 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia). This implementation requires significant 
investments in banks’ personal and technological capacities. Majnoni et al. (2004) 
commenting on the Basel implementation in emerging countries, reported that the penetration 
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 On the 30th of June 2006 the European Commission published the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
which reflects the Basel II rules on capital measurement and capital standards. That new European framework 
consists of two directives: the Directive 2006/48/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions and the Directive 2006/49/EC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit 
institutions.  
Albania
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithvania
Macedoni
a, FYR Montenegro Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia
The regulatory capital adequacy 
regimes the countries used as of 
end of 2010
a. Basel I Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No No
b. Basel II No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
The risks covered by the current 
regulatory minimum capital 
requirements
a. Credit risk Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. Market risk Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
c. Operational risk Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No No Yes No - No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
---
All risks 
covered 
under Pillar II 
of Basel II.
--- ---
liquidity 
risk and 
concentra
tion risk.
--- --- liquidity risk Country risk
Settlement 
risk, delivery 
risk and 
counterparty 
credit risk
--- ---
Basel II regime (if applicable)
Will be 
applcable 
from 2011
Will be 
applcable from 
2018
Will be 
applcable 
from 2011
a. Simplified standardized 
approach (SSA)
--- --- No No No No No No No No No No No --- Yes No
b. Standardized approach (SA) --- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes --- Yes Yes
c. Foundation internal ratings-
based approach (F-IRB)
--- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes --- Yes Yes
d. Advanced internal ratings-based 
approach (A-IRB)
--- --- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes --- Yes Yes
d. Other risks (explaination)
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of external ratings agencies in these countries is typically low and that the majority of banks’ 
portfolios are un-rated. Hence, they concluded that the standardized approach would not 
properly contribute to assessing regulatory capital. In addition, they argue that the set of 
procedures embedded in the IRB approach might be difficult to implement in emerging 
economies. In particular, they explain that the IRB approach provides a certain degree of 
autonomy to banks, since they are allowed to employ their own rating methodologies and 
their own mappings of their ratings to default probabilities. It further requires bank 
supervisors control that process, without considering the available numbers and level of 
expertise of the supervisors. Helmreich and Jäger (2008) noted that like in many other CEE 
countries where the banking sector is characterized by the presence of many foreign banks, in 
South Eastern Europe the international banks have many advantages over local banks, and 
were likely to implement the more advanced techniques.  An additional problem is that in 
some countries there is no appropriate data series for some of the more sophisticated models, 
such as the advanced IRB approaches. Thus, as concluded by the IMF (2005) based on the 
BCBS guidelines: “Basel II may not be a first priority for all non-G 10 supervisory 
authorities in terms of what is needed to strengthen their banking supervision, and (they) 
should adopt Basel II only in a timeframe consistent with national priorities and capacities 
(paragraph 19.)”.  
The implications of Basel II, its various approaches, its rationale and design, and its impacts 
on banks and the macroeconomy have been discussed by many researchers (Hahn, 2003; 
Heid, 2003; IMF, 2005; Rochet, 2008; etc.).  The Basel Committee defined their scope of 
activities as follows: first, the improved exchange of information; second, increasing the 
efficiency of techniques for the control of banks that operate internationally; and third, setting 
the minimum standards that were required. In the following Table we present the main pillars 
of Basel II. 
Table 4.3 Components of Basel II 
BASEL II 
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III 
Minimum capital 
requirements 
Supervisory review process Market discipline 
Source: BCBS (2004) 
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Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010) noted that the more demanding minimum capital requirements 
(in Basel II) should restrain incentives for excessive risk-taking created by limited liability 
and amplified by deposit insurance and bailout expectations. They would force bank owners 
to have some like they said “skin in the game”22 in order to achieve a stable system. We have 
previously explained the minimum capital requirements according to the Basel I and later 
adopted Basel II. As mentioned in section 2.5, the Basel II standard brought three particularly 
important changes. First, besides credit and market risk, operational risk is now introduced. 
Namely, Basel II outlines a spectrum of simpler-to more-complex approaches for measuring 
operational risk. At the most complex is the “advanced measurement approach” (AMA), 
designed specifically for internationally active banks, which are likely to have significant 
operational risk exposure (BCBS, 2006). Second, in the standardized approach an important 
place is given to external credit agencies whose outputs are used to classify all the companies 
in the portfolio of the bank, which ultimately affects the level of capital requirements. Third, 
Basel II enables banks to create their owned models for measuring risk in their business and 
in accordance with the results to set aside the necessary capital.  Importantly, Basel II not 
only brought changes to the regulatory capital measurement, but also introduced fundamental 
principles and best practices for banks` supervision and transparent disclosures in banking 
practices.  
The supervisory review process (Pillar II) is intended not only to ensure that banks have 
adequate capital to support all the risks in their business, but also to  encourage banks to 
develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and  managing their risks 
(BCBS, 2006). Stress testing, to be assessed later in this Chapter, is an important element of 
capital adequacy assessments under Pillar II. Under Pillar II, banks are required to undertake 
capital planning in a stress situation. Namely, the first principle in Pillar II says that “banks 
should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk 
profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels” (BCBS, 2001 p. 3). Then 
supervisors should evaluate bank’s capital assessment and strategies, as well as their ability to 
ensure full compliance with regulatory capital requirements (BCBS, 2001, 2006). According 
to the Financial Services Authority (2009), firms should develop a range of stress scenarios 
relevant to their risk profile. Those scenarios should include a severe economic downturn 
based on forward-looking hypothetical events that are calibrated against the most adverse 
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 "Skin in the game" refers to the proposition that minimum capital requirements should curb incentives for 
excessive risk taking, amplified by deposit insurance and high expectations. 
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movements in individual risk drivers experienced over a long historical period. In addition, 
supervisory authorities might recommend scenarios to banks, to run stress tests as part of 
their Pillar II capital planning. That recommended scenario should reflect supervisory views 
on the worst, but still plausible, macroeconomic scenario through which a bank might go, 
whilst still be able to satisfy the minimum prescribe capital coefficient. Supervisors may ask 
banks to run that scenario directly as an input in bank`s internal capital adequacy planning. 
Namely, this scenario can serve banks as an ‘anchor’ scenario to help them develop their own 
scenarios. However, supervisors may also use that scenario to run their own supervisory 
stress testing at the aggregate level to assess banking sector’s overall resilience.  
Finally, the purpose the last component of Basel II is to complement the operation of 
minimum capital requirements and the supervisory review process (BCBS, 2001).  With this 
component the capital adequacy requirement is not just the subject of supervisory and 
regulatory authorities, namely, it becomes available to all market participants. In particular, 
Pillar III refers to a set of disclosure recommendations (and requirements) which allow 
market participants to assess key pieces of information on the scope of application
23
, capital, 
risk exposures, risk assessment and management processes, and hence the capital adequacy of 
the bank (BCBS, 2001).  
The main criticisms of Basel II refer to the lack of emphasis placed on the second and third 
pillars as compared to the first pillar and the lack of analysis of the connections existing 
between the supervisory process and market discipline (Rochet, 2004; Van Hoose, 2007; 
Luberti, 2007; etc.). That the three pillars of Basel II were not given equal importance was 
noticed by Rochet (2004), who highlighted the need for rebalancing the three pillars to ensure 
the effectiveness of these regulations. Van Hoose (2007) examines the market-discipline and 
supervisory-process “pillars” of the Basel II framework. His conclusion on Pillar III is that 
the market disclosure features are likely to have significant positive spillovers for bank safety 
                                                          
23 Pillar 3 applies to the top consolidated level of the banking group. Disclosures related to individual banks 
within the groups require the disclosure of Total and Tier 1 Capital Ratios, in order to recognise the need for 
these subsidiaries to comply with this Framework and other applicable limitations on the transfer of funds or 
capital within the group. The scope of application includes: the name of the top corporate entity in the group to 
which this Framework  applies; an outline of differences in the basis of consolidation for accounting and  
regulatory purposes, with a brief description of the entities; any restrictions on transfer of funds or regulatory 
capital within the group; the aggregate amount of surplus capital of subsidiaries included in the capital of the 
consolidated group and the aggregate amount of capital deficiencies in all subsidiaries not included in the 
consolidation (BCBS, 2006).  
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and soundness only in developing countries. However, this pillar of Basel II falls short of 
promoting effective market monitoring by private investors or encouraging the utilization of 
market signals by both investors and bank regulators in developed countries.  In addition, he 
considers that the Basel II supervisory-process pillar is completely misguided in its reliance 
on regulatory discretion, so that implementation of this pillar could potentially have 
counterproductive safety-and-soundness impacts. Namely, in his view the supervisory 
process included in Pillar II just delegate discretionary powers to banks without any 
consideration of a rules-based approach to banking regulation. Overall Van Hoose’s (2007) 
analysis of Basel II is that the market-discipline pillar does not go far enough in the direction 
suggested by academic research and the supervisory-process pillar actually goes in the wrong 
direction.  
Most of the criticisms of the implementation of the Basel II Accord have been related to the 
significant divergence in implementation across different countries.  Namely, harmonized 
policies might not work the same in different institutional environments, which might be one 
reason why cross-country empirical studies cannot find any consistent effect of tighter capital 
regulations or increased supervisory powers (Barth, et al., 2006). As summarised by Bruce 
(2010), different countries are adopting different capital leverage ratios and allowing capital 
levels to change to their own satisfaction as long as they are meeting the minimum capital 
standards. This has the effects of encouraging banks to move into particular territories with 
favourable capital requirements or engaging in cross border mergers with other banks, 
thereby through such circumventive innovations igniting regional regulatory arbitrage. 
Luberti (2007) argues that the Basel II Accord presents a compromise between two very 
heterogeneous supervisory systems and juridical-administrative contexts, the US system, on 
the one side, and continental Europe, on the other. He explains that the main difference 
between the two systems lies in the role played by market discipline and in the reliance on 
that mechanism. Furthermore, he notes that the US model, seeks to address both market and 
regulatory failures and to ensure effective supervisory action by entrusting the supervisory 
authority with the task of mirroring controls typical of market discipline, when these cannot 
work as a consequence of the peculiarities of the banking industry. However, the European 
model takes market failures as a fundamental rationale for public controls and considers 
supervisory discretion instrumental to the structural role played by regulation. Luberti (2007) 
analysing the Italian banking supervisory system notes that corrective supervisory actions are 
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likely to come too late, because of difficulties in identifying actual risk conditions and 
interfering with the entrepreneurial autonomy of banks. He considers that the “wait and see” 
attitude of banking supervision, can cause deposit guarantee schemes to be expensive for 
taxpayers and may also have a negative impact on the reputation of the supervisory 
authorities themselves. Using the crisis that started in August 2007 as an unexpected negative 
shock, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010) explore whether market participants in 12 countries from 
2005-2009, perceived different capital definitions to be effective measures of banks’ ability 
to withstand stress. They find that before the crisis, differences in initial capital – whether 
risk-adjusted or not, however defined – did not consistently affect subsequent bank stock 
returns. However, they show that the importance of capital becomes evident during the crisis 
period, particularly for the largest banks in sample they examined. Their results suggest that 
during the crisis stock returns of large banks were more sensitive to the leverage ratio than 
the risk-adjusted capital ratio. They explained that the market participants viewed the risk-
adjustment under Basel rules as subject to manipulation or not reflective of true risk in the 
case of large banks.  
Čihák et al. (2013) analyse the bank regulation and supervision after the global financial 
crisis, notes that the Basel capital adequacy measures considerably misrepresented the 
solvency of the banks. They, citing Haldane (2011), conclude that during the crisis the major 
failures occurred in banks that were compliant with the current regulatory capital 
requirements. They explain that the reasons for that were the use of risk weights that 
underestimated the true riskiness of assets such as mortgages and sovereign debts, the 
different treatment under the Basel rules of assets held in the banking book and those held in 
the trading book, and the definition of capital.
24
 According the Čihák et al. (2013), the Basel 
Committee had neglected the endogeneity of risk, its attempts to level the competitive field 
for banks had increased the covariance of banks’ exposures, which should be anathema to 
bank regulators but instead has received little attention.  
Basel II has also been criticized for procyclicality, as it requires that banks increase their 
capital ratios when they meet larger risks. That may require them to reduce lending during a 
bad times or even credit crunch, which could aggravate the downturn. Namely, many authors 
                                                          
24
 Čihák et al. (2013) note that many banks, especially in advanced economies, held a relatively small part of 
capital as equity, with the remainder being in capital with weak loss absorbing characteristics that had little 
value during the crisis. Bearing in mind the differences in the definition of capital, it was hard to assess and 
compare the adequacy of capital across institutions. 
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have argued that Basel II requirements tend to reinforce business cycle fluctuations. Kashyap 
and Stein’s (2004) simulations suggest that the new Basel II capital requirements have the 
potential to create an amount of additional cyclicality in capital charges. This Accord is 
believed to exacerbate business cycle fluctuations by forcing a bank in an economic 
downturn to hold more capital against its current loan portfolio, given that its existing (non-
defaulted) borrowers will be downgraded by the relevant credit-risk models. To the extent 
that it is difficult or costly for the bank to raise fresh external capital in bad times, it will be 
forced to cut back on its lending activity, thereby contributing to a worsening of the initial 
downturn. The authors examine the cyclicality aspects of Basel II by developing a conceptual 
framework questioning the optimality of the proposed regulations. Basel II is found to be 
sub-optimal by having a single time-invariant risk curve rather than a family of risk curves 
with the capital charge being reduced when economy-wide bank capital is scarce relative to 
lending opportunities. Simulations are then conducted supporting the theoretical reasoning. 
These findings are in line with other studies that have examined the pro-cyclicality of Basel II 
(e.g. Heid, 2003; Taylor and Goodhart, 2006). Goodhart and Persaud (2008) point to the lack 
of counter-cyclical control mechanisms or instruments in Basel II, in particular they note that 
the Basel regime of capital adequacy does nothing to constrain credit booms, instead it is 
likely to deepen them. 
However, Cannata and Quagliermo (2009) suggests that it is not appropriate to attribute the 
last global financial crisis solely to the Basel II Accord and that some of the main drivers of 
the crisis cannot be entirely ascribed to the new regulation. They have argued that some of 
the ‘regulatory failures’ that have been highlighted (inadequate growth of banks’ capital, 
proliferation of off-balance-sheet exposures) are failures of Basel I, rather than of the new 
Framework, though in other cases, they are indeed related to Basel II. Finally, they claim that 
other issues which have been criticized such fair-value assessment
25 
 have nothing to do with 
prudential regulation. They have also loudly reminded critics that the Basel II rules were not 
applied in most major countries when the crisis erupted.  In Europe most banks started to 
                                                          
25 Basel II introduced ‘fair-value accounting’ for trading book assets. Those assets are to be marked-to market, if 
there is an active market or marked-to-model otherwise, i.e. at a value deriving from the application of pricing 
models.  
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apply the new rules only in 2008, whilst in the US the regulatory agencies decided to 
postpone its implementation to 2010. 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that bank regulation and supervision in its design or 
its implementation, were inadequate to prevent a panic in the financial sector. Many authors 
have strongly criticized the Basel II framework for banks’ capital adequacy, suggesting that it 
was a major contributor to the global financial crisis. In addition, many regulated banks tried 
to circumvent the complex Basel requirements through financial innovations. Thus, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision issued new guidelines in the form of the Basel III 
regulation framework, with the aim of improving the stability of the banking sectors. The 
Basel III regulation framework will be discussed in the following subsection.   
4.3.1 Basel III 
The widespread underestimation of risk, which started back in the period of Basel I and 
continued under Basel II,  has led to many concluding that the regulatory instruments need to 
be revised again in order to have better capitalized financial system (Gorton, 2009; Janson, 
2009; Caprio, 2013). Two years after the beginning of the global financial crises, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision issued new guidelines in the form of the Basel III 
regulation framework, with the aim to improve the ability of the banking sector to absorb 
shocks arising from financial and banking pressures (thus reducing the risk of their transfer to 
the real sector), improve risk management and general management in banks, as well as to 
increase the transparency of bank operations. Miu et al. (2010), citing the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2009a), explain that special attention in Basel III is 
dedicated to the definition of available capital (i.e. the supply of capital) that is narrowed to 
raise the quality of capital; the level of risk capital (i.e. the demand of capital) that is 
increased via “bottom-of-the-cycle” calibration, so that throughout the cycle capital demand 
stays at its maximum; and discretionary distributions of earnings that are restricted to prevent 
capital reduction during stress periods. In addition Basel III, proposed enhancements to the 
measurement of risks related to securitization and trading book exposures (BCBS, 2009b).  
It has been claimed that these new Basel III rules should significantly increase the quality and 
level of capital that banks will hold (BCBS, 2011). Higher quality capital means a greater 
capacity to absorb losses. The new Basel framework introduces a Tier 1 ratio that will 
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increase to 6 percent from 4 percent, while the total risk-adjusted capital requirement will 
remain unchanged at the existing 8 percent level (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4 Basel II and Basel III capital requirements 
 Basel II Basel III 
 Common 
Equity Tier 1 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Common 
Equity Tier 
1 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Minimum 2% 4% 8% 4.5% 6% 8% 
Conservation buffer 
Not applicable 
2.5%   
Minimum plus conservation buffer 7% 8.5% 10.5% 
 
Countercyclical buffer range 0-2.5%   
Source: BCBS (2011) and authors own calculations 
 
The key element in this new definition of capital is greater focus on the core (or common 
equity Tier 1) capital. The bank's core capital is the most effective type of capital, given it is 
used directly to cover losses. The minimum requirement for core capital rose from the 2%, 
under Basel II, to 4.5% in the new regulatory framework (Table 4.2). In addition, the 
minimum amount of core capital will be supplement with another "protective amount" of 
core capital of 2.5% of risk weighted assets, which raises the overall regulatory requirement 
for core capital that banks will have to hold at 7%. The purpose of these additional capital 
requirements is to ensure that banks maintain the amount of capital that can be used to absorb 
losses during periods of financial and economic pressures. Banks will be allowed a drawn 
down conservation buffer or "protective amount" in stressful periods.
26
 Also, if the level of 
banks` capital is close to the minimum requirement, the greater are the restrictions placed on 
the distribution of income (less money available for the payment of dividends, bonuses and 
other compensation). This helps to ensure the availability of capital to support the operations 
of banks during periods of stress, which reinforces the goal of strong supervision and bank 
governance and intends to solve the problem of excessive bonus payments and dividends in 
times of deteriorating capital positions of banks. The minimum requirement for Tier 1 ratio, 
which includes core capital and other financial instruments, whose involvement is based on 
                                                          
26
 According to Basel III, when buffers have been drawn down, one way banks should look to rebuild them is 
through reducing discretionary distributions of earnings. That may include reducing dividend payments, share-
backs and staff bonus payments. In addition, banks may choose to raise new capital from the private sector as an 
alternative to conserving internally generated capital (BCBS, 2011, p. 54). 
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more stringent criteria, increases from 4% to 6% (before turning on the “protected amount”). 
In the case where these amounts are not sufficient, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision provides a third, countercyclical amount in the range of 0 to 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets. Its purpose is to achieve a wider macroprudentional goal of protecting the 
banking sector in periods of excessive credit growth. This amount is to be used if there is 
excessive credit growth
27
, which can result in increasing the system-wide risk and represents 
a supplement to the regulatory requirements for the core capital of 7%. In particular, 
according Basel III, the requirement to address excess credit growth is set at zero (no added 
capital buffers) in normal times and only increases during periods of excessive credit 
availability. However, in Basel III it is also explained that even in the absence of a credit 
bubble, supervisors should expect the banking sector to build a buffer above the minimum in 
order to protect it against plausibly severe shocks (BCBS, 2011). 
Basel III has introduced two new harmonised liquidity standards to safeguard the banks from 
liquidity risk, which had become more prevalent in the global financial crisis. Namely, 
besides difficulty in achieving adequate capital levels a bank may experience difficulties in 
providing liquidity. As already mentioned in the previous two Chapters, pre-GFC asset 
markets were buoyant and funding sources were available at very low costs. However, the 
rapid reversal in market conditions showed how quickly liquidity can evaporate and that 
illiquidity can last for an extended period of time (BCBS, 2011). To cope with such a 
situation banks will have to maintain a buffer of highly liquid securities measured by the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). This ratio, high-quality liquid assets to offset the net cash 
outflows, intends to promote short-term resilience to potential liquidity risk over one month, 
by ensuring that a bank has sufficient high quality liquid resources to overcome a stress 
scenario. The second liquidity risk measure, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), requires a 
minimum amount of stable sources of funding at a bank relative to the liquidity profiles of the 
assets, as well as the potential for contingent liquidity needs arising from off-balance sheet 
commitments, over a one-year horizon (BCBS, 2011). The intention of this ratio is to limit 
over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity and 
to encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and off-balance sheet items 
(BCBS, 2011).  
                                                          
27  Basel III highlights that countries that experience excessive credit growth during the transition period should 
consider accelerating the build-up of the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer (BCBS, 
2011). 
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Recent events have shown that banks may be more exposed to risk at times when they are not 
able to make an additional capitalization due to deteriorating market conditions. Therefore, 
these rules of Basel III were to be introduced gradually in order to provide banks enough time 
to adapt to stricter requirements and in order not to jeopardize the economic recovery from 
the global financial crisis, due to a credit crunch which might come if the weaker bank stop 
lending in order to meet the new guidelines. The implementation of Basel III started in 2013, 
and the new rules are planned to be fully completed by 2019. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2010) note that as a bank’s capital helps to absorb potential losses and 
to curb bank's risk-taking incentives, it is expected that, when a large, unexpected negative 
shock to a bank’s value materializes (such as in the GFC), equity market participants would 
judge better capitalized banks to be in a better position to withstand the shock, and the stock 
price of these banks would not fall as much as that of poorly capitalized banks. However, in 
order to safeguard the system as a whole, macro-prudential regulation, that seeks to control 
the social costs associated with a decrease in capital adequacy on the part of multiple 
financial institutions hit with a common shock, should not be neglected. Even though Basel 
III enhances the microprudential regulations and should contribute to making individual 
banks/banking groups much safer, the novel feature of Basel III is the recognition of the need 
to address systemic risk, which it does through macroprudential policies (Sinha, 2012). 
Macroprudential regulation will be critically evaluated in the following section where we will 
present an evaluation of the shift from micro to macro prudential regulation and supervision. 
4.4 From Micro to Macro-Prudential Regulation and Supervision 
Many practitioners and theorists argued that the regulatory framework before the global 
financial crisis was inadequate because it was largely “microprudential” in nature (Kashyap 
et al., 2008; Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Hirtle et al. (2009), citing Goodhart (2004), make a 
comparison between a recent crisis in Japan and the subprime crisis. Namely, Goodhart 
(2004) argued that Japan in the 1990s was an example of a system where banks were 
individually strong but systemically weak in response to real estate shocks. Similarly, as 
noted by Hirtle et al. (2009),  the recent subprime crisis shows the adverse, systemic impact 
of common exposures and positions that accumulate across firms that seemed ex ante to be 
individually well capitalised.  
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The prime aim of microprudentional regulation and supervision is prevention of failure of 
individual financial institutions. As noted by Hirtle et al. (2009), microprudential regulation 
and supervision takes the economy as given and thus exogenous to the supervisory decision-
making process. The main concern of microprudential supervision is whether the individual 
financial institution has enough capital in the wake of losses to protect consumers and 
taxpayers, and to take immediate steps to restore its capital ratio. Chang-Lok (2006) notes 
that microprudential supervision typically acts according to the Basel II regulation, 
disregarding any unique characteristics of individual financial institutions and is applied as a 
"one size fits all" system. In particular, he notes that under microprudential supervision, 
economic conditions are treated merely as exogenous variables with no relevance to the 
business operation by individual financial institutions. Hanson et al. (2010) argue that the 
main critique of microprudential regulation is that when a regulator pushes a troubled bank to 
restore its capital ratio, the regulator did not care whether the bank adjusted by raising new 
capital or shrinking assets. In both ways, the probability of banks` failure is reduced, which is 
most important from a microprudential supervisor’s viewpoint. This method of adjustment 
can be justified if we are considering a single bank that is in trouble for idiosyncratic reasons; 
however, if a large fraction of the financial system is in difficulty, a simultaneous attempt by 
many institutions to shrink their assets is likely to be more damaging to the system and the 
overall economy. Therefore, Hanson et al. (2010) suggest that we need a system of financial 
regulation which would internalise the social costs associated with excessive balance-sheet 
shrinkage on the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common shock. This 
provides the basis for the adoption of macroprudential regulatory policy. As noted in the 
previous sub-section, macroprudential elements were introduced in Basel III. Namely, 
summarized by Sinha (2012) macroprudential elements in the form of the capital 
conservation buffer, countercyclical capital buffer and leverage ratio are the hallmark of 
Basel III. The aim of these elements was to reduce the procyclicality of capital regulations 
and control the build-up of systemic risk.  
Caruana (2010) considers that the objective of macroprudential policy is to “to reduce 
systemic risk by explicitly addressing the interlinkages between and common exposures of, 
all financial institutions, and the procyclicality of the financial system”. According to 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) a financial system is prone to instability even when the 
level of aggregate risk is low, thus they argued that macroprudential regulation encourages 
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financial institutions to retain earnings and build up capital buffers in good times and then 
relaxes constraints in downturns. As summarized Galati and Moessner (2011), 
macroprudential policy aims to contribute to financial stability, in terms of increasing the 
robustness of the financial system to external shocks. Moreover, according to them, 
macroprudential policy also aims to ensure greater resilience to shocks originating within the 
financial system (e.g. Schinasi, 2004; Borio and Drehman, 2009). 
Regulatory reform requires recognition of the linkages between the macro and 
microprudential approaches. Both the macro and microprudential perspectives should be 
considered since they are both important and overlap with substantial complementarities (see 
Table 4.5). The ability to comprehensively aggregate positions and exposures across banks in 
a consistent way helps supervisors to identify industry-level trends and improve the 
macroprudential perspective. That micro and macro perspectives might work together is 
illustrated by the stress tests which are the main part of Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program (SCAP).
28
 Hirtle et al. (2009) identify the adoption of stress tests as one example of 
how the macro- and microprudential perspectives can be combined to create a stronger 
supervisory framework that addresses a wider range of supervisory objectives. Stress test 
techniques will be critically evaluated in the next section, as a part of the macroprudential 
tools used in central banks for the purpose of maintaining banking stability.  
Table 4.5 Comparison between Microprudential and Macroprudential Supervision 
 Microprudential Supervision Macroprudential Supervision 
Objective 
 Maintain soundness of 
individual institution 
 Maintain stability of the overall 
financial system 
Method 
 Present standardized supervision 
criteria for various risk factors 
 Evaluate management 
performance and make timely 
adjustments 
 Run market-responsive supervision 
standards 
 Analyse risk factors according to 
changes in macro-financial 
environment 
Recognition of 
economic 
conditions 
 Exogenous variables with no 
relevance to business operation 
by financial institutions 
 Endogenous variables influenced by 
collective business operation by 
individual financial institutions.  
Source: Chang-Lok (2006) p. 3. 
                                                          
28
 In early 2009, the Federal Reserve System prepared a financial stress test to assess the capital buffers of U.S. 
banking organizations during financial crisis 2008-2009. The specifications and results of those stress test were 
published in The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program.   
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An efficient macro-prudential supervision may significantly complement micro-prudential 
supervision at the national level, as well as cross-border context. In order for better 
identification of potential risks and to confront them, many countries have in the years after 
the GFC been working on establishing a framework of macro-prudential policy. When it 
comes to the European Union, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is responsible for 
macro-prudential oversight at EU level (IMF, 2011; IMF, 2013). 
Gopinath (2011) suggests that we need to acknowledge that the macroprudential policy needs 
to be used with other policies to be effective. Namely, he notes that the macroprudential 
measures enhance the resilience of the financial system, but cannot by themselves manage 
economic cycles or target asset prices. Gopinath (2011) suggest that a synergy between 
monetary and macroprudential policies is necessary, which may not be possible if banking 
supervision is separated from central banks. In that context, Gopinath (2011) considers that 
the involvement of central banks becomes critical.  Thus, in the following section we will 
provide an analysis of analytical models and tools that are used by central banks and 
supervisory agencies to assess financial sector vulnerabilities to severe but plausible 
scenarios of widespread shocks.  However, the last crisis highlighted some weaknesses in 
those models and tools.  Thus, a key lesson from the last crisis is that central banks and 
supervisory agencies should assign much more importance to development of more accurate 
models and tools for macroprudential analysis. 
4.4.1 The Instruments Used to Assess Banking Sector Stability 
In this Section we will analyse the techniques used to preserve banking sector stability. In 
particular, the intention is to investigate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
instruments used pre-global financial crisis to assess banking sector stability. In practice, 
quantitative methodologies, such as early warning systems (EWS) and stress testing are used 
together with expert judgment and a wealth of institutional and legal circumstance, to assess 
financial system stability (Worrell, 2004). EWS were developed with the aim to identify 
economic weaknesses and vulnerabilities among markets and ultimately to anticipate those 
vulnerabilities (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002). From the financial supervisor’s point of view, 
EWS, which generate specific indicators in order to assess new developments to identify risk 
build - up and vulnerabilities, are important elements of macroprudential supervision. 
Namely, the EWS were created to monitor cross sectorial and system wide developments, to 
pick up signals, connect the dots, identify vulnerabilities and identify aspects that may need 
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policy response (IMF, 2010). The literature (Gonzales-Hemonsillo, 1999; Barrell et al., 2009) 
describes EWS as an ex ante approach to regulation designed to highlight severe conditions 
which had happened in the past crises. Thus, EWS can have substantial value to policy-
makers by prompting them to take pre-emptive steps to reduce the risk of experiencing a 
crisis (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002).   
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) used the multivariate logit technique to relate the 
probabilities of systemic banking crises to a vector of explanatory variables. In their model 
the dependent variable, banking crisis,  is represented by a binary banking crisis dummy 
which is defined in terms of observable stresses to a countries’ banking system (when the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total banking system assets exceeds 10%). In the early 
warning systems` literature there is an increasing recognition of the relevance of the 
macroeconomic environment, and the health of the financial system in the performance of the 
individual indicators of individual bank soundness (Gaytán and Johnson, 2002). Those 
indicators that the economic literature suggests should capture sources of vulnerability to 
widespread financial crisis (Worrell, 2004). According to Worrell (2004) they include 
macroeconomic variables that have a direct impact on the balance sheets and profit and loss 
of financial institutions, such as interest rate changes; macroeconomic variables that have an 
indirect effect, for example by reducing borrowers’ ability to service their obligations to 
banks; prudential indicators of the adequacy of bank capital, such as the quality of bank 
assets, the efficiency of management, the robustness of earnings, the adequacy of liquidity, 
and the coverage of market risk; measures of exposure to interbank contagion; and measures 
of exposure to contagion from abroad. Männasoo and Mayes (2005) using panel data at the 
bank level, suggest that is possible to find bank-specific and macro-economic variables that 
are able to predict vulnerabilities in the CEE countries’ banking sector over the period 1996-
2002. They find that macro-economic variables tend to perform better in predicting a couple 
of years ahead, as they are more persistent compared to the more volatile financial variables. 
However, the financial variables have more to say about the crisis pattern, explaining how 
both the causes and the reactions contribute to a crisis or its avoidance. In addition they 
conclude that both types of indicators are inter-related and while individual factors may be 
weakly determined their joint effect is clear. 
The GFC raised the question of why the EWS failed to predict that crisis. Davis and Karim 
(2008) note that most of the EWS were based on previous experiences with banking crises. 
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Namely they followed a “check list approach”29 of indicators based on history. These did not 
capture recent financial innovations, in particular securitization and subprime lending. 
According to them, the previous approach highlighted vulnerability but needed 
supplementing in respect of possible triggers of a crisis by more accurate early warning 
models and detailed macroprudential analysis. However, the trigger(s) of a crisis depend on 
the type of economy (and its stage of development as well) and the nature of the banking 
system as suggested by Barrell et al (2009). According to Barrell et al. (2009), focusing on a 
certain type of economy and selecting explanatory variables that are relevant to their specific 
banking structures and lending behaviour might improve EWS design. They justify this with 
the example of advanced economies where the level of banking intermediation is high, 
shocks related to trade are less important crisis triggers than property price bubbles. 
Furthermore, Barrell et al. (2009) argue that previous EWSs failed to incorporate balance 
sheet variables as explicit banking crisis predictors, probably because of a lack of foresight 
on the part of regulators. Namely, as they note, capital adequacy and liquidity ratios were 
monitored in a way to limit financial instability, suggesting that those variables were at least 
used implicitly as EWSs.  They also consider that EWS design never evolved in this direction 
possibly because banking crises in developed economies were viewed as highly unlikely 
events. In this context forward looking supervision become important or, as Gramlich et al. 
(2010) concluded, forward-looking supervisory instruments are important as they should 
provide the basis for ex ante policy action and consequently reduce the need for ex post 
regulation. 
In addition to EWS, testing the resistance of the financial system to extreme shocks, has 
become an integral part of the regular financial reports published by many central banks and 
regulators, and reports of The Financial Sector Assessment Program  (FSAPs) published by 
IMF and World Bank. In order to investigate the resistance to adverse shocks, stress tests can 
be used from both a microprudential perspective, where financial institutions are analysed 
individually; and from a macroprudential perspective, where the whole financial system is 
                                                          
29
 Davis and Karim (2008) identify certain common features which might be useful in anticipating a crisis. 
These include the following aspects: regime shifts, first to laxity (such as deregulation) which provokes a credit 
cycle, later to rigour (e.g. monetary tightening) that triggers a crisis; easing of entry conditions to financial 
markets, leading to heightened competition and risk taking; debt accumulation and asset price booms, 
generating vulnerable balance sheets in the financial and non-financial sectors; innovation in financial markets, 
which increases uncertainty during the crisis; and  risk concentration and lower capital adequacy for banks, 
which reduces robustness to shocks. 
 
135 
 
analysed. Namely, Blaschke, et al. (2001) argue that the focus of the stress test could be at the 
macroeconomic level when trying to understand the possible impact of major changes in the 
economic environment on the financial system, and at the microeconomic when stress tests 
are used as a tool for managing credit, market and liquidity risk in banks. The outcome of 
these tests should suggest whether a financial institution (or system) can continue with their 
regular activities due to adverse events and continue to settle its obligations, whether the 
funds available are sufficient or financial institution should find additional sources of 
financing. As noted by Varotto (2011), regulators have recently re-emphasized the need to 
couple standard risk measurement tools with stress tests designed to capture severe but 
plausible events (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 2009c; Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 2010, and Financial Services Authority (FSA) 2009). 
Worell (2004) describes stress tests as tools designed to explore vulnerabilities to events 
which have a low probability of occurrence, but which, should they occur, could prove 
extremely costly. In addition, Worell (2004) notes that stress tests might be helpful for 
contingencies whose probability of occurrence is difficult to estimate, and that they 
complement analyses which deal with vulnerabilities which are highly probable, for which 
expected losses are small, unless the financial system is on the brink of a crisis. Melecky and 
Podpiera (2010) identify stress tests as the main practical tools of macroprudential oversight.  
Reviewing the literature on stress test methodologies, Sorge (2004) explained that the 
implementation of macro stress-tests involves the following steps: defining the scope of the 
analysis in terms of the relevant set of institutions and portfolios; constricting a 
macroeconomic stress scenario; quantifying the direct impact of the simulated scenario on the 
balance sheet of the financial sector (e.g., expected loss, capital adequacy ratio); interpreting 
the results to evaluate the overall risk-bearing capacity of the financial system; accounting for 
potential feedback effects both within the financial system and from the financial sector onto 
the real economy. Melecky and Podpiera (2010) concluded that there are two distinctive 
approaches employed in the construction of scenarios: the judgmental approach and the 
model-consistent approach. The first one sets the relevant economic variables according to 
experts’ judgments, while the second approach builds the macro scenario based on a model, 
which accounts for the inter-linkages among macroeconomic variables, and financial sectors 
specific variables. 
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The IMF (2012) explained that macro stress tests have traditionally been designed to assess 
how the financial system would react to a macroeconomic shock drawn from a tail of the 
underlying probability distribution. However, given that stress scenarios should be 
constructed to deal with tail events
30
, or the adverse events that unlikely to happen, macro 
stress tests have to include nonlinear behaviour in times of stress (Kliti and Shijaku, 2011). 
CEBS (2010) argue that there is a significant difference between the establishment of a 
minimum regulatory capital under Pillar 1, whose purpose was to provide enough capital in 
case of unexpected loss, and the assessment of risk in a stress testing practices. Namely, as 
they noted, in Pillar I capital against unexpected tail events is set to a specific confidence 
level, which might be interpreted as a measure of regulatory solvency. However, stress 
testing, particularly in reference to testing under Pillar 2, should examine what happens to a 
bank’s ability to meet its internal capital requirements when external conditions change for 
the worse over a period of time. Most stress testing before the GFC ignored this requirement. 
The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Larosier (2009), 
concludes that stress test scenarios were too mild or even wrong, given that model-based risk 
assessments underestimated the exposure to common shocks and tail risks. Also, as 
highlighted by Cecchetti et al. (2009), “economic behaviour is inherently nonlinear, so the 
linear approximation of existing empirical models is likely to be very inaccurate” (p.3).31 
However, this discussion is related to the macroeconomic and financial variables which are 
frequently modelled as a multivariate t copula.
32
 Foglia (2009) summarized the advantages 
and disadvantages of this approach. According to her, the advantages are that the marginal 
distributions can be different from the multivariate distribution that characterizes the joint 
behaviour of the variables; and the co-dependence between the macro-financial variables 
displays tail dependence (i.e. “correlation” increases under stress scenarios). Melecky and 
Podpiera (2010) have also confirmed these models’ benefits of working with marginal 
distributions which capture the higher moments’ dependence among the macro-financial 
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 Refers to an event more extreme than most observations in a normal distribution.  
31
 They explain that with linear approximation all models have the same path, or "they all go through the mean 
of the data" (p.3). That implies that they are most accurate when they have the same path, and in other cases 
they are not reliable.  
32
T-copula refers to a multivariate probability distribution. The Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) has used 
a multivariate t-copula model for macroeconomic and financial variables in their Systemic Risk Monitor (SRM). 
Foglia (2009) explains that the OeNB’s SRM multivariate t-copula approach is used to draw risk-factor changes 
randomly according to their estimated multivariate distribution. During that simulation, as Foglia (2009) 
explains, one or more of the factor changes are set to a fixed value according to the given shock; changes for all 
other (non-stressed) risk factors are drawn from the conditional distribution given the stress scenario.  
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variables. However, Foglia (2009) argues that these models are not good for policy analysis, 
as they do not recognize the key transmission channels that link the shock with its effect on 
the degree of credit risk. 
In countries like Montenegro where the conditions do not enable complex structural 
macroeconomic models to be constructed (such as those used by the central bank for 
forecasts), particular risk models such as credit risk model could be useful for prudential 
analysis. Namely, Foglia (2009) stresses the usage of credit risk models which should map 
external shocks into banks’ asset quality shocks.  In these credit-quality regression models, 
loan performance measures (such as NPLs) are typically related to macroeconomic measures 
(such as the nominal interest rate, inflation rate and change in real GDP) and some financial 
variables that according to theory and empirical evidence affect credit risk. These models can 
be estimated using data for individual banks and even individual borrowers. 
After the global financial crisis, it was generally agreed that previous stress tests were not 
informative enough and did not generate an adequate policy response (Čihák, 2007; Haldane, 
2009; Cecchetti et al., 2009; Galati and Moessner, 2011). Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) 
examining the reasons for the poor performance of stress tests, note that over a third of 
countries implemented macro stress testing results as part of an IMF Financial Sector 
Assessment Program in 2005, 2006 or the first half of 2007 and the majority concluded that 
their banking systems were robust even in the face of very severe adverse scenarios. In those 
counties where stress tests were conducted the structural assumptions underlying the stress 
models did not match the behaviour of output in many previous crises.
33
 The IMF (2012) 
suggested that the main reasons for the failure of stress tests pre-GFC were that the stress 
scenarios were not severe enough and important new risks were missed. Alfaro and 
Drehmann (2009) suggest for stress tests to be useful, their underlying structure has to be 
improved in order to better capture crisis dynamics, and future research on stress test should 
incorporate more risk factors, such as international inter-linkages and bank-specific factors. 
According to the BCBS (2009c) banks should consider more risk factors such as previously 
undetected correlations between market and credit risks, as well as between those risks and 
liquidity risk; excessive concentrations in off-balance sheet exposure, etc. Moreover, IMF 
(2012) suggests including sovereign risk in stress testing through analysing interlinked risk 
                                                          
33 In nearly 50% of the analysed crises, the evolution of GDP growth does not seem to be in line with the 
structural assumptions of the, then, current stress testing models. 
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exposures between the government and financial sector. IMF (2012) concludes that banks are 
now expected to manage enterprise-wide risks, which cover broad ranges of risk exposures, 
including risks of different business lines.   
Analysing Central and Eastern Europe macroprudential stress-testing practices Melecky and 
Podpiera (2010) note that in many CEEs the limited availability of both current and historical 
data, the delays involved in accessing financial data, and the inconsistencies between various 
data sources reduce the scope of stress tests. This is a particular problem for Montenegro, 
given that there are only short series for both macroeconomic and bank-specific data. 
Moreover, most of the bank do not use internal risk-based approaches thus it is not possible 
to estimate their future probabilities of default. Furthermore, Melecky and Podpiera (2010) 
note that the main challenges for these countries involve the need to develop quantitative 
microprudential indicators (corresponding to bank specific risks) in macroprudential stress 
tests and the explicit incorporation of dynamics in stress tests to include reaction functions of 
banks and macroprudential policy. Namely, stress test in almost all CEE countries are 
currently static, where the effect of an adverse scenario is directly mapped into the banks’ 
financial statements and accordingly it is concluded which banks are undercapitalized and 
whether there is a need for re-capitalization. However, this methodology does not consider 
that some risk factors (such as the direct effect of the interest rate risk or the exchange rate 
risk) propagate at a much higher pace than other risk factors, for example credit risk. 
Furthermore, they suggest that an effective macroprudential policy should comprise of: the 
usage of stress-tests, better communication between banks and supervisory authorities, full 
cooperation between macroprudential and microprudential supervisors and fuller information 
exchanges for better cross-border supervision of international banking groups. 
Buncic and Melecky (2012) proposed a methodology for macroprudential stress testing 
which includes the direct linking of systemic credit risk to macroeconomic conditions based 
on cross-country experience that can be further tailored to country specific conditions, and 
that allows for the credit risk sensitivity to changing macroeconomic conditions to increase 
during crisis times. Furthermore the bank-specific, idiosyncratic component of credit risk 
should be based on the different underwriting standards across individual banks and their 
aggressiveness in lending, including the assumption of indirect credit risk from foreign 
currency lending to unhedged borrowers. In addition, according to them, the concentration of 
a bank’s lending within individual asset classes and the extent of the performed maturity 
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transformation should be allowed to play an important role in bank specific capital charge 
calculations, eliminating some of the drawbacks of the capital charge calculation based on the 
Basel II methodology identified above. According, Buncic and Melecky (2012) all these 
above mentioned suggestions should be prudently combined to produce a more relevant 
outcome indicator measuring bank resilience to macroeconomic and bank-specific shocks. 
In this section, we draw attention to some important tools for macroprudential policy. The 
analysis of early warning systems and stress tests identified their main deficiencies which had 
become evident in the global financial crisis. This section also provided some useful insights 
for developing countries such as Montenegro, where these tools are still in a primitive form, 
mainly being based on a judgmental analysis approach. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The global financial crisis has revealed serious shortcomings in the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions. Namely, regulations and supervision were focused only 
on standard financial instruments. Moreover, important deficiencies were manifest in the 
Basel I and II prudential rules for capital and liquidity. Based on the review presented above, 
the regulations prevailing in the period before the global financial crisis were in need of 
significant changes. The recently created Basel III rules should significantly increase the 
quality and level of capital that banks will hold. Furthermore, given that liquidity risk became 
pivotal in the global financial crisis, Basel III introduces new standards for banks’ liquidity. 
As the legal and institutional frameworks governing central banks throughout the world have 
undergone significant changes over the last decade, in this Chapter we have assessed the new 
objectives for central bank and supervisory agencies. The current literature concludes that 
authorities should adopt a more macroprudentional perspective in regulation and supervision. 
However, microprudentional perspective should not be neglected.  Indeed, the recent crisis 
has highlighted the importance of complementing the microprudential approach to regulation 
and supervision with a macroprudential perspective. Techniques currently used to assess 
banking stability, early warning systems and stress testing techniques, illustrate how the 
macro- and microprudential perspectives can be joined to create a stronger supervisory 
framework that addresses a wider range of supervisory objectives. Though central banks and 
international financial institutions made extensive use of stress tests prior to the crisis, these 
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frequently ignored or under-estimated important vulnerabilities in the system. After, the 
global financial crisis there has been a general consensus that stress tests should better 
capture crisis dynamics, and should consider more risk factors, such as international inter-
linkages and bank-specific factors. 
In the following Chapter we will research the econometric relations in the Montenegrin 
banking system which can be used for stress testing purposes by the supervisory authorities. 
The regression coefficients on the macroeconomic variables and bank-specific variables can 
be used in a credit risk model (proposed by Foglia, 2009) which can be used as a baseline 
model for stress testing in Montenegro. The main contribution is the parameterisation of the 
impact of macroeconomic and bank specific factors on loan quality in the Montenegrin 
banking sector.  Based on the evolution of the dependent variables, we can anticipate future 
NPLs and assess whether they present a threat to financial stability. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 we identified the incidence of non-performing loans as the key indicator of the 
degree of banking distress in Montenegro. Namely, the overall situation in the real sector, the 
severe illiquidity of the economy in the post-crisis period, difficulties in the repayment of 
debts, increasing unemployment and indebtedness of households suggested growing 
problems with the quality of bank loans. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 we discussed how the 
high and rising non-performing loans ratios are often considered as an indicator of financial 
vulnerability and of future turbulence in the banking sector. Indeed, the origins of the GFC 
were attributed to the rapid default of sub-prime loans/mortgages in the United States. Lastly, 
in Chapter 4 we concluded that in order to improve macroprudential policy it would be useful 
to have a credit risk model which could serve as a baseline model for stress testing 
techniques. 
Summarising the findings from the previous chapters, it would be useful to derive a model to 
help understanding of the determinants of the incidence of non-performing loans. Thus, the 
intention of this Chapter is to consider the joint role of macro-economic and bank-speciﬁc 
factors in explaining the occurrence of banking distresses in Montenegro from 2004 to 2010. 
Using data at the individual bank level, we plan to examine to what extent is the degree of 
banking distress a function of macroeconomic developments (meaning does Montenegrin 
evidence display similar factors to those recognized in the theory of financial crises) or 
whether these distresses primarily reflect the unique difficulties of banking in transition, such 
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as previously inadequate risk-assessments, the high risk appetite of banks’ management and 
the high level of concentration in the banking system.  
Previous research suggests that credit risk, as reflected in the proportion of NPLs, seems to be 
primarily driven by macroeconomic developments as the business cycle literature has 
suggested (Williamson, 1985; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a; Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu, 1999; Mueller, 2000; Anderson and Sundaresan, 2000; Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein, 2001; Diamond and Rajan, 2005; Pesola, 2005; Quagliarello, 2007; Espinosa and 
Prasad, 2010). However, another strand of the empirical literature has focused on the effect of 
bank-specific characteristics such as the quality of management, policy choices, size and 
market power on the incidence of problem loans (Hughes et al., 1995; Berger and DeYoung, 
1997; Keeton, 1999; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Pain, 2003; Rajan and Dhal, 2003; Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2005; Dash and Kabra, 2010; Louzis et al., 2010). This Chapter aims to provide a 
synthesis of these two approaches, with the explanatory power of both macroeconomic and 
bank-specific variables being investigated. 
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the determinants of non-performing loans and formulates a number of 
hypotheses regarding the impact of macro and bank-specific variables on the proportion of 
non-performing loans. Section 5.3 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics for 
the variables which will be used in the model. Section 5.4 investigates the appropriate 
econometric strategy for modelling macro and bank specific determinants of NPLs and 
Section 5.5 provides a discussion of the empirical results. The conclusions of this Chapter are 
presented in Section 5.6. 
5.2 Determinants of Non-performing Loans 
In Section 2.4 we started discussion of the macroeconomic influences on banking sector 
stability. Based on the empirical literature we found that the macroeconomic environment 
affects the components of banks` financial variables which may then contribute to banking 
crises. Another part of the literature suggests that high or rising non-performing loans could 
be used to mark the onset of a crisis. In addition, we have noticed that some banks in the 
boom phase of the cycle underestimate their risk exposures, which in the later phases may 
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cause high non-performing loans and losses in their balance sheets. However, we argued that 
bank-specific factors should not be neglected when assessing the banking distresses.  
Our focus in this Section will be to investigate the determinants of the incidence of NPLs. In 
general, shocks to the banking sector may emanate from firm (bank) specific factors or from 
macroeconomic imbalances. The research on the major economies which has indicated that 
macroeconomic environment is important when analysing credit risk, will be examined in 
Section 5.2.1. Later, in Section 5.2.2, we will investigate the bank-specific variables that may 
also be a cause of risky lending. Subsequently, in Section 5.4 we will test the influence of 
macro and bank-specific variables on the incidence of non-performing loans. 
5.2.1 Macro Determinants of Non-performing Loans 
The empirical literature which investigates the relations between the macroeconomic 
environment and loan quality is basically grounded in theoretical models. In general, 
theoretical business cycle models with an explicit role for financial intermediation offer a 
suitable starting point for modelling NPLs as they highlight the counter-cyclicality of credit 
risk and business failures (Williamson, 1985). The macroeconomic environment influences 
borrowers’ balance sheets and their debt servicing capacity. The set of macroeconomic 
variables used varies across studies, but includes broad indicators of macroeconomic 
performance, such as GDP growth, nominal interest rate, inflation rate and unemployment as 
determinants of the incidence of NPLs.  
One of the earliest studies on the macroeconomic determinants of the quality of banks’ loans 
was by Keeton and Morris (1987). They found, for over 2400 commercial banks in the U.S. 
between 1979 and 1985, that local economic conditions explained all of the variation in loan 
losses recorded by banks. Pesola (2005) examining banking fragility in Northern Europe also 
confirms a link between the phase of the cycle and credit defaults. Jimenez and Saurina 
(2005) while examining the Spanish banking sector in the period from1984 to 2003, find that 
a rising incidence of non-performing loans is determined by lower GDP growth, high real 
interest rates and previous loose credit conditions. Furthermore, Dash and Kabra (2010) 
interpret their findings to mean that an improvement in the real economy is likely to see an 
instantaneous reduction in the non-performing loan portfolio of commercial banks, though 
the absence of a lag in the adjustment process is surprising. Finally, Bofondi and Ropele 
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(2011) find that the changes in macroeconomic conditions generally have significantly 
affected banks’ loan quality in Italy in the past twenty years. 
There are some studies which indicate that although risks tended to be realized during the 
contractionary phase of the business cycle, the origins of those risks actually peaked at the 
top of the cycle. For instance, Kent and D’Arcy (2000) while examining the relationship 
between the cyclical lending behaviour of banks in Australia, argue that, the potential for 
banks to experience substantial losses on their loan portfolios increases towards the peak of 
the expansionary phase of the cycle. Notwithstanding that towards the top of the cycle, banks 
appear to be relatively healthy, with low rates of non-performing loans and high profits, 
reflecting that even the riskiest of borrowers tend to benefit from buoyant economic 
conditions. According to them, while the risk inherent in banks’ lending portfolios peaks at 
the top of the cycle, this risk tends only to be realized during the contractionary phase of the 
business cycle. At this time, banks’ non-performing loans would increase, profits would 
decline and substantial losses to capital may become apparent. As Fernández de Lis et al. 
(2000) explain, the “excessive” accumulation of debt occurs when the economy is booming, 
when borrowers appear able to bear higher levels of expenditure and debt. However, that 
“excess” is then corrected during recessions through increased risks, deflation and finally, 
economic crisis. This is in line with the previously discussed findings of Quagliarello (2007) 
and Knutsen (2012) in Section 2.4.  
Similarly, Salas and Saurina (2002) analyse the relation between problem loans and the 
economic cycle in Spain over the period 1985-1997. They find that during economic booms 
banks tend to expand their lending activity in order to increase their market share; this often 
results in increased lending to borrowers of lower credit quality. They also report that bad 
loans increase in recessionary phases and that a contraction has an immediate effect on the 
incidence of NPLs, concluding that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted to banks’ 
balance sheets. Summarizing these empirical studies it is evident that there is a need to model 
the effect of the past period of output growth and rapid credit growth on the future behaviour 
of non-performing loans. This relationship has been neglected in the empirical literature so 
far and this will be further discussed in Section 5.4. 
Empirical studies have also suggested that aside from GDP growth, variables such as 
unemployment, interest rates and inflation may provide additional information regarding the 
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impact of macroeconomic conditions on non-performing loans. The change in the 
unemployment rate is usually not considered as a leading indicator; however, it influences the 
income of households and, in turn, their debt servicing ability. It should be mentioned that the 
unemployment rate might also proxy the financial standing of companies, which influences 
their decisions on the optimal level of employment. Gambera (2000) assesses the impact of 
state and nation-wide macroeconomic variables on the quality of different types of loans 
(agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential) using US quarterly data for 1987–1999. 
The author reports that the unemployment rate is one of the significant predictors of bank 
asset quality. Furthermore, Babouček and Jančar (2005) quantify the effects of 
macroeconomic shocks on the loan quality of the Czech banking sector for the period 1993–
2006 and report evidence of a positive effect of  a rising unemployment rate and consumer 
price inflation on the incidence of non-performing loans. Louzis et al. (2010) used dynamic 
panel data methods to examine the determinants of non-performing loans in the Greek 
financial sector. They found that macroeconomic variables, specifically the real GDP growth 
rate, the unemployment rate and the real lending rates have a strong effect on the level of 
NPLs. In addition, they find evidence that firms cut their labour costs before they face credit 
repayment problems. The hypothesis for the use of unemployment rate might also be justified 
with the expected positive association with bad debts, confirming that unemployment affects 
borrowers’ disposable income and, in turn, their ability to pay back the debt. According to 
Glogowski (2008) an increase in the unemployment rate precedes an increase in loan losses. 
Since it takes time for banks to downgrade their assets this transmission mechanism is not 
instantaneous. Hence, it might be reasonable to consider inclusion of lagged values of this 
variable in the model. 
Previous empirical research also provides evidence that inflation may be included as an 
indicator of the state of the macroeconomic and financial environment that affects loan 
quality. Inflation may affect borrowers’ debt servicing capacity through several channels and 
its impact on the proportion of NPLs can be positive or negative. Higher inflation can make 
debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of outstanding loans. However, it can also 
weaken some borrowers’ ability to service debt by reducing real income when wages and 
prices are sticky. In addition, when loan rates are variable, inflation is likely to reduce 
borrowers’ loan servicing capacity as lenders adjust rates to maintain their real returns or 
simply to pass on increases in policy rates resulting from monetary policy actions to combat 
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inflation (Nkusu, 2011). Against this background, the relationship between NPLs and 
inflation can be positive or negative. Fofack (2005) finds that inflationary pressures 
contribute to the high level of impaired loans in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries. 
According to this research, higher inflation is responsible for the rapid erosion of commercial 
banks’ equity and consequently higher credit risk in the banking sectors of these African 
countries. Hoggarth et al. (2005) employ UK quarterly data for the period 1988–2004 to 
evaluate the dynamics between banks’ write-off to loan ratio and several macroeconomic 
variables. In general, they find that both banks’ total and corporate write-offs are significantly 
related to deviations of output from potential. Namely, following an adverse output shock, 
total and corporate write-off ratios increase. Banks’ write-off ratio also rises after increases in 
retail price inflation and nominal interest rates. In contrast, Shu (2002) find that the ratio of 
bad loans to performing loans in Hong Kong decreases with a higher consumer price inflation 
rate. Also, Dash and Kabra (2010) analysing the determinants of non-performing loans in 
India have found a negative association between inflation and the ratio of NPLs to total loans. 
They explain this situation by the common indexation of wages in India. Therefore, it seems 
that the influence of inflation is mediated by what is happening to real wages and by the 
institutional context.  
Interest rates were also found to be significant in several studies. A hike in both real and 
nominal interest rates typically weakens borrowers’ debt servicing capacity, especially in the 
case of floating rate loans (Louzis et al., 2010). This implies that the proportion of NPLs is 
expected to be positively related to interest rates. Shu (2002) found that the ratio of bad loans 
to performing loans in Hong Kong falls with higher real gross domestic product growth, 
higher consumer price inflation rate and higher property prices growth, whereas it rises with 
increases in nominal interest rates. Fuentes and Maquieira (2003) found, looking at Chilean 
banks, that interest rate changes had a greater effect on NPLs than the business cycle. 
Furthermore, Espinosa and Prasad (2010) examining a sample of 80 banks in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) region find that the NPLs ratio worsens as economic growth 
weakens and nominal interest rates increase. Jimenez and Saurina (2005) examine the 
Spanish banking sector from 1984 to 2003 and provide evidence that the acceleration of GDP 
as well as a decline in real interest rates brings about a decline in problem loans. They also 
find that the impact of changes in real interest rates is much more rapid than that of economic 
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activity. Furthermore, Dash and Kabra (2010) found a significant positive contemporaneous 
association between the real interest rate and the level of NPLs.  
The majority of empirical studies do not elaborate precisely which interest rate should be 
taken as a determinant of NPLs, or why nominal interest rates are used instead of real interest 
rate and vice versa. After testing for both unrestricted and restricted versions of including 
interest rate and inflation, looking from an economic perspective it was decided to use a 
restricted version: real interest rates. Namely, including the nominal interest rate and inflation 
separately is the same as including the real interest rate but with the implied restriction:  
 
NPL = β1 i + β2 π                                              Implied restriction is:  β1=- β2 
i=nominal interest rate                                     NPL = β (i - π) 
π= inflation                                                       real interest rate = i - π 
 
To summarize, one of the hypotheses formulated in previous empirical studies is that a 
growing economy is characterized by a relatively low proportion of NPLs, as most debtors 
have a sufficient stream of income and revenues to service their debts. However, in the boom 
phase of the cycle credit is likely to be extended to lower-quality debtors, and subsequently, 
when the recession phase sets in, the proportion of NPLs in total loans increases. As 
summarized by Louzis et al. (2010), the inability of lower-quality debtors to service their 
loans during a recession might be caused by a decrease in asset values which serve as 
collateral and the subsequent contraction of credit as banks become more risk-averse.  Our 
empirical estimation will use real GDP growth and the unemployment rate as indicators of 
macroeconomic performance. According to previous empirical research real GDP growth is 
negatively associated with NPLs. Conversely, unemployment is positively related with NPLs. 
In addition to these indicators of macroeconomic performance we are going to use the real 
interest rate: that is the difference between the weighted average lending rate and the inflation 
rate of the period. Higher real interest rates weaken borrowers’ debt servicing capacity and 
the incidence of NPLs is expected to be positively associated with increases in real interest 
rates. The relevance and expected signs of the relationships between NPLs and the selected 
macroeconomic variables are presented in Table 5.1. 
148 
 
Table 5.1 Macroeconomic determinants of non- performing loans 
Name of the 
variable 
Definition Expected sign Data Source 
GGDP growth 
rate (GGDP)* 
The quarterly growth in real GDP at time t computed 
as follows: 
GGDP t = GDP t - GDP t -1  / GDPt -1 * 100 
(-) 
Central Bank 
of Montenegro 
(CBM) 
Unemployment 
rate (UNEMP) 
Quarterly  unemployment rate (+) 
Montenegrin 
Employment 
Agency 
Real interest rate 
(INTR) 
The difference between the weighted average lending 
rate and the inflation rate of bank i at time t . 
INTR t = NIR t − INF t , where  NIR refers to nominal 
interest rate 
(+) 
Central Bank 
of Montenegro 
(CBM) 
* Quarterly data of GGDP are derived using standard techniques for interpolation. 
 
We will analyse the influence of these three macroeconomic variables. It may be argued that, 
for the analysis of non-performing loans in Montenegro, it would be desirable to consider the 
composition of capital flows. As presented in section 1.2, before the crisis a significant part 
of foreign direct investment was in real estate and these large investments caused the rapid 
rise in prices in the real estate market. Additionally, given the unrealistic valuation of 
collateral for many of these loans they subsequently deteriorated the overall quality of loans 
in Montenegro. Therefore, it would be desirable to examine how the composition of capital 
flows impact on the loans quality in Montenegro. However, the data for composition of 
capital flows is available only from 2007.  As we already have a small sample (from 2004 to 
2010, quarterly), losing twelve observations for all eleven banks would not be the appropriate 
empirical strategy.   
An important consideration is to address the problem of potential endogeneity between these 
variables. Endogeneity has been usually ignored in the literature, though some recent 
empirical studies have used different approaches to deal with this problem. The use of lagged 
explanatory variables might alleviate potential endogeneity problems. There are studies that 
aim to overcome the bias associated with the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables  
using either the fixed effects or the GMM system estimator (Jimenez and Saurina, 2005; 
Quagliarello, 2007; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Louzis, et. al. 2010). 
Formally, endogeneity is the statistical condition where the error term in the “true" model is 
correlated with the regressors. Since standard regression techniques assume the error term to 
be uncorrelated and force the underlying residuals to be orthogonal to the regressors, the 
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standard approach will produce estimates which are biased. From a practical standpoint this 
means that, when estimating the effect of economic phenomenon which may be jointly 
determined, isolating the sources of variation becomes extremely important. In addressing 
these concerns, it is useful to precisely identify the sources of endogeneity. In applied 
econometrics, Wooldridge (2002) indicates that endogeneity usually arises in one of three 
ways: omitted variables which should appear when controlling for additional variables but 
due to data unavailability one cannot include them in the regression model; measurement 
error is the case of measuring the (partial) effect of a variable observed only by  an imperfect 
measure of it; and simultaneity which occurs when at least one of the explanatory variables is 
determined mutually with the dependent variable. 
In our model bias may stem from the possible simultaneity of the macroeconomic 
environment and the quality of loans, which is described by the NPLs ratio.  Namely, the 
theory suggests that the macroeconomic environment affects the quality of loans, however 
there might the feedback between the quality of loans and its macroeconomic determinants. 
Namely, some of the current macroeconomic variables might be endogenous, since banking 
system performance variables are likely to have second round effects on the real economy. 
To tackle this issue, the inclusion of lagged explanatory variables will be considered. This 
will be further discussed in Section 5.3.  
5.2.2 Micro Determinants of Non-performing Loans 
In addition to macroeconomic indicators, another branch of the literature has been focused on 
the effect of bank-specific characteristics such as the quality of management, strategy choices 
and size and market power on the incidence of problem loans. For instance, Rajan and Dhal 
(2003) use a panel regression analysis to report that bank-specific factors such as maturity, 
cost and terms of credit, bank size and credit policy orientation impact significantly on the 
incidence of NPLs of commercial banks in India. Similarly, Dash and Kabra (2010) find that 
management quality, in terms of aggressive lending policies, inefficiency and moral hazard, 
have impacted the loan portfolios of commercial banks in India. 
Analysing the determinants of the risk-taking behaviour of banks has been of particular 
importance in the banking empirical literature. According to Espinoza and Prasad (2010) 
banks’ risk-taking may be affected by a number of factors, including, moral hazard, agency 
problems, ownership structure and regulatory actions. Namely, they noticed that moral hazard 
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may be induced by deposit insurance schemes, thus the banks may increase their risk 
positions while their capital is declining. However, risk taking driven by moral hazard should 
be limited by appropriate regulatory and supervisory activities, which we have considered in 
Section 4.2. 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, growth in a bank’s lending might be a signal of positive phase 
of the business cycle if it is led by expansion of aggregate demand when firms’ profits tend to 
increase, asset prices rise and customers’ expectations are optimistic. In this situation credit 
growth may have a negative effect on the incidence of NPLs (an improvement) 
(Quagliariello, 2007). However, the empirical literature which uses bank level data (Keeton 
and Morris, 1985; Sinkey and Greenwalt, 1991; Keeton, 1999; Salas and Saurina, 2002 and 
Jimenez and Saurina, 2005) suggests that in boom phases of the business cycle banks lend 
over aggressively which coincides with more reckless risk-taking. Thus, this aggressive 
lending would suggest a positive effect on the incidence of NPLs (i.e. a deterioration). 
Therefore, excessive lending by commercial banks is often identified as an important 
determinant of the incidence of NPLs. 
Fernández de Lis et al. (2000) explain the following possible “mistakes” in banks expansive 
credit policy: disaster myopia, herding behaviour, perverse incentives and principal-agent 
problems. They explain that principal-agent problems could stimulate credit expansion 
because bank managers are willing to increase risk in order to maximise their profits and 
banks’ market share, particularly when they are poorly monitored by their shareholders. In 
these situations banks ̀ managers often disregard relevant information concerning the 
increasing level of risk, which indicates their myopia and tendency to follow other lenders’ 
behaviour. They noticed that banks could be forced into excessive credit expansion as a result 
of an informational externality that makes bank credit policies interdependent. Namely, they 
noticed that bank managers often act according to the belief that the market is more forgiving 
if mistakes are made by many players at the same time. That explains the herding behaviour 
of banks managers, which drives the market into an excessive expansion of credit that will 
increase borrowers’ debt levels and may result in an increase in non-performing loans. 
Similar conclusions are drawn by Jimenez and Saurina (2005). Namely, they report that 
short-term and reputational objectives of bank managers might explain why banks are 
prepared to finance uncertain "high risk" projects during expansions that, later on, will 
become non-performing loans. Their findings are in line with Rajan (1994) who emphasizes 
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that bank managers have short-term decision horizons, because their reputations are strongly 
influenced by other banks’ perceptions of their performance.  
A typical scenario for credit expansion is the situations where loans are approved with 
collateral which is insufficient to cover the value of the approved loan (Rajan 1994, 
Weinberg, 1995; Jimenez and Saurina, 2005).  Namely, supply-side explanations of the 
(excessive) expansion of bank loans frequently suggest a relaxation of underwriting 
standards, whereas loan contractions are said to suggest a tightening of standards (O’Keefe, 
2010). This is confirmed by Jimenez and Saurina (2005) as they find that in boom periods 
collateral requirements are relaxed while the opposite happens in recessions, which they take 
as evidence of looser credit standards during expansions. This is in line with the findings of 
Weinberg (1995), as his model suggests that banks change their lending standards with the 
new market conditions, in order to try to smooth overall lending risk. Moreover, Rajan and 
Dhal (2003) analysing Indian banks found that lenient credit conditions affect the occurrence 
of non-performing loans. 
Different empirical studies report different conclusions on when the effect of past rapid credit 
growth becomes evident, implying emerging problems in loans quality. Fernández de Lis, et 
al. (2000) find that in a context of strong competitive pressures, there is a tendency for loose 
credit standards and low provisions in an upturn in view of the low level of contemporaneous 
non-performing loans. That may contribute to an overextension of credit. They stressed that 
the low quality of these loans will only become apparent with the ex post emergence of 
problem loans, which will tend to appear during downturns, with an estimated lag of 
approximately three years in the case of Spain. Furthermore, Salas and Saurina (2002) find 
that credit growth has a negative effect on the incidence of NPLs when current values are 
considered and positive when one year lagged values are used. Jimenez and Saurina (2005) 
pay particular attention to the influence of loan growth on NPLs. In their empirical study, an 
increase in the loan growth rate worsens loan quality with a four-year lag. They also find that 
higher loan growth at bank level (compared to the average for the sector) is an additional 
factor influencing loan quality. In addition, Kraft and Jankov (2005) find that in Croatia, 
rapid loan growth increased the probability of credit quality deteriorating.  
There are also additional bank characteristics which are likely to be correlated with credit 
risk. For instance, Espinoza and Prasad (2010), citing Hughes et al. (1995), link risk taking to 
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banks’ operating efficiency. Namely, they consider that it may be possible that risk-averse 
managers are willing to trade-off reduced earnings for reduced risk, especially when their 
own wealth depends on the performance of the bank. Thus, in order to improve loan quality, 
they are likely to increase monitoring and incur higher costs, affecting the measure of 
operating efficiency. In that case, seemingly more inefficient banks might in fact hold a lower 
risk portfolio. Conversely, Pain (2003) find that inefficient banks may be tempted to engage 
in riskier lending. The costs-to-income ratio is a commonly used indicator of banks’ 
efficiency. Quagliariello (2007) finds that banks with higher values of this ratio are expected 
to be also less effective in the selection of borrowers and, in turn, make higher provisions. 
Keeton (1999) highlighted the relationship between capital and credit risk and its interaction 
with operational efficiency. He investigated the causality between loan quality, cost 
efficiency and bank capital using a sample of U.S. commercial banks for the period 1985-
1994. He found that low cost efficiency is positively associated with increases in future non-
performing loans. Additionally, he found that a low capitalization of banks leads to an 
increase in non-performing loans. Similar findings, that operating efficiency also helped to 
explain the incidence of NPLs were reported by Bercoff et al. (2002).  The study of Louzis et 
al. (2010) which covered Greece’s nine largest banks for the period 2003–2009 found that 
management quality and macroeconomic fundamentals largely explain the incidence of 
NPLs. Besides a positive relationship between the incidence of NPLs and the real lending 
rates, they find that management inefficiency, proxied by a higher ratio of operating 
expenses-to-operating income, is positively associated with the proportion of NPLs. Similar 
results have been reported by Espinosa and Prasad (2010).  
According to previous empirical studies and with special reference to Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), Salas and Saurina (2002) and Louzis et al. (2010), we will test the following 
hypotheses concerning bank specific factors. Although following the practice adopted by 
these previous studies we acknowledge that the available bank-specific variables included are 
not always close proxies for those identified in the underlying theorised relationships. 
″Procyclical credit policy″ hypothesis - As previously mentioned banks may adopt an overly 
expansive credit policy during the boom phase of the cycle and a tight policy in the 
contraction phase.  
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″Bad Management″ hypothesis - According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) cost 
inefficiency is positively associated with increases in future non-performing loans. The 
proposed justification links ″bad″ management with poor skills in credit scoring, appraisal of 
pledged collaterals and monitoring borrowers. Godlewski (2004) using the return on assets 
(ROA) as a proxy for performance, finds that banks’ profitability negatively impacts on the 
level of NPLs ratio. In addition, Louzis et al. (2010) considered past performance measured 
by ROA and ROE as a proxy for management quality. Namely, the rationale for this 
hypothesis is that worse past performance may be a proxy for a lower quality of skills with 
respect to lending activities. 
″Moral Hazard″ hypothesis - A low capitalization of banks has been argued to lead to an 
increase in the ratio of non-performing loans in the future. The link is to be found in the 
moral hazard incentives on the part of bank managers who increase the riskiness of their loan 
portfolio when their banks are thinly capitalized (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Ahmad and 
Ariff (2007) analysing credit risk in Australian and Indian banks confirm that under-
capitalized banks take more risks. Banks’ capital resources, measured by the solvency ratio, 
will be included to account for the possibility of such “moral hazard” behaviour. Lagged 
values rather than contemporaneous values of the solvency ratio will be used in the models in 
order to reduce bias from the potential endogeneity problems that may rise from reverse 
causality. 
″Good Monitoring″ hypothesis - According to this view, there exists a trade-off between 
allocating resources for underwriting and monitoring loans and measured cost efficiency 
(Louzis et al., 2010). Namely, banks which devote less effort to ensure higher loan quality 
will seem to be more cost-efficient; however, on average there will be a higher proportion of 
NPLs in the long run. To test the this hypothesis the cost-income ratio will be used, 
calculated as operating expenses relative to operating income. 
″Market Power″ hypothesis - considers the relative market share of the assets of each 
commercial bank in relation to total aggregate banking assets. The size distribution of banks 
is of interest to policy makers given that size is likely to influence a bank’s risk taking 
behaviour (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997), credit availability (Peek and Rosengren, 1998), 
lending relationships (Stein, 2002; Berger et al., 2005) and lending specialization (Delgado et 
al., 2007). Salas and Saurina (2002) reveal that market power, calculated as the ratio of the 
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relative market share of each bank’s assets, explains some of the variation in the incidence of 
NPLs. In addition, they find that the large banks seem to have a lower proportion of NPLs. 
Hu et al. (2006) while analysing the relationship between the proportion of NPLs and the 
ownership structure of commercial banks in Taiwan also find that bank size is negatively 
related to the incidence of the NPLs. The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis is that the 
larger banks have more resources to build-up know how and technologies for high-quality 
risk management.  
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the bank-specific determinants of NPLs which will form the 
basis for the following empirical work.  
Table 5.2 Bank-specific determinants of NPLs (in %) 
Variable  Definition Hypothesis tested 
Expected 
sign 
Return on Assets  ROAit = Profitsit / Total Assetsit ″Bad Management″ (-) 
Return on Equity  ROEit = Profitsit / Total Equityit ″Bad Management″ (-) 
Capital adequacy ratio 
CAP it = Owned Capitalit / Total 
Assetsit 
″Moral Hazard″, ″Bad 
Management″ 
(+) 
Loans to Deposit Ratio LtD it = Loansit / Depositit ″Moral Hazard″ (+) 
Inefficiency 
CIR it = Operating Expensesit / 
Operating  Incomeit 
″Bad Management″, 
″Good monitoring″ 
(+) (-) 
 
Credit growth
34
 
CRit = (Loansit – Loans it-1) /  Loans 
it-1 
″Procyclical credit 
policy″ 
(-) 
(+) 
Market share 
Mshareit = Total Assetsit  /  
                   ∑ Total Assetsit
11
     𝑖 =1
 
″Market power″ (-) (+) 
Note: All ratios are expressed in percentage points 
 
Before an explanation of the variables is provided, it is necessary to mention that some 
variables do not uniquely identify the proposed concepts. Namely, from the Table above it is 
seen that for one hypothesis there are several identified variables. Although following the 
practice adopted by the previous studies, we also acknowledge that the bank-specific 
variables included are not always close proxies for those identified in the underlying 
theorised relationships. 
                                                          
34
 In Section 5.4 we will explain the empirical strategy for calculating the effect of this variable. 
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Explanation of variables 
Return on assets (ROA) and Return on equity (ROE) will be used to test the “Bad 
Management” hypothesis. ROA is usually used as a measure of overall bank performance 
from an accounting perspective (Sinkey, 1992, p. 43). It is used as primary indicator of 
managerial efficiency. ROA indicates how a bank’s management has been converting the 
bank’s assets into net earnings. ROE measures approximately the net benefit that the 
stockholders have received from investing their capital (Rose and Hudgins, 2006, p. 151). 
However, using ROA and ROE as independent variables in determining the incidence of 
NPLs raises endogeneity concerns. The source of endogeneity in this case would be reverse 
causality. Since a change in NPLs can drive a change in bank performance, the effect of an 
independent change in bank performance on NPLs is likely to be incorrectly measured. 
Following the practice of several previous studies (Jimenez and Saurina, 2005; Głogowski, 
2008; Louzis, et al., 2010; etc.), we use lagged explanatory variables to overcome, or at least 
to reduce, endogeneity problems.  
A bank’s capital resources, measured by the solvency ratio, will be included to account for 
the possibility of “Moral Hazard” behaviour. The Capital adequacy ratio or solvency ratio 
(CAP) indicates the capital strength of a bank, indicating whether the bank has enough 
capital to meet the potential losses which can occur. As required by the Central Bank of 
Montenegro, banks have to maintain a minimum CAP equal to 10%. The Central Bank of 
Montenegro also requires that capital funds consist of capital inclusive of Tier-1 and Tier-2 
capital, i.e. core capital and supplementary capital respectively. Tier 1 capital consists of 
paid-up capital and disclosed reserves such as capital reserves and the previous year’s after-
tax profit. The Tier-2 capital comprises of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general 
provisions, hybrid instruments and subordinated term debt.  
Lagged values rather than contemporaneous values of the solvency ratio will be used in the 
models in order to reduce bias, namely the potential endogeneity problems that may rise from 
reverse causality. In addition, since the hypothesis is that the low capitalization of banks leads 
to an increase in the ratio of non-performing loans in the future, it is appropriate that lagged 
values of the solvency ratio will be used.   
The loan to deposit ratio (LtD) is the variable used to test banks ̓ risk attitude.  LtD is a 
measure of a bank’s liquidity, indicating the extent to which deposits are used to meet loan 
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requests. LtD serves as an indicator which shows the extent to which a bank is 
intermediating, connecting the excess fund-holders and the borrowers in their economic 
activities. Banks have to maintain sufficient level of LtDs so that their function as an 
intermediary is fulfilled. Generally, as banks borrow short and lend long, they have a constant 
need to refinance long-term assets as their short-term funding expires. However, this might 
be problematic in a crisis period, when the sources of funding are usually limited, and then 
banks may face significant funding gaps. If a bank has trouble funding itself, then it cannot 
grow and, indeed, must actually shrink its balance sheet. The "Moral Hazard" hypothesis 
predicts that the bigger the loan portfolio relative to deposit size the higher should be the ratio 
of NPLs.  Ahmad and Ariff (2007) find that the LtD ratio is a significant positive determinant 
of credit risk in Malaysia, the U.S. and France. 
To test the hypothesis of “Bad Management” and “Good Monitoring” we will use the cost-
income ratio, which is calculated as operating expenses relative to operating income 
(CIR). Theory provides mixed predictions on the sign of the expected coefficient of this 
variable. On the one hand, high cost inefficiency, as a characteristic of bad management, is 
expected to be positively associated with the increase in the proportion of NPLs. On the other 
hand, extensive screening and monitoring of borrowers requires higher operating costs, which 
could also consequently result in an increase in the cost to income ratio but a lowering of the 
incidence of non-performing loans.  
The variable CR will be included to measure the growth rate of banks’ total loans.  As 
mentioned above, the growth in a bank’s lending might be a signal of a positive phase of the 
business cycle if it is led by expansion of aggregate demand, in which case NPLs are low. 
However, we have also discussed that in that phase there may be incentives for bank 
managers to take on more risk. Thus, since aggressive lending is likely to coincide with 
reckless risk taking, the rate of non-performing loans is likely to increases in the next phase 
of the business cycle. Therefore we have created an interaction term which will consider the 
effect of past rapid credit growth on the incidence of non-performing loans. The strategy of 
how to model this effect of past rapid loans growth on future non-performing loans will be 
explained in Section 5.4. 
Finally, we include the variable Mshare, the relative market share of the assets of each 
commercial bank in total aggregate banking assets. The empirical evidence relating to the 
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impact of market share on NPLs is mixed. For instance, some studies report a negative 
impact of the market share on the incidence of non-performing loans (see Rajan and Dhal, 
2003; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Hu et al., 2006; Louzis, et. al. 2010). According to these 
studies, the inverse relationship means that large banks have better risk management 
strategies that usually translate into superior loan portfolios vis-à-vis their smaller 
counterparts. It is interesting that Galloway et al. (1997) find that size (measured by market 
value of equity) was significantly positively related to risk during a well regulatory period of 
the cycle but was significantly negative during a deregulatory regime when restrictions were 
imposed on banks following the failure of too-big to fail policy.  
5.3 Data Analysis 
Bearing in mind that the Montenegrin banking sector has been in its current form for just 
eight years, there are many unresolved issues with regards to the determinants of NPLs.  This 
Chapter focuses on the period from 2004 to 2010, using quarterly data and uses a panel data 
set of the 11 banks operating in Montenegro. During this period the Montenegrin banking 
system could be characterized as a sector which was responding to global market changes. In 
addition, this period encompasses part of a boom period and also of the Global Financial 
Crisis, originating from the US subprime mortgages market. Thus, in the time period 
examined contrasting phases of the business cycle are represented.  
In order to learn which sectors are likely to experience higher NPLs and to examine the 
determinants of NPLs for each type of loan portfolio, it would be useful to have the sectoral 
breakdown of non-performing loans. However, these data are not available for Montenegro. 
The macroeconomic data, such as GDP growth and real interest lending rate, are provided by 
Central Bank of Montenegro (CBM), while the unemployment rate
35
 is provided by the 
Montenegrin Employment Agency. In particular, GDP quarterly data are determined using 
the standard techniques for interpolation by the Statistics Department of the CBM, since 
during the sample period quarterly GDP data were not reported by the Montenegrin 
Statistical Agency. The bank-specific data are collected from the Supervision Department 
                                                          
35
 Registered unemployment rate is the proportion of registered unemployed in the labour force within the 
‘official’ working age (typically, from 15 or 16 to retirement age, which can be different for men and women; in 
Montenegro it is 65 for both genders). 
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database of the CBM.
36
Since in Chapter 1 we discussed the main macroeconomic and bank-
specific developments in Montenegro, this Section will be dedicated to summary statistics of 
the main variables. These are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for macro and bank-specific variables in Montenegro (in %) 
Variable name Variable label N.Obs. Mean Std. Dev.        Min Max 
Non-performing loans NPL 281 8.740 8.763 0.120 48.070 
GDP growth rate GGDP 308 1.029 0.032 0.943 1.075 
Real lending interest rate INTR 242 9.909 1.068 9.030 12.570 
Unemployment rate UNEMP 308 15.358 4.930 10.260 27.420 
Return of assets ROA 283 -0.295 6.398 -30.240 50.000 
Return of equity ROE 283 -2.589 31.690 -188.84 54.000 
Solvency Ratio CAP 283 34.589 30.943 6.540 196.910 
Loan To Deposit Ratio LtD 283 143.986 114.800 37.410 790.460 
Inefficiency ratio CIR 283 139.125 457.494 35.190 6882.120 
Credit growth CR 282 11.145 23.019 -45.450 171.680 
Market share Mshare 283 9.718 9.704 0.040 46.000 
 
 
The relatively large values of some variables (CAP, LtD, CIR, CR) are mainly related to two 
new banks that started to operate in the observed period. The profitability measures, ROA 
and ROE, after the crisis became negative because some banks experienced large losses. As 
presented in Chapter 1, section 1.4.4, the ROE at the aggregate level in 2010 reached -27%. 
Regarding unemployment data, it is worth mentioning that there is an issue of particular 
concern to the accuracy of an unemployment measure based upon registrants given that a 
high level of undeclared work has been present in Montenegro. According to the ISSP 
Labour Force Survey 2007 data, close to 50,000 or 22.6% of the total  number of employed 
                                                          
36
 These data are handled through a confidentiality agreement with the Central Bank of Montenegro. According 
to that agreement the names of banks cannot be mentioned. 
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persons are employed in the informal sector or hold informal employment in formal sector 
companies (informal employees) (European Commission, 2010).  
The correlation matrix (in Appendix 5.1) shows that the size of correlation between NPL and 
other variables is not very high, except for the relation between NPL and ROE (51.66%).  
5.4 Econometric Specification 
Most previous studies of the determinants of NPL ratio estimate a static FE model (Rajan and 
Dhal, 2003;  Gerlach, et al., 2005; Głogowski,  2008; Khemraj,  and  Pasha, 2009; Dash and 
Kabra; 2010). However, upon investigation we have found that static FE specifications are 
seriously misspecified with respect to serial correlation.
37
 This suggests respecifying the 
model as a dynamic linear regression model. Interestingly, several recent studies use a 
dynamic specification in order to account for time persistence in the determinants of non-
performing loans (Louzis, et. al., 2010; Espinoza and Prasad; 2010). The main feature of a 
dynamic panel data specification is the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the set of 
regressors. However, given that the lack of cross sectional units precludes GMM Estimators, 
we will investigate the use of FE estimation adjusted to take account of dynamic 
misspecification (which may be possible given the time series depth of our data). Namely, 
there is a possibility that the dynamics are unobservable and therefore contained within the 
residuals. To overcome this problem we check whether the common factor restrictions 
(CFRs) hold (Hlivnjak, 2010). First of all, a dynamic linear regression model of order one 
(DLRM (1)) will be specified and estimated. Using one independent variable, the form of the 
DLRM (1) is: 
NPLt =  α0 +  α1NPLt-1 +  β0GGDPt +  β1GGDPt-1 +  εt       t = 1, 2, … , T.       (5.1)     
The dynamic linear model is misspecified in the panel context (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Accordingly, two approaches are used to estimate the first order dynamic panel model and to 
test the CFRs: OLS in which the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is subject to 
maximum upward bias and a fixed effect estimation in which the coefficient on the lagged 
dependant variable is subject to maximum downward bias. Therefore, all possible dynamic 
misspecifications are encompassed (Bond, 2002). By checking whether the CFRs hold in 
                                                          
37 The Wooldridge (2002) test - implemented in Stata by xtserial - rejects the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation (p=0.000). 
160 
 
both OLS and fixed effects estimation, greater confidence can be placed in the approach to 
estimation and, hence, in the validity of the results.  
The CFR is tested for each continuous variable (McGuirk and Spanos, 2004). The CFR 
indicates that something may be missing in our specification, namely that there may be 
dynamics in the model but it is not known from which variables the dynamics arise. If they 
are not accounted for in the model then they are in the residual, in which case the 
hypothesised CFRs cannot be rejected. Since it was found that the CFRs cannot be rejected 
(see Appendix 5.2) in both the OLS and FE estimations, an unobserved components model is 
the preferred empirical strategy for estimation (McGuirk and  Spanos, 2004).  
In the model we have included potential macroeconomic determinants of credit risk (i.e. 
common shocks to all banks) through the real rate of growth of the gross domestic product 
(GGDP), the unemployment rate (UNEMP) and the real lending interest rate (INTR). As 
mentioned in Section 5.2.1, an important consideration is to address the problem of potential 
endogeneity between these variables and NPLs. Even though endogeneity has typically been 
neglected in the literature, recently some empirical studies have used different approaches to 
deal with this problem. In our model, as noted above, bias might stem from the simultaneity - 
mutual causation - of macroeconomic variables on the right-hand side of the model and the 
NPLs ratio.  As noted in Section 5.2.1, even though theory suggests that the macroeconomic 
environment affects the quality of loans, there might be feedback between the quality of loans 
and macroeconomic determinants. Namely, in this case, some of the current macroeconomic 
variables might be considered as endogenous, since banking system performance variables 
are likely to have a second round effect on the real economy. To tackle this issue the GGDP 
growth rate and UNEMP are included as lagged one quarter indicators capturing borrowers’ 
response to expected macroeconomic environment and business prospects. Additionally, the 
bank specific variables: ROA, ROE and CAP are also used in a form of lagged value to avoid 
potential endogeneity, as discussed in Section 5.2.2. Considering that 90 day past due loans 
are characterized as non-performing loans, one quarter lagged ROA, ROE and CAP give an 
even longer lag in the model.  
As mentioned previously, during booms banks tend to expand their lending activity to try to 
increase their market share, which, on average, is likely to result in increased lending to 
borrowers of lower credit quality. Hence, the credit risk increases in the boom periods 
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although it only appears as NPLs during bad times. Bearing in mind the empirical literature, 
it was necessary to implement a strategy to model the effect of past rapid loans growth on 
future non-performing loans. This required that the period of fast past rapid loans growth is 
interacted with a period after the peak of loans growth. The following Figure helps to explain 
how we have implemented this strategy.  
 
Source: CBM data 
Figure 5.1 The growth of loans in Montenegro (aggregate data) and its lagged effect on 
the incidence of NPLs 
Note: Vertical axis refers to loans growth (in %) 
 
The existing literature gives the general proposition that present developments in credit give 
rise to future deterioration of loans quality. However, previous studies do not provide precise 
guidance on the timing of the lagged effect of past credit growth on the incidence of non-
performing loans, which might be expected to vary across time and place. In order to 
determine the timing of this effect - if any- we proceeded as follows. For each bank, we 
created dummy variables for various periods after the peak of its loans growth
38
, each one of 
which was interacted with a variable which captures its loans growth from the beginning of 
the sample period to the peak of its loans growth. After some experimentation it was 
                                                          
38 The peak of loan growth was different for different banks.The peak of loan growth varies from the first 
quarter of 2006 to the last quarter of 2008. On average, as seen in Figure 5.1 the peak of loans growth was in 
2007.  
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concluded that the effect of past peak loan growth on the incidence of NPLs became most 
evident in the second year (from the fifth to the eighth quarter)  after the peak of loans growth 
(see Figure 5.1 which displays this procedure using aggregate rather than individual bank 
data). 
The equation below presents a linear regression function with an AR (I) error term that seeks 
to explain the ratio of NPLs to total loans through the behaviour of key macroeconomic and 
bank specific variables.   
NPLi,t = β0i + β̂1GGDPt-1 + β̂2UNEMPt-1 + β̂3INTRt + β̂4ROAi,t-1 + β̂5ROEi,t-1 + β̂6CAPi,t-1 +
β̂7CIRi,t + β̂8LtDi,t + β̂9CRi,t + β̂10D2YGLOANSi,t + β̂11D2Yi + β̂12msharei,t + λt +
 εi,t                                                                                                                                                                (5.2)   
 
where: εi,t=𝜌εi,t-1 +  𝑣t                        i =  1, … N, t =  1, … T     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
where: NPLi,t  represents the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans for bank i in quarter 
t; ∆GDPt-1  represents the quarterly growth in real GGDP at time t-1; UNEMPt-1 denotes the 
quarterly unemployment rate at time t-1; INTRt represents the quarterly real  weighted 
average lending rate at time t ; ROAi,t -1 is  the return on assets for bank i at time t-1;  ROEi,t-1  
represents the return on equity for bank i at time t-1; CAPi,t-1  is the solvency ratio for bank i 
in quarter t-1; CIRi,t  represents the cost to income ratio for bank i in quarter t; LtDi,t  
represents the loans to deposit  ratio for bank i in time t;  CRi,t  represent the growth in loans 
for bank i in quarter t;  D2Yi  is a dummy variable which equals 1 for the period of the second 
year (or for the 5th to 8th quarter)  after the peak of loans growth for each bank, and zero 
otherwise; D2YGLOANSi,t  represents the interaction term calculated as the overall 
percentage change in loans growth from the beginning of the sample period to the peak of 
loans growth for each individual bank multiplied by the dummy for period after the peak; 
Msharei,t is the ratio that captures the market share of the bank i at time t; and a set of time 
dummies (λt).  In this model, the fixed effects β0i capture the effect of time invariant, 
unobserved bank-specific, variables that are otherwise omitted from the model; εi,t is the 
idiosyncratic error term (since we do not know where it comes from) which represents the 
unexplained part of dependent variable for each observation, in other words for each bank for 
each quarter; ρ is the autoregressive coefficient and 𝑣t  represents a white noise component. 
There are two important reasons for specifying with a full set of time dummies (of course 
omitting the 1
st
 period). Firstly, to model group-specific invariant but time-specific influences 
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otherwise omitted from the model. This is particularly important to model the effects of 
global financial crisis, which affected all banks in our sample. Namely, a part of the model 
specification is to control for quarter by quarter changes in the global economic environment. 
Secondly, including time dummies allows us to address a developing concern in the 
econometric literature on panel analysis, and on dynamic panel analysis in particular: cross-
group residual correlation. This is a serious issue largely neglected by applied researchers. 
Yet failure to address cross-group correlation may invalidate statistical inference (specifically 
standard errors are likely to be underestimated). The recommended strategy to remove, or at 
least to minimize, cross group correlation is to include a full set of time dummies 
(Wooldridge, 2008). Inclusion of time dummies was neglected in the previous empirical 
studies.  
5.5 Estimation Results 
Non-rejection of the CFRs (see Appendix 5.2) transforms the DLRM into an unobserved 
components model, which is static in the observables but dynamic in the unobservables (as in 
equation 5.2). This model requires a non-linear numerical estimator and it is implemented in 
its FE version as explained above (equation 5.2). This estimator is legitimate only, indeed if 
and only if, the CFRs cannot be rejected. In its essentials, the estimator proceeds by 
estimating the beta (β) coefficients in equation 5.1, then estimating the autoregressive 
coefficient ρ in equation 5.2, then re-estimating the β coefficients conditional on ρ, re-
estimating ρ conditional upon the β coefficients and so on until iteration to stable estimates of 
both β and ρ is achieved.  
By applying a panel AR (1) estimator, the errors are assumed to follow a first order 
autoregressive process. The diagnostic check for first-order serial correlation in the residuals 
(ρ= 0.71, substantially above the rule of thumb threshold of 0.3) suggests that taking into 
account the AR structure of the residuals should improve the estimation results significantly. 
The results from the fixed effects linear model with an AR (1) disturbance are presented in 
the following Table.  
Table 5.4 Fixed effects linear model with AR (1) disturbance 
VARIABLE NAME ABBREVIATIONS COEFFICIENT t p>|t| HYPOTHESIS 
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Growth rate    GGDP L1. -40.050  -1.56        0.122 Credit risk is pro-cyclical 
Unemployment rate UNEMP L1. 0.507 0.35    0.728     
Deteriorates debtors capacity of 
repayment 
Real weighted average lending 
rate 
 
INTR 
 
-8.614 -0.74    0.462      
Affects the difficulty in servicing 
debt 
Return on Assets ROA L1. 0.009 0.18    0.856     ″Bad Management″ 
Return on Equity ROE L1. -0.007 -0.52    0.604     ″Bad Management″ 
Solvency Ratio CAP L1.  0.060* 1.90     0.059  ″Moral Hazard″ 
Loans to Deposit Ratio LtD -0.004 -0.57    0.570     ″Moral Hazard″ 
Inefficiency CIR  0.003** 2.19    0.030  ″Bad Management″ 
Credit growth CR -0.012 -0.72    0.474     ″Procyclical credit policy″ 
Dummy for 2nd year after the  
peak 
D2Y -0.053 0.06    0.954     ″Procyclical credit policy″ 
Interaction D2YGLOANS  0.078* 1.83    0.070   ″Procyclical credit policy″ 
Market Power Mshare  -0.344** -2.12    0.035    ″Market power″ 
Time dummies included but not 
reported 
     
Note: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Note: Time dummies are reported in Appendix 5.3 
 
Looking at the estimation results, there is evidence of a substantial negative effect of GDP 
growth
39
 on the incidence of non-performing loans in Montenegro, albeit approaches 
significance at the 10 per cent level (p=0.122). The lack of precision of this estimate may first 
and foremost be explained by the low number of observations on GGDP and the other 
macroeconomic variables (t=28 with no variation between banks`). Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, the quarterly data for GDP growth rate were interpolated and thus 
might not accurately measure the actual changes in the GDP growth rate. Finally, the lack of 
precision of the estimate may also reflect multicollinearity between GGDP observations 
(derived from annual data) and time dummies. Evidence for this is provided by estimation 
without time dummies where the GDP growth coefficient is now marginally significant at the 
10% level. According the these results, an increase of one percentage point in the GDP 
growth rate during the first quarter, leads to a decrease of 13.7 percentage points in the NPL 
ratio during the second quarter. All but one of the other variables had similar coefficients to 
                                                          
39
 However, considering that one standard deviation change in the growth rate of GDP (0.032) is associated with 
a marginal effect of GDP growth rate on the incidence of NPLs, the marginal effect of GDP growth has a 
plausible size. 
165 
 
those in the preferred model. The results of estimation without period times are provided in 
Appendix 5.4.  
The other two macroeconomic indicators presented in Table 5.4, lagged unemployment rate 
and real lending interest rates are found to be statistically insignificant. One reason why the 
unemployment rate is statistically insignificant may be due to the inaccurate measuring of 
unemployment due to the registrant measure used and the large informal economy in 
Montenegro. 
Focusing on bank-specific coefficients, the results partly comply with expectations with 
respect to the relationship between management quality and non-performing loans. Namely, 
one of the variables, CIR, used to test for the hypothesis of "Bad Management" is found to be 
statistically significant. In particular, using this variable in the model we have assumed that 
the quality of banks` management may be also reflected through the cost efficiency. Our 
results provide evidence that the inefficiency index, measured as a ratio of operating costs to 
operating income, has a positive and statistically significant influence on the incidence of 
NPLs. Specifically, an increase of one percentage point in the ratio of operating costs to 
operating income, at 5% significance level, leads to a slight increase of 0.003 percentage 
point in the NPL ratio during the first quarter. The other three variables (ROA, ROE, LtD) 
which were used to test the hypothesis of "Bad Management", are not significant. However, 
banks’ risk attitude, seen through the solvency ratio, seems to have a positive and statistically 
significant influence on the incidence of NPLs. An increase of one percentage point in the 
solvency ratio in the first quarter leads to an increase in 0.06 percentage points in the NPL 
ratio in the second quarter, at the 10% significance level,. Thus, the "Moral Hazard" 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the Montenegrin banking system. Finally, the variable 
Mshare, which represents the market share of the bank, has a negative, statistically significant 
impact on the incidence of NPLs. This finding, which is consistent with the "Market Power" 
hypothesis, can be interpreted to mean that relatively large banks might be more careful in 
approving loans and screening loan customers. Large banks might have more resources to 
build-up know how and technologies for high quality risk management. Hence, they may 
attract and/or select less risky borrowers.  
In this Chapter, we paid special attention to modelling the effect of rapid past loans growth 
on the incidence of NPLs, implying that short sightedness amongst bank managers was 
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present in Montenegro and that the aggressive lending coincides with more reckless risk 
taking. In particular, we were interested to investigate at which point this effect of past rapid 
loans growth might become evident. Thus, observing the interaction between the overall 
percentage change in loans growth from the beginning of the sample period to the peak of 
loans growth for each individual bank and the dummy for period after the peak 
(D2YGLOANS), the result suggests a positive and significant influence of past loans growth 
on the incidence of NPLs in the second year after the peak of loans growth. More precisely, 
at the 10% significance level, an increase of one percentage point in loans growth, prior to the 
peak (measured for each particular bank), leads to an increase in the ratio of NPLs of 0.08 
percentage points, during the period five to eight quarters after the peak of loans growth. It is 
noteworthy that we find no contemporaneous effect of loans growth on NPLs. Yet, if we 
estimate in the absence of period dummies, we do find a statistically significant negative 
effect (see Appendix 5.4). This may suggest that this finding in previous studies reflects 
model misspecification arising from the omission of period dummies (Ranjan and Dhal, 
2003; Dash and Kabra, 2010; Louzis et al., 2010; Nkusu, 2011; Beck et al., 2013).  
While the main purpose of time dummies is to control for omitted group invariant, time 
specific effects and to address possible cross-group residual correlation, in this model they do 
have a plausible economic interpretation.  The signs of the time dummies after the crisis 
period are uniformly positive and jointly significant, suggesting that the crisis has a positive 
influence on the incidence of NPLs, while the time dummies before the crisis are not jointly 
significant (see Appendix 5.3). 
We have reported the results from a model which did not consider period dummies, in order 
to demonstrate how previous empirical studies not considering time dummies might be 
misspecified and most probably report spurious results. For example, the variable ROE is not 
statistically significant in our model specified with period dummies (equation 5.2), while it 
appears statistically significant in the misspecified model (Appendix 5.4). However, our 
variable of interest, the delayed effect of loans growth on NPLs, which becomes evident in 
the 5th to 8th quarter, has an even stronger effect when we include time dummies in the 
model. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
In this Chapter we use a dynamic panel approach to investigate the determinants of the 
incidence of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Montenegrin banking sector. In particular, 
we specify a dynamic linear regression model and test the common factor restrictions (CFRs). 
The non-rejection of the CFRs suggests estimation of a dynamic linear regression model in 
the form of an unobservable components model with fixed effects, which is static in the 
observables but dynamic in unobservables and which is estimated by a non-linear iterative 
procedure. Using data at the individual bank level we examine whether our proxy for the 
degree of banking distress is a function of macroeconomic developments and/or the unique 
difficulties of transition such as inadequate risk-assessment, excessive risk-taking or the high 
concentration of the banking system. 
The empirical findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, a strong performance in the real economy 
results in a lower ratio of non-performing loans, albeit with borderline statistical significance. 
Bearing in mind the lack of precision of the estimate and the substantial size of the GDP 
estimate, which probably reflects not only the small number of observations on 
macroeconomic variables but also multicollinearity between GDP observations (derived from 
annual data) and time dummies, we cannot determine the precise size of the GDP effect on 
the incidence of non-performing loans.  
The empirical results also indicate a delayed effect of credit growth on the incidence of non-
performing loans. In particular, the results suggest a significant positive effect of past rapid 
loans growth on the incidence of NPLs that becomes evident in the second year after the 
credit boom, implying that persistent short-sightedness of banks` managers was present in 
Montenegro and that the aggressive lending during the boom phase coincides with more 
reckless risk taking. Furthermore, the Montenegrin bank-specific variables, such as cost 
inefficiency and solvency ratio, which are used to describe the quality of banks` management 
and their risk attitude, are found to have significant influence on the of NPLs.  
Our findings have several implications for policy and regulation, these are more fully 
outlined in Chapter 7 but we briefly summarise them here. The supervisory authority should 
expand its monitoring framework to include both macroeconomic prudential and bank-
specific indicators when assessing the stability of the banking system. In addition, regulators 
should become more concerned with a loosening of bank credit conditions in an upturn since 
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our results suggest a delayed effect of loans growth on non-performing loans. Based on our 
findings, the supervisory authority could use the regression coefficients on the 
macroeconomic variables and bank-specific variables in their development of a credit risk 
model that can be used in Montenegro. This is of major importance, given that there is still no 
credit risk model for stress testing that links both macro and bank-specific variables in the 
Central Bank of Montenegro. Furthermore, based on the evolution of the dependent variables, 
we can anticipate the future behaviour of the NPL ratios and assess whether they present a 
threat to financial stability.  
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6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there have been a few multi-country studies of the determinants of bank 
credit risk (Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Nkusu, 2011; Makri et al., 2011) but only one relating 
specifically to Central and Eastern Europe (Klein, 2013).
40 
Most studies of bank credit have 
been for a single country, with attention being directed at banks in developed countries. This 
chapter will present a study of the factors contributing to the determinants of credit risk of 
commercial banks in a multi-country setting. The intention of this chapter is to provide a 
better insight into financial weaknesses in the economies of the CEE countries and hence to 
help design monitoring processes and systems which minimize the costs that could arise from 
banking instability. Since high NPLs are generally a source of concern for financial stability, 
an increase in their incidence can cause deterioration in the economic outlook for the region.  
As seen in Chapter 3, the global financial crisis has left a legacy of high NPLs in many CEE 
countries, which, according to the Sirtaine and Rosenberg (2012) and Raiffeisen Research 
(2014), are a threat to the region’s economic recovery. The purpose of this chapter is to 
investigate the factors affecting the non-performing loans ratios, as a measure of the quality 
of loans, in 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, from 1999 to 2011, which is the most 
recent period for which the data is available. Based on the existing literature, reviewed in 
Chapter 5, both bank-specific and macroeconomic factors are included as independent 
variables in the estimation of the determinants of the ratio of non-performing loans in CEE 
                                                          
40 This study became available during the course of writing this Chapter. 
170 
 
banks. Since we investigate the model for 16 countries, the previous chapter’s model 
specification will be extended to control for variables that in the context of CEE countries 
may be expected to affect the incidence of non-performing loans. Such contextual variables 
can be included in a multicounty study but not in a single country study. Those additional 
variables are the exchange rate and level of public debt. Furthermore, our analysis in Chapter 
3, suggests that the structure of banking sectors in CEE countries, particularly regarding 
ownership, had a moderating effect on the transmission of the global financial crisis to these 
countries. Thus, in this Chapter we investigate whether the foreign ownership of a bank has 
an impact on the incidence of non-performing loans. Thus, non-performing loans will be 
modelled to capture any differences between banks based on their ownership structure. Apart 
from information on ownership status, the characteristics of the home country of the parent 
bank may also affect the non-performing loans of a foreign-owned bank, therefore the origin 
of parent banks will be considered in modelling non-performing loans in CEE countries.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the methodology for modelling 
non-performing loans in CEE and extends the presentation of the macroeconomic and bank-
specific indicators in CEE countries, which was introduced in Chapter 3. Section 6.3 provides 
explanation of the data used, descriptive statistics and an examination of the quality of the 
data. Section 6.4 investigates the appropriate econometric strategy for modelling macro and 
bank specific determinants of NPLs, followed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6 by a discussion of the 
empirical results. In Section 6.7 the results from the previous two sections are compared with 
Klein’s (2013) findings. Subsequently, in Section 6.8 a model that applies the same empirical 
strategy as Klein for proxying the excessive lending effect on non-performing loans ratios 
will be presented. In the following Section, 6.9, we exclude the variables that Klein (2013) 
did not consider, in order to check whether that explains the differences in findings. In 
Section 6.10, we check whether our findings are biased by the unobserved propensity to 
report non-performing loans ratios. Finally, the conclusions of this Chapter are presented in 
Section 6.11.  
6.2 Methodology and Empirical Consideration  
From the theoretical perspective analysed in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 there are two sets of 
indicators that are commonly thought to explain the evolution of non-performing loans. First, 
the proportion of non-performing loans in total loans seems to be driven by macroeconomic 
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developments that are likely to affect the borrowers’ capacity to repay their loans. In order to 
capture the macroeconomic developments prevailing in CEE countries from 1999 to 2011, 
and how they affect loans quality, the GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate, the annual 
inflation rate and the nominal interest rate will be considered in the estimation process. As 
shown in Chapter 5 (see section 5.2.1), the NPL ratio is typically countercyclical, falling in 
business cycle upturns and rising in recessions. As also explained in section 5.2.1, the 
relationship between the ratio of NPLs with unemployment is expected to be positive and 
negative with real GDP growth. Furthermore, inflation may affect borrowers’ debt servicing 
capacity through several channels and its impact on the proportion of NPLs can be positive or 
negative. Higher inflation can make debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of 
outstanding loans. However, when loan rates are variable, inflation is likely to reduce 
borrowers’ loan servicing capacity as lenders adjust rates to maintain their real returns or 
simply to pass on increases in policy rates resulting from monetary policy actions to combat 
inflation (see section 5.2.1). Finally, in the case of nominal interest rates, the channel to non-
performing loans is likely to work through a rise of debt service costs of borrowers, 
particularly if loan rates are variable (Louzis et al., 2010), which is the case in most of the 
CEE countries (Beck et al., 2013). Therefore, interest rates are expected to be positively 
related to the incidence of NPLs. Most of these macroeconomic developments have been 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Bearing in mind that in this Chapter we investigate the model for 16 countries, the 
Montenegrin model specification will be extended to control for variables that in the context 
of CEE countries may be expected to affect the incidence of non-performing loans. In 
particular, we will consider the public debt and exchange rate. As expected in the period of 
crisis, most of the countries engaged in fiscal stimulus to alleviate the downturn. As a result, 
in 2011, the public debt is much higher than before the crisis. For instance, public sector debt 
exceeded 50 per cent of GDP in Albania, Poland, and Hungary in 2011 (see Figure 6.1).  
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Source: IMF WEO (October 2012) 
Figure 6.1 Public debt as a % of GDP in CEE countries 
 
The problem of over-indebtedness can be reflected in the banking sector by an increasing 
number of bad loans, as noted by Impavido et al. (2012). Makri et al. (2011, 2014) 
investigating NPLs in the Euro zone countries, stressed that fiscal problems in countries of 
the Euro zone might lead to a significant rise in problem loans. Indeed, they reported that 
outstanding public debt in the previous year has a positive influence on the NPL index in the 
current year. To a lesser extent, high public debt may adversely affect borrowers’ wealth or 
income, thereby raising the likelihood that they would run into debt servicing problems 
(Nkusu, 2011). Namely, Guy and Lowe (2011) find that high public debt caused the 
Barbadian government to raise taxes, which is likely to reducing disposable income for its 
citizens and placing them in a worse debtor position. Bearing in mind the conditions of 
increased indebtedness in CEE and these recent studies, we will test for an effect of public 
debt on the incidence of NPLs in CEE.  
In addition to economic activity the exchange rate will be considered. The exchange rate will 
be included in order to capture any effect that a depreciation of the national currency (against 
the euro) had on the dynamics of NPLs in the CEE region. If the national currency 
depreciates the borrowers which have loans in foreign currency will have higher debt 
servicing costs, this can lead them to default and their loans classified as non-performing. In 
order to escape misunderstanding the depreciation is defined as an increase in exchange rate: 
namely, more units of domestic currency are required to purchase a given basket of foreign 
currencies. To avoid exchange rate fluctuations, most of CEE countries have fixed exchange 
rate systems or manage the float of their national currencies against the euro or US dollar.  
The exchange rate systems in CEE are presented in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Exchange Rate Systems in CEE at the end of 2010 
Country  Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Albania De facto crawling band around US dollar 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Currency board/Peg to euro 
Bulgaria  Currency board/Peg to euro 
Croatia De facto band around euro 
Czech Republic De facto crawling band around euro 
Estonia* Peg to euro/Currency board 
Hungary Crawling peg system 
Latvia De jure peg to euro 
Lithuania De facto band around the euro. 
Macedonia Managed float 
Poland Managed floating/de facto band around euro 
Romania Managed float/ De facto band around the euro. 
Serbia Managed float/De facto band around euro 
Slovakia Currency Union 
Slovenia Currency Union 
* Euro starting January 2011. 
Source: IMF official classification 
 
According to the ECB (2011), exchange rate depreciation might have a negative impact on 
asset quality, particularly in countries with a large amount of lending in foreign currency to 
un-hedged borrowers. FX-denominated loans had been one of the drivers of fast lending 
expansion before the crisis (EBRD, 2010). As can be seen in Figure 6.2, in 2011 more than 
70 per cent of total loans in Latvia, Lithuania and Serbia were denominated in a foreign 
currency. The share of FX loans also exceeds that of domestic currency loans in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia and Romania. 
 
 
Source: IMF Country Specific Reports 
Figure 6.2 Foreign currency loans as a % of total loans in selected CEE countries from 
2009-2011 
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According to the PFS research (2012) of foreign currency lending in CEE countries, lending 
in foreign currency may be advantageous to borrowers as the interest rates are generally 
much lower, however these loans carry increased repayment risks for both banks and 
borrowers. In particular, they find that the risks of FX-lending appeared to rise in 2008 and 
2009 because the exchange rates in CEE countries moved in favour of the foreign currencies. 
Loan repayments, while stable in the foreign currency, grew in terms of local currency 
equivalents. Consequently, both banks and borrowers have suffered from these exchange rate 
movements. Since borrowers might not be able to repay their debts, banks might be exposed 
to a higher number of NPLs. Fofack (2005) reveals that changes in the real effective 
exchange rate had a positive impact on NPLs of commercial banks that operate in some Sub-
Saharan African countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. The author argues that this result 
is due to the large concentration of loans to the export-oriented agriculture sector, which was 
adversely affected by the appreciation in the currency of these countries during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Similarly, Khemraj and Pasha (2009) found that the exchange rate has a strong 
positive association with the levels of NPLs reported by commercial banks, suggesting that 
whenever there is a deterioration in the international competitiveness of the domestic 
economy (as reflected by an appreciation in the exchange rate) this translates into higher 
NPLs. So, currency movements may have opposing effects on NPLs, via currency mismatch 
and trade effects. If so the overall effect might turn out not significant.  
Following the practice prevalent in the empirical literature, we did not include the 
composition of capital flows in our model specification, but we do not exclude the possibility 
of including them in future work. In this phase we have concentrated on examining the 
influence of the GDP growth rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate, nominal short-term 
interest rate, exchange rate and public debt, on the incidence of NPLs. Namely, using GDP 
growth rate in our model specification we test for the aggregate influences of the economy on 
the incidence of NPLs. Furthermore, we include the leading economic indicators (inflation 
rate, unemployment rate, exchange rate, etc.) which are commonly used by policymakers to 
predict the economy's future. 
A second strand of the literature focuses on indicators, such as the quality of management and 
operational decisions, attributing the level of non-performing loans to bank-level factors. 
Similar to the Montenegrin model, the following bank-specific variables will be included in 
the CEE model: return on assets, return on equity, capital adequacy ratio, loans to deposit 
175 
 
ratio, cost to income ratio, credit growth and market share of banks` assets. Respectively, 
these are used to test the hypothesis of “Bad Management”, “Moral Hazard”, “Good 
Monitoring”, “Procyclical Credit Policy” and “Market Share”. An explanation of these 
variables was presented in section 5.2.2 and in section 6.4 we will analyse the recent 
developments of some bank-specific variables in CEECs which will be used to test the above 
mentioned hypothesis.  
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, high NPLs ratios may give rise to financial stress, especially if 
banks’ provisioning is inadequate, their capital buffers are low, and further NPL rises are in 
the offing. Outright losses can arise that weaken banks’ capital base, potentially giving rise to 
insolvency or illiquidity. However, a comparison of capital adequacy ratios with the share of 
NPLs to total loans in the CEE context, see Figure 6.3, suggests that banks have provided a 
sufficient amount of capital to cover possible losses. Banks capital adequacy ratios in the 
CEE region were substantially higher compared to the minimum required by their countries’ 
regulators (that is approximately 10%).  However, the capital adequacy ratios were not 
always higher than NPLs in some CEE countries (e.g. Albania).  
 
Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators (2012) 
Figure 6.3 Non-performing loans and adequacy capital ratios for CEE countries in 2011 
 
While relatively high bank capitalization in CEE countries provides considerable buffers, 
according to Sirtaine and Rosenberg (2012) the high level of NPLs may still present an 
obstacle to economic recovery and a considerable stress on the financial sector, particularly if 
economic growth remains weak or these economies slip back into recession. 
Albania 
Bosnia  
 
 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech R 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR 
Montenegro 
Poland 
Romania 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
10
12
14
16
18
20
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Non-performing loans to total gross loans (%) 
A
d
e
q
u
ac
y 
ca
p
it
al
 r
at
io
 
176 
 
With the global financial crisis, the overall bank profitability has fallen in the CEE region. 
The return-on-equity declined from an average of 16 per cent in 2007-2008 to almost 10 per 
cent in 2011 (Mucci et al., 2013). However, there were large differences between countries, 
and the banking sector in Hungary, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia reported overall 
negative returns on their equity (see Figure 6.4). SEE countries emerge on average with a 
much lower profitability, having a return-on-equity below 5 per cent. 
 
Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators (2012) 
Figure 6.4 Return on equity (ROE) in CEE countries in 2011 
 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, an important factor determining the stability of a country’s 
banking sector is the relation between loans and deposits. In general, if the ratio is below 
100% it means that credits are financed from domestic savings. A ratio of above 100% 
responds to an increase in funding uncertainty (Ritz, 2010), suggesting that the new 
additional loans will probably be financed by borrowing money from abroad. However, that 
makes them extremely vulnerable to the situation in the global financial markets and creates a 
major risk for a country’s banking sector in the case of increased global turmoil. The banking 
sector’s situation may be assessed from that point of view as relatively resilient only in the 
case of Albania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and – to a certain degree – in Montenegro, 
Poland and Serbia (Figure 6.5). In contrast, the loans to deposits ratio remained dangerously 
high in Latvia and Slovenia.  
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Source: EBDR and central banks of the mentioned countries 
Figure 6.5 Loans to deposit ratio in CEE banking systems at the end of 2011 (%) 
 
In addition to macroeconomic and bank-specific indicators, the ownership structure of 
banking sectors will be considered in the CEE model of NPLs. Namely, non-performing 
loans will be modelled to capture any differences between banks based on their ownership 
structure. In order to distinguish between foreign and domestic owned banks we have created 
the dummy variable “Foreign”, which takes the values of 1 if the bank is foreign owned 
(foreign-owned banks are defined as those with foreign ownership exceeding 50% in year t) 
and 0 otherwise. As discussed in Chapter 3, foreign banks in the CEE region helped to create 
macroeconomic imbalances and over-indebtedness but also in the crisis supported their 
subsidiaries with capital infusions, especially through the private-public co-operation and the 
international financial institutions’ coordination mechanisms (such as the Vienna Initiative). 
Since the crisis started, the debate about the effects of foreign bank ownership has become 
more nuanced as foreign banks can transmit home-country shocks. These developments have 
led to an increased demand among policy makers and interest among academics for more 
analyses of the pros and cons of banks foreign ownership. According to one strand of the 
literature, foreign ownership has been accepted as an important driver in improving bank 
performance and reducing risk taking. Levine (1996) argues that foreign shareholding leads 
to improved financial services and easier access to international financial markets. The 
presence of foreign banks may also contribute to a country’s attractiveness to foreign direct 
investments (Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996). Moreover, foreign banks can contribute to 
alleviating some of the problems associated with underdeveloped markets, increasing credit 
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availability to the private sector. In particular, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2002) analysing 
banks ownership in ten CEE countries, find a positive relationship between the market share 
of foreign banks
41 
and private sector credit growth. Empirically, various studies reported a 
beneficial impact of foreign ownership on banks’ outcomes: non-performing loans; bank 
performance and efficiency. Accordingly, Boudriga et al. (2010) analysing 46 banks in 12 
countries over the period 2002-2006 find that, among bank specific factors, the degree of 
foreign participation from developed countries reduces the non-performing level. Micco et al. 
(2004), Lensink and Hermes (2004) and Bonin et al. (2005) argue that foreign bank entry to 
less developed markets is important in improving efficiency, skills and technologies and bank 
performance; therefore it leads to a lower number of non-performing loans.  
However, some economists identify possible adverse effects of such foreign participation. 
More recently, the financial crisis that originated in high-income economies, and which has 
spread rapidly to developing economies through investment, has put into question the 
desirability of foreign banks dominating the banking system in the latter countries. Martinez-
Peria et al. (2002) analysing claims from seven “lender” countries on ten “borrower” 
countries in Latin America, argue that an economic downturn in the country of the foreign 
bank may cause a bank to reduce its operations in other countries. Although, De Haas and 
Lelyveld (2002) find a positive relationship between foreign banks and private sector credit 
growth in Central and East European countries’, they find that foreign banks reduce their 
credit activity in the host countries if their home country experiences a crisis. Furthermore, 
Popov and Udell (2010) suggest that foreign banks may transmit a large portion of financial 
shocks from their origin countries to host countries in CEE. Claessens and Van Horen (2012) 
analyse the risks associated with cross-border banking and foreign banks presence. They 
report that during the global crisis foreign banks reduced credit by more when compared to 
domestic banks, except when they dominated the host banking systems. Namely, they explain 
when a foreign bank is dominant in one country, that bank tends to focus on maintaining its 
dominant position and does not, disproportionately, reduce credit.  
As mentioned earlier the macroeconomic environment of the country of the parent bank may 
affect the performance of foreign banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2009) found that foreign 
banks performed better (in term of efficiency and profitability) than domestic banks, if their 
parent bank was from a more developed country. They also reported that foreign bank have 
                                                          
41
 They consider a foreign bank a bank where foreign shareholders own a majority of outstanding shares. 
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better performance if the geographical, cultural and institutional distance to their origin is 
small. Furthermore, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) find that foreign banks are not 
adversely hit by systemic banking crises in the host countries, because these banks have a 
different structure of assets and liabilities than domestic banks. Thus, apart from information 
on ownership status, the specific origin or home country of the parent bank may also affect 
the profitability and efficiency of its subsidiaries, as suggested by Sturm and Williams 
(2008), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) and Claessens and van Horen (2009, 2012). In order to 
check whether the country of origin of the parent bank has an impact on the quality of loans 
of their subsidiary bank, foreign-owned banks are in the analysis presented below divided 
into sub-samples of banks originating from the EU12 countries
42
, the countries of the 
“Southern Enlargement”43,  the US and Switzerland, CEE countries, Russia and Turkey. The 
reason for this classification was to differentiate between parent banks from countries with 
different levels of development and that have suffered differently from their exposure to the 
global financial crisis.  
6.3 Data Analysis 
A large number of studies have examined loans quality in groups of countries using aggregate 
data (for example Boudriga et al., 2010; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Nkusu et al., 2011; 
Makri et al., 2011). A certain number of studies examine individual banks from a particular 
country (for example Fernandez de Lis et al., 2000; Jimenez and Saurina, 2005; Louzis et al., 
2010; Cotugno et al., 2010). However, there are few studies that use individual bank data 
from several countries. The objective in this chapter was to collect bank level data and macro 
data from 16 countries in Central and Eastern Europe for the longest possible period. The 
countries considered are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, FYR of Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia. In this context, as presented in Table 6.2, the sample 
consisted of a panel of 334 banks for the period 1999-2011.  To be included in the final 
                                                          
42
The EU 12 includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
43 Since the debt crisis in Southern European Eurozone members (Spain, Portugal and Greece) had been 
aggravated over the last few years, there is a greater risk that banks coming from these countries may become 
insolvent. 
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sample, a bank had to be classified as a commercial bank and data for all the variables had to 
be available for that year. 
Table 6.2 Number of commercial banks by countries in the sample 
Country  Number of banks  Country  Number of banks 
Albania    11 Lithuania    10 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    20 FYR Macedonia    15 
Bulgaria    22 Montenegro    11  
Croatia    36 Poland    43 
Czech Republic    24 Romania    28 
Estonia      7 Serbia    31  
Hungary    17 Slovak Republic    15 
Latvia    25 Slovenia    19 
  Total 334 
Source: Bankscope data set 
 
In Table 6.3 we record how many banks reported their NPLs by country and year. We notice 
that many banks avoided reporting NPLs, in particular in the first year of our sample period. 
This potential problem will be discussed in more details in section 6.10. 
Table 6.3 Number of dependent variable observations by country and year 
Country/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Albania 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 7 7 8 8 8 53 
Bosna and 
Herzegovina 
5 5 4 4 7 6 6 8 8 10 12 14 13 102 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 11 14 16 18 17 14 106 
Croatia 11 13 13 10 11 13 17 15 20 19 20 18 17 197 
Czech Republic 7 7 7 7 8 13 15 13 14 15 14 13 13 146 
Estonia 0 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 41 
Hungary 4 6 5 5 6 6 7 7 5 7 7 9 9 83 
Latvia 5 5 4 4 5 5 7 9 11 16 17 16 16 120 
Lithuania 3 3 3 3 4 3 5 7 8 8 8 9 8 72 
Macedonia, FYR 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 10 13 11 9 8 70 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 10 11 11 11 11 81 
Poland 11 12 9 10 11 15 16 16 16 21 24 23 22 206 
Romania 5 8 6 5 5 4 4 10 15 15 17 18 15 127 
Serbia 3 4 2 5 10 8 5 6 4 8 11 8 6 80 
Slovakia 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 8 11 13 11 8 7 102 
Slovenia 7 7 8 6 5 4 9 11 11 14 14 13 14 123 
Total 71 81 75 74 89 105 118 139 168 198 208 198 185 1,709 
Source: Bankscope dataset 
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The macro data (GDP growth rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate and public debt) used in 
this study was collected from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the World Bank 
database, while data for the exchange rate against the euro and nominal short-term interest 
rates were collected from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and from central banks` 
websites (for the missing countries in the IFS database). The bank specific data was collected 
from Bankscope.
44
  
The correlation matrix (in Appendix 6.1) shows that the size of correlation between NPL and 
other variables is not very high. The ratio of NPLs exhibits a positive correlation with the rate 
of unemployment, public debt, interest rate, capital adequacy ratio, loan to deposit ratio and 
cost to income ratio, while being negatively correlated with real GDP growth, the exchange 
rate, return on assets, and return on equity, credit growth and market share.  In contrast to the 
initial expectations, the inflation rate is negatively correlated with the ratio of NPLs.   
The CEE region is characterised by substantial heterogeneity.  For example, some CEE 
countries may be regarded as advanced economies, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
other EU members, fairly close to the conditions prevailing in more mature economies, while 
others, such as Western Balkan countries are more typical of emerging markets (see 
Raiffeisen Research, 2012). To control for such country-specific effects, in particular for the 
cultural and institutional characteristics, country dummies will be included in the estimation. 
The inclusion of these dummy variables in the model should enable efficient estimation of the 
parameters. Furthermore, in order to control for time-specific effects the model specification 
will include time dummies. 
Macroeconomic variables show high variability across time and countries, as can be seen in 
Table 6.4. For instance, as reported by Klein (2013), high double-digit levels of inflation 
were recorded in Serbia and Romania in late 1990s and early 2000s, while deflation rates 
were evident in the period of crisis (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, and Latvia).  
 
                                                          
44
 Bankscope is the best available dataset, providing bank level data for many countries around the world.  
Bankscope collects annual reports and financial statements from individual financial institutions and due to the 
maintenance of a uniform accounting convention provides globally comparable indicators. It is widely used 
within the business community and, more recently, by academic scholars. 
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for macro variables (in %) 
Variable Variable Label Observations Mean Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
GDP growth rate GDP 2939 3.445 4.249 -17.729 11.154 
Inflation rate INF 2933 5.893 8.522 -1.224 80.601 
Unemployment rate UNEMP 2930 13.902 7.787 4.298 37.251 
Public debt (% of GDP) DEBT 2832 36.655 20.054 3.685 241.653 
Exchange rate (against Euro) EXCR 2941 31.151 62.227 0.559 280.331 
Interest rate INTR 2926 7.659 8.252 0.548 74.208 
Source: Bankscope dataset 
 
The descriptive statistics for the bank specific variables used in this empirical analysis are 
presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics for bank-specific variables (in %) 
Variable Variable Label Observation
s 
Mean Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
Non-performing loans in total 
loans  NPL 1709 10.353 12.867 0 99.470 
Return on assets ROA 2917 0.695 3.124 -29.010 36.520 
Return on equity ROE 2917 5.871 31.215 -351.060 570.171 
Credit growth rate CR 2724 29.953 60.403 -100.000 850.000 
Capital adequacy ratio CAP 1985 21.281 21.269 0.990 393.850 
Loans to deposit ratio LTD 2844 122.470 111.536 0.000 988.800 
Cost to income ratio CIR 2910 72.477 45.775 0.000 1165.51
0 
Market share  Marketshare 2889 6.794 10.097 0.017 80.149 
Source: Bankscope dataset 
 
The number of observations of the dependent variable, NPL, is smaller than those for the 
other variables. As mentioned earlier, some banks used to avoid presenting their data on asset 
quality in Bankscope.  The potential bias that can arise from the self-selection of banks into 
our sample will be addressed in Section 6.10. Looking at the dependent variable, a large 
disparity between countries is present. Regarding the indicators of profitability, the minimum 
value of both the ROA and the ROE displays a negative sign, while the ROE records a 
relatively high disparity between countries. 
The evolution of the NPLs ratios, presented in Figure 6.6, indicate that they varied 
significantly over time and between banks. The left-hand axis measures the percentage of 
NPLs for each bank. The right-hand axis measures the median percentage of NPL for all 334 
banks in the data set. Each dot/year represent a bank/year. 
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Source: Bankscope 
Figure 6.6 Evolution of banks` non-performing loans from 1999-2011 
  
Figure 6.6 also shows that deterioration in the banks’ assets quality has occurred since the 
beginning of the financial crisis in the balance sheets of most of the banks (see the median 
line). 
The quality of NPL Data  
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 5, NPLs data are difficult to interpret, since there is no 
internationally accepted definition of a non-performing loan. The definitions differ by 
country, since national supervisors follow different definitions for classifying loans (Laurin 
and Majnoni, 2003; Moody’s Investor Service, 2003; and Barisitz, 2011). There is, however, 
some convergence of opinion on this issue. The definition of non-performing loans, 
summarized from paragraphs 4.84-4.85 of the IMF’s Compilation Guide on Financial 
Soundness Indicators 2004 (Guide) is: 
A loan is non-performing when payments of interest and/or principal are past due by 90 days 
or more, or interest payments equal to 90 days or more have been capitalized, refinanced, or 
delayed by agreement, or payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good 
reasons—such as a debtor filing for bankruptcy—to doubt that payments will be made in full. 
According to Impavido et al.’s (2012) survey, all but one of the countries in our sample 
(Lithuania) apply the 90-day overdue threshold and report the total amount of defaulted loans 
as non-performing, though practices regarding the treatment of collateral, restructured loans, 
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criteria other than the overdue period, and multiple loans by the same defaulted borrower 
vary widely. 
Bankscope, a commercial provider of data from bank statements, provides the level of 
“impaired loans” as a proxy for non-performing loans. It should be mentioned that “impaired 
loans” may be different than the official classification of non-performing loans. Namely,  
“impaired loans” is an accounting term45, which reflects cases in which it is probable that the 
creditor will not be able to collect the full amount that is specified in the loan agreement, 
while NPL is a regulatory concept, which primarily reflects loans that are more than 90 days 
past due. International Accounting Standard 39 (paragraphs 58-70) specifies that objective 
evidence is required for a loan to be impaired and that the total amount of loan value should 
be reduced for impairment losses. When a loan is impaired, it should be placed on non-
accrual status, i.e. interest should not be accrued on such loans in the income statement of the 
lender. Impaired loans might be a better measure of asset quality than non-performing loans, 
as they are more comparable between countries and less prone to regulatory discretion. 
Acknowledging these differences, “impaired loans” are used as a proxy with NPLs in the 
following analysis. 
6.4 Estimation Procedure 
As previously mentioned, a panel approach will be used. Combining time series and cross-
section observations, panel data provides data that are more informative, possess more 
variability, more degrees of freedom, less collinearity among variables and more efficiency 
(Gujarati, 2004). Following the discussion in section 6.2, we base our empirical analysis on 
the following equation 
              NPLi,t =  β0i +  β̂1GDPi,t  +  β̂2INFi,t + β̂3UNEMPi,t  +   β̂4DEBTi,t  +  β̂5EXCRi,t  +  β̂6INTRi,t +  β̂7ROEi,t  
+  β̂8ROEi,t  +  β̂9CRi,t + β̂10CAPi,t +  β̂11LTDi,t +  β̂12CIRi,t +  β̂13Marketsharei,t +  β̂14Foreigni,t 
+  β̂15Dummy_EU12i,t +  β̂16Dummy_SouthernEnlargi,t +   β̂17Dummy_CEEi,t 
+  β̂18Dummy_USAandCHi,t +  β̂19Dummy_RUi,t +  β̂20Dummy_TRi,t +  𝜆t  +  Ci +  ηi 
+ εit      (6.1) 
                                                          
45 Impairment is a specific term used in the International Accounting Standard 39 and by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision.  
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Where NPLi,t is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. GDPi,t is the annual 
percentage growth rate of GDPi,t, INFi,t is the annual average inflation rate, UNEMPi,t is the 
unemployment rate, DEBTi,t  is the public debt to GDP ratio, EXCRi,t is exchange rate and 
INTRi,t is short term interest rate. Looking at bank-specific variables: ROAi,t is the return on 
assets, ROEi,t is the return on equity, CRi,t  is the credit growth, CAPi,t  is the capital adequacy 
ratio, LtDi,t is the loans to deposit ratio and CIRi,t represents the cost to income ratio. 
MarketSharei,t  represents a share of a bank`s assets in the total banking assets of the country. 
Foreigni,t is a dummy variable where a value of 1 represents a 51% or more foreign-owned 
banks and value 0 represents majority domestic-owned banks. As explained in Section 6.2, 
the Dummy_EU12i,t is a dummy variable where a value of 1 indicates that the origin of the 
parent bank is within the EU12, Similarly the Dummy_SouthernEnlargementi,t  indicates that 
the origin of the parent bank is in a “SouthernEnlargement” country: Dummy_CEEi,t that the 
parent bank is in CEE; Dummy_USAandCHi,t  the parent bank is from USA or CH;  
Dummy_RUi,t the parent bank is from Russia and, Dummy_TRi,t from Turkey.
46
 The 
equation also includes a set of time (λt) and country (Ci) dummies and where ηi are the 
unobserved individual bank effects; and εit are the error terms. Note that i=1…n denotes the 
individual bank and t=1…T the year. 
As a starting point, we investigate a static model that takes advantage of asymptotic theory 
(see Appendix 6.2.1). In addition, we estimate a static fixed effects model in first differences, 
intended to capture short-run movements in the NPL ratio. However, the diagnostic tests 
reveal that our static model is misspecified. In particular, we find evidence of pronounced 
serial correlation (see Appendix 6.2.1). Consequently, the analysis is extended to a dynamic 
setting. In addition, bearing in mind previous empirical studies (e.g. see Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Louzis et al., 2010; Espinoza and Prasad, 2010; Blanco and Gimeno, 2012; Beck et al. 
2013), it is expected that some degree of persistence may exist in the evolution of NPLs. 
Therefore, the static model is misspecified due to the omitted dynamics that would result in 
biased and inconsistent estimates. Furthermore, the dynamic specification is suitable for 
testing the hypotheses formulated in section 6.2 regarding the bank-specific determinants of 
NPLs.  
                                                          
46
The rational for the inclusion of these dummies is explained in Section 6.2. 
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The main feature of a dynamic panel data specification is the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the set of regressors, as shown below: 
yit = ?̂?yi,t-1 + ?̂?x′it + ηi + εit , α <  1, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁,
𝑡 = 1, . . . , 𝑇               (6.2) 
where each observation is indexed over i cross-section groups (banks) and t time periods (13 
years), yi,t−1 is the first lag of the NPLs, x'it is  k×1 vector of explanatory variables other 
than yi,t−1, and the error term is composed of the ηi, which are the unobserved bank specific 
effects, and the ε it, which are the observation specific – idiosyncratic - error terms. ̂ is a 
coefficient to be estimated and β̂ a 1×k vector of coefficients to be estimated. The lagged 
dependent variable, yit−1 is correlated with the compound disturbance, (ηi +ε it), because the 
same bank-specific effect, ηi, enters the equation for every observation in group i (Greene, 
2003, p. 308). Hence, in order to calculate consistent estimates in the presence of lags of the 
dependent variable, we employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) “system” 
approach as proposed by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and 
operationalised as a programme for Stata (xtabond2) by Roodman (2006). Roodman (2006) 
notes this is the proper approach for situations with “small T, large N” panels, meaning few 
time periods and many individuals;  with independent variables that are not strictly 
exogenous, meaning correlated with past and possibly current realizations of the error; with 
fixed effects; and with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals” (p.1). A 
main advantage of all GMM dynamic panel models is that the procedure for handling the 
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable may be applied to all potentially endogenous 
variables in the model: in GMM dynamic panel estimators “predetermined or endogenous 
variables are handled analogous to the dependent variable” (StataCorp, 2007, p.83). 
The reason for usage of the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) model, 
(Roodman, 2005) can be explained as follows. A problem with the original Arellano and 
Bond (1991) estimator is that lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences, 
especially for variables that are close to a random walk. Arellano and Bover (1995) described 
how, if the original equation in levels were added to the system, additional moment 
conditions could be brought to bear to increase efficiency. In these equations, predetermined 
and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first 
differences. The Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator thus uses more moment conditions: 
both predetermined and endogenous variables in first differences instrumented with suitable 
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lags of their own levels (used by Arellano and Bond, 1991); and predetermined and 
endogenous variables in levels instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences. 
With more moments, more information is used in estimation with consequent increase in 
efficiency (Bond, 2002, p.17).  Furthermore, Roodman (2006, p. 30) explains that 
differencing within groups must remove all variables that are constant. In that case “system” 
GMM estimation has an advantage in that it can include time invariant regressors, which 
disappear in the “difference” GMM approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Even 
though time invariant regressors are differenced out of the differenced (transformed) 
equations in the system, they remain in the levels (untransformed) equations in the system. 
Finally, with system GMM we obtain more valid instruments in the presence of random-walk 
processes. Roodman (2006, p.28) explains that for random walk-like variables, past changes 
may indeed be more predictive of current levels than past levels are of current changes, so the 
new instruments are more relevant. Bearing in mind the incidence of random walk statistical 
generating mechanisms in macroeconomic variables, this is likely to be a significant 
advantage of the system over the difference GMM estimator. 
To implement the system GMM model we will use xtabond2 that "make available a finite-
sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer". Allowing for 
dynamics in the model seems to be important for getting consistent estimates. Therefore, we 
proceed with a dynamic NPLs model (see Appendix 6.2.2). Applying GMM we account for 
potential endogeneity arising from the lagged dependent variable and the weakly exogenous 
variables. Using appropriate instruments for the endogenous variables one can overcome the 
endogeneity problem. Under this approach, the lagged bank-level variables were modelled as 
pre-determined (thus instrumented GMM-style in the same way as the lagged dependent 
variable), while the macroeconomic variables were treated as strictly exogenous 
(instrumented by themselves as “IV style” instruments; see Roodman 2009a). However, a 
model with one or more lags of the dependent variable together with several endogenous 
variables will generate a large number of instruments (see Appendix 6.2.2.1). It is worth 
mentioning that with increases in the number of lags of the dependent variable and in the 
number of potentially endogenous variables to be instrumented in “gmmstyle”, the sign and 
statistical significance of the variables of interest in the NPLs model do not change 
substantially and the diagnostic tests are still valid.  
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Too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and fail to expunge their endogenous 
components. Moreover, xtabond2 issues a warning when the number of instruments may be 
large relative to the number of observations, in which case the instruments may be invalid. In 
addition, in all our model specifications the diagnostic test m2 indicates that there is no 
second order serial correlation among the differenced residuals and the heteroskedasticity-
robust Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are valid. 
The t statistic is greater than 0.25 and does not approach 1.0, which correspond to the 
guidelines suggested by Roodman (2009a). Therefore, the H0: the restrictions are sufficiently 
close to zero cannot be rejected, since the test statistics are smaller than the chi-square critical 
values at all levels of significance in all ours specifications. 
According Roodman (2009b) and Mehrhoff (2009), there are three ways to limit the 
instruments count while minimizing loss of identifying information. First, it is suggested to 
restrict the lag ranges that are used in generating these instrument sets. The second way to 
limit the instruments is to use the “collapse” command available in xtabond2. In the “Help” 
manual the collapse command is explained as follows:  
The collapse suboption of gmmstyle() specifies that xtabond2 should create one 
instrument for each variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, 
variable, and lag distance.     
The GMM instrument matrix includes “one column for each time period and lag available to 
that time period” (Roodman, 2009a, p.108). Conversely, when using “collapse” to reduce the 
instrument set, we do not create a whole matrix of instruments but, instead, a single column 
vector of instruments, which means that there is only one instrument for all time periods. 
Consequently, with the instrument set “collapsed”, there is only one moment condition. 
The third way is to apply Factor Analysis or Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to the 
"GMM"-style instruments. Technically, PCA is applied to de-meaned variables. However, 
xtabond2 computes the retained components as linear combinations of the original 
instruments, not the de-meaned ones. This is because de-meaning subtracts a constant from 
an instrument. If the constant is itself an instrument, this does no harm, but it might not be, in 
which case the identifying assumptions would be materially changed. When using PCA in 
System GMM, Roodman (2012) recommends using "gmm(X, eq(diff)) gmm(X, eq(lev))" 
instead of "gmm(X)". Namely, Arellano and Bover 1995, gmm(X) will generate the 
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quadratically-numerous-in-T, "exploded" set of instruments based on X for the differenced 
equation, but only generate a linearly numerous set of instruments for the levels equation 
(those for the shortest lag depth used). It could generate the full, exploded set for the levels 
equation too, but the additional instruments would be mathematically redundant, containing 
no new identifying information. However, they would not be formally collinear with the 
normally retained instruments. Therefore, Roodman suggests when doing PCA it is better to 
start with a symmetric instrument set, and let the PCA algorithm pare it down from there.   
All three of the suggested ways to reduce the number of instruments have been used (see 
Appendix 6.2.3). In order to yield more acceptable diagnostics from a reduced number of 
instruments, we experimented, with lag levels, the collapse command, and the PCA approach. 
As yet, there is no consensus as to how to achieve the optimum instrument set. The results are 
reported in the following section.  
6.5 Model 1- Results  
In order to avoid a misunderstanding of the independent variable influences on the incidence 
of NPLs, here and throughout the rest of this Chapter, a negative sign on the independent 
variable suggests improvement in loans quality (reduces NPLs), while a positive sign of 
independent variable deteriorates loans quality (increases NPLs). Variables: ROA, ROE, CR, 
CAP, LtD and CIR are treated as endogenous and the pattern of instrumentation in each case 
is recorded in Appendix 6.2.3. 
Looking at the results presented in Table 6.6, it may be observed that the estimated 
coefficients have signs that are compatible with economic intuition and the theoretical 
arguments presented in section 6.2. Among the macroeconomic variables, it has been 
suggested that inflationary pressures contribute to the high non-performing loan ratios in 
Central and East European countries, which is indicated by a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient, albeit only at the 10% significance level, on the inflation rate variable. 
Namely, an increase in the inflation rate by 1 percentage point causes the ratio of NPLs to 
increase by 0.27 percentage points, suggesting that inflation makes it more expensive to 
service debts. In this context our results are in line with Fofack’s (2005) and Niksu’s (2011) 
findings. Apart from the inflation rate, the results suggest that the degree of indebtedness of a 
country contributes to the evolution of NPLs among CEE banks, as the variable public debt is 
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positive and statistically significant. In this context, an increase of the public debt by 1 
percentage point causes NPLs to increase by 0.28 percentage points. These results agree with 
the findings of Ali and Daly (2010) and Makri et al. (2011). Other macroeconomic indicators 
were not found to have a significant impact on the incidence of NPLs.  
Table 6.6 Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations results from model 1 
Dependent variable  Non-performing loans (%) 
 Variables name  Label Coefficient p-values 
 Lag dependent variable  NPL 0.742*** 0.000   
Macro variables 
GDP growth rate GDP -0.091 0.480     
Inflation rate INF 0.272*    0.066  
Interest rate  INTR -0.142 0.394    
Exchange rate EXCR 0.007 0.379   
Unemployment rate UNEMP 0.009 0.963  
Public debt (% of GDP) DEBT 0.277**    0.024   
Bank-specific variables 
Return on assets ROA -2.153*** 
 
0.012 
Return on equity ROE 0.073  
 
0.309 
Credit growth rate CR 0.003 
 
0.954 
Capital adequacy ratio CAP -0.271
 a)    
 
0.108  
Loans to deposit ratio LtD 0.014 
 
0.242    
  
 Cost to income ratio 
CIR -0.004 
 
0.913 
Market Share Mshare -0.033 0.397  
 
Ownership variables 
Foreign bank Foreign -2.647 **      0.018  
Dummy_CEE CEE 3.046*   0.061  
Dummy_USAandCH 
 
USandCH 2.608 0.127 
Dummy_SouthernEnlargement 
 
SouthEnl 0.236    0.854  
Dummy_RU 
 
RU 4.118 
 
0.247 
Dummy_TR 
 
TR 5.497 
 
0.333 
Time dummies b) 
Country dummies c) 
Included in the model Yes   
Included in the model Yes   
 Number of observations 1052 
 Number of groups 226 
 Number of instruments 64 
 Wald Test Wald chi2(46) =   
10001.37                                      
Prob > chi2   =     
0.000                                                                         
 Hansen test p value 0.499 
 A-B AR(1) or m1 test p-values  0.009 
 A-B AR(2) or m2 test p-values 0.184 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
a) On the borderline of 10% significance level 
b) Time dummies reported in full in Appendix 6.2.3 
c) Country dummies reported in full in Appendix 6.2.3 
 
The Wald test establishes that the estimated coefficients are jointly significant; i.e. that the 
model has explanatory power. As required the m1 test rejects the null hypothesis of no 
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autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (p=0.009), while the m2 test - crutually - 
does not reject the null of no autocorrelation in the second-difference residuals (p=0.184). 
This combination supports the validity of instruments (Rodman, 2009a). The Hansen test 
does not reject the null of overidentifying restrictions at any conventional level of 
significance (p=0.499); hence, it is an indication that the model has valid instrumentation. In 
Table 6.7 we compare the system-GMM estimate of the lagged dependent variable with the 
FE (which is the most downward biased estimator) and OLS ones (which is the most upward 
biased estimator). Our system-GMM estimate is within the range given by FE and OLS 
estimators (Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006) which supports its validity. 
Table 6.7 Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in terms of the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable  
 FE OLS System-GMM 
NPL (-1) 0.495   0.746 0.742 
 
The dynamic specification affirms the presence of a high and significant persistence effect, as 
indicated by the significant positive coefficient on the first lag of the dependent variable. It 
captures the partial adjustment of banks` non-performing loan ratios, suggesting that a shock 
to the ratio of NPLs is likely to have a prolonged effect on the banking system, which is in 
line with findings of Klein (2013). Thus, the obtained results would suggest that ceteris 
paribus, a 1 percentage point increase in the non-performing loans ratio in the previous year 
contributes a 0.74 percentage point increase to the non-performing loans ratio in the current 
year.  
Looking to the other bank-specific variables, the estimations show that a higher return on 
assets ratio leads to decrease in banks` NPLs ratios, therefore suggesting that better managed 
banks have, on average, a better quality of loans (corroborating the “Bad Management” 
hypothesis).  More precisely, a 1 percentage point increase in return on asset variable leads to 
a 2.15 percentage point decrease in the non-performing loans ratio.  Banks’ risk attitude, as 
reflected in the capital adequacy ratio, appears to be a relevant indicator of banks` loans 
quality in the context of the CEE banks. Namely, a decrease in banks` capitalization by 1 
percentage point leads to a 0.27 percentage point increase in NPLs, at the borderline of the 
10% level of significance. This link is consistent with moral hazard incentives on the part of 
banks’ managers who increase the riskiness of their loan portfolio when their banks are thinly 
capitalized. Unlike in the other studies reviewed earlier, additional bank-level indicators, such 
192 
 
as the credit growth, the loan to deposit ratio, cost-to-income ratio and market share were not 
found to have a significant impact.  
The results confirm that both bank-level and macroeconomic factors play a role in affecting 
the banks’ asset quality. In addition, this analysis emphasizes the impact that the presence of 
foreign-owned banks had on the quality of loans during this period. Foreign ownership 
appears to positively influence financial stability in CEE countries. This suggests that most 
foreign banks have remained committed to the region, notwithstanding the global financial 
crisis. This suggests that, on average, those banks with a foreign owner have a lower NPLs 
ratio than those domestically owned. Quantitatively, the corresponding estimate suggests that 
the NPL ratio is 2.65 percentage points lower for foreign-owned banks than for domestically-
owned banks, ceteris paribus. 
 As mentioned in section 6.2, with the aim of investigating whether the differences in NPLs 
between foreign and domestic banks can be attributed to the country of origin of the foreign 
bank, we added dummy variables for the country of origin being in “Southern Enlargement” 
countries, CEE countries; United States or Switzerland, Russia and Turkey. The estimated 
effect of dummy for foreign ownership indicates an overall benign effect on NPLs. However, 
the additional dummies suggest a more differentiated effect, with CEE-owned foreign banks 
having a higher incidence of NPLs; the NPLs ratio is 3.05 percentage points higher for banks 
whose parent banks are coming from CEE region. 
The year dummy variables, which are included to control for period effects that influence all 
the banks in the sample in much the same way, appeared statistically insignificant. Turning to 
the country dummies, Estonia, Hungary and Poland specific dummy variable are the country 
dummies that reflect the NPLs data (see Appendix 6.2.3) .The coefficients of country 
dummies for Hungary and Poland reflect the presence of strong exogenous factors negatively 
affecting banks’ NPLs ratios. Poland has proved to be a particularly attractive market thanks 
to its relatively strong economic performance and large internal market (Deloitte Centre for 
Financial Services’ Research, 2012).  The Polish economy recorded a solid growth 
performance during the entire period of the global financial crisis. The main reasons behind 
the continuous GDP growth were: the relatively low level of dependence on exports, the 
moderate indebtedness, the strong banking sector, and the strong fiscal stimulus financed 
partly through EU structural funds. The Polish banking sector stands out in CEE as the largest 
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and that which recorded the fastest growth (Deloitte Centre for Financial Services’ Research, 
2012). Asset quality remained resilient between 2009 and 2011, especially when considered 
in a regional context, as the Polish banking sector has the one of the lowest share of non-
performing loans. Regarding Hungary, our findings are in line with Raiffaisen Research 
(2012) where NPLs ratios in Hungary have a significant negative impact on the NPLs ratio of 
the region In addition, it is important to note that Hungary and Poland have strengthened their 
macroprudential oversight in recent years, a development which might be considered as 
positive. In addition, Poland (and Romania as well) have introduced or tightened regulations 
supporting prudent lending practices, which should help to avoid excessive private sector 
indebtedness. 
In contrast, the country dummy for Estonia reflects factors positively affecting the NPLs 
ratios. Estonia suffered a fallout from the bursting of its real estate bubble (OECD, 2011). 
The situation in the mortgage market was expected to deteriorate the quality of bank’s assets. 
Particularly, the non-performing ratios of loans to the construction sector are rising. Most of 
the banks were sitting on growing inventories of real estate collateral that were difficult to 
liquidate in the current environment (OECD, 2011). 
We have tested for potential long-run effects on banks` NPL ratios of changes in all of the 
independent variables. However, we find that they were not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. They are reported in Appendix 6.2.3. 
6.6 Model 2 - Results 
Model 2 is an augmented version of model 1. Namely, model 1 is expanded by the addition 
of the interaction of the credit growth during the boom period and a dummy variable for the 
period after the end of the credit boom. Since there are growing concerns (mentioned in 
section 5.2.2) about the implications of rapid credit growth for macroeconomic and financial 
stability, the intention of this section is to find an appropriate empirical strategy to capture the 
effects of the phenomenon of rapid growth in banks` lending, which has been particularly 
prominent in many Central and East European countries. In order to understand 
developments in the loans market in the context of transition economies, it is useful to recall 
that in the financial systems of these countries around 85% of financial assets are bank assets. 
Namely, capital markets, especially the corporate bond and stock market segments, are not 
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well developed. Rapid and persistent credit expansion in many of these countries has been 
identified as posing an increased risk of a deterioration in asset quality (Borio and Lowe, 
2002; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Jimenez and Saurina, 2005; Borio and Drehmann, 2009).  
Hence, the credit expansions during the last decade pose the question as to whether the 
quality of loans granted during that period was evaluated accurately by the banking system. 
Recent experience has suggested that banks in an economic growth phase have over-
optimistic expectations about borrowers’ future ability to repay their debts and thus they 
often may over-lend to risky borrowers. As noted in section 5.2.2, Jimenez and Saurina 
(2005) find that in boom periods collateral requirements are relaxed while the opposite 
happens in recessions, which they take as evidence of looser credit standards during 
expansions. Therefore in the downward phase of the credit cycle, bad loans, approved in an 
upward phase, become more evident. Moreover, fast FX-denominated credit growth exposes 
lenders and borrowers to risks because of the increase in unhedged foreign currency lending. 
If the domestic currency depreciates, debt-servicing costs go up, and foreign exchange risk 
turns into credit risk. Thus, as noted by Steiner (2011), in many cases, regulatory measures to 
contain credit growth were targeted primarily at reducing growth in foreign currency loans. 
Furthermore, if a domestic credit boom is financed from foreign sources, as was the case in 
several CEE countries, the risk of the domestic banking sector having insufficient balance-
sheet liquidity (roll-over risk) increases. 
In this section, in particular, we are interested to investigate at which point the effect of past 
rapid loans growth might become evident. Consistent with the approach developed in section 
5.4, the period of past fast credit growth is interacted with a dummy variable for the period 
after the peak of credit growth. The peak of credit growth is observed for each CEE country 
individually. Figure 6.7 illustrates the credit growth in all CEE countries that are considered 
in the model. The Baltic countries experienced their highest rates of credit growth in 2004 
and 2005, while in most of the other CEE countries the peak was in 2007, just before the 
onset of the global financial crisis.  
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Source: Central bank sites (Financial Stability Reports), IMF, Author’s own calculation 
Figure 6.7 Credit growth in CEE countries  
 
Following the approach developed in section 5.4, the growth of credit during the period of 
past fast credit growth is interacted with an indicator variable for the period after the peak of 
credit growth. Looking at the graphs above, the peak of credit growth is observed for each 
country individually. In this augmented model specification, we include a dummy variable 
that represents the period after the peak of credit growth and the interaction term, calculated 
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as this dummy variable multiplied by the overall percentage change in credit growth, for each 
country,  from the beginning of the sample period to the peak of credit growth. However, we 
do not obtain results that provide evidence of a positive effect of credit growth on NPLs ratio 
when using these country-specific peaks of credit boom. Indeed, the results, when the past 
credit growth is interacted with  the period after the peak of credit growth for each CEE 
country individually, suggested a statistically significant negative overall effect of previous 
credit growth on the post-peak incidence of NPLs ratios, other things being equal. These 
findings do not coincide with the results obtained by Saurina et al. (2008) and Klein (2013), 
who suggest that excessive lending leads to a higher percentage of NPLs. In this context we 
continue to experiment with the interaction of the past credit growth and the period after the 
peak of credit growth. Since consideration of the peak of credit growth by each CEE country 
individually did not generate the results expected, the peak of credit growth is considered at 
the aggregate level for our data set. Namely, if we observe the total lending activity in the 
CEE and SEE region (see graph 3.20) we conclude that the peak of loans growth was in 
2007, the year when the global financial crisis started.  The argument for considering the 
peak of the credit boom on a regional, i.e. aggregate, level is that from the perspective of each 
individual bank the GFC was a huge exogenous shock, changing the trading environment for 
all banks in a similar way. Furthermore, foreign banks’ behaviour is likely to be determined 
by behaviour across the whole region not by events in a single country. Moreover, this 
common shock was met in CEE by a common response, aided by international institutional 
coordination. Namely, as already mentioned, the Vienna Initiative was created as a 
coordination platform for multinational banks, their home and host country supervisors, fiscal 
authorities, the IMF, and development institutions to protect and secure a continued 
commitment of parent banks to their subsidiaries and to guarantee macroeconomic stability in 
emerging Europe. 
Therefore, the model in equation 6.1 will be expanded by the inclusion of 
Interactioncreditgr2009, an interaction term calculated as the period dummy 2009 multiplied 
by the overall percentage change in credit growth from the beginning of the sample period to 
the peak of credit growth. As noted in section 6.4, the bank specific variables are treated as 
potentially endogenous. Hence, if credit growth is correlated with unobserved effects in the 
error term then the interaction with the post crisis period will itself be correlated with 
unobserved country specific effects in the error term; therefore, it should be treated as a 
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potentially endogenous as well.  Moreover, when the period of past credit growth is 
interacted with the period after the peak of credit growth the results suggest a positive and 
significant influence of past credit growth on the incidence of NPLs in the second year (in 
2009) after the peak of credit growth. The results of this augmented model are presented in 
Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations results from the model 2  
Dependent variable  Non-performing loans (%) 
 Variables name   Coefficient p-values 
 Lag dependent variable  NPL  0.639*** 0.000 
 
 
Macro variable 
 
GDP growth rate GDP -0.307*    0.059  
Inflation rate INF  0.006   0.215     
Interest rate INTR -0.051    0.746 
Exchange rate EXCR -0.113    0.312     
Unemployment rate UNEMP -0.272 0.975     
Public debt (% of GDP) DEBT  0.236*       0.077  
Bank-specific variables 
Return on assets ROA -1.167 0.137     
Return on equity  ROE  0.034    
 
0.637     
 Credit growth rate CR -0.132 **     
 
0.035  
Capital adequacy ratio CAP -0.122  
 
0.377     
 Loans to deposit ratio LtD  0.007  
 
0.874     
 Cost to income ratio CIR  0.008    
 
0.680     
 Market share Mshare -0.037 0.442      
Interactioncreditgr2009 Int 2009  0.179  *   0.066 
Ownership variables 
Foreign bank Foreign -2.166** 0.045 
Dummy_CEE CEE  3.954**     0.027  
Dummy_USAandCH  USandCH  1.232   0.287     
Dummy_SouthernEnlargement SouthEnl  0.497    0.765     
Dummy_RU RU  4.214 0.623     
Dummy_TR  TR -2.594 0.165      
Time dummies a) Included in the model Yes  
Country dummies b) Included in the model Yes  
 Number of observations 1052 
 Number of groups 226 
 Number of instruments 64 
 Hansen test p value 0.495 
 A-B AR(1) or m1 test p-values 0.008 
 A-B AR(2)  or m2 test p-values 0.751 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%. 
a) Time dummies reported in full Appendix 6.3 
b) Country dummies reported in full Appendix 6.3 
 
The m1 test rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals 
(p=0.008), while the m2 test - crucially - does not reject the null of no autocorrelation in the 
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second-difference residuals (p=0.751). This combination supports the validity of the 
instruments (Rodman, 2009a). Moreover, the Hansen test does not reject the null of the 
validity overidentifying restrictions at any conventional level of significance (p=0.495). The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is within the range established by FE and OLS 
and this supports its validity (see Table 6.9). 
Table 6.9 Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in terms of the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable – model 2 
 FE OLS System-GMM 
NPL (-1) 0.495   0.746 0.639 
 
The results summarized, in Table 6.8, suggest that, ceteris paribus, an increase of one 
percentage point in loan growth, prior to the aggregate peak (2007), leads to an increase in 
the ratio of NPLs of 0.05 percentage point two years after the peak of loans growth (the 
combined effect of the effect of credit growth overall, -0.132, which is significant at the 5%; 
and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, 0.179, which is significant at the 10%). 
This finding is in line with the procyclical credit-growth hypothesis (see 5.2.2), implying that 
excessive lending coincides with reckless risk-taking. Most interestingly, the estimated effect 
of the credit growth rate suggests that credit growth alone has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the incidence of NPLs. However, bearing in mind our data span, this 
trend might be viewed as a positive consequence of the deepening and restructuring of the 
financial system in these countries, given that most of these countries were, and some of them 
still are, in a transition phase. 
Table 6.10 The combined coefficient of credit growth variable and Interaction2009 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |    .046581   .0601011     0.78   0.438    -.0712149     .164377 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Both the credit growth rate and the interaction term are statistically significant; however, the 
combined coefficient is not significant (see Table 6.10). Non-significance may be expected, 
since the estimates have different signs with similar absolute values; hence, they more or less 
cancel out leaving a small combined coefficient that is not easily distinguishable from zero. 
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Looking at the effect of other variables on the ratio of NPLs, the GDP growth rate appears 
significant but only at the 10% level, suggesting that the NPLs ratios may be negatively 
affected by a higher GDP growth rate. Namely, an increase of one percentage point of GDP, 
ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease of 0.30 percentage points in the banks` NPLs ratio. This 
finding is in line with the hypothesis that NPLs ratios are countercyclical, falling in business 
cycle upturns and rising in recessions (see 5.2.1).  As found in model 1, the public debt 
variable is positive and statistically significant but again only at the 10% level, implying that, 
other things being equal, an increase of the public debt by 1 percentage point causes NPLs to 
increase by 0.24 percentage points. Similar to the results shown in Table 6.6, the obtained 
result on the lagged dependent variable suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the non-performing loans ratio in the previous year contributes a 0.64 percentage 
point increase to the non-performing loans ratio in the current year. Similar to our initial 
findings, models 2’s results confirm that the NPLs ratio is 2.2 percentage points lower for 
foreign-owned banks than for domestically-owned banks. Moreover, as in the previous model 
the results suggest that the NPLs ratio is 3.95 percentage points higher for banks whose 
parent banks are coming from the CEE region than for those banks whose parent banks are 
from EU12 countries. 
The period dummies, which are used to control for period effects that influence all the banks 
in the sample in much the same way, appeared statistically insignificant. The augmented 
model 2 reveals more country specific effects that have an influence on the incidence of 
NPLs, and which are indicated by positive and statistically significant coefficients. Here, the 
coefficients for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia and Romania 
reflect unobserved time invariant influences specific to these countries that increase NPLs 
ratios (see Appendix 6.3). 
These large persistence effects suggest that the long-run effects on NPLs of changes in the 
independent variables are considerably larger than the estimated short-run effects reported in 
Table 6.8. The long run coefficients are presented in the following Table.   
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Table 6.11 Long-run coefficients for the variables 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
Credit growth rate -0.366** 0.012 
Interaction 2009  0.495*  
 
0.069 
Public debt (% of GDP)  0.655* 0.091    
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%. 
Note: The long run coefficients on other variable are reported in Appendix 6.3. 
 
Furthermore, these results suggest that past credit growth can account for a substantial part of 
non-performing loans, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Taken 
literally, and allowing for a non-marginal change, the mean of credit growth (30% - see Table 
6.5), the long-run coefficient suggests an effect considerably larger than the mean NPLs in 
2009 (see Figure 6.6).  Whereas the estimated short-run coefficient measures the current 
impact, the long-run coefficient measures the entire effect from the current impact up to 
infinity. From a policy perspective the importance of the long-run coefficient is in the insight 
that the effect of economic causes cumulate over time. The short-run coefficient (0.179) 
suggest that an increase in credit growth of 10 percentage point causes an increase in NPLs of 
1.79%. The long run coefficient reminds us that this effect cumulates over time and is thus 
larger in the long-run. Taking even an estimative of 0.2 or 0.25 suggests that previous credit 
growth can have a substantial impact on future NPLs.  
There are some modest improvements in explanatory power compared to the previous model. 
The specification of the model is somewhat improved by inclusion of the interaction term 
representing the overall percentage change in credit growth from the beginning of the sample 
period to the aggregate peak of credit growth, pointing to a delayed effect of fast credit 
growth on the incidence of NPLs ratios. That delayed effect of credit growth becomes evident 
in the second year after the peak. These findings are in line with Klein (2013). However, he 
uses a different empirical strategy to model the effect of past credit growth. Klein’s 
investigation of the determinants of the NPLs in CEE region will be critically reviewed in the 
following section. This comparison is expected to be revealing since Klein (2013) and our 
models have slightly different specifications and are used to analyse somewhat different 
datasets, and, in the main, come to similar conclusions. In the next section, we highlight the 
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difference with respect to modelling of the potentially delayed impact of rapid credit growth 
on NPLs.  
6.7 Comparison with Klein (2013) 
In this Section, we compare our key results with those obtained by Klein (2013).  Given the 
same dependent variable, similar structure of the independent variables and econometric 
procedures in these two studies, a comparison of results should provide useful insights. 
Initially we will summarize Klein’s (2013) model, data used and main findings. Klein’s study 
evaluates the determinants of non-performing loans in CESEE economies, looking at both 
bank-level data and macroeconomic indicators between 1998 and 2011.  
The analysis uses panel data of individual banks’ balance sheets from Bankscope as well as 
macroeconomic indicators from the Haver Analytics dataset and World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) datasets, the latter are different from the sources used for our sample. Data is based 
on annual frequency and covers the ten largest banks (commercial, savings, cooperate, and 
real estate & mortgage) in each of the 16 countries
47
 covered in the analysis. The dependent 
variable is again the ratio of non-performing loans in total loans. As macro or country-
specific indicators, Klein included inflation, the change in exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro 
and the change in the unemployment rate. He has also considered two ‘global’ variables: the 
Euro zone’s GDP growth and the global risk aversion captured by the volatility of Standard 
& Poor’s 500 stock market index. Turning to the bank level data, Klein’s main model 
specification includes four explanatory bank-level variables: the equity-to-assets ratio; the 
return on equity; the loan-to-assets ratio; and the growth rate of loans. Overall, the data on 
NPLs includes 976 observations, which are divided into, in order to evaluate the effect of the 
financial crisis: the pre-crisis period (1998–2007) and the “post-crisis” period (2008-11).  
Klein considers three alternative estimation techniques. The first one is a fixed effects model, 
which allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across banks. Second, they apply the 
“difference GMM” method of Arellano and Bond (1991), which transforms the data to first 
differences to remove the fixed effect element and uses the lagged levels of the right hand-
                                                          
47 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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side variables as instruments. However, Klein (2013) notes one drawback of this approach; 
that, in samples with a limited time dimension (small T) and high persistence, the estimation 
has low precision (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Finally, they also estimate a “system GMM” 
model, an approach developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
which addresses this concern. 
The results suggest that NPLs ratios are indeed affected by both macroeconomic and bank-
level factors. Among the macroeconomic determinants, the results suggest that an increase in 
the unemployment  rate, exchange rate depreciation (against the euro) and higher inflation 
contribute to higher NPLs ratios, while higher Euro area GDP growth results in lower NPLs 
ratios. Higher global risk aversion was also found to increase NPLs ratios.  Klein`s 
explanation for the latter is that a more volatile stock market index may reduce firms’ 
capacity to repay, perhaps because of higher interest rates in the international financial 
markets, which reduce firms’ ability to rollover their debt. Also, he considers that lower Euro 
area growth may reduce firms’ capacity to repay, because of reduced export opportunities and 
lower export revenues, however, we think that this is questionable. In addition, according to 
Klein these two factors may also lead to lower external funding of banks and therefore may 
result in lower or even reverse credit growth (the latter affecting NPLs ratio through the 
denominator).  The impact of bank-specific factors is broadly in line with previous findings: 
the equity-to-asset ratio and return on equity (ROE) are negatively correlated with NPLs 
while excessive lending (measured by loan-to-asset ratio and the past growth rate of banks’ 
lending) leads to higher NPLs. Although bank-level factors have a significant impact on 
NPLs, Klein reports that their overall explanatory power was low. Their inclusion marginally 
increases the “within” explanatory power of each group, while it significantly reduces the 
“between” explanatory power (in the fixed effects estimations). 
Table 6.12 provides a comparison of the variables we have used and the variables used by 
Klein (2013). 
 
 
203 
 
Table 6.12 Comparison of the variables   
Dependent Variable  Our model Klein`s model 
Non-performing loans in total loans     
Independent Variables Our model Klein`s model 
Lagged dependent variable       
GDP growth rate          × 
Unemployment     
Inflation rate     
Interest rate    × 
Exchange rate     
Public debt (% of GDP)   × 
Euro area’s GDP growth        ×   
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index        ×   
Return on assets          × 
Return on equity     
Capital adequacy ratio   × 
Credit growth     
Loans in (%) total assets        ×   
Equity in (%) total assets        ×   
Cost to income ratio          × 
Market share          × 
Foreign/domestic ownership (dummy variable)          × 
Origin of foreign owner (dummy variables)          × 
  
Looking at Table 6.12 it is clear that our model specification involves more variables, with 
the main differences being in the choice of macroeconomic and ownership variables. Namely, 
Klein’s model does not take into consideration interest rates and public debt, as well as bank 
ownership. As explained in section 6.2, increasing interest rates and public debt may 
contribute to an increase in banks non-performing loan ratios. Turning to the bank specific 
variables, most of these variables are similar in the two models. The differences are in the 
following variables: equity in total assets, capital adequacy ratio, loans in assets and market 
share. Instead of using the variable equity in total assets, we included the capital adequacy 
ratio. These two variables are both used as a proxy for the “Moral Hazard” hypothesis (see 
5.2.2). However, we also included the capital adequacy ratio as a measure of the relation of 
each banks` capital to its risky assets, particularly because it is a measure used by national 
regulators to monitor each bank’s capital from the perspective of whether they can absorb a 
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reasonable amount of loss and is in accordance with statutory capital requirements. In order 
to measure credit growth Klein uses two measures loans in assets and credit growth. We have 
considered just one measure credit growth. Klein does not directly take into consideration the 
market share of banks’ assets, instead he just considers the ten largest banks in each country 
without providing the rationale for that choice. The results from Klein’s and our two models 
suggest that both bank-specific and macro variables affect banks’ loans quality.  In addition, 
our models suggest that ownership status of the banks and the home country of the parent 
bank also affect the banks` NPL ratios (see Tables 6.6 and 6.8). A full comparison is 
presented in the following Table.  
Table 6.13 Comparison of the results: significant variables only  
Variable name Our model 1 Our model 2 Klein`s model 
Level of statistical significance 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
1
st
 Lag of the dependent variable 0.742       0.639   0.878   
Return on asset (ROA) -
2.153    
        
Return on equity (ROE)        - 0.005  
Capital adequacy ratio   -
0.272    
      
Credit growth*     -
0.132  
   0.002 
Interactioncreditgrowth2009     0.179         
Loans in (%) total assets                        
Equity in (%) total assets                      - 0.044  
GDP growth rate      -
0.307    
   
Unemployment         0.039 
Inflation rate   0.272         
Exchange rate        0.009  
Public debt (% of GDP)  0.227    0.236       
Euro area’s GDP growth                -
0.017 
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market 
index 
             0.022   
Foreign/domestic ownership  -
2.647    
  -
2.166 
    
Origin of foreign owner - CEE  3.046      3.954     
*Note: In Klein model credit growth is in the 2
nd
 lag 
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In all three models the lagged dependent variable is positive, statistically significant and 
large, suggesting that a dynamic specification is the appropriate empirical strategy. The 
persistence effect on NPL ratios, measured by the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, suggests that the long-term effects of variables included in the model are 
considerably larger than the directly estimated short-term or impact effects.  
The variables used as proxies for banks` performance, ROA and ROE, are statistically 
significant, corroborating the “Bad Management” hypothesis (see 5.2.2). In model 1 ROA 
affects negatively the incidence of NPLs ratio, while in Klein`s analysis the NPLs ratios are 
adversely affected by the ROE. Supporting the same hypothesis of “Moral Hazard”, the 
capital adequacy ratio is positive and statistically significant in our model 1, while the equity 
in total assets is positive and significant in Klein’s (2013) model. Excessive lending, 
measured as loans in total assets, leads to higher NPLs ratios in the Klein’s model. Also, in 
Klein`s model the effect of past rapid credit growth is captured by lagged lending growth 
(second lag). On the other hand, in our model 2, the credit growth alone has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the incidence of NPLs; while the effect of past rapid credit 
growth interacted with the period after 2009 (two years after the global financial crisis)  
results in a higher NPLs ratio, like in Klein`s model. However, there is a difference in the size 
of the delayed effect of credit growth of the incidence of NPLs ratio; this will be discussed 
later in this section. Looking at the macroeconomic variables, Klein finds that an increase in 
the unemployment and the exchange rate contributes to higher NPLs. In addition, Klein finds 
that a higher volatility index and lower Euro area growth reduce the incidence of NPLs 
among CEE banks. As opposed to those results, our results suggest that the increase in GDP 
growth rate, the public debt and in the inflation rate lead to increase in the NPLs ratio.
48
   
Summing up the results of both studies, there are differences in terms of the significance and 
the strength of the estimated effects. Namely, looking at Table 6.13 we can see that the size 
of the coefficients of all the statistically significant variables in our model are larger than in 
Klein`s model. In particular, in Klein`s model an increase of 1 percentage point in the past 
fast credit growth leads to increase by 0.002 percentage  points in the NPLs ratios, however, 
in our case the increase is much larger, 0.179 on impact and 0,495 percentage points in the 
long run. The effect of excessive lending in Klein`s model is statistically significant and 
                                                          
48 In one of Klein`s model specifications (FE and Difference GMM) the inflation rate was statistically 
significant, implying that the higher inflation leads to an increase in the NPLs ratio. 
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different from zero, but that result is not economically important. Klein does not give much 
in the way of explanation for including the second lag of credit growth and for not including 
the current values of the variable credit growth in his model specification. In addition, an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the variables that characterize the banks` performance (ROA 
and ROE), in our case leads to decrease in NPLs ratio by 2.04 percentage points, while in 
Klein`s model lead to decrease by 0.005 percentage points. Turning to the macro economic 
variables, the coefficients’ sizes in our model are also larger than in Klein`s model. 
The difference in results may arise from differences in the dataset. As previously mentioned, 
in Klein`s dataset Russia and Ukraine are included, while Albania and Montenegro are absent 
in comparison with our own dataset. The rationale for the countries we have included in our 
dataset, can be found in Raiffaisen Research Publications, where Russia and Ukraine are not 
considered to be in the CEE region; instead, they are included in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) region. A second important limitation of Klein’s analysis is that he 
does not investigate all the banks that have reported NPLs ratios in BankScope, only 
considering the ten largest banks in each country. In our opinion, this choice is suspect, 
bearing in mind that the 10 largest banks in Russia are much larger than the nine banks in 
Estonia who reported NPL ratios and have a significantly lower market share. In order to 
investigate the latter we have controlled for each bank’s market share.  However, when the 
market share of the banks was included in our econometric specification, the relationship 
between NPLs ratios and market share variable was found to be statistically insignificant. 
Thirdly, Klein does not consider the ownership structure of the banks, which we find to be an 
important determinant of loan quality in CEE. This effect may be especially important in the 
years after the beginning of the global financial crisis, as foreign banks may transmit home-
country shocks. Finally, Klein does not control for the countries’ indebtedness, expressed as 
public debt as a percentage of GDP. This may be an important variable, since in most 
European countries the current crisis first affected fiscal indices and then extended to the 
banks. As explained in section 6.2, high public debts may make debtors more vulnerable to 
adverse shocks affecting their economic wealth, thereby raising the likelihood that they 
would run into debt servicing problems.  
The comparison reported in this section provides a direction for future research. One 
suggestion for further empirical work is to extend the data set with data for Russia and 
Ukraine and then to check the robustness of these results. However, since that data are 
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currently not available, in the next section we explore a different strategy: we will exclude 
two of our variables that Klein (2013) does not consider and then compare the results.  
6.8 Model 3 - Results 
We now follow the same empirical strategy as Klein (2013) used for investigating the effect 
of excessive lending on the incidence of NPLs. Namely, the effect of past rapid growth will 
be captured by the lagged credit growth (see Appendix 6.4). As noted above, Klein does not 
explain why the second lag of credit growth is included in his model rather than its current 
value. The excessive lending effect appeared positive and statistically significant on the 
second lag of credit growth variable, suggesting that the credit growth of two years ago 
positively affect the current NPLs ratio, which is in line with Klein’s findings. Specifically, 
as presented in Table 6.14, an increase of credit growth by one percentage point in, ceteris 
paribus, leads to an increase of 0.006 in the NPL ratio in the second year after. It is important 
to note that this finding is consistent with the findings from model 2, in which the effect of 
credit growth before 2007 is interacted with the period after 2009 (two years after the global 
financial crisis) and through this interaction is found to result in higher NPLs ratios. Namely, 
it was revealed that, ceteris paribus, an increase of one percentage point in loan growth, prior 
to the peak (2007), leads to an increase in the ratio of NPLs by 0.05 percentage point two 
years after the peak of loans growth. In our model 2, the second lag of the variable credit 
growth is based on a more disaggregated analysis (i.e. including variables to analyse 
separately the effects of credit growth in pre- and post-crisis periods).  The results for Model 
3, using the second lag of credit growth in the same manner as Klein, are presented in Table 
6.14. 
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Table 6.14 Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations results from model 3 
Dependent variable  Non-performing loans (%) 
 Variables name   Coefficient p-values 
 Lag dependent variable  NPL 0.514***    0.000  
 
 
Macro variable 
 
GDP growth rate GDP -0.331***    0.001   
Inflation rate INF 0.120 0.331 
Interest rate INTR -0.149 0.386 
Exchange rate EXCR -0.067 0.347 
Unemployment rate UNEMP -0.130 0.341 
Public debt (% of GDP) DEBT 0.155** 0.048 
Bank-specific variables 
Return on assets ROA 0.004  
 
0.995  
 Return on equity  ROE -0.203***    
 
0.006  
 Credit growth rate 2nd lag CR 0.006*    
 
0.083  
 Capital adequacy ratio CAP 0.059 
 
0.252    
 Loans to deposit ratio LtD 0.004 
 
0.382     
 Cost to income ratio CIR -0.010  
 
0.568     
 Market share Mshare 0.017 
 
0.572    
 
Ownership variables 
Foreign bank Foreign -2.322*** 0.004   
Dummy_CEE CEE 1.712 0.266 
Dummy_USAandCH  USandCH -0.370 0.784 
Dummy_SouthernEnlargement SouthEnl 2.122 0.113 
Dummy_RU RU 5.069 0.151 
Dummy_TR  TR -3.970 0.158 
Time dummies a) Included in the model Yes  
Country dummies b) Included in the model Yes  
 Number of observation 1030 
 Number of groups 227 
 Number of instruments 131 
 Hansen test p value 0.647 
 A-B AR(1) or m1 test p-values 0.005 
 A-B AR(2) or m2 test p-values 0.599 
 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%.  
a) Time dummies reported in full Appendix 6.4 
b) Country dummies reported in full Appendix 6.4 
 
The Hansen test (p=0.647) suggests the over-identifying instruments are valid. As required 
the m1 test suggests that there is evidence of autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals 
(p=0.005), while the m2 test (p=0.599) suggests no evidence of serial correlation in the 
errors, which is also consistent with instrument validity. The coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable (see Table 6.15) is within the range established by FE, the most 
downward biased estimator, and OLS, the most upward biased estimator. This supports the 
validity of the modelling strategy. 
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Table 6.15 Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in terms of the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable – model 3 
 FE OLS System-GMM 
NPL (-1) 0.495   0.746 0.514 
 
Looking at the results for the macroeconomic variables in model 3, the GDP growth rate 
suggests that the NPLs ratios are negatively affected by higher GDP growth rate, which is 
indicated by the statistically significant coefficient. The same result was found in model 2. 
An increase of one percentage point of GDP, ceteris paribus, leads to a decrease of 0.33 
percentage points in the banks` NPLs ratio. Similar to the model`s 2 results, an increase 
public debt will contribute to the increase in NPLs ratios. Specifically, an increase of one 
percentage point in the public debt/GDP ratio leads to increase of 0.16 percentage points in 
the NPLs ratio in banks in the CEE region. Turning to the bank specific variables, the lagged 
NPLs ratio is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of a rising NPLs 
ratio is likely to have a prolonged effect on the banking system. This finding is in line with 
findings from models 1 and 2 as well as with Klein’s investigation. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
a 1 percentage point increase in the non-performing loans ratio in the previous year 
contributes to a 0.51 percentage point increase to the non-performing loans ratio in the 
current year.  The results from model 3 suggest that a better return on equity ratio leads to a 
decrease in banks` NPLs ratios, corroborating the hypothesis that the better banks` 
performance improves the quality of banks’ assets. Namely, a 1 percentage point increase in 
the return on equity leads to a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the NPLs ratio, other things 
being equal. This conclusion is also consistent with Klein’s findings. However, in models 1 
and 2 instead of the return of equity, the coefficient on return on asset suggests that a higher 
return on assets contributes to the lower NPLs ratios. Similarly to model 1, the estimate on 
the ownership identity, indicates that, on average, those banks with a foreign owner have a 
lower NPLs ratio than those under domestic ownership. As revealed in model 2, the 
significant country specific effects, Estonia and Romania, reflect unobserved time invariant 
influences, specific to these countries, which increase the NPLs ratios.   
Given the large persistence effects of the lagged dependent variable, as in the previous 
section, we calculate the long-run effects of the independent variables. The results presented 
in the Table below suggest that estimates which were found statistically significant in the 
short-term, have even larger effects in the long-run.  
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Table 6.16 Long-run coefficients for the variables 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
GDP growth rate -0.545*** 0.000 
Return on equity -0.439*** 0.001 
Credit growth rate 0.014** 0.032 
Foreign -4.182** 0.009 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%. 
 
Replicating Klein’s strategy, in our model 3 we find the same small effect of past credit 
growth on the incidence of NPLs ratios. In particular, Klein’s findings, and our findings when 
following Klein`s strategy, are picking up part of a more complex effect of past credit 
growth. This was unpicked in model 2 to reveal a  positive coefficient on  the interaction of 
past credit growth and period of two years after the peak of credit growth together with a 
small and negative coefficient on the credit growth variable.  
6.9 Model 4 - Results 
As mentioned in section 6.7, Klein does not directly consider the potential effects of public 
debt and interest rates. In this section, we will check whether the results from model 1, 2 and 
3 change if we exclude these two variables from the final models 3 specifications. The results 
are reported in Table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 Dynamic Panel System GMM estimations results from model 4 
Dependent variable  Non-performing loans (%) 
 Variables name   Coefficient p-values 
 Lag dependent variable (NPL) NPL 0.515***     0.000  
 
 
Macro variable 
 
GDP growth rate GDP -0.332***     0.001    
 Inflation rate INF 0.123 0.522    
 Exchange rate EXCR -0.003 0.548  
 Unemployment rate UNEMP -0.048 0.731    
Bank-specific variables Return on assets ROA 0.238 0.708 
 Return on equity  ROE -0.241***     
 
0.004  
 
 Credit growth rate 2
nd lag CR 0.007* 0.100*     
 Capital adequacy ratio CAP -0.062 0.239     
 Loans to deposit ratio LtD 0.006 
 
 
0.332 
     
 
 Cost to income ratio CIR -0.006 0.730 
 Market share Mshare 0.031 0.345       
Ownership variables 
Foreign bank Foreign -2.491** 0.003      
Dummy_CEE CEE 1.770 0.271     
Dummy_USAandCH  USandCH 0.185 0.888    
Dummy_SouthernEnlargement SouthEnl 1.816 0.185     
Dummy_RU RU 4.636 0.331  
Dummy_TR  TR -3.106 0.269    
Time dummies a) Included in the model Yes  
Country dummies b) Included in the model Yes  
 Number of observation 1039 
 Number of groups 228 
 Number of instruments 129 
 Hansen test p value 0.564 
 A-B AR(1) or m1 test p-values 0.004 
 A-B AR(2) or m2 test p-values 0.534 
 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%.  
a) Time dummies reported in full Appendix 6.5 
b) Country dummies reported in full Appendix 6.5 
 
Hansen’s test for over-identification, the Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests for serial 
correlation, suggest an appropriate model specification. Namely, the Hansen test (p=0.564) 
suggests the over-identifying instruments are valid. . The Arellano-Bond (1) test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals (p=0.004), while the 
Arellano-Bond (2) does not reject the null of no autocorrelation in the second-difference 
residuals (p=0.534). As can be seen in Table 6.18, the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is again within the range established by FE and OLS and hence, this supports its 
validity. 
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Table 6.18 Comparison statistics of System-GMM with OLS and FE in terms of the 
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable – model 4 
 FE OLS System-GMM 
NPL (-1) 0.495   0.746 0.515 
 
In general, the results do not differ much from the previous model`s findings presented in 
previous section. As revealed in model 3, the GDP growth negatively affects the incidence of 
NPLs ratios, suggesting that an increase of one percentage point of GDP, ceteris paribus, 
leads to a decrease of 0.33 percentage points in the banks’ NPLs ratio. The lagged dependent 
variable again has a positive effect on the banks` NPLs ratios. Looking at the bank specific 
variables, the return on equity has a negative effect on the NPLs ratios, implying that an 
increase of one percentage point in the capital adequacy ratio, ceteris paribus, leads to a 
decrease of 0.24 percentage points in the banks’ NPLs ratio. This finding is in line with our 
previous findings. Similar to our previous results and Klein`s the excessive lending effect - 
the second lag of credit growth - is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
credit growth of two year ago positively affects the current NPLs ratio. However, that effect 
is small (0.007) as previously estimated. Turning to the banks’ ownership, on average, those 
banks with a foreign owner have a lower NPLs ratio than those domestic. This result is 
consistent with our previous findings in model 1 and model 3.  
The coefficient on the year dummies, Yr_2007 and Yr_2009 appeared to be negative and 
statistically significant, but only at the 10% significance level. There may be some suggestion 
that developments in 2007 and 2009 negatively affected banks` NPLs ratios in the CEE 
region, but a test found no significant difference between the period before and after the 
GFC.  
Following the same procedure as in the previous sections we calculate the long-run effect of 
independent variables on the NPLs. The long-run coefficients are a little more than twice the 
size of the short-term estimates reported in the previous Table but do not change the 
inferences drawn.  
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Table 6.19 Long-run coefficients for the variables 
Variables Coefficient p-value 
GDP growth rate -0.686** 0.007 
Return on equity -0.497*** 0.002 
Credit growth rate 0.015* 0.086 
Foreign -5.140** 0.005 
Significance level: ***significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% *significant at 10%. 
To conclude, the exclusion of public debt and interest rate did not disturb the estimated 
effects of other variables in the model. However, the results from the three previous models 
do suggest that the degree of indebtedness of a country contributes to the evolution of NPLs 
among CEE banks. As in the previous models, the results of model 4 suggest that the 
ownership of a bank may be an important factor in explaining the quality of loans in CEE. 
Namely, results from all our models suggest that mainly foreign-owned banks have a lower 
NPLs ratio compared to domestic-owned banks. Implementing Klein’s strategy, in our model 
4 we find the same effect of past credit growth on the incidence of NPLs ratios as Klein did. 
However, although we find that this effect of past fast credit growth on the incidence of NPLs 
ratio is statistically significant, it is not economically important. As mentioned earlier, Klein 
does not provide an explanation for including the second lag of credit growth and for not 
including the current values of credit growth in his model specification. The problem with his 
analysis is that these results suggest that credit growth will always adversely affect NPLs. In 
contrast, our approach explained in section 6.6 allows a more nuanced analysis of the effects 
of credit growth on the incidence of NPLs ratio, by allowing these to be different before and 
after the global financial crisis. It is important to note that we are not arguing that ‘excessive’ 
credit growth causes financial crisis; only that once a crisis does take a place the effect of 
previous rapid credit growth is a contributory cause of the increase in the NPLs ratio.  On the 
other hand, Klein considers just the excessive past credit growth (expressed in the second lag 
of the credit growth variable) and its adverse effect on the NPLs ratio. However, because of 
their underdeveloped financial systems, relatively rapid credit growth is and was needed in 
many European transition countries and cannot be considered a ‘bad thing’ as such. 
6.10 Sample Selection  
Not all banks could be included in our sample; i.e. those that have not reported non-
performing loans are, perforce, not available for estimation. Although sample selection is 
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commonly confronted in cross-sectional studies, it is less considered in panel data estimation. 
This is partially due to the conception that estimating bank-specific fixed effects will 
eliminate most forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Namely, when we have a FE or RE model 
we are controlling for the unobserved group specific effects that will include all those specific 
features of banks that makes them, more or less, likely to report NPLs. Hence, FE or RE 
models address this problem. That is, in RE estimation group specific effects in the error term 
control for the banks unobserved characteristics including the propensity to report NPLs. 
However, the effectiveness of this approach to control the unobserved characteristics depends 
on the assumption that the relevant unobserved effects are time invariant (or at least slowly 
moving).  
To consider this issue further, we first estimated a probit model to investigate the 
determinants of the propensity to report their NPLs. In doing so, we found a positive time 
trend such that banks are becoming, generally, more likely over time to report their NPLs. 
This indicates that over time banks that do report NPLs become more typical of the whole 
population. In other words, over time our analysis of those banks that do report NPLs can be 
regarded as increasingly representative of the banking sector as a whole. This suggests that 
the non-reporters are, over time, becoming more similar to the reporters as is the intention of 
regulatory authorities. For example, in 1999 our sample covered 49.1% of total banking 
sector assets, however, by 2011 the sample covered 85.5% of total banking assets.  Second, 
when we analyse the banking sector our main concern is to include those banks of the 
greatest importance to policy makers and regulators. Hence, even if we cannot establish that 
our sample is completely representative of the population, it is more important to check that 
we include those banks that are of systemic importance, which we assume to be the banks 
with a largest market share. We expect that the bigger banks are more likely to report NPLs 
bearing in mind that they are under greater public attention. Therefore, we investigate 
whether there is a correlation between the market share of the banks and propensity to report 
NPLs ratio. That correlation coefficient reveals the positive relationship between the market 
share of the banks and likelihood to report NPLs, although the size of the coefficient is not 
large (0.19). In Figure 6.8 we present the national market share of the banks that did not 
report NPLs in the period 1999-2011 in the CEE region.  
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Source: Bankscope data 
Figure 6.8 Market shares of the banks that did not report NPLs 
Note: Each dot represents one bank in one year 
 
Looking at the Figure above, most banks (thirty-five) that have not reported NPLs have lower 
that 5% market share of assets of the banking sector in their country of operation. Only five 
non-reporting banks have a market share that is between 5-10% of total banking sector assets; 
and two banks have market share between 10-25% of total assets in banking sector. 
Therefore; as previously assumed, we conclude that banks with a larger market share (above 
10% of total assets in banking sector) are more likely to report NPLs than those with a 
smaller market share (below 10% of total assets in banking sector). However, whilst the issue 
of possible sample selection bias is of interest, we restate our argument that having a sample 
that contains the systemically important banks in our countries of interest is, for our current 
study, more important than having a fully representative sample of banks.  
6.11 Conclusion  
The objective of the chapter was to empirically examine and analyse the factors affecting the 
non-performing loans ratios in 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe from 1999 to 
2011. Using data at the individual bank level, we examine the macro, bank-specific and the 
ownership determinants of the NPLs ratio.   
The results suggest that NPLs ratios are indeed affected by both macroeconomic and bank-
level factors. Among the macroeconomic determinants, the results from our preferred model 
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2 suggest that an improvement in the real economy is likely to see a reduction in the non-
performing loan portfolios of commercial banks. In addition, the results suggest that the 
degree of indebtedness of a country contributes adversely to the evolution of NPLs among 
CEE banks. Furthermore, the results suggest that mainly foreign-owned banks have a lower 
NPLs ratio compared to domestic owned banks. The empirical results also indicate a 
significant positive effect of past rapid loans growth on the incidence of NPLs in the second 
year after the end of the credit boom, implying that aggressive lending coincides with more 
reckless risk taking. 
Special attention in this chapter is dedicated to Klein`s paper where the determinants of NPLs 
in CEE countries are also examined. Given the same dependent variable, similar independent 
variables and econometric procedures of these two studies, comparison of results provides 
useful insights. In model 3 we followed the same empirical strategy as Klein (2013) used for 
investigating the effect of excessive lending on the incidence of NPLs; and in model 4 we 
excluded two of our variables that Klein does not consider and then compared the results. 
Although we find similar results to Klein, there are some important differences. In particular, 
there is disagreement about the effect of credit growth on the NPLs ratio. 
Klein identifies a positive effect of past credit growth which is statistically significant, but not 
economically important. However, Klein includes the second lag of credit growth and not the 
current values of credit growth in his model. In contrast, in our model we analyse separately 
the effects of credit growth in the pre and post crisis periods. The results from Klein`s 
analysis suggest that the credit growth will always adversely affect NPLs. Our approach 
allows a more nuanced analysis of the effects of credit growth on the incidence of NPLs  by 
allowing these to be different before and after the peak of credit growth. It is important to 
note that we are not arguing the rapid credit growth causes a financial crisis; only that, once 
the crisis does take a place, the effect of previous credit growth is a contributory cause of an 
increasing NPLs ratio.   
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7.1 Introduction  
The aim of this research programme was to identify the main exposures to risk of the banking 
system in Montenegro and more generally in Central and Eastern Europe, and hence inform 
the design of preventive control systems in order to preserve banking sector stability. In order 
to research the answer to this research question, the initial objectives were:  
a) To critically review theoretical and empirical studies of banking sector stability. 
b) To investigate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the instruments currently used 
to assess banking sector stability. 
c) Estimate empirically the macroeconomic and bank specific determinants of banking 
sector distress in Montenegro.  
d) Estimate empirically the macroeconomic, bank specific and ownership variables of 
banking sector distress in Central East European countries.  
e) To identify forward-looking central bank policies that should be adopted in order to 
safeguard banking sector stability. 
However, during the research programme these initial objectives gradually evolved. Namely, 
when addressing the first objective, banking sector stability, it was concluded that it would be 
useful to address which requirements for a sound and stable banking sector were disturbed in 
the last global financial crisis. In particular, it was decided to analyse the effect of the global 
financial crisis on CEE and Montenegro. Thus an additional objective was added to the 
research programme. 
 
Five of the final six objectives of the research programme have been addressed in the 
previous chapters and the role of this final Chapter is to bring together the overall findings 
and to discuss their broad policy implications. In pursuing this role, the current Chapter 
218 
 
summarises the research conducted in this thesis, highlighting the contributions made to 
knowledge. We start with a resume of the most prominent findings of the research undertaken 
in the dissertation (Section 7.2). We continue with Section 7.3 that presents the main 
contribution to knowledge, followed by Section 7.4 that introduces the policy implications of 
these findings. The inevitable limitations of the empirical work are identified and assessed in 
Section 7.5, while suggestions for the further research are offered in Section 7.6. The final 
Section (7.7) concludes the thesis.  
7.2 Main Findings of the Research  
In Chapter 1 we analysed the main characteristics of and developments in the banking sector 
in Montenegro, highlighting the importance of banking stability for its economic 
development. It was established that the banking sector has the dominant role in the 
Montenegrin economy’s financial system, since banks are the primary source of funding for 
all sectors of the economy. Banking stability in Montenegro is necessary not only to promote 
internal stability but also to attract inflow of foreign direct investment and to promote the 
development of small and medium enterprises necessary for economic convergence to the 
EU’s level of per capita GDP. The recent rapid growth of banking assets was driven by the 
entry of foreign banks, which have a dominant role in the Montenegrin banking sector. It is 
argued that, in 2008, ‘excessive’ credit growth, primarily financed by high external 
borrowing, posed a threat to banking sector stability, given that all sectors of the Montenegrin 
economy had a high level of debt. Namely, strong credit growth from 2003 to 2008 led to an 
unsustainable boom that suddenly ended with the occurrence of the global financial crisis 
(GFC). Subsequently, the deep recession pointed to a number of accumulated problems, 
including the poor quality of many of the loans on banks` books. Namely, the boom and bust 
cycle in Montenegro left behind a large number of non-performing loans, which present the 
main current threat to banking stability.  
In Chapter 2, we concluded that banking instability is costly to the entire economy, meaning 
that banking crises can generate a large disruption of economic activity because of the role 
played by banks in the allocation of resources. Since the banking system fragility refers to the 
latent possibility of a crisis in the banking system, we have critically reviewed the theoretical 
and empirical literature on banking crises. One part of the expanding literature emphasizes 
moral hazard and asymmetric information, in credit contracts or in bank-depositor relations, 
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as fundamental determinants of financial crises.  While, the other part stresses that the 
banking sector stability depends solely on the phase of the real economy. Furthermore, 
according to the empirical studies, the growth in bank lending during the upswing of the 
business cycle and the corresponding accumulation of debt in the non-financial sector 
increases banks' credit risk and the occurrence of non-performing loans and, consequently, 
fragility in the banking sector. This generates instability, amplifies the danger of an 
occurrence of a financial crisis and increases systemic risk. Much research on the cause of 
bank failures finds that asset quality is a statistically significant predictor of insolvency (e.g. 
Dermirgue-Kunt 1989, Barr and Siems 1994), and that failing banks always have a high level 
of non-performing loans prior to failure. That has induced greater concern in studying the 
determinants of non-performing loans, which are likely to be affected by both bank specific 
and macroeconomic factors. Lastly, given that the recent GFC has been characterized by the 
phenomenon of contagion, Chapter 2 tackles the channels transmitting financial turmoil from 
a crisis-country to other countries, assessing what makes one country vulnerable to contagion. 
The key conclusion drawn from the theoretical discussion was that the determinants of the 
degree of banking stability are normally a complex and interactive mix of macroeconomic, 
financial and structural factors.  
Accordingly, Chapter 3 researched how banking system stability was disturbed in the GFC, 
evaluating the fundamental causes and consequences of that crisis. Furthermore, the analysis 
evaluated the contagion effects of GFC, calling into question how banks treated their 
subsidiaries in emerging markets. Excessive leverage by banks is believed to have 
contributed to the GFC, as highly leveraged banks threatened to drag down the entire 
financial system. Special attention in this Chapter was paid to the impact of the GFC on 
economies similar to Montenegro, since their future development depends, to a large extent, 
on global economic prospects. In Central and Eastern Europe, the GFC resulted in large 
declines in economic activity, a large slowdown in net capital inflows, higher unemployment 
and increased insolvencies. These developments were followed by a credit crunch, credit 
quality problems, high ratios of non-performing loans, and consequently bank 
recapitalizations. However, the full-blown financial crisis was avoided. The review of the 
empirical literature suggested that international bank lending through subsidiaries is more 
stable than direct cross-border lending, and indicated that foreign bank subsidiaries reduce 
their lending during a financial crisis less than do domestic-owned banks. The stability of 
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foreign banks’ roles in Central and Eastern Europe during the GFC was guaranteed by a 
unique private-public co-operation with international financial institutions providing the 
coordination mechanisms. These findings indicate that the structure of banking sectors in 
CEE countries, especially regarding ownership, had a moderating effect on the transmission 
of the GFC to these countries. 
In Chapter 4, banking stability was examined from the institutional, or more precisely, the 
regulator’s perspective. As Caprio (1996) notes, the success of financial reform and the 
stability of financial systems both particularly depend on developing an effective regulatory 
framework that rewards prudent risk-taking and is attuned to both institutions and the specific 
structure of the economy. The recent financial crisis demonstrated that in many countries the 
existing capital regulations, in design and/or implementation, were inadequate to prevent a 
panic in the financial sector, with governments around the world having to engage in 
emergency support to prevent a collapse. Thus, recently created Basel III rules should 
significantly increase the liquidity requirements and the quality and level of capital that banks 
will hold. Amongst researchers, there is now a general agreement that the supervision 
standards and instruments to maintain the banking stability prior to GFC were too weak, 
though few economists identified these weaknesses prior to the crisis. Chapter 4 assesses the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the instruments used pre-Global financial crisis (GFC) to 
assess banking sector stability. In practice, quantitative methodologies, such as early warning 
systems (EWS) and stress testing were used together with ‘expert’ judgment and a wealth of 
institutional and legal circumstance, to assess financial system stability. The analysis 
presented in this Chapter reveals that regulatory reform requires recognition of the linkages 
between the macro and microprudential approaches. Both the macro and microprudential 
perspectives are important and overlap with substantial complementarities. The ability to 
comprehensively aggregate positions and exposures across banks in a consistent way helps 
supervisors to identify industry-level trends and improve the macroprudential perspective. 
How micro and macro perspectives might work together is illustrated by the stress tests that 
are part of the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). Empirical studies have 
identified stress tests as one example of how the macro and microprudential perspectives can 
be combined to create a stronger supervisory framework that addresses a wider range of 
supervisory objectives for the purpose of maintaining banking stability.  
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Exploring the factors determining ex post credit risk is an issue of substantial importance for 
regulatory authorities concerned with financial stability and individual bank’s management 
(Louzis, 2010). The ex post credit risk usually takes the form of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). The relation between the macroeconomic environment and loan quality has been 
investigated in previous studies critically reviewed in Chapter 2, which typically link the 
phase of the business cycle with banking stability. However, in Chapter 5 we reveal that the 
determinants of NPLs should not be sought exclusively amongst macroeconomic factors that 
are viewed as exogenous forces influencing the banking industry. On the contrary, the 
distinctive features of the banking sector and the policy choices of each particular bank with 
respect to their efforts for maximum efficiency and improvements in their risk management, 
are also expected to exert a decisive influence on the evolution of NPLs. Hence in Chapter 5, 
we consider the joint role of macroeconomic and bank-speciﬁc factors in explaining the 
occurrence of banking distresses, expressed in non-performing loan ratios, in Montenegro 
since 2004. Using data at the individual bank level, we examine whether the degree of 
banking distress is a function of macroeconomic developments and/or the unique difficulties 
of transition such as inadequate risk-assessment, excessive risk-taking or the high 
concentration of the banking system. The results suggest that an improvement in the real 
economy is likely to see a reduction in the non-performing loan portfolios of commercial 
banks. Looking at each individual bank, the study emphasizes the delayed effect of loan 
growth on the ratio of non-performing loans. This is in line with the hypothesis that the 
expansion phase of the economy is characterized by a relatively low proportion of NPLs, as 
most consumers and firms receive a sufficient stream of income and revenues to service their 
debts. However as the boom period continues, credit is extended to lower-quality debtors and, 
subsequently, when the recession phase sets in, NPLs increase. In addition, this Chapter find 
evidence that bank-specific features, such as market share, cost efficiency, and risk profile 
have an important influence on the evolution of non-performing loans. 
The problems addressed in Chapter 5, are extended to a multi-country setting in Chapter 6. 
The intention of this Chapter is to provide a better insight into the nature of the financial 
weaknesses in the economies of the CEE countries and, hence, to help minimize the costs that 
could arise from banking instability. As argued in Chapter 3, the GFC has left a legacy of 
high NPLs in many CEE countries, implying a threat to the region’s economic recovery. 
Thus, in Chapter 6 we investigate the factors affecting the non-performing loans ratios in 16 
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe, from 1999 to 2011. Based on the rationale 
developed in Chapter 5, both bank-specific and macroeconomic factors are included as 
independent variables in the estimation of the determinants of the ratio of non-performing 
loans in CEE banks. Bearing in mind that we are investigating 16 countries, the model 
specification is extended to control for variables that, in the context of variations between 
CEE countries, may be expected to affect the incidence of non-performing loans. Those 
additional variables are related to the extent of public debt and the exchange rate. Among the 
macroeconomic determinants, the results suggest that an improvement in the real economy is 
likely to see a reduction in the non-performing loan portfolios of commercial banks. In 
addition, the results suggest that the degree of indebtedness of a country contributes to the 
evolution of NPLs among CEE banks. Namely, high public debt often causes the 
governments to raise taxes, reducing disposable income for banks` clients and placing them 
in a worse debtor position, raising the likelihood that they would run into debt servicing 
problems. The empirical results also indicate a significant positive effect of past rapid loans 
growth on the incidence of NPLs in the second year after the end of the credit boom, 
implying that aggressive lending coincides with more reckless risk taking. In most of the 
CEE countries, foreign-owned banks dominate the banking sectors. Since the onset of the 
crisis, the debate about the influence of foreign bank ownership has become more prevalent 
as foreign banks can transmit home-country shocks. Those developments led us to investigate 
whether foreign ownership of a bank has an impact on the incidence of non-performing loans. 
Therefore, non-performing loans were modelled to capture any differences between banks 
based on their ownership structure. The results suggest that foreign-owned banks, in general, 
have a lower NPLs ratio comparing to domestic-owned banks. Apart from information on 
ownership status, the characteristics of the home country of the parent bank may also affect 
the non-performing loans of a foreign-owned bank. Accordingly, the origin of parent banks 
was also considered in modelling non-performing loans in CEE countries; however, this part 
of our investigation did not generate any significant differences by country of origin.  Given 
that during the course of writing Chapter 6, Klein`s (2013) study, on determinants of NPLs in 
CEE countries, appeared we paid special attention to the comparison of Klein`s and our 
study. Although we find similar results to Klein, there are some important differences. 
Namely, our approach allows a more nuanced analysis of the effects of credit growth on the 
incidence of NPLs, by allowing these to be different before and after the peak of credit 
growth, while Klein`s approach is concentrated just on the effect of past credit growth (2
nd
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lag) and does not consider the current values of credit growth in his model. Furthermore, 
different to our analysis, Klein identifies a positive effect of past credit growth which is 
statistically significant, but not economically important. Lastly, our results suggest that the 
long-run effects on NPLs of changes in the independent variables are considerably larger than 
the estimated short-run effects that we obtained from GMM estimations. Given that the long-
run coefficients measure the entire effect from the current impact up to infinity, these 
coefficients may provide useful insights for policy actions. 
7.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
This research makes an important contribution to knowledge, filling a gap in the empirical 
literature on banking stability in Montenegro, a country that chose unilateral euroization, and 
in CEE countries in general. Our research combines both critical theoretical and empirical 
analyses, providing useful insights into the distinctive challenges that countries with largely 
foreign-owned banking sectors may encounter in order to ensure banking and financial 
stability. The research contributes to knowledge by refining the concept of banking sector 
stability; in particular, by identifying the causes of banking sector distresses, expressed by the 
ratio of non-performing loans. Furthermore, our empirical research helps to explain the 
development of non-performing loans during the boom-bust cycle in past decade in Central 
and Eastern Europe, particularly in Montenegro. As noted in the previous Section, in both 
models, Montenegrin and Central Eastern European, the findings suggest that an 
improvement in the macroeconomic conditions is likely to see a reduction in the relative size 
of the non-performing loan portfolios of commercial banks. Furthermore, in both models the 
results also indicate a significant positive effect of past rapid loans growth on the incidence of 
NPLs in the second year after the end of the credit boom, implying that aggressive lending 
coincides with more reckless risk taking. In addition, in the Montenegrin model we find 
evidence that bank-specific features - such as size, cost efficiency, and risk profile - influence 
the evolution of non-performing loans.  
Those findings are all contributions to knowledge concerning our substantive topic; namely, 
assessing banking sector stability in Montenegro and Central and Eastern Europe. Examining 
the Montenegrin banking sector is of special interest for researchers since it offers insights 
from a country with unilateral euroization and a mainly foreign-owned banking sector, with 
most of the parent banks coming from the euro area. Therefore, Montenegro is highly 
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influenced by the developments in the euro area and the monetary policy of the ECB. 
Assessing the determinants of loans quality in order to ensure banking stability in a fully 
euroised economy is even more important as the limited ability to apply monetary policy may 
be a problem in particular phases of the economic cycle. Namely, in periods of crisis the 
central bank cannot assume the role of lender of last resort and the main way central bank can 
react is through adequate supervision of the banking sector.  
To the authors’ knowledge, Montenegro has not been investigated previously in the context 
of examination of the determinants of non-performing loans. In order to overcome the 
absence of empirical research on loans quality in Montenegro, we specified a model to 
include all available indicators that might have an effect on loans quality. As such, this 
contributes to the existing literature by providing further evidence on the causes of impaired 
loans in a small, developing country. However, our contribution goes beyond the 
investigation of non-performing loans in a hitherto unexplored context. In doing this, we also 
make a methodological contribution to this area of research: namely, we make some novel 
contributions to model specification, which highlight the corresponding use of bank-level 
data, as well as to estimation strategy. This research employs bank-level data that have 
previously rarely been used by those who study non-performing loans. Bank level data can 
support more complex analyses of the sources of banking instability. In particular, more 
analytical work can be done based on bank level data in order to explore complex issues like 
the effects of banks` management, market power and ownership status. Garrett (2002) 
explains that the use of aggregated data to explain individual behaviour assumes that the 
hypothesized relationship between the economic variables in question is homogenous across 
all individuals. Given the different behaviour of individual banks, analysis using bank level 
data can therefore provide better insights into the causes of banking instability.
49
 Thus, the 
research in this thesis extends the literature on non-performing loans and utilizes both 
macroeconomic and bank specific variables.  
                                                          
49 Using national (aggregate) data to explain bank (individual) behaviour is to commit what is described 
elsewhere in the social sciences as the “ecological fallacy”. For example, as explained in Pugh et al. (2014)  the 
"ecological fallacy" is concerned with  the possibility of spurious inferences when interpreting the results of 
analysis at some aggregate or group level ("ecological analysis") 'in terms of the individuals who gave rise to the 
data' (Piantadosi, 1988, p.893).  When interpreting ecological analyses, 'inferences should be confined to the 
level of observation' (Piantadosi, 1988, p.902; emphasis added), even if ecological analyses 'may offer valuable 
clues about individual behaviour' for further investigation using individual data (Freedman, 1999, p.5; also 
Piantadosi, 1988, p.902). 
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Regarding model specification, particularly innovative is how the dynamics of the credit 
cycle and behaviour of NPLs was modelled. Namely, there have been growing concerns 
about the implications of rapid credit growth for financial stability and the intention was to 
find an appropriate empirical strategy to capture the phenomenon of rapid growth in banks` 
lending, which has been particularly prominent Montenegro and other CEE countries. In 
order to capture that phenomenon, we introduced the interaction of the credit growth during 
the boom period and an indicator variable for the period after the peak of credit growth in our 
model specification.  
 In addition to the above contributions to model specification, which includes bank-specific 
variables, our research contributes to widening the range of approaches to econometric 
estimation in this area of research. Namely, in the case of the Montenegrin model, the small 
number of banks means that we cannot estimate a dynamic linear model (because the 
corresponding GMM estimation methods require a “large N”, i.e. a large number of cross-
section units). Accordingly, we test and apply the common factor restrictions (CRFs). Non-
rejection of the CRFs suggests estimation of a dynamic linear regression model in the form of 
an unobservable components model with fixed effects, which is static in the observables but 
dynamic in unobservables. The testing and application of CRFs in analysing determinants of 
NPLs presents a novelty in the empirical literature, which may be applicable by other 
researchers confronting the problem of reconciling dynamic specification with data limited in 
its cross-sectional “breadth”.  
Apart from contributing to the empirical literature, this model may also have valuable 
practical implications for commercial bankers and bank regulators/supervisors in the 
Montenegrin banking system. Namely, the findings can be used to develop a framework for 
assessing and analysing credit risk, which is an important indicator of banking and financial 
stability, the latter being one of the key aims of  the Central bank in Montenegro. In 
particular, it is expected that banks’ measures of banks’ performance, specific inefficiency 
measures and their excessive lending may serve as leading indicators of future trends in 
problem loans. That would suggest that the regulatory authorities could use these measures to 
detect banks with potentially damaging NPLs increases; this will be explained further 
examined in the following Section. In addition, the econometric relations established in the 
model could be used for forecasting and stress testing purposes by both regulators and banks. 
On the other hand, similar exercises could be performed at the bank-specific level in order to 
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assess future problems that may ensue in particular banks characterized by relatively low 
performance and efficiency. 
Another contribution to knowledge is related to the estimation of determinants of non-
performing loans in Central and Eastern Europe. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
investigation for Central and Eastern Europe where ownership status related to the incidence 
of non-performing loans is examined. Namely, the estimated model captures differences 
between banks arising from their ownership structure. Another contribution to the empirical 
literature is that we have used banks` ownership indicators to check whether the country of 
origin of the parent bank has an impact on the quality of loans of their subsidiary bank. 
Foreign-owned banks are divided into sub-samples of banks originating from the EU12 
countries, the countries of the “Southern Enlargement”, the US and Switzerland, CEE 
countries, Russia and Turkey. Namely, our aim has been to differentiate between parent 
banks that are coming from countries with different levels of development and have suffered 
differently from their exposure to the GFC. 
These contributions to knowledge are the product of a comprehensive empirical investigation 
of potential risks to banking stability in Montenegro and Central Eastern Europe. Importantly 
for future research in this area, the findings suggest that in assessing banking stability we 
need to consider a combination of macroeconomic, bank-specific and ownership measures.  
7.4 Policy Implications  
At the beginning of this section we will assess the policy implications drawn from our 
empirical work, and subsequently compare those implications with those drawn from the 
literature review. Our empirical research presented in Chapters 5 and 6 provides plausible 
models for explaining the determinants of non-performing loans. The findings of this thesis 
highlight the need for a particular policy approach in order to prevent the escalation of credit 
risks generated in the banking sector and their transformation into systemic risk, given that 
the credit risk is prevalent in CEE banking sectors.  The findings of the thesis supplement 
those from previous research of the literature on banking sector stability and provide 
important insights into banks’ lending behaviour in Montenegro and other countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Namely, appropriate lending policy designed with relevant 
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economic and bank-specific factors will make a significant impact on reducing banks` non-
performing loans.  
Based on our findings in Chapters 5 and 6, commercial banks should in their stress testing 
models or EWSs pay more attention to the future performance of the economy when 
approving loans, given that our results suggest that the loan delinquencies are likely to be 
higher during the period of economic slowdown. Furthermore, excessive lending during the 
boom phase tends to lower the NPL ratio, but to increase it later on, with a delayed effect of 
two years after the peak, according to our results. More importantly from policy perspective, 
our findings on the long run coefficients in Chapter 6 indicate that the effect of past credit 
growth accumulates over time and is thus larger in the long-run. Our results confirmed 
Jimenez et al.’s (2007) findings that during the excessively high credit growth in boom times 
banks loosen their lending standards and exploit weaker regulatory standards. In this regard, 
preventing excessive risk-taking during upturns through adequate supervisory actions is 
highly desirable. Moreover, bank supervisors should place greater emphasis on the adequacy 
of the risk management systems in banks, and provisioning procedures in order to prevent 
future instability of the banking sector. 
In order to preserve banking stability, supervisory authorities have to establish more effective 
monitoring processes and make greater efforts into anticipating adverse developments in non-
performing loans for the following period. A strong focus on macroprudential regulation, 
particularly through capital buffers and countercyclical provisioning, could help to mitigate 
the impact of adverse macro and bank-specific indicators on the banking sector. The 
econometric relations exhibited in the Montenegrin model (in Chapter 5) can be used for 
stress testing purposes and forecasting by supervisory authorities. The regression coefficients 
on the macroeconomic variables and bank-specific variables can be used in a country macro-
stress testing exercise to assess the likely change in NPLs and whether such a change could 
pose a risks of financial instability.  
In addition, based on our findings, bank-specific indicators could be implemented as early 
warning systems to promote stability in the banking sector. Namely, there is evidence that 
performance, capital and inefficiency measures may be used as leading indicators of future 
problem loans in Montenegro, while in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
performance measures can be used as leading indicators of future NPLs.  This suggests that 
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the supervisory authorities could use these measures to detect banks with potential NPLs 
increases. Based on our findings in the Montenegrin model, banking sector supervisors 
should enforce proper capitalization of the banks during the positive phase of the business 
cycle, so they would be prepared for the bust period. Our findings support the arguments of 
BDDK (2009) that during the ‘sunny’ days when the risk appetite is increasing and the 
expectations are improving, the surveillance and supervision activities should be tightened, 
whilst during the days of crisis the regulations should be partially loosened. Namely, that 
during the boom period of the economy, regulatory requirements should be made by 
tightening the standards and provisions, while  during crisis periods the regulatory 
requirements should be loosened by cleaning out these accommodations  in order to avert bad 
loans.  
Our findings from the literature review raise important bank supervisory policy issues: the 
use of macroprudential policy; the use of bank level variables as early warning indicators; 
and the role of ownership in determining credit risk. Supervisory authorities should be 
orientated to a macroprudential stance, as suggested in Chapter 4. Namely, the recent 
financial crisis demonstrated that the supervisory framework, in design and/or 
implementation, was inadequate to prevent a panic in the banking sector. As argued in 
Chapter 4, successful supervisory reform requires efficient monitoring, effective early 
warning systems, and recognition of the linkages between the macro and microprudential 
approaches, as they are both important and overlap with substantial complementarities. The 
ability to comprehensively aggregate positions and exposures across banks in a consistent 
way would help supervisors to identify trends in the banking sector and improve the 
macroprudential perspective. In particular, given that the regulatory and supervisory skills of 
the Central Bank of Montenegro are still developing, (e.g. stress tests and early warning 
systems are in their infancies) efforts to establish effective macroprudential supervision are 
essential. In that respect, our findings from Chapter 5 suggest that the Central Bank of 
Montenegro should expand its supervisory framework to include macroeconomic prudential 
indicators - such as GDP, inflation and interest rates - when assessing banking sector stability 
and soundness. However, macroprudentional policy will not be easy to apply, bearing in 
mind that Montenegro and surrounding countries are new countries still in a catching-up 
process, which implies financial deepening. Thus, the policy makers should assess whether 
credit growth rates exceed levels that are justified and sustainable. Periods of relatively high 
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credit growth could be justified by a country’s financial development and economic 
fundamentals (Zdzienicka, 2009). However, assessing whether credit growth is ‘excessive’ is 
difficult, especially in the case of the CEE countries, given the catching up processes. 
Zdzienicka (2009) suggests that in assessing the sustainability of credit growth in a country, 
we should compare the size of credit deviation to the level of financial development in the 
country and to the previous leading-to-crises experiences. In order to assess this in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Coudert and Pouvelle (2010) considered two indicators: the credit/GDP 
ratio and real credit growth. They identified excessive credit growth by setting the thresholds 
using two measures.  First, they estimated the long-run trend using a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
and a Baxter-King filter, and then they calculated the deviations from trend. If the credit/GDP 
ratio and real credit growth had not yet reached its threshold
50
, the rapid credit growth may 
stem from the catching-up process. Furthermore, recent analyses of expansions in credit by 
Martin and Ventura (2014) distinguish between credit expansions that are backed by 
expectations of future profits (i.e. fundamental collateral) and those based on expectations of 
future credit (i.e. bubbly collateral). Namely, Martin and Ventura (2014) explain that during 
the credit bubble there is more credit available credit for entrepreneurs, which indicates a 
crowding-in effect. However, on the other hand, entrepreneurs have to use some of this credit 
to cancel past credit: which indicates a crowding-out effect. They explain that when bubbles 
are small, the crowding-in eﬀect dominates and investment and output increase, while, if the 
bubbles are large, the crowding-out eﬀect is likely to dominate and investment and output 
growth are low. Thus, they conclude that there is an “optimal” bubble size that trades oﬀ 
these two eﬀects to maximize long-term output and consumption growth. Given that markets 
are mostly unable to provide the optimal amount of bubbly collateral, they conclude that the 
lender of last resort can replicate the “optimal” bubble allocation by taxing credit when 
bubbly collateral is excessive and subsidizing it when it is insuﬃcient. 
Regarding the predominant foreign-owned banking sectors in CEE, the GFC highlighted the 
importance of developing mechanisms to curb the effects of large and volatile capital inflows 
in these economies. Prudential policies designed to influence cross-border capital flows 
should be a part of the toolkit for capital flows management. As suggested by Spiegel et al. 
(2010), developing countries should be encouraged to use a fuller range of tools available to 
manage the volatility associated with the international financial system. Typically these 
                                                          
50 Coudert and Pouvelle (2010) set thresholds for credit boom which are defined as observations exceeding their 
trend by more than 1.75 times their standard deviation or 5 percentage points for the credit/GDP ratio. 
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should include stemming currency appreciation, reducing the volume of inflows, changing 
their composition towards longer maturity flows
51
, providing greater room for manoeuvre for 
monetary policy, slowing credit growth, and dampening asset price bubbles (Habermeier et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, full euroization makes the financial sector 
more vulnerable to a slowdown in capital inflows and calls for capital controls and more 
prudent fiscal policy, as domestic monetary policy is limited. 
Finally, the home country regulators should cooperate closely with host country (the country 
in which the foreign bank operates) regulators. Indeed, as presented in Chapter 3, the recent 
GFC underscored the importance of integrated financial supervision. Namely, if large 
international banking groups go bankrupt, the shock will spread to their subsidiaries in the 
host countries. The Euro Zone countries have adopted the universal approach of forming a 
banking union, forgoing the national authorities.  The Banking Union is expected to start 
work in November 2014. Those CEE countries that are not in the EU should cooperate more 
deeply with this organisation, through stronger supervisory colleges
52
 and elimination of legal 
barriers. For these countries it is also desirable to cooperate with other international 
institution. Namely, in order to mitigate the problem of high non-performing loans, there has 
been cooperation between the World Bank, the Montenegrin Ministry of Finance and the 
CBM, with the purpose of developing a model of voluntary financial restructuring of non-
performing loans known as the “Podgorica Approach”. The model is designed with the aim to 
improve loan quality in Montenegrin banks, allowing the revitalization of bank lending to 
productive sectors of the Montenegrin economy (Ministry of Finance Bulletin, 2014). The 
“Podgorica Approach” implies voluntary restructuring of non-performing loans of banks 
based on the new measures and incentives for banks and companies to comply the assessment 
of their credit portfolios with the post-crisis economic conditions of their borrowers (Ministry 
of Finance Bulletin, 2014). The implementation of this project is expected in last quarter of 
2014. 
Last by not the least, commercial banks should keep improving and harmonizing their 
reporting of NPLs. Namely, while analysing data for our CEE model, we have noticed that 
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 Long-term flows are generally more stable than short-term ones. Generally, foreign direct investment is the 
least volatile, followed by long-term debt, short-term debt and portfolio investment. 
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 According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), supervisory colleges are a mechanism for the exchange 
of information between home and host authorities, for the planning and performance of key supervisory tasks in 
a coordinated manner or jointly, including all aspects of ongoing supervision, and also for the preparation for 
and the handling of emergency situations. 
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some banks did not report NPLs in the Bankscope database. This issue will be discussed in 
the following Section in more detail, but it also implies that national supervisory authorities 
should consider regular reporting of NPLs. NPL data should be transparent so as to that they 
are trackable, thereby increasing awareness of potential shocks. In particular, whether high 
NPLs could pose a risk for the stability of the banking sector based on some indicative 
threshold. This policy implication is in line with the Sirtaine and Rosenberg (2012) which 
suggests that central banks or supervisory authorities should publish monthly data on NPL 
ratios with a breakdown into the main categories, such as corporate loans, consumer loans, 
and mortgages, as well as currency denominations.  
7.5 Limitations of the Research  
There is one main limitation of the research presented in this thesis. This limitation relates to 
data availability and, in particular, the absence of data on sector-specific non-performing 
loans. In many transitional countries, problems arise when it is necessary to collect and 
collate the high-quality data crucial for good decision-making. Looking at data availability in 
Montenegro, loans quality data from the Central Bank of Montenegro were available only 
from 2004. In addition, we did not have consistent macroeconomic indicators before 2004, 
since Montenegro had been passing through political, structural and systemic reforms. 
Furthermore, the GDP growth rate has not been reported on a quarterly basis. Thus, we had to 
use interpolated, seasonally adjusted data for quarterly GDP growth, which might not 
accurately measure the actual changes in the GDP growth rate. 
Further limitations apply to the dependent variable, non-performing loans. Our first aim was 
to conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of non-performing loans in a 
disaggregated way by classifying the banks` loan portfolio into two main categories: 
corporate loans and consumer loans. Our intention was to examine each category of non-
performing loans separately so as to identify any differences in their determinants. 
Unfortunately, the banks in Montenegro were not required to report bad loans in this 
disaggregated manner. In addition, Bankscope’s data did not provide information on 
corporate and consumer non-performing loans. Given these limitations, we had to use 
aggregate non-performing loans data.  
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Furthermore, in Chapter 5, we encountered limitations in specifying our preferred model. 
Bearing in mind that just eleven banks operate in Montenegro, we were unable to implement 
the preferred dynamic model. Namely, as stated in Section 5.4, following the critical 
literature review, a fully dynamic approach – i.e. specifying the model to include the lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors - was favoured in order to account for time 
persistence in the structure of NPLs. Also the GMM approach to estimating dynamic models 
is able to address potential endogeneity associated with some of our independent variables. 
However, the small number of banks in Montenegro – i.e. the lack of cross sectional units - 
precludes GMM estimation. Consequently, we had to use FE estimation adjusted to take 
account of dynamic misspecification (which is possible given the time-series depth of our 
data). We tested a dynamic specification to see whether the common factor restrictions 
(CFRs) hold, and so – given that the CFRs cannot be rejected - we estimated an unobserved 
components model. In this model, we have used lagged explanatory variables, to alleviate 
potential endogeneity problems. 
Some banks used to avoid presenting their asset quality data in Bankscope. Therefore, not all 
banks in Central and Eastern Europe have been included in our sample; i.e. those that have 
not reported non-performing loans are, perforce, not available for estimation. In order to 
avoid potential sample selection bias, in Section 6.11 we investigated which banks had not 
reported non-performing loans, by their market share of their assets in total banking sector 
assets in their country of operation. The findings suggested that most banks that did not report 
NPLs had a market share of less than 5% of total banking sector assets in their country of 
operation. Only five non-reporting banks had a market share that was between 5-10% of total 
banking sector assets and two banks had between 10-25% of total assets in the banking 
sector. Therefore, we concluded that banks with a larger market share (above 10% of total 
assets in banking sector) are more likely to report NPLs than those with a smaller market 
share (below 10% of total assets in banking sector). It was concluded that having a sample 
that contained the systemically important banks in the countries of interest was more 
important than having a fully representative sample of banks.  
7.6 Suggestions for Further Research  
The empirical research conducted in this thesis suggests the need for future research. Future 
work should be focused on assessing, in a disaggregated manner, the potentially different 
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determinants and/or effect sizes of shared determinants of, respectively, non-performing 
corporate and consumer loans. Once suitable data becomes available, each category of non-
performing loans could then be examined separately in order to detect potential differences 
and similarities in the behaviour of each loan category. Furthermore, in the future research it 
would be useful to examine the importance of the composition of capital flows for banks’ 
asset quality in Montenegro and in CEE in general.   
Our findings suggest that adverse macroeconomic developments are likely to contribute to a 
rise in the incidence of NPLs. In further empirical work, it would be interesting to examine 
the effects that the incidence of non-performing loans have on the real economy. Marcucci 
and Quagliariello (2008) find that there is a feedback from the banking sector to the 
macroeconomy which operates via the bank capital channel. Espinosa and Prasad (2010) find 
that the NPL ratio worsens as economic growth weakens and interest rates increase. Their 
investigation of the effects of increasing non-performing loans on growth suggest that there 
could be a strong, albeit short-lived adverse feedback effect from losses in banks’ balance 
sheets to economic activity. Similarly, Nkusu (2011) finds that non-performing loans play a 
central role in the linkages between credit markets frictions and macroeconomic 
vulnerabilities. Namely, he finds that a sharp increase in NPLs weakens macroeconomic 
performance, activating a vicious spiral that exacerbates macrofinancial vulnerabilities. 
According to Impavido et al. (2012), weak loan portfolios might be a potential drag on 
economic growth. They note that banks saddled with high NPLs might be ill-placed to extend 
fresh credit. In addition, they reveal that overextended borrowers face reduced incentives to 
invest and assets remain under their control rather than being reallocated to more productive 
uses. In general, the literature suggests that there exist interactions between loans quality 
indicators and macroeconomic conditions, indicating that both directions of influence should 
be investigated.  
Lastly, as we mentioned in Chapter 2, besides NPLs there are other measures of banking 
stability suggested by the literature, such as loan loss provisions (LLP), loss given default 
(LGD) and expected default frequencies (EDF), which could be used in assessing banking 
stability of a country or region. However, since NPLs have been characterised as the main 
indicator of distress in the banking sector in Montenegro and other CEE countries, we 
decided to focus on that measure. In addition, LGDs and EDFs measures were not available 
to use for these countries. Thus, in the future work we could consider including other 
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measures of banking stability. However, on the other hand, the relative simplicity of the 
Montenegrin and CEE financial systems means a limited transferability of our findings to 
economies with more complex and highly developed financial systems. 
7.7 Conclusion  
In this Chapter we have summarized the most prominent findings of the research undertaken 
in this research programme. The goal of this dissertation has been to assess the main 
exposures to risk of the banking systems in Montenegro and Central and Eastern Europe and, 
hence, to inform the design of policies to achieve and preserve banking sector stability. Since 
assessing the determinants of credit risk is an important issue for banking stability in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Montenegro, we have investigated the factors that affect banks’ loan 
quality. The non-performing loan ratio was taken as the key measure of the quality of loan 
portfolios. The main hypothesis was that macroeconomic environment, bank-specific 
variables and ownership status would jointly explain the incidence of non-performing loans. 
That hypothesis has been supported across different model specifications. Finally, the 
dissertation addresses forward-looking central bank policies that should be adopted in order 
to safeguard banking sector stability.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 5 
Appendix 5.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
             |      npl     ggdp    intr    unemp      roa      roe     cap     ltd      cir     cr     Mshare 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         npl |   1.0000 
        ggdp |  -0.2267   1.0000 
        intr |   0.0958   0.0035   1.0000 
       unemp |   0.0101   0.1970   0.9180   1.0000 
         roa |  -0.3310   0.0557   0.1335   0.1708   1.0000 
         roe |  -0.5166   0.1939   0.1253   0.2008   0.5908   1.0000 
        cap  |   0.1485   0.0684   0.0491   0.0677  -0.3318  -0.0018   1.0000 
         ltd |   0.2836  -0.1425  -0.1712  -0.2329  -0.1808  -0.3853  -0.0452  1.0000 
        cir  |   0.0140  -0.0010  -0.0692  -0.0801  -0.5167  -0.1618   0.4946 -0.0608   1.0000 
          cr |  -0.2958   0.2698  -0.0272   0.1143  -0.1602   0.0518   0.1061 -0.1127   0.4238   1.0000 
      Mshare |  -0.0981   0.0237   0.0464   0.0538   0.0286  -0.1301  -0.4670 0.0500   -0.1571  -0.0458 .10000 
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Appendix 5.2 Testing for CFR  
 
OLS FE
Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2
GDP 0.5283 0.5379
UNEMP 0.4056 0.4427
INTR 0.0534 0.0951
ROA 0.1827 0.6683
ROE 0.1916 0.0821
CAP 0.0035 0.1364
LtD 0.5883 0.555
CIR 0.023 0.0904
CR 0.2073 0.0366
MSHARE 0.1547 0.0799
Testing for CFR in a FE estimation of the 
dynamic linear regression model of order one:
 
 
Note: We cannot reject the hypothesis of CFR at 1% and at 5% significance level 
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Appendix 5.3 Model with time dummies 
 
 
xtregar npl l.gdp l.unemp intr  l.roa  l.roe  l.cap  ltd  cir  cr  d2y d2ygloans Mshare  
t2004q1 t2004q2 t2004q3 t2004q4 t2005q1 t2005q2 t2005q3 t2005q4 t2006q1 t2006q2 t2006q3 
t2006q4 t2007q1 t2007q2 t2007q3 t2007q4 t2008q1 t2008q2 t2008q3 t2008q4 t2009q1 t2009q2 
t2009q3 t2009q4 t2010q1 t2010q2 t2010q3 t2010q4, fe rhotype(dw) two 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       215 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        11 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3479                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2912                                        avg =      19.5 
       overall = 0.0746                                        max =        21 
                                           F(34,170)          =      2.67 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3368                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    ggdp L1. |  -40.05015   25.75236    -1.56   0.122    -90.88573    10.78543 
   unemp L1. |    .506941   1.456109     0.35   0.728    -2.367442    3.381324 
        intr |  -8.614297   11.68815    -0.74   0.462     -31.6869    14.45831 
     roa L1. |   .0097768   .0536153     0.18   0.856    -.0960607    .1156143 
     roe L1. |  -.0068767   .0132366    -0.52   0.604    -.0330059    .0192526 
     cap L1. |   .0601473   .0315881     1.90   0.059    -.0022081    .1225028 
         ltd |  -.0042863   .0075282    -0.57   0.570    -.0191472    .0105746 
         cir |   .0027284   .0012445     2.19   0.030     .0002717     .005185 
          cr |  -.0125218   .0174377    -0.72   0.474    -.0469442    .0219005 
         d2y |   .0530223   .9117181     0.06   0.954    -1.746725    1.852769 
   d2ygloans |   .0781816   .0428086     1.83   0.070    -.0063234    .1626865 
      Mshare |  -.4336895   .2043465    -2.12   0.035    -.8370728   -.0303061 
     t2005q3 |  -22.36901   68.73775    -0.33   0.745    -158.0585    113.3205 
     t2005q4 |  -9.505821   51.24567    -0.19   0.853    -110.6656    91.65399 
     t2006q1 |  -1.457913   42.23476    -0.03   0.973    -84.83004    81.91422 
     t2006q2 |   .4339681   28.66701     0.02   0.988    -56.15519    57.02312 
     t2006q3 |   2.211919   20.76054     0.11   0.915    -38.76973    43.19357 
     t2006q4 |  -1.469546   9.529277    -0.15   0.878     -20.2805    17.34141 
     t2007q1 |  -4.925585   3.931267    -1.25   0.212    -12.68597    2.834801 
     t2007q2 |  -6.082008   5.415391    -1.12   0.263    -16.77208    4.608065 
     t2007q3 |  -.8015727   6.241583    -0.13   0.898    -13.12256    11.51942 
     t2007q4 |   1.101839   6.424994     0.17   0.864    -11.58121    13.78488 
     t2008q1 |   1.841725   6.314283     0.29   0.771    -10.62278    14.30623 
     t2008q2 |   1.004762   6.012033     0.17   0.867    -10.86309    12.87262 
     t2008q3 |   3.659367   6.118847     0.60   0.551    -8.419339    15.73807 
     t2008q4 |   8.992732   6.442816     1.40   0.165    -3.725494    21.71096 
     t2009q1 |   7.991669   6.368391     1.25   0.211    -4.579641    20.56298 
     t2009q2 |   9.518385   6.234915     1.53   0.129    -2.789441    21.82621 
     t2009q3 |   7.879273   6.603712     1.19   0.234    -5.156564    20.91511 
     t2009q4 |   8.784808   6.682867     1.31   0.190    -4.407282     21.9769 
     t2010q1 |   11.69317    6.34332     1.84   0.067    -.8286463    24.21499 
     t2010q2 |   14.08852   6.649728     2.12   0.036     .9618498     27.2152 
     t2010q3 |   15.11357   6.728697     2.25   0.026     1.831006    28.39613 
     t2010q4 |   16.80419   6.861874     2.45   0.015     3.258733    30.34964 
       _cons |   119.9292   32.16229     3.73   0.000     56.44034    183.4182 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |   .7087069 
     sigma_u |  5.3484261 
     sigma_e |  3.2900044 
     rho_fov |  .72548348   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(10,170) =     2.95              Prob > F = 0.0019 
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Joint test for time dummies for the pre-crisis period 
 
. test  t2004q1 t2004q2 t2004q3 t2004q4 t2005q1 t2005q2 t2005q3 t2005q4 t2006q1 t2006q2 t2006q3 t2006q4 
t2007q1 t2007q2 t2007q3 t2007q4 
 
 ( 1)  o.t2004q1 = 0 
 ( 2)  o.t2004q2 = 0 
 ( 3)  o.t2004q3 = 0 
 ( 4)  o.t2004q4 = 0 
 ( 5)  o.t2005q1 = 0 
 ( 6)  o.t2005q2 = 0 
 ( 7)  t2005q3 = 0 
 ( 8)  t2005q4 = 0 
 ( 9)  t2006q1 = 0 
 (10)  t2006q2 = 0 
 (11)  t2006q3 = 0 
 (12)  t2006q4 = 0 
 (13)  t2007q1 = 0 
 (14)  t2007q2 = 0 
 (15)  t2007q3 = 0 
 (16)  t2007q4 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
       Constraint 2 dropped 
       Constraint 3 dropped 
       Constraint 4 dropped 
       Constraint 5 dropped 
       Constraint 6 dropped 
 
       F( 10,   170) =    0.96 
            Prob > F =    0.4795 
 
 
Joint test for time dummies for the period after the crisis 
 
 
 
. test   t2008q1 t2008q2 t2008q3 t2008q4 t2009q1 t2009q2 t2009q3 t2009q4 t2010q1 t2010q2 t2010q3 
 
 ( 1)  t2008q1 = 0 
 ( 2)  t2008q2 = 0 
 ( 3)  t2008q3 = 0 
 ( 4)  t2008q4 = 0 
 ( 5)  t2009q1 = 0 
 ( 6)  t2009q2 = 0 
 ( 7)  t2009q3 = 0 
 ( 8)  t2009q4 = 0 
 ( 9)  t2010q1 = 0 
 (10)  t2010q2 = 0 
 (11)  t2010q3 = 0 
 
       F( 11,   170) =    1.73 
            Prob > F =    0.0707 
 
  
 
. lincom  d2ygloans+gloans 
 
 ( 1)  gloans + d2ygloans = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0656597   .0420425     1.56   0.120    -.0173329    .1486523 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5.4 Model without time dummies 
 
 
. xtregar npl l.ggdp l.unemp intr  l.roa  l.roe  l.cap  ltd  cir  cr  d2y d2ygloans Mshare, 
fe rhotype(dw) two 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       215 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        11 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1707                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1551                                        avg =      19.5 
       overall = 0.1001                                        max =        21 
 
                                                F(12,192)          =      3.29 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6245                        Prob > F           =    0.0002 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        ggdp | 
         L1. |  -13.71162   8.064401    -1.70   0.091    -29.61781    2.194577 
             | 
       unemp | 
         L1. |  -.1596625   .2986532    -0.53   0.594    -.7487251       .4294 
             | 
        intr |   1.115556   1.020048     1.09   0.275     -.896383    3.127494 
             | 
         roa | 
         L1. |  -.0050801   .0558455    -0.09   0.928    -.1152296    .1050693 
             | 
         roe | 
         L1. |  -.0267692   .0134357    -1.99   0.048    -.0532697   -.0002687 
             | 
         cap | 
         L1. |   .0652427   .0239263     2.73   0.007     .0180506    .1124348 
             | 
         ltd |   .0012097   .0072311     0.17   0.867    -.0130529    .0154723 
         cir |   .0049671   .0013391     3.71   0.000      .002326    .0076083 
          cr |  -.0388141   .0170018    -2.28   0.024    -.0723484   -.0052798 
         d2y |  -.2081257   .8960857    -0.23   0.817    -1.975562    1.559311 
   d2ygloans |   .0759995   .0437011     1.74   0.084    -.0101964    .1621954 
      Mshare |  -.4143237   .2098485    -1.97   0.050    -.8282281   -.0004193 
       _cons |   16.27858   4.172807     3.90   0.000     8.048151    24.50901 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .66932741 
     sigma_u |  5.5813076 
     sigma_e |  3.5737973 
     rho_fov |  .70921793   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(10,192) =     3.81              Prob > F = 0.0001 
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Appendix 6 
List of Abbreviations 
 
Country 1 – Albania 
Country 2 – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Country 3 – Bulgaria 
Country 4 - Croatia 
Country 5 – Czech Republic 
Country 6 - Estonia 
Country 7 - Hungary 
Country 8 - Latvia 
Country 9 - Lithuania 
Country 10 - Macedonia 
Country 11 - Montenegro 
Country 12 - Poland 
Country 13 - Romania 
Country 14 - Serbia 
Country 15 - Slovakia 
Country 16 – Slovenia 
 
Yr1  – 1999  
Yr2  – 2000 
Yr3  – 2001 
Yr4  – 2002 
Yr5  – 2003 
Yr6  – 2004 
Yr7  – 2005 
Yr8  – 2006 
Yr9  – 2007 
Yr10 – 2008 
Yr11 – 2009 
Yr12 – 2010 
Yr13 – 2011 
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Appendix 6.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
             |      npl      roa      roe       cr      cap      ltd      cir market~e      gdp      inf    unempl     debt   excr   inter 
-----------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         npl |   1.0000 
         roa |  -0.2709   1.0000 
         roe |  -0.3081   0.5701   1.0000 
          cr |  -0.2014   0.2205   0.1475   1.0000 
         cap |   0.1039  -0.0937  -0.0514   0.0021   1.0000 
         ltd |   0.0909  -0.0598  -0.1285   0.0563   0.0867   1.0000 
         cir |   0.1845  -0.5695  -0.3159  -0.0342   0.3752  -0.0496   1.0000 
 marketshare |  -0.1298   0.1269   0.1389  -0.0451  -0.1755  -0.0682  -0.1602   1.0000 
         gdp |  -0.2325   0.2574   0.2946   0.3003   0.0386  -0.0678  -0.0153   0.0798   1.0000 
         inf |  -0.0128   0.1680   0.2329   0.1297   0.1436  -0.0000   0.0291  -0.0073   0.1106   1.0000 
      unempl |   0.2035  -0.0849  -0.1462  -0.1003   0.2923  -0.0738   0.1155  -0.0050  -0.0378  -0.1592   1.0000 
        debt |   0.1196   0.0906  -0.0277  -0.0625   0.0079  -0.0167   0.0019  -0.0627  -0.1334   0.0397   0.1380   1.0000 
        excr |  -0.0067   0.0040   0.0009  -0.0102  -0.0122   0.0221  -0.0217   0.0867  -0.0349   0.0590  -0.0135   0.0662   1.0000 
       inter |   0.0824   0.0446   0.1394   0.0400   0.1818  -0.0593   0.0420   0.0078  -0.0908   0.7229   0.0937   0.1806   0.1677   1.0000 
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Appendix 6.2 Estimation Procedure  
 
6.2.1 Fixed Effects 
 
xtreg npl roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr inter southenl cee 
usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 
country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 
country16, fe 
note: yr11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country15 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country16 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1250 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       242 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3725                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0498                                        avg =       5.2 
       overall = 0.1860                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(31,977)          =     18.71 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3512                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         roa |   -.395523   .2506638    -1.58   0.115    -.8874244    .0963784 
         roe |  -.1155488   .0244771    -4.72   0.000    -.1635826   -.0675151 
          cr |  -.0305364   .0066822    -4.57   0.000    -.0436495   -.0174234 
         cap |  -.0063141   .0359121    -0.18   0.860    -.0767878    .0641596 
         ltd |   .0163167   .0053615     3.04   0.002     .0057953    .0268382 
         cir |  -.0009249   .0074028    -0.12   0.901    -.0154522    .0136024 
foreigndo~51 |   -1.29783   1.351764    -0.96   0.337    -3.950526    1.354866 
 marketshare |  -.2353636   .0865058    -2.72   0.007    -.4051221    -.065605 
         gdp |  -.1298913   .0947337    -1.37   0.171    -.3157962    .0560136 
         inf |   -.147729   .1118135    -1.32   0.187    -.3671512    .0716932 
      unempl |   .5135481   .1095489     4.69   0.000     .2985699    .7285262 
        debt |  -.0450305   .0422024    -1.07   0.286    -.1278483    .0377872 
        excr |   .0040062   .0066841     0.60   0.549    -.0091107     .017123 
        inter|  -.0606623   .1117615    -0.54   0.587    -.2799826    .1586579 
    southenl |  -.8959394   3.573607    -0.25   0.802    -7.908768    6.116889 
         cee |   2.310981   2.274434     1.02   0.310    -2.152358     6.77432 
       usach |   1.003299   3.337204     0.30   0.764    -5.545614    7.552211 
          ru |  -2.903197   6.093176    -0.48   0.634    -14.86041    9.054022 
          tr |  -28.83644    7.85752    -3.67   0.000      -44.256   -13.41688 
         yr1 |   7.124067   2.178263     3.27   0.001     2.849454    11.39868 
         yr2 |   7.443512    2.10452     3.54   0.000     3.313613    11.57341 
         yr3 |   4.029292   2.012101     2.00   0.046      .080754    7.977829 
         yr4 |   4.872069   1.839303     2.65   0.008     1.262631    8.481508 
         yr5 |   3.265078   1.801981     1.81   0.070    -.2711202    6.801275 
         yr6 |  -.2249206   1.741927    -0.13   0.897    -3.643269    3.193428 
         yr7 |   .4492004   1.584735     0.28   0.777    -2.660677    3.559077 
         yr8 |  -.1077034   1.586159    -0.07   0.946    -3.220374    3.004967 
         yr9 |   1.258387   1.451194     0.87   0.386    -1.589428    4.106202 
        yr10 |   .7440161   1.275175     0.58   0.560    -1.758381    3.246414 
        yr11 |  (omitted) 
        yr12 |   3.448329   1.117562     3.09   0.002     1.255231    5.641427 
        yr13 |   5.880707   1.281182     4.59   0.000     3.366522    8.394892 
    country1 |  (omitted) 
    country2 |  (omitted) 
    country3 |  (omitted) 
    country4 |  (omitted) 
    country5 |  (omitted) 
    country6 |  (omitted) 
    country7 |  (omitted) 
    country8 |  (omitted) 
    country9 |  (omitted) 
   country10 |  (omitted) 
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   country11 |  (omitted) 
   country12 |  (omitted) 
   country13 |  (omitted) 
   country14 |  (omitted) 
   country15 |  (omitted) 
   country16 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   6.610888   2.351886     2.81   0.005     1.995559    11.22622 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  13.151834 
     sigma_e |  6.9492899 
         rho |  .78174141   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(241, 977) =     6.13            Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
xtserial npl  roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr inter southenl 
cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country2 country3 country4 country5 
country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     165) =     45.564 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
Serial correlation has been identified and the model is misspecified.  
 
6.2.1.1 FE with Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
xtreg npl lagnpl  roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr inter 
southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 
country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 
country15 country16, fe 
note: yr1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: yr11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country2 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country3 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country4 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country5 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country6 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country7 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country8 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country9 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country10 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country11 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country12 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country13 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country14 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country15 omitted because of collinearity 
note: country16 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1052 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       226 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6052                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3377                                        avg =       4.7 
       overall = 0.5306                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(31,795)          =     39.32 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0406                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lagnpl |   .4953182   .0263627    18.79   0.000     .4435695    .5470668 
         roa |  -1.121414   .2339452    -4.79   0.000    -1.580637   -.6621906 
         roe |  -.0339501   .0207291    -1.64   0.102    -.0746402      .00674 
          cr |  -.0249287    .005411    -4.61   0.000    -.0355502   -.0143071 
         cap |   .0383247   .0309705     1.24   0.216    -.0224689    .0991184 
         ltd |   .0113772    .004312     2.64   0.008     .0029129    .0198415 
         cir |   .0050451   .0075789     0.67   0.506    -.0098319    .0199221 
foreigndo~51 |  -.0742147   1.175492    -0.06   0.950     -2.38165    2.233221 
 marketshare |  -.1179603   .0741624    -1.59   0.112    -.2635374    .0276169 
         gdp |  -.0838108   .0763273    -1.10   0.273    -.2336377    .0660161 
         inf |  -.0730275   .0928234    -0.79   0.432    -.2552355    .1091805 
      unempl |   .1194146   .0913109     1.31   0.191    -.0598243    .2986536 
        debt |  -.0333624   .0365669    -0.91   0.362    -.1051416    .0384167 
        excr |   .0024703   .0055044     0.45   0.654    -.0083346    .0132753 
        inter|   -.000307   .0980622    -0.00   0.998    -.1927984    .1921844 
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    southenl |  -.7053295   2.937179    -0.24   0.810    -6.470872    5.060213 
         cee |   .8931705   1.825407     0.49   0.625    -2.690017    4.476358 
       usach |   1.184215   2.769382     0.43   0.669    -4.251951    6.620381 
          ru |  -.4630375   5.675664    -0.08   0.935     -11.6041    10.67802 
          tr |   11.57175   5.938687     1.95   0.052    -.0856092    23.22911 
         yr1 |  (omitted) 
         yr2 |   2.181845   1.694248     1.29   0.198    -1.143884    5.507574 
         yr3 |   .1474408   1.618598     0.09   0.927     -3.02979    3.324672 
         yr4 |   2.335889    1.48836     1.57   0.117      -.58569    5.257468 
         yr5 |   .5070228   1.432131     0.35   0.723    -2.304183    3.318229 
         yr6 |  -.8256855   1.394217    -0.59   0.554    -3.562466    1.911095 
         yr7 |   .3132699   1.260727     0.25   0.804    -2.161477    2.788017 
         yr8 |  -.9430221   1.265795    -0.75   0.456    -3.427717    1.541673 
         yr9 |  -.3584724   1.158853    -0.31   0.757    -2.633246    1.916301 
        yr10 |  -.4534111   1.015142    -0.45   0.655    -2.446087    1.539264 
        yr11 |  (omitted) 
        yr12 |   1.829478   .8624193     2.12   0.034     .1365895    3.522366 
        yr13 |   2.698665   .9968276     2.71   0.007     .7419397     4.65539 
    country1 |  (omitted) 
    country2 |  (omitted) 
    country3 |  (omitted) 
    country4 |  (omitted) 
    country5 |  (omitted) 
    country6 |  (omitted) 
    country7 |  (omitted) 
    country8 |  (omitted) 
    country9 |  (omitted) 
   country10 |  (omitted) 
   country11 |  (omitted) 
   country12 |  (omitted) 
   country13 |  (omitted) 
   country14 |  (omitted) 
   country15 |  (omitted) 
   country16 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   5.137167   2.014184     2.55   0.011     1.183419    9.090916 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  10.227925 
     sigma_e |  5.0170533 
         rho |  .80605195   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(225, 795) =     3.91            Prob > F = 0.0000 
xtserial npl lagnpl roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare gdp inf unempl debt  excr inter 
southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country2 country3 country4 
country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 
country16 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     152) =     33.497 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
Again, the serial correlation has been identified and the model is misspecified.  
 
 
We run OLS to check the coefficient of lagged dependent variable, because we will need to compare that 
coefficient with the coefficient of lagged dependent variable from GMM estimations. 
 
 
6.2.1.2 OLS  
 
 
. reg npl lagnpl  roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare gdp inf unempl debt   excr inter 
southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country2 country3 country4 
country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 
country16 
note: yr1 omitted because of collinearity 
note: yr4 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1052 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 46,  1005) =   46.93 
       Model |  90505.2604    46  1967.50566           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  42130.1372  1005  41.9205345           R-squared     =  0.6824 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6678 
       Total |  132635.398  1051  126.199237           Root MSE      =  6.4746 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lagnpl |   .7455599    .022364    33.34   0.000     .7016744    .7894454 
         roa |  -.5223034   .1329762    -3.93   0.000    -.7832463   -.2613605 
         roe |   -.052609   .0098879    -5.32   0.000    -.0720123   -.0332057 
          cr |  -.0210101   .0056207    -3.74   0.000    -.0320398   -.0099804 
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         cap |   .0028556   .0226029     0.13   0.899    -.0414987    .0472098 
         ltd |   .0037062   .0024456     1.52   0.130    -.0010928    .0085052 
         cir |  -.0058824   .0070816    -0.83   0.406    -.0197789    .0080141 
foreigndo~51 |  -1.001662   .5049898    -1.98   0.048    -1.992617   -.0107069 
 marketshare |  -.0089051   .0210227    -0.42   0.672    -.0501585    .0323484 
         gdp |  -.2288802   .0893373    -2.56   0.011    -.4041893    -.053571 
         inf |    .163815   .1040326     1.57   0.116    -.0403311     .367961 
      unempl |   -.196319   .1003169    -1.96   0.051    -.3931737    .0005356 
        debt |   .1511484   .0301877     5.01   0.000     .0919102    .2103866 
        excr |  -.0003543   .0065033    -0.05   0.957    -.0131159    .0124072 
       inter |  -.0341631   .1082889    -0.32   0.752    -.2466614    .1783353 
    southenl |  -.1205748     .96783    -0.12   0.901    -2.019774    1.778624 
         cee |   1.983862   .8724892     2.27   0.023      .271753    3.695972 
       usach |   1.041619   1.126632     0.92   0.355    -1.169201     3.25244 
          ru |   3.438768   3.039091     1.13   0.258    -2.524924    9.402459 
          tr |  -3.655294   2.616089    -1.40   0.163    -8.788917     1.47833 
         yr1 |  (omitted) 
         yr2 |  -1.183402   1.711057    -0.69   0.489    -4.541057    2.174252 
         yr3 |  -2.587595   1.721626    -1.50   0.133    -5.965989    .7907997 
         yr4 |  (omitted) 
         yr5 |  -1.666111   1.673587    -1.00   0.320    -4.950237    1.618015 
         yr6 |  -2.173886   1.591243    -1.37   0.172    -5.296425    .9486525 
         yr7 |  -.4092636   1.482422    -0.28   0.783    -3.318261    2.499734 
         yr8 |  -1.400074   1.445108    -0.97   0.333    -4.235848    1.435701 
         yr9 |  -.9623301   1.442244    -0.67   0.505    -3.792485    1.867824 
        yr10 |  -2.261062   1.506068    -1.50   0.134    -5.216461    .6943373 
        yr11 |  -1.829073   1.751229    -1.04   0.297    -5.265557    1.607412 
        yr12 |  -.4638737   1.479422    -0.31   0.754    -3.366984    2.439237 
        yr13 |  -1.104332   1.487035    -0.74   0.458    -4.022382    1.813717 
    country2 |   4.521779   2.505554     1.80   0.071    -.3949388    9.438497 
    country3 |   1.426323   2.259364     0.63   0.528    -3.007289    5.859935 
    country4 |  -2.353352   1.951094    -1.21   0.228    -6.182037    1.475333 
    country5 |  -2.391206   2.035946    -1.17   0.240    -6.386398    1.603987 
    country6 |   2.796891    2.61784     1.07   0.286    -2.340167    7.933949 
    country7 |  -7.247158   2.009504    -3.61   0.000    -11.19046   -3.303853 
    country8 |   1.284305    2.23116     0.58   0.565    -3.093962    5.662571 
    country9 |  -.5630494   2.184764    -0.26   0.797    -4.850272    3.724173 
   country10 |   3.207236   2.903653     1.10   0.270    -2.490681    8.905153 
   country11 |  -1.057407   2.209374    -0.48   0.632    -5.392922    3.278109 
   country12 |  -3.812402   1.804476    -2.11   0.035    -7.353375   -.2714295 
   country13 |   .8713631   2.198609     0.40   0.692    -3.443027    5.185753 
   country14 |   .2456278   2.120517     0.12   0.908    -3.915521    4.406776 
   country15 |  -1.350842   1.949819    -0.69   0.489    -5.177025     2.47534 
   country16 |  -2.367627   1.967193    -1.20   0.229    -6.227903    1.492649 
       _cons |   4.541505   3.252191     1.40   0.163    -1.840359    10.92337 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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6.2.2 System GMM 
 
xtabond2  npl lagnpl  roa roe cr cap ltd cir  marketshare foreigndomestic_51  gdp inf unempl debt    excr 
inter southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 
country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 
country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 2)) gmm(cap, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(roa,laglimits (2 
2)) gmm(roe, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(cr, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(ltd, laglimits (2 2)) 
iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr  foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) robust twostep 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1052 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       226 
Number of instruments = 204                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(46) =   1009.43                                      avg =      4.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |              Corrected 
               npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lagnpl |   .6084145   .1025069     5.94   0.000     .4075047    .8093243 
               roa |  -1.531758   .4553056    -3.36   0.001     -2.42414   -.6393754 
               roe |  -.0626073   .0452898    -1.38   0.167    -.1513737    .0261591 
                cr |  -.0295122   .0162571    -1.82   0.069    -.0613756    .0023512 
               cap |   -.047681   .0577758    -0.83   0.409    -.1609196    .0655575 
               ltd |  -.0027927   .0056642    -0.49   0.622    -.0138942    .0083089 
               cir |  -.0370535   .0218095    -1.70   0.089    -.0797993    .0056924 
       marketshare |  -.0212424   .0299489    -0.71   0.478    -.0799412    .0374564 
foreigndomestic_51 |  -1.334955   .7542978    -1.77   0.077    -2.813351    .1434418 
               gdp |  -.0387914   .1010275    -0.38   0.701    -.2368016    .1592188 
               inf |   .1992409   .1366772     1.46   0.145    -.0686414    .4671232 
            unempl |  -.1829795   .1478316    -1.24   0.216     -.472724     .106765 
              debt |   .2142794    .125893     1.70   0.089    -.0324664    .4610252 
              excr |   .0005151   .0051626     0.10   0.921    -.0096035    .0106337 
             inter |  -.0707728    .125111    -0.57   0.572    -.3159858    .1744402 
          southenl |  -.5372204   1.034705    -0.52   0.604    -2.565204    1.490763 
               cee |   1.616707   1.242913     1.30   0.193    -.8193584    4.052772 
             usach |    1.41728   1.268952     1.12   0.264    -1.069819    3.904379 
                ru |   1.471435   4.076153     0.36   0.718    -6.517678    9.460548 
                tr |  -2.161659   2.126665    -1.02   0.309    -6.329845    2.006528 
               yr2 |   1.861715   2.548575     0.73   0.465      -3.1334    6.856831 
               yr3 |   .6745507   2.083172     0.32   0.746    -3.408392    4.757493 
               yr4 |   2.510812   2.001101     1.25   0.210    -1.411274    6.432898 
               yr5 |   1.197975   1.578745     0.76   0.448    -1.896309    4.292259 
               yr6 |    .169712   1.676164     0.10   0.919    -3.115509    3.454933 
               yr7 |   1.512046   1.764114     0.86   0.391    -1.945554    4.969645 
               yr8 |   .6287041   1.812034     0.35   0.729    -2.922817    4.180225 
               yr9 |   .9812836   1.700989     0.58   0.564    -2.352595    4.315162 
              yr10 |  -.3736068    1.60838    -0.23   0.816    -3.525973    2.778759 
              yr11 |   .1134995   1.551248     0.07   0.942     -2.92689    3.153889 
              yr12 |   .7458245   .8819141     0.85   0.398    -.9826953    2.474344 
          country1 |   1.501583   3.035868     0.49   0.621    -4.448608    7.451775 
          country2 |   5.703931   4.899917     1.16   0.244     -3.89973    15.30759 
          country3 |      6.091   2.625037     2.32   0.020     .9460222    11.23598 
          country4 |    .825963   1.191008     0.69   0.488    -1.508371    3.160297 
          country5 |   .5980239   1.159049     0.52   0.606     -1.67367    2.869718 
          country6 |   7.957407   4.184159     1.90   0.057    -.2433936    16.15821 
          country7 |  -6.939815   4.216302    -1.65   0.100    -15.20361    1.323984 
          country8 |   4.186452   2.254847     1.86   0.063    -.2329682    8.605871 
          country9 |   2.738915   2.547031     1.08   0.282    -2.253174    7.731004 
         country10 |   7.997133   4.896472     1.63   0.102    -1.599776    17.59404 
         country11 |   2.734591   2.432635     1.12   0.261    -2.033286    7.502469 
         country12 |  -1.324597   2.138088    -0.62   0.536    -5.515172    2.865978 
         country13 |   5.121403   2.196458     2.33   0.020     .8164238    9.426382 
         country14 |   6.343831   3.880705     1.63   0.102    -1.262211    13.94987 
         country15 |   .3172123   1.421114     0.22   0.823    -2.468119    3.102544 
             _cons |   2.846229   4.977794     0.57   0.567    -6.910068    12.60253 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).lagnpl 
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    L2.cap 
    L2.roa 
    L2.roe 
    L2.cir 
    L2.cr 
    L2.ltd 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 
yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 
country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15  country16 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.lagnpl 
    DL.cap 
    DL.roa 
    DL.roe 
    DL.cir 
    DL.cr 
    DL.ltd 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.10  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.08  Pr > z =  0.280 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(157)  = 535.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(157)  = 147.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.693 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(74)   =  76.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.390 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(83)   =  70.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.827 
  gmm(lagnpl, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(130)  = 128.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.521 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(27)   =  19.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.866 
  gmm(cap, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(135)  = 134.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.489 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  12.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.938 
  gmm(roa, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(134)  = 133.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.504 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  14.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.914 
  gmm(roe, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(134)  = 132.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.516 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  14.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.898 
  gmm(cir, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(134)  = 134.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.464 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  12.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.956 
  gmm(cr, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(134)  = 134.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.472 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  13.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.950 
  gmm(ltd, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(134)  = 129.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.603 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  18.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.730 
  iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(118)  = 122.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(39)   =  25.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.957 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Increasing Lag Limits and Using Collapse Command 
 
 
xtabond2  npl lagnpl  roa roe cr cap ltd cir marketshare foreigndomestic_51  gdp inf unempl debt  excr 
inter southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 
country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 
country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 4)collapse) gmm(cap, laglimits (2 2)) 
gmm(roa,laglimits (2 2)collapse) gmm(roe, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)collapse) gmm(cr, 
laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(ltd, laglimits (2 3)collapse) iv( marketshare gdp inf unempl debt   excr 
foreigndomestic_51  inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 
country1  country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 
country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) robust twostep 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1052 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       226 
Number of instruments = 100                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(46) =   1253.05                                      avg =      4.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |              Corrected 
               npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lagnpl |   .6967034   .1393223     5.00   0.000     .4236367    .9697701 
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               roa |  -1.570817   .7145712    -2.20   0.028    -2.971351   -.1702836 
               roe |  -.0297685   .0464899    -0.64   0.522     -.120887      .06135 
                cr |   .0021366   .0234816     0.09   0.928    -.0438864    .0481596 
               cap |  -.1624541   .0882081    -1.84   0.066    -.3353387    .0104305 
               ltd |  -.0012906   .0174405    -0.07   0.941    -.0354733    .0328921 
               cir |   -.014612   .0383854    -0.38   0.703     -.089846     .060622 
       marketshare |  -.0091847   .0320521    -0.29   0.774    -.0720057    .0536362 
foreigndomestic_51 |   -1.41281   .9083185    -1.56   0.120    -3.193081    .3674618 
               gdp |   .0057717   .1145351     0.05   0.960     -.218713    .2302564 
               inf |   .2694532   .1366056     1.97   0.049     .0017111    .5371952 
            unempl |  -.0268283   .1789099    -0.15   0.881    -.3774854    .3238287 
              debt |   .1950115   .1233148     1.58   0.114    -.0466811    .4367042 
              excr |  -.0006456   .0057175    -0.11   0.910    -.0118517    .0105605 
             inter |  -.0313966   .1338577    -0.23   0.815    -.2937528    .2309597 
          southenl |  -.0220164   1.274688    -0.02   0.986    -2.520358    2.476325 
               cee |   2.027745   1.427821     1.42   0.156    -.7707327    4.826224 
             usach |   2.444645   1.376377     1.78   0.076     -.253004    5.142294 
                ru |   2.290187   3.836959     0.60   0.551    -5.230115    9.810489 
                tr |   3.640284   3.098936     1.17   0.240    -2.433519    9.714088 
               yr2 |  -.9798246   2.395117    -0.41   0.682    -5.674167    3.714518 
               yr3 |  -.6137675   2.234291    -0.27   0.784    -4.992896    3.765361 
               yr4 |   .2117823   2.178823     0.10   0.923    -4.058633    4.482197 
               yr5 |  -.0930976   1.862891    -0.05   0.960    -3.744296    3.558101 
               yr6 |  -.2176011   2.016129    -0.11   0.914     -4.16914    3.733938 
               yr7 |    .354673   2.127125     0.17   0.868    -3.814415    4.523761 
               yr8 |  -.4520186   1.961423    -0.23   0.818    -4.296336    3.392299 
               yr9 |  -.4719914    1.79865    -0.26   0.793    -3.997281    3.053298 
              yr10 |  -.5540227   1.492435    -0.37   0.710    -3.479142    2.371096 
              yr11 |   1.105146   1.592478     0.69   0.488    -2.016055    4.226346 
              yr12 |    1.22428   .8794713     1.39   0.164    -.4994524    2.948012 
          country1 |   1.677564   3.072134     0.55   0.585    -4.343708    7.698837 
          country2 |   .8346636   4.111647     0.20   0.839    -7.224017    8.893344 
          country3 |   4.121776   3.342826     1.23   0.218    -2.430043     10.6736 
          country4 |   .0092614   1.648599     0.01   0.996    -3.221934    3.240456 
          country5 |    .834569   1.436152     0.58   0.561    -1.980238    3.649376 
          country6 |   7.083971   4.439563     1.60   0.111    -1.617414    15.78535 
          country7 |  -6.517531   4.381156    -1.49   0.137    -15.10444    2.069378 
          country8 |   2.532895   2.248906     1.13   0.260     -1.87488    6.940671 
          country9 |   1.442214   2.171248     0.66   0.507    -2.813354    5.697782 
         country10 |   4.985913   5.296931     0.94   0.347    -5.395881    15.36771 
         country11 |   .8918828    3.25681     0.27   0.784    -5.491348    7.275114 
         country12 |  -2.735061   2.450532    -1.12   0.264    -7.538015    2.067893 
         country13 |   3.536119    2.42009     1.46   0.144    -1.207171    8.279409 
         country14 |   1.794404   4.643123     0.39   0.699     -7.30595    10.89476 
         country15 |  -.8673363   1.738105    -0.50   0.618    -4.273959    2.539286 
             _cons |   .9936958   5.006929     0.20   0.843    -8.819704     10.8071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/4).lagnpl collapsed 
    L2.cap 
    L2.roa collapsed 
    L2.roe 
    L2.cir collapsed 
    L(2/4).cr collapsed 
    L(2/3).ltd collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 
yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 
country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.lagnpl collapsed 
    DL.cap 
    DL.roa collapsed 
    DL.roe 
    DL.cir collapsed 
    DL.cr collapsed 
    DL.ltd collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.74  Pr > z =  0.006 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.42  Pr > z =  0.156 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(53)   = 196.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(53)   =  47.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.684 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  23.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.490 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(29)   =  24.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.724 
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  gmm(lagnpl, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(50)   =  41.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.797 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   6.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.109 
  gmm(cap, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  30.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.424 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  16.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.820 
  gmm(roa, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  45.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.691 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.350 
  gmm(roe, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(30)   =  27.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.604 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  20.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.628 
  gmm(cir, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  46.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.648 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.616 
  gmm(cr, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(49)   =  42.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.741 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.253 
  gmm(ltd, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(50)   =  47.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.575 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.989 
  iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  13.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.505 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(39)   =  34.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.683 
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6.2.3 Model 1 
 
xtabond2 npl lagnpl roa roe cr cap ltd cir marketshare foreigndomestic_51  gdp inf unempl debt  excr inter 
southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 
country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 
country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 4)collapse) gmm(cap, laglimits (2 2)collapse) 
gmm(roa,laglimits (2 3)collapse) gmm(roe, laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)collapse) 
gmm(cr, laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(ltd, laglimits (2 4)collapse) iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr 
foreigndomestic_51  inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 
country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 
country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) robust twostep 
 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor space, perm. 
yr1 dropped due to collinearity 
yr13 dropped due to collinearity 
country16 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1052 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       226 
Number of instruments = 64                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(46) =   1001.37                                      avg =      4.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lagnpl |   .7420183    .166945     4.44   0.000     .4148121    1.069224 
         roa |  -2.153347    .853133    -2.52   0.012    -3.825457    -.481237 
         roe |   .0734449   .0721273     1.02   0.309    -.0679221    .2148119 
          cr |   .0026033   .0450587     0.06   0.954    -.0857101    .0909168 
         cap |  -.2715326   .1690864    -1.61   0.108    -.6029358    .0598706 
         ltd |   .0138888   .0118752     1.17   0.242    -.0093862    .0371637 
         cir |  -.0041379   .0380529    -0.11   0.913    -.0787203    .0704445 
 marketshare |  -.0327573   .0386555    -0.85   0.397    -.1085208    .0430061 
foreigndo~51 |  -2.647211   1.118265    -2.37   0.018     -4.83897   -.4554523 
         gdp |  -.0906458   .1282605    -0.71   0.480    -.3420317    .1607402 
         inf |   .2715208   .1478819     1.84   0.066    -.0183224    .5613641 
      unempl |   .0089285   .1912066     0.05   0.963    -.3658295    .3836866 
        debt |   .2773126   .1229324     2.26   0.024     .0363695    .5182557 
        excr |   .0071564     .00813     0.88   0.379    -.0087781    .0230909 
       inter |  -.1419456   .1664192    -0.85   0.394    -.4681212    .1842299 
    southenl |   .2356282   1.278896     0.18   0.854    -2.270961    2.742218 
         cee |   3.045956    1.62763     1.87   0.061    -.1441389    6.236052 
       usach |   2.608004   1.707578     1.53   0.127    -.7387867    5.954795 
          ru |    4.11872   3.559038     1.16   0.247    -2.856865    11.09431 
          tr |   5.497601   5.678104     0.97   0.333    -5.631278    16.62648 
         yr2 |   1.450912   3.649518     0.40   0.691    -5.702012    8.603836 
         yr3 |   .1940254    2.84592     0.07   0.946    -5.383876    5.771927 
         yr4 |   2.243953    2.67966     0.84   0.402    -3.008085     7.49599 
         yr5 |   .7571851   1.992324     0.38   0.704    -3.147699    4.662069 
         yr6 |    .131224   2.388403     0.05   0.956     -4.54996    4.812408 
         yr7 |    1.28686    2.34874     0.55   0.584    -3.316586    5.890306 
         yr8 |   .6436655   2.293291     0.28   0.779    -3.851102    5.138433 
         yr9 |   .5804688   2.487059     0.23   0.815    -4.294078    5.455016 
        yr10 |   .3230341    1.97189     0.16   0.870    -3.541799    4.187867 
        yr11 |   .8393015   1.752171     0.48   0.632     -2.59489    4.273493 
        yr12 |   .7822073    .981414     0.80   0.425    -1.141329    2.705744 
    country1 |  -.1697924   2.823915    -0.06   0.952    -5.704563    5.364978 
    country2 |   4.377469   4.858494     0.90   0.368    -5.145004    13.89994 
    country3 |   4.402888   3.669246     1.20   0.230    -2.788701    11.59448 
    country4 |  -.0126423   1.467358    -0.01   0.993     -2.88861    2.863326 
    country5 |   .9569909   1.379116     0.69   0.488    -1.746027    3.660009 
    country6 |   9.923501   4.670071     2.12   0.034     .7703308    19.07667 
    country7 |  -11.07409   4.146549    -2.67   0.008    -19.20117   -2.947002 
    country8 |   3.570913   2.558039     1.40   0.163    -1.442751    8.584577 
    country9 |   1.699726   2.475789     0.69   0.492    -3.152731    6.552182 
   country10 |   5.355169   5.787814     0.93   0.355    -5.988737    16.69908 
   country11 |   1.454926   3.558698     0.41   0.683    -5.519994    8.429846 
   country12 |  -4.166729   1.980099    -2.10   0.035    -8.047651    -.285807 
   country13 |   4.576759    3.28499     1.39   0.164    -1.861703    11.01522 
   country14 |   3.612455   5.283627     0.68   0.494    -6.743264    13.96817 
   country15 |  -.9243037   1.745685    -0.53   0.596    -4.345783    2.497176 
       _cons |  -2.492458   4.615953    -0.54   0.589    -11.53956    6.554644 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
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    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).ltd collapsed 
    L(2/4).cr collapsed 
    L2.cir collapsed 
    L(2/4).roe collapsed 
    L(2/3).roa collapsed 
    L2.cap collapsed 
    L(1/4).lagnpl collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51  inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 
yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5  country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16_cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.ltd collapsed 
    DL.cr collapsed 
    DL.cir collapsed 
    DL.roe collapsed 
    DL.roa collapsed 
    DL.cap collapsed 
    D.lagnpl collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.62  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.33  Pr > z =  0.184 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  56.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  16.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.499 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   4.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.931 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =  12.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.100 
  gmm(lagnpl, collapse lag(1 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   9.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.658 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
  gmm(cap, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  14.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.480 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.418 
  gmm(roa, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  10.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.730 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.115 
  gmm(roe, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  11.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.282 
  gmm(cir, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(15)   =  13.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.571 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.229 
  gmm(cr, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  14.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.335 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.775 
  gmm(ltd, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  15.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.306 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.854 
 
 
We jointly test period dummies before and after the crisis. However, we do not find that they are jointly 
significant either before or after the crisis. 
 
. test yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 
 
 ( 1)  yr2 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr3 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr4 = 0 
 ( 4)  yr5 = 0 
 ( 5)  yr6 = 0 
 ( 6)  yr7 = 0 
 ( 7)  yr8 = 0 
 ( 8)  yr9 = 0 
 
           chi2(  8) =    5.99 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6480 
 
. test yr10 yr11 yr12 
 
 ( 1)  yr10 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr11 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr12 = 0 
 
           chi2(  3) =    0.75 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8616 
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Long-run coefficients 
 
. nlcom _b[  roa]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ roa]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -8.346897   7.015657    -1.19   0.234    -22.09733    5.403538 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  roe]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ roe]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2846902   .3697251     0.77   0.441    -.4399578    1.009338 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0100912   .1777237     0.06   0.955    -.3382409    .3584233 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cir]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cir]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0160394   .1501684    -0.11   0.915     -.310364    .2782853 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ltd]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ltd]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0538362    .062425     0.86   0.388    -.0685145    .1761869 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cap]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cap]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.052526   1.147166    -0.92   0.359    -3.300931    1.195878 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   marketshare]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ marketshare]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1269754   .1810204    -0.70   0.483    -.4817688    .2278181 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  gdp]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ gdp]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3513651   .5474566    -0.64   0.521     -1.42436    .7216301 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
282 
 
. nlcom _b[  inf]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inf]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.052481    1.05934     0.99   0.320    -1.023787    3.128749 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   excr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ excr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0277398   .0411126     0.67   0.500    -.0528395    .1083191 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[    unempl]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ unempl]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0346091   .7415667     0.05   0.963    -1.418835    1.488053 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[     debt]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ debt]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   1.074931   .7928573     1.36   0.175    -.4790408    2.628903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[      inter]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inter]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.5502159   .6808352    -0.81   0.419    -1.884628    .7841967 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[      foreign]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ foreign]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -10.26124   7.839415    -1.31   0.191    -25.62621    5.103735 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[      cee]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cee]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   11.80687   9.966959     1.18   0.236    -7.728011    31.34175 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Appendix 6.3 Credit Growth Improvement Model- Model 2 
 
xtabond2 npl lagnpl  int2009  roa roe cr cap ltd cir foreigndomestic_51 marketshare  gdp inf unempl debt     
excr inter southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 
country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 
country13 country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 3)collapse) gmm(int2009, laglimits (2 3))  
gmm(cap, laglimits (2 2)collapse) gmm(roa,laglimits (2 3)collapse) gmm(roe, laglimits (2 3)collapse) 
gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)collapse) gmm(cr, laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(ltd, laglimits (2 3)collapse) iv( 
marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr  foreigndomestic_51   inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) robust twostep 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1052 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       226 
Number of instruments = 64                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(47) =   1046.35                                      avg =      4.65 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |              Corrected 
               npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            lagnpl |   .6391256   .1638591     3.90   0.000     .3179677    .9602835 
           int2009 |   .1786396    .097133     1.84   0.066    -.0117375    .3690168 
               roa |  -1.166862   .7838854    -1.49   0.137    -2.703249    .3695247 
               roe |   .0339469    .071882     0.47   0.637    -.1069391     .174833 
                cr |  -.1320586   .0627284    -2.11   0.035     -.255004   -.0091132 
               cap |  -.1219893    .138227    -0.88   0.377    -.3929092    .1489306 
               ltd |   .0076811   .0186196     0.41   0.680    -.0288126    .0441748 
               cir |   .0068972   .0433794     0.16   0.874    -.0781249    .0919192 
foreigndomestic_51 |  -2.166027   1.078901    -2.01   0.045    -4.280634   -.0514209 
       marketshare |  -.0372101   .0484263    -0.77   0.442     -.132124    .0577038 
               gdp |  -.3071665   .1627277    -1.89   0.059    -.6261069    .0117739 
               inf |   .0057176   .1798533     0.03   0.975    -.3467884    .3582237 
            unempl |  -.2717634   .2190158    -1.24   0.215    -.7010266    .1574998 
              debt |   .2364514   .1337966     1.77   0.077    -.0257851    .4986878 
              excr |  -.1130883   .1119624    -1.01   0.312    -.3325305    .1063539 
             inter |  -.0506585   .1564354    -0.32   0.746    -.3572663    .2559492 
          southenl |   1.231525    1.15671     1.06   0.287    -1.035584    3.498635 
               cee |   3.953803   1.782138     2.22   0.027     .4608776    7.446729 
             usach |   .4967958   1.663717     0.30   0.765    -2.764029     3.75762 
                ru |   4.213674    3.03366     1.39   0.165     -1.73219    10.15954 
                tr |  -2.593956   5.272245    -0.49   0.623    -12.92737    7.739454 
               yr2 |   3.557908    3.76828     0.94   0.345    -3.827786     10.9436 
               yr3 |    2.37704   2.909726     0.82   0.414    -3.325919    8.079999 
               yr4 |   4.219914   2.660543     1.59   0.113    -.9946538    9.434483 
               yr5 |   2.373377   2.571703     0.92   0.356    -2.667068    7.413823 
               yr6 |   2.491378   2.607545     0.96   0.339    -2.619317    7.602073 
               yr7 |   3.921344   2.522601     1.55   0.120    -1.022864    8.865552 
               yr8 |   3.439165   2.724887     1.26   0.207    -1.901516    8.779846 
               yr9 |   4.427669   2.971187     1.49   0.136    -1.395751    10.25109 
              yr10 |   1.625505   1.769251     0.92   0.358    -1.842164    5.093174 
              yr11 |  -3.269063   2.464546    -1.33   0.185    -8.099484    1.561358 
              yr12 |   .1798362   1.049286     0.17   0.864    -1.876726    2.236399 
          country1 |   18.08295   13.52926     1.34   0.181    -8.433915    44.59981 
          country2 |   11.77583    6.05011     1.95   0.052    -.0821636    23.63383 
          country3 |   6.667974   3.410938     1.95   0.051     -.017341    13.35329 
          country4 |   .7696811   1.691351     0.46   0.649    -2.545306    4.084668 
          country5 |   3.070029   3.296331     0.93   0.352    -3.390661    9.530718 
          country6 |   10.13425   5.929183     1.71   0.087     -1.48673    21.75524 
          country7 |    22.5951   26.34493     0.86   0.391       -29.04    74.23021 
          country8 |    5.90355   2.962759     1.99   0.046     .0966496    11.71045 
          country9 |   4.311967   3.619534     1.19   0.234     -2.78219    11.40612 
         country10 |   19.34141   11.78519     1.64   0.101    -3.757143    42.43997 
         country11 |    3.33757   4.003617     0.83   0.404    -4.509374    11.18451 
         country12 |  -1.433383   2.301513    -0.62   0.533    -5.944265    3.077499 
         country13 |   7.558803   3.854999     1.96   0.050     .0031445    15.11446 
         country14 |   20.72956   16.42567     1.26   0.207    -11.46415    52.92328 
         country15 |   2.109947   1.962358     1.08   0.282    -1.736203    5.956098 
             _cons |   1.398989    5.70001     0.25   0.806    -9.772825     12.5708 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/3).lagnpl collapsed 
    L(2/3).int2009 
    L2.cap collapsed 
    L(2/3).roa collapsed 
    L(2/3).roe collapsed 
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    L2.cir collapsed 
    L(2/4).cr collapsed 
    L(2/3).ltd collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
 _cons marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.lagnpl collapsed 
    DL.int2009 
    DL.cap collapsed 
    DL.roa collapsed 
    DL.roe collapsed 
    DL.cir collapsed 
    DL.cr collapsed 
    DL.ltd collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.65  Pr > z =  0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.32  Pr > z =  0.751 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  53.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  15.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.495 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   3.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.800 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  11.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.238 
  gmm(lagnpl, collapse lag(1 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  10.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.617 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.214 
  gmm(int2009, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   7.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.795 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.110 
  gmm(cap, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  11.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.662 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.128 
  gmm(roa, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  14.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.357 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.760 
  gmm(roe, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  13.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.379 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.686 
  gmm(cir, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =  14.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.436 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.542 
  gmm(cr, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  12.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.393 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.603 
  gmm(ltd, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  14.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.326 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.873 
 
 
. test yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 
 
 ( 1)  yr2 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr3 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr4 = 0 
 ( 4)  yr5 = 0 
 ( 5)  yr6 = 0 
 ( 6)  yr7 = 0 
 ( 7)  yr8 = 0 
 ( 8)  yr9 = 0 
 
           chi2(  8) =    9.60 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2944 
 
 
 
. test yr10 yr11 yr12 
 
 ( 1)  yr10 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr11 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr12 = 0 
 
           chi2(  3) =    5.12 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1633 
 
 
. 
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Long run coefficients 
 
 
. nlcom _b[  roa]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ roa]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -3.233431   2.469039    -1.31   0.190    -8.072659    1.605797 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  roe]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ roe]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0940686   .2111597     0.45   0.656    -.3197967    .5079339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3659407   .1449717    -2.52   0.012      -.65008   -.0818014 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cap]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cap]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3380381   .4449911    -0.76   0.447    -1.210205    .5341284 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cir]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cir]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0191124   .1223224     0.16   0.876    -.2206352      .25886 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ltd]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ltd]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0212848   .0564728     0.38   0.706    -.0893999    .1319694 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  gdp]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ gdp]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.8511729   .5935864    -1.43   0.152    -2.014581     .312235 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  inf]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inf]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0158439   .5003431     0.03   0.975    -.9648106    .9964983 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   inter]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
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       _nl_1:  _b[ inter]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1403771    .418696    -0.34   0.737    -.9610063     .680252 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[ excr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ excr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3133731   .2750683    -1.14   0.255     -.852497    .2257508 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  unempl]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ unempl]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.7530692   .6236579    -1.21   0.227    -1.975416    .4692779 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[ debt]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ debt]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |    .655218   .3881131     1.69   0.091    -.1054697    1.415906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[ foreign]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ foreign]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -6.002164   4.022193    -1.49   0.136    -13.88552     1.88119 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.4 Model 3 
 
 
xtabond2 npl lagnpl lagroa lagroe lagcap lagcr2 ltd cir  marketshare foreigndomestic_51  gdp inf unempl 
debt excr inter southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 country1 
country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 
country13 country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 5)collapse) gmm(lagcap, laglimits (2 3)) 
gmm(lagroa,laglimits (2 2)) gmm(lagroe, laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)collapse) 
gmm(lagcr2, laglimits (2 3)collapse) gmm(ltd, laglim its (2 2)) iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr  
foreigndomestic_51  inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 
country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 
country12 country13 country14 country15) robust twostep 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1030 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       227 
Number of instruments = 131                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(46) =   1042.48                                      avg =      4.54 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lagnpl |   .5139011   .0910548     5.64   0.000      .335437    .6923653 
      lagroa |   .0040519    .603527     0.01   0.995    -1.178839    1.186943 
      lagroe |  -.2025376   .0729778    -2.78   0.006    -.3455714   -.0595038 
      lagcap |  -.0589826   .0514671    -1.15   0.252    -.1598563     .041891 
      lagcr2 |   .0064747   .0037314     1.74   0.083    -.0008386     .013788 
         ltd |   .0044328   .0050657     0.88   0.382    -.0054958    .0143615 
         cir |  -.0102009   .0178837    -0.57   0.568    -.0452524    .0248506 
 marketshare |   .0171394   .0303379     0.56   0.572    -.0423218    .0766006 
foreigndo~51 |  -2.321537   .8082555    -2.87   0.004    -3.905689   -.7373855 
         gdp |  -.3311122   .1032518    -3.21   0.001    -.5334821   -.1287424 
         inf |   .1196589   .1232073     0.97   0.331    -.1218229    .3611408 
      unempl |  -.1296743    .136307    -0.95   0.341    -.3968311    .1374825 
        debt |    .155284   .0785993     1.98   0.048     .0012322    .3093357 
        excr |  -.0670468   .0712297    -0.94   0.347    -.2066544    .0725609 
       inter |  -.1493813   .1722783    -0.87   0.386    -.4870405     .188278 
    southenl |  -.3697257    1.35023    -0.27   0.784    -3.016128    2.276677 
         cee |   1.712217   1.540046     1.11   0.266    -1.306218    4.730652 
       usach |    2.12182   1.337312     1.59   0.113     -.499264    4.742905 
          ru |   5.069226   3.531898     1.44   0.151    -1.853167    11.99162 
          tr |  -3.970125   2.809284    -1.41   0.158     -9.47622    1.535971 
         yr2 |   .1876495   2.009998     0.09   0.926    -3.751874    4.127173 
         yr3 |   1.425078   2.046219     0.70   0.486    -2.585438    5.435594 
         yr4 |   1.808954   1.674211     1.08   0.280    -1.472438    5.090347 
         yr5 |   -.467754   1.343144    -0.35   0.728    -3.100268     2.16476 
         yr6 |  -.1562949   1.444072    -0.11   0.914    -2.986624    2.674034 
         yr7 |   .1986144   1.257125     0.16   0.874    -2.265306    2.662534 
         yr8 |  -.1118404   1.261775    -0.09   0.929    -2.584875    2.361194 
         yr9 |   .0391942   1.147138     0.03   0.973    -2.209155    2.287543 
        yr10 |   .2154324    1.11376     0.19   0.847    -1.967498    2.398363 
        yr11 |  -1.247713   1.308707    -0.95   0.340    -3.812732    1.317306 
        yr12 |  -.3683845   .7572688    -0.49   0.627    -1.852604    1.115835 
    country1 |   13.34855   9.100832     1.47   0.142    -4.488758    31.18585 
    country2 |   6.497319   4.230829     1.54   0.125    -1.794954    14.78959 
    country3 |   4.378519   2.522963     1.74   0.083    -.5663975    9.323436 
    country4 |   .4294982   1.310145     0.33   0.743    -2.138339    2.997335 
    country5 |   2.286042    2.11625     1.08   0.280    -1.861733    6.433816 
    country6 |   5.965782   2.954779     2.02   0.043     .1745212    11.75704 
    country7 |   13.22686   17.42289     0.76   0.448    -20.92137    47.37509 
    country8 |   2.294979   2.089021     1.10   0.272    -1.799427    6.389386 
    country9 |    .828918   1.783801     0.46   0.642    -2.667267    4.325103 
   country10 |   10.77459    6.77353     1.59   0.112    -2.501288    24.05046 
   country11 |   1.277298   2.725802     0.47   0.639    -4.065176    6.619772 
   country12 |  -.1418011   2.041971    -0.07   0.945    -4.143991    3.860388 
   country13 |   4.602024   2.412728     1.91   0.056    -.1268353    9.330884 
   country14 |   9.022261   7.387484     1.22   0.222    -5.456943    23.50146 
   country15 |   1.463943   1.825303     0.80   0.423    -2.113586    5.041472 
       _cons |   4.320551    3.89234     1.11   0.267    -3.308295     11.9494 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 
yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 
country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.ltd 
    L(2/3).lagcr2 collapsed 
    L2.cir collapsed 
    L(2/4).lagroe collapsed 
    L2.lagroa 
    L(2/3).lagcap 
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    L(1/5).lagnpl collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 
country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.ltd 
    DL.lagcr2 collapsed 
    DL.cir collapsed 
    DL.lagroe collapsed 
    DL.lagroa 
    DL.lagcap 
    D.lagnpl collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.81  Pr > z =  0.005 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.53  Pr > z =  0.599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(84)   = 202.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(84)   =  78.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.647 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  40.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.584 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(41)   =  38.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.598 
  gmm(lagnpl, collapse lag(1 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  75.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.645 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.413 
  gmm(lagcap, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  42.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.787 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(33)   =  35.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.339 
  gmm(lagroa, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(61)   =  57.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.611 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  21.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.565 
  gmm(lagroe, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(80)   =  77.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.560 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.892 
  gmm(cir, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(82)   =  75.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.695 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.169 
  gmm(lagcr2, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  75.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.658 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.350 
  gmm(ltd, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(61)   =  58.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.556 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  19.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.655 
  iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl debt excr foreigndomestic_51 inter southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 
yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 
country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(45)   =  43.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.526 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(39)   =  34.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.659 
 
 
 
We jointly test period dummies before and after the crisis. However, we do not find that they are jointly 
significant either before or after the crisis. 
 
 
test yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 
 
 ( 1)  yr2 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr3 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr4 = 0 
 ( 4)  yr5 = 0 
 ( 5)  yr6 = 0 
 ( 6)  yr7 = 0 
 ( 7)  yr8 = 0 
 ( 8)  yr9 = 0 
 
           chi2(  8) =    5.46 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7079 
 
 
test yr10 yr11 yr12 
 
 ( 1)  yr10 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr11 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr12 = 0 
 
           chi2(  3) =    1.56 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6674 
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Long-run coefficients 
 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagroa]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagroa]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2908905   1.213721     0.24   0.811    -2.087958    2.669739 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagroe]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagroe]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4387108   .1305277    -3.36   0.001    -.6945404   -.1828813 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagcr2]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagcr2]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0143761   .0066855     2.15   0.032     .0012728    .0274794 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagcap]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagcap]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0589665    .112517    -0.52   0.600    -.2794958    .1615628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
nlcom _b[  cir]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cir]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0194684   .0327892    -0.59   0.553     -.083734    .0447971 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ltd]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ltd]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0206169   .0175664     1.17   0.241    -.0138127    .0550465 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  gdp]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ gdp]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -.544972   .1532985    -3.55   0.000    -.8454316   -.2445125 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  inf]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inf]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2461617    .262379     0.94   0.348    -.2680916    .7604151 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. nlcom _b[  unempl]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
290 
 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ unempl]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |     .19656   .1777193     1.11   0.269    -.1517635    .5448834 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[   debt]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ debt]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1738872   .1133789     1.53   0.125    -.0483314    .3961058 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[    excr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ excr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0285726   .0386991     0.74   0.460    -.0472761    .1044214 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[     inter]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inter]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.3872516   .2760308    -1.40   0.161    -.9282621    .1537589 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[     foreign]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ foreign]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -4.182178   1.597287    -2.62   0.009    -7.312804   -1.051553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.5 Model 4 
 
xtabond2 npl lagnpl lagroa lagroe lagcap lagcr2 ltd cir  marketshare foreigndomestic_51  gdp inf unempl 
excr  southenl cee usach ru tr  yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 
country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 
country14 country15 country16, gmm(lagnpl, laglimits (1 5)collapse) gmm(lagcap, laglimits (2 3)) 
gmm(lagroa,laglimits (2 2)) gmm(lagroe, laglimits (2 4)collapse) gmm(cir, laglimits (2 2)collapse) 
gmm(lagcr2, laglimits (2 3)collapse) gmm(ltd, laglimits (2 2)) iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl excr  
foreigndomestic_51   southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 
country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 country10 country11 
country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) robust twostep 
 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1039 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       228 
Number of instruments = 129                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(44) =   1009.61                                      avg =      4.56 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lagnpl |    .515331   .0971744     5.30   0.000     .3248727    .7057893 
      lagroa |   .2378613   .6355581     0.37   0.708     -1.00781    1.483532 
      lagroe |  -.2409742   .0839192    -2.87   0.004    -.4054529   -.0764955 
      lagcap |  -.0624999   .0531303    -1.18   0.239    -.1666333    .0416335 
      lagcr2 |   .0072397   .0043991     1.65   0.100    -.0013824    .0158618 
         ltd |   .0058757   .0060606     0.97   0.332    -.0060028    .0177542 
         cir |  -.0057668   .0166883    -0.35   0.730    -.0384752    .0269416 
 marketshare |   .0309742   .0327781     0.94   0.345    -.0332696     .095218 
foreigndo~51 |  -2.491272   .8423261    -2.96   0.003    -4.142201    -.840343 
         gdp |  -.3324357   .1018636    -3.26   0.001    -.5320847   -.1327868 
         inf |   .1232216   .1924155     0.64   0.522    -.2539058     .500349 
      unempl |  -.0486939   .1415709    -0.34   0.731    -.3261678      .22878 
        excr |  -.0027612   .0045978    -0.60   0.548    -.0117728    .0062503 
    southenl |    .185354   1.315553     0.14   0.888    -2.393082     2.76379 
         cee |   1.769984   1.608432     1.10   0.271    -1.382485    4.922452 
       usach |   1.815761   1.371379     1.32   0.185    -.8720924    4.503615 
          ru |   4.636306   4.769615     0.97   0.331    -4.711969    13.98458 
          tr |  -3.105521   2.807621    -1.11   0.269    -8.608358    2.397315 
         yr2 |  -2.519873    1.64184    -1.53   0.125    -5.737819    .6980738 
         yr3 |  -1.504794   1.625482    -0.93   0.355    -4.690679    1.681092 
         yr4 |   .0251359   1.296283     0.02   0.985    -2.515533    2.565805 
         yr5 |   -1.57423   1.193397    -1.32   0.187    -3.913244    .7647849 
         yr6 |  -1.449028   1.261888    -1.15   0.251    -3.922284    1.024228 
         yr7 |  -1.164914   1.074649    -1.08   0.278    -3.271187    .9413584 
         yr8 |  -1.570335   1.123917    -1.40   0.162    -3.773172    .6325032 
         yr9 |  -1.645792   .9658671    -1.70   0.088    -3.538857    .2472723 
        yr10 |  -1.810459    1.10864    -1.63   0.102    -3.983352    .3624348 
        yr11 |  -2.344152   1.234915    -1.90   0.058    -4.764541    .0762377 
        yr12 |  -.7828788   .7904962    -0.99   0.322    -2.332223    .7664652 
    country1 |   7.775814   2.215828     3.51   0.000      3.43287    12.11876 
    country2 |   3.624138   3.584194     1.01   0.312    -3.400753    10.64903 
    country3 |   2.317437   2.208861     1.05   0.294    -2.011851    6.646725 
    country4 |   .4382427   1.256423     0.35   0.727    -2.024301    2.900787 
    country5 |   1.013155   1.140667     0.89   0.374    -1.222512    3.248822 
    country6 |   1.205839    2.24708     0.54   0.592    -3.198356    5.610034 
    country7 |   1.721533   1.608122     1.07   0.284    -1.430328    4.873395 
    country8 |  -.3175092   1.784688    -0.18   0.859    -3.815434    3.180416 
    country9 |  -1.212134   1.747712    -0.69   0.488    -4.637586    2.213318 
   country10 |   3.745563     4.4206     0.85   0.397    -4.918654    12.40978 
   country11 |   .5643212   2.891011     0.20   0.845    -5.101956    6.230598 
   country12 |   2.116313   1.595355     1.33   0.185    -1.010525    5.243151 
   country13 |   1.192071   2.419451     0.49   0.622    -3.549966    5.934109 
   country14 |   4.376857   3.620291     1.21   0.227    -2.718784     11.4725 
   country15 |   2.107155    2.09937     1.00   0.316    -2.007535    6.221845 
       _cons |   8.913159   2.882586     3.09   0.002     3.263395    14.56292 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(marketshare gdp inf unempl excr foreigndomestic_51 southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 
yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 
country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.ltd 
    L(2/3).lagcr2 collapsed 
    L2.cir collapsed 
    L(2/4).lagroe collapsed 
    L2.lagroa 
    L(2/3).lagcap 
    L(1/5).lagnpl collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
marketshare gdp inf unempl excr foreigndomestic_51 southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 
yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 country9 
country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16 _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.ltd 
    DL.lagcr2 collapsed 
    DL.cir collapsed 
    DL.lagroe collapsed 
    DL.lagroa 
    DL.lagcap 
    D.lagnpl collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.85  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.62  Pr > z =  0.534 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(84)   = 204.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(84)   =  81.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.564 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  38.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.656 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(41)   =  42.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.405 
  gmm(lagnpl, collapse lag(1 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  76.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.614 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.207 
  gmm(lagcap, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  43.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.750 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(33)   =  37.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.274 
  gmm(lagroa, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(61)   =  55.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.671 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  25.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.317 
  gmm(lagroe, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(80)   =  79.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.511 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.686 
  gmm(cir, collapse lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(82)   =  77.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.635 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   4.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.119 
  gmm(lagcr2, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  77.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.593 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.276 
  gmm(ltd, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(61)   =  57.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.588 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  23.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.441 
  iv(marketshare gdp inf unempl excr foreigndomestic_51 southenl cee usach ru tr yr1 yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 
yr7 yr8 yr9 yr10 yr11 yr12 yr13 country1 country2 country3 country4 country5 country6 country7 country8 
country9 country10 country11 country12 country13 country14 country15 country16) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =  45.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.522 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  35.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.541 
 
 
 
. test yr2 yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9 
 
 ( 1)  yr2 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr3 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr4 = 0 
 ( 4)  yr5 = 0 
 ( 5)  yr6 = 0 
 ( 6)  yr7 = 0 
 ( 7)  yr8 = 0 
 ( 8)  yr9 = 0 
 
           chi2(  8) =    8.22 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4121 
 
. test yr10 yr11 yr12 
 
 ( 1)  yr10 = 0 
 ( 2)  yr11 = 0 
 ( 3)  yr12 = 0 
 
           chi2(  3) =    5.61 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1321 
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Long-run coefficients 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagroa]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagroa]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .4907707   1.319255     0.37   0.710    -2.094922    3.076463 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagroe]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagroe]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4971934   .1611041    -3.09   0.002    -.8129516   -.1814352 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagcr2]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagcr2]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0149375   .0086976     1.72   0.086    -.0021095    .0319844 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  lagcap]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ lagcap]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1289538   .1087197    -1.19   0.236    -.3420404    .0841329 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  ltd]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ ltd]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0121231   .0127913     0.95   0.343    -.0129474    .0371936 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  cir]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ cir]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0118985   .0339835    -0.35   0.726    -.0785049    .0547079 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  gdp]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ gdp]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.6859026   .2549174    -2.69   0.007    -1.185532   -.1862736 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  inf]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ inf]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .2542387   .4094082     0.62   0.535    -.5481867    1.056664 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[  unempl]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
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       _nl_1:  _b[ unempl]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1004684   .2896073    -0.35   0.729    -.6680883    .4671515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[    excr]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ excr]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0056971   .0095119    -0.60   0.549    -.0243401    .0129458 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. nlcom _b[  unempl]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ unempl]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.1004684   .2896073    -0.35   0.729    -.6680883    .4671515 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[     foreign]/[1- _b[  lagnpl]] 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ foreign]/[1- _b[ lagnpl]] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         npl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -5.140151   1.816915    -2.83   0.005    -8.701239   -1.579063 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
